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PREFACE

The subject of this dissertation is the development of the
Continental Army's organizational forms and the evolution of its
doctrine on the employment of military force.

As such it combines

institutional and Intellectual history, rather than using the tra
ditional orientation of military history toward battles.

I believe

that understanding of the nature of opposing forces and their innate
capabilities is a requirement for assessing generalship and campaigns.
Military organization takes place on two levels.

A superior

command structure includes a specialized staff and subordinate
groupings of units.

The staff functions as a collection of technical

advisors to the army's leader and relieves him of much of the burden
of detailed planning.

The lower echelons of organization permit

independent actions by field armies and a responsive internal arrange
ment of a large force on the battlefield.

On a unit level, organization

means the formulation of a "flexible organization, permitting full
application of the principle of economy of force," reduction of
"headquarters and other overhead to speed up command," and devotion
of "strength as fully as possible to elements which can be made
effective offensively against the enemy."1

1. Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair's Army Ground Forces Letter,
subject: Orientation with Reference to Revised Organization, 21 Jul
1943, quoted in Kent Roberts Greenfield, _et a l .. The Organization of
Ground Combat Troops (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947),
pp. 374-5.
iv

This dissertation concentrates only on the Continental Army, the
forerunner of today's Regular Army.

Two other military forces existed

during the War of American Independence:
militia.

regular state troops and the

The former were directly under the control of their

respective state governments and tended to perform garrison duties at
important ports or local fortifications, although at times they
cooperated with the Continentals for extended periods.
were quintessentially local forces.

The latter

John Shy and a host of other

historians have recently paid close attention to the militia, high
lighting its local defense mission and the institution's political
implications.

I hope that my work will complement theirs by explaining

the nature of the other major component serving in the Revolution.
The War of American Independence was not a war of national liber
ation in the Maoist sense.

It did involve a struggle for popular

support in which the militia played a critical role, but it also in
cluded a very conventional eighteenth century military conflict.

That

contest between a regular British army with assistance from German
auxiliaries and a regular American force with French aid relates
directly to this dissertation.

I have examined the creation of that

American force and its evolution into a professional fighting machine
which was among the most modern of the era.

Many compromises had to be

made during this process as a result of various financial, logistical,
and manpower crises.

Although the army in the field seldom matched

the plans made for it, the very existence of that planning reveals a
great deal about the nature of the war.

Unfortunately, the transfor

mation in 1778 of a local war into a global conflict obscured some of

v

the changes.

British commanders, now concerned with France's actions,

could no longer offer battle in the same way that they had in 1776
and 1777.
No military institution exists in a vacuum.

Organizations are

designed within a context of doctrinal assumptions on the nature of
military force and its most effective means of expression.

The types

of weapons and equipment available, conditions of terrain in which the
fighting will take place, and the opponent to be faced are all factors
weighing heavily on planners.

Less obvious but equally important are

political and ideological conditions.

Extensive research over the

last two decades into the ideological nature of the American Revolution
and the development of American political institutions now makes it
possible to place the Continental Army in perspective.

Militants in

the political opposition to Great Britain carried certain fundamental
assumptions about military force in their ideological baggage which
influenced the organization of the Continentals during the early years
of the war.

As the conflict went on a more cautious political element,

allied with army leaders, altered the nature of the army.
This dissertation traces the emergence of a new American military
institution from a combination of European roots and New World
influences.

It traces the transformation of an extemporized force

into a national army.

I tell the story from the perspective of George

Washington and the Continental Congress because planning took place on
that level.

As I worked on the subject I became convinced that

Washington's role was paramount.

He set the tone of the army, guided

its development, and coordinated the contributions of many subordinates.
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I can only conclude that he deserves credit as the father of the
Continental Army.
Too many Individuals assisted me during the research and writing
of this dissertation to thank individually.

I would be remiss if 1

did not particularly commend the archivists at the New-York Historical
Society, the National Archives, and the Library of Congress; Mrs.
Penny Crumpler of the U.S. Army Engineer Library; Mr. John Slonaker
and Ms. Phyllys Cassler of the U.S. Army Military History Institute;
Dr. Robert Coakley and Ms. Janice McKenney of the U.S. Army Center
of Military History; and Dr. Russell Weigley of Temple University.
Each in his own way made valuable suggestions or eased research
problems immeasurably.

Very special thanks go to Dr. John E. Selby

and the other members of my dissertation committee for their patience
and willingness to correspond frequently with me.
aid I received, however, came from my family:
and children.

The most invaluable

parents, brother, wife,

Without their support and sacrifices I would have

abandoned this project many times over.

In spite of all the individuals

who helped in the completion of this task, the sole responsibility for
errors of omission or commission rests with the author.

vii

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

’.

Infantry Regiments of 1775 ................................

25

2.

Initial Recruitment of Officers for 1776 ..................

88

3.

Regiments of 1776

117

A.

Distribution of Regiments for 1777 ........................

153

5.

1781 Q u o t a s ................................................. 256

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Page
Massachusetts Artillery Regiment of 1775 ...............

. 26

Continental Infantry Regiment of 1776

. 83

.................

British Infantry Regiment of 25 August 1775

...........

. 84

Continental Artillery Regiment of 1776 .................

. 91

South Carolina Artillery Regiment of 12 November 1775

.

123

Hesse-Cassel Infantry Regiment of 1776 .................

156

Continental Light Dragoon Regiment of 1777 .............

172

Continental Infantry Regiment of 27 May 1778 ...........

200

Continental Light Dragoon Regiment of 27 May 1778

202

. . .

Schematic Diagram of an Infantry Regiment
Deployed in Two Battalions 1779 .................

232

Continental Infantry Regiment of 1781

...........

257

Continental Artillery Regiment of 1781 .................

258

Continental Legionary Corps of 1 7 8 1 ..........

259

...

. . . .

Continental Partisan Corps of 1781 ......... ...........

ix

260

ABSTRACT

This dissertation traces the development o£ organizational forns
and tactic \1 doctrine in the Continental Army, the regular United States
armed force in the War of American Independence. It investigates poli
tical, ideological, technological, economic, and strategic influences
on the decisions made by the Continental Congress, George Washington,
and other Army leaders. In the process it places the Continentals in a
context of eighteenth century military science.
Individual colonies raised the first troops by drawing on their
experiences in earlier wars, especially on the example of short-term
Provincials supplementing the militia.
Congress assumed national re
sponsibility for the war on 14 June 1775 by establishing the Continental
Army. During the next year the Army expanded to include units from every
state (plus Canada), controlled by a network of territorial departments
and subordinate commands. Administrative, logistical, and disciplinary
systems and a staff were adapted from British Army usages.
Combat performance in 1776 convinced a majority in Congress that
victory required a basic change of philosophy. It created a large army
of infantry, artillery, and cavalry regiments raised for the duration
of the war. The infantry regimental organization, first used in 1776,
was a native development tailored to American conditions. In conjunc
tion with the 1777 adoption of the excellent French military musket it
emphasized the American advantage in Individual marksmanship and was
superior to British and German regiments in strength, efficiency, and
flexibility. As a result of the Trenton campaign Washington introduced
permanent tactical brigades capable of limited independent action.
The only significant argument over military policy occurred during
the winter of 1777-1778. One element, more militant in its ideology,
wished to revert to the ideal of a small regular force backed by the
militia. Most Army leaders, including an influential contingent of
foreign volunteers, proposed to retain the large army and make it more
professional and sophisticated.
Congress actually followed a course
which came closer to Washington's views. New staff officers and special
ists, particularly the Inspector General, and the adoption of a uniform
drill dramatically improved the Army's fighting ability. In 1781 the
Continentals, with important French aid, won a decisive victory at Yorktown. Washington sustained a high level of training to the end of the
war and then disbanded the Army without undermining the political ideals
of the Revolution.
The Continental Army triumphed in the War of American Independence
because it judiciously blended American experience and new military con
cepts from Europe, particularly those advanced by French theorists, to
create a sophisticated military machine tailored for combat in North
America.
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doctrine
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THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, 1774 TO 1784

CHAPTER I
THE ARMY OF OBSERVATION:
NEW ENGLAND IN ARMS

On 19 April 1775 local militiamen and regular British troops began
the War of American Independence at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts.
The four New England colonies reacted by raising their own individual
armies.

Each jurisdiction formed its force according to its particular

experience in earlier wars and its individual interpretation of
European military developments of the previous century.

Their speedy

actions resulted from a decade of tensions within the British Empire
and tentative preparations for possible armed conflict begun some months
earlier.

The four forces concentrated at Boston under the loose

hegemony of Massachusetts as a cle facto regional army, paving the way
for the establishment of a national Continental Army.

Warfare in the Eighteenth Century.

The Continental Army which fought in the War of American Indepen
dence was the product of European military science.

Like all institu

tions developed by the American colonists, it drew from European
roots and was modified by the particular conditions of American exper
ience.

Therefore, a proper appreciation of the place of that army in

the context of its own times requires an understanding of both the
general developments in the military art of western civilization during
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the particular martial
traditions and experiences of the English colonists in North America.
In the seventeenth century Europeans developed a new range of
weapons and gradually introduced them into their armies.

At the same

time a wave of dynastic wars began in western Europe which led to the
creation of increasingly larger forces.

Commanders and the leading

military theoreticians spent the majority of the eighteenth century
attempting to develop organizational structures and tactical doctrines
which would exploit the potential of the new weapons and armies.

These

developments culminated in the series of conflicts known collectively
as the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815).1
During the seventeenth century armies turned from pole arms,
primarily the pike, to a reliance on firearms as the basic infantry
weapon.

The first firearm was a heavy matchlock musket which used a

burning match to ignite the gunpowder charge that propelled a lead ball.
The matchlock suffered from several serious defects as a military
weapon:

it was cumbersome; reloading was a long and complicated process;

the chance of misfire was extremely high, particularly in damp weather;
and the lit match betrayed positions in the dark.

Its defensive

defects, particularly at close quarters, required a proportion of each
unit to carry pikes to protect itself from cavalry attack or enemy pikes.

1. The basic sources for this section are: David Chandler, The Art of
Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1976);
Christopher Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great (New York:
Hippo
crene Books, 1974); Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic
Warfare: The Theory of Military Tacticn in Eighteenth Century France
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957); and Richard Glover,
Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).

A technological breakthrough occurred in the second hal£ of the
century vith the introduction of a new firing mechanism.

It relied on

the spark produced by a piece of flint striking a steel plate to touch
off the propellant.

The flintlock musket was lighter and handier than

its predecessor (although still susceptible to moisture), had a more
rapid rate of fire, and was easier to maintain.

Late in the century it

was complemented by the development of the socket bayonet.

The bayonet,

a foot-long triangular blade which slipped around the muzzle of the
musket without blocking it, transformed the firearm into a pole weapon.
The transition to the musket-and-bayonet combination gradually elimina
ted the need for defensive pikemen, who disappeared from most western
European armies by the end of the first decade of the eighteenth
century.
Standardized flintlocks appeared shortly thereafter.

Whether they

were produced at government arsenals or by private contractors, the
eighteenth century muskets of every country were inaccurate, lacking
even a rear sight.

Each weighed over ten pounds and had a barrel over

a yard long, making it difficult to aim.

Flints tended to wear out

after only twenty rounds, and even under ideal conditions the effective
range for the one-ounce balls (between two-thirds and three-quarters of
an inch in diameter) fired by these smooth-bore weapons was about one
hundred yards.

An average soldier under the stress of combat was

capable of firing three rounds a minute for short periods, but required
considerable training to accomplish this feat.

Since care in reloading

was a major factor influencing accuracy, only the first round loaded
before combat was fully reliable.
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Tactical formations and doctrine were evolved during the period
between 1688 and 1745 to take advantage of these new weapons.

Infantry

gradually became the most important combat arm as firepower came to
dominate the battlefield.

Beginning with the War of the Spanish

Succession (1702-14), generals sought literally to blast the enemy off
the field with concentrated close-range fire.

To this end they moved

away from the massed formations characteristic of the era of the pike
and adopted what is known technically as linear tactics or deployment
in long lines.

By mid-century in nearly every army infantrymen stood

in three-deep lines to bring a maximum number of muskets into play.
The critical firefight took place at ranges of between fifty and one
hundred yards.
These weapons and tactics required an adjustment in the organization
of an army.

Since the sixteenth century the regiment had formed the

basic component of an army, providing administrative and tactical control
over a group of companies.

The need for better fire control in battle

led to many complicated experiments.

Ultimately, every army turned to

a more manageable sub-element, the platoon, the smallest force whose
fire could be controlled by a handful of officers and noncommissioned
officers.

A simple technique of coordinating the actions of a number

of these basic elements of fire (normally eight) produced the battalion,
the fundamental element of maneuver.

Most regiments contained two or

more battalions except the British Army's.

Great Britain opted to form

only eight platoons in a regiment, making their regiment and battalion
normally synonymous.

The relationship between the company (an adminis

trative entity) and the platoon varied, although by the end of the
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century most armies moved to make them interchangeable.

The battalions

and platoons, filled with rank and file trained like robots to fire in
unison at areas rather than individual targets, formed the heart of the
typical European army in the Seven Years' War (1756-63).
A second area of development during the century involved improved
handling of armies on the battlefield.

At the beginning of the century

armies marched overland in massed formations and took hours to deploy
into line of battle.

This lengthy process often allowed commanders who

felt that they were at a disadvantage to march away and decline combat.
Several reforms were introduced to overcome this obstacle.

The cadenced

march step and standardized drill maneuvers were developed to reduce
the length of time needed to deploy and minimize the confusion in
forming a line of battle.

They also allowed a general to adjust his

formations to the changing flow of a battle without risking total
disruption of his ranks.

Successful use of brigades and divisions to

control the movements of groups of battalions produced a tendency to
make those higher echelons permanent.
Mobile field artillery was also a development of the eighteenth
century.

While heavy cannon continued to be important in fortresses and

sieges, lighter guns were introduced to give direct support to the in
fantry.

As a first step, standardized calibers simplified administra

tive and logistical problems.

Ballistics experts and metallurgists

reduced the weight of the tubes, while others improved carriages.

The

French emerged with the best of the new artillery in the aftermath of
the 1764 reforms of General Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval, an experienced
combat officer and able theoretician.

Greater mobility enabled tac

ticians to consider artillery as a supporting arm whose function was

to fire at enemy personnel instead of opposing artillery.

In nearly

every European army, however, the artillery was a separate armed ser
vice distinct from the infantry and cavalry.

This situation complicated

battlefield deployment to a certain extent, and more importantly retarded
the development of effective combined arms operations.
The array which naturally exercised the greatest influence on the
American colonies was the British.

Great Britain enjoyed a unique status

among the powers during this period because its strong navy protected it
from hostile neighbors.

With less threat of attack the British lagged

behind the rest of Europe in adopting the reforms of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.

Nonetheless, it had adopted the major ones by the

time of the Seven Years' War and, in fact, had led in the introduction
of many techniques of infantry fire control.
The lag, however, created an incredibly inefficient and complex
administrative and logistical superstructure.

Authority and responsi

bility were divided between two major army commands (the British and
Irish Establishments), between the army proper and the Ordnance Depart
ment (controlling artillery, engineers, and munitions), and between the
civilian Secretary at War and the military Commander-in-Chief (when that
office was filled).
retaries of State.

Strategic direction was shared by two or three Sec
At times the various individuals responsible for the

different chains of command cooperated and the system functioned accep
tably.

Breakdowns made the British Army appear to be leaderless and

inept.2

2.

Glover, Peninsular Preparation, pp. 2, 12.

England's less sophisticated military system caused It to lag
behind other European powers particularly in the area of military
theory.
century.

The art of war changed dramatically during the eighteenth
By 1800 Napoleon's armies maneuvered in ways that exceeded

even the Prussian army of Frederick the Great, the preeminent force of
the Seven Years' War.

Poor performance in the wars of the mid-century

forced the French to seek better ways to handle armies in the field.
The British officers, however, learned only through trial and error,
contributing little original thought, and by and large did not read the
military texts written by Frenchmen and other Europeans.^
British works prior to the Revolution consisted for the most part
of drill manuals rather than profound theoretical volumes.

The first

important manuals depicted the best practices of Marlborough's army:
Humphrey Bland's 1727 A Treatise of Military Discipline and Richard
Kane's Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne which appeared in 1745.
Under the influence of the Duke of Cumberland and Field Marshal l.igonier
the British began moving towards a drill patterned after the Prussians
in the late 1750's.

This trend began with a series of translations of

Prussian regulations by William Fawcett in 1754 and 1757, and in the
latter year of Malosti de Martemont's The Spirit of the Modern System
of War, by a Prussian General Officer.

An official drill regulation

3. In addition to Quimby, Background of Napoleonic Warfare, and Glover,
Peninsular Preparation, the best sources on military theory after the
1750's are J. F. C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth
Century (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925) and Ira D. Gruber, "British
Strategy: The Theory and Practice of Eighteenth-Century Warfare" in
Don Higginbotham, ed., Considerations on the Revolutionary War: Selec
ted Essays (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 14-31.
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issued in 1757 followed a line of Prussian influence which was main
tained in amendments in 1759 and which culminated with the publication
of Adjutant General Edward Harvey's drill book in 1764.

"The '64"

remained the official drill until 1795, although lax enforcement gave
no assurances that all regiments followed it.

Two other unofficial

manuals offered alternative drills which appealed to some officers:
Campbell Dalrymple's A Military Essay (1761) and William Windham's and
George Townshend's Norfolk Discipline (1759), a simplified volume
designed for militia use.^
Three other British authors produced works which had a reasonably
wide readership after the Seven Years' War.

Major General James Wolfe

became a popular hero for capturing Quebec.

In 1768 a collection of

miscellaneous orders and notes that he prepared, mostly while a regi
mental commander prior to the French and Indian War, appeared under the
title Instructions to Young Officers.

It contained no systematic theory.

William Young became a prolific author of volumes dealing with drill,
fortifications, and outpost duty.

In 1771 his collected works along with

Wolfe's appeared under the title Manoeuvres, or practical observations
on the art of war.

A similar two-volume compendium by Thomas Simes,

The Military guide for young officers, came out the next year.

These

pedestrian works represented an effort to furnish junior officers with
reading material on routine military life from a regimental perspective.

4. Rex Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: A Story of the British
Army 1702-1770 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 32n, 34,
57n, 218. Fuller, British Light Infantry, pp. 79-86. David Chandler,
The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: Hippocrene
Books, 1976), pp. 106-7, 117.
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The leading European theorists sought to establish a system of
warfare which extracted the maximum worth from the weapons and soldiers
available to the standing armies of the century.

Exponents of linear

warfare (1'ordre mince) tended to stress the firepower of infantry
vollies.

They also admired Frederick the Great and avidly read his

Instructions for his Generals after a copy of that secret work fell
into Austrian hands in 1760 and was published in various languages.
Most imitators of Frederick failed to realize that he achieved results
through his personal genius and a capacity for hard work, not because
he had developed a well-rounded theory of war.-*
A series of French authors began to propose a different system in
the late 1720's, l'ordre profond.

They suggested that infantry formed

in dense columns could successfully attack lines of infantry by relying
on shock effect and the bayonet.

The major authors of this school were

Chevalier Jean-Charles de Folard (1669-1752), Joly de Maizeroy (1719-80),
and Frangois-Jean de Graindorge d'Orgeville de Mesnil-Durand (1729-99).
Their theories remained largely paper exercises because they did not
fit the realities of contemporary battlefields.

In time a practical

compromise emerged in 1 'ordre mixte, a flexible combination of line and
column according to the tactical needs of a particular situation.

It

also stressed training of men to perform both light and line infantry
missions.

Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert (1743-90) was the

5. Peter Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807-1815 (Prince
ton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 13-15. Thomas R. Phillips,
trans., Frederick the Great:
Instructions for his Generals (Harrisburg:
Stackpole Co., 1944), pp. 9-10.
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major spokesman for this school.
became the seminal text.

His 1772 Essai general de tactique

Although the French Army did not formally

adopt Guibert's ideas until 1791, a series of war games in 1778 at
Vassieux, Normandy, converted most French officers to the mixed order.

Colonial Military Experience.

English military institutions formed part of the cultural inheri
tance brought to America by the first colonists.

Immigrants and occa

sional contact with the British Army kept the colonists informed about
newer developments.

The most important of these inherited military

institutions was the militia, which dated back to Anglo-Saxon times,
but the specific conditions of colonial settlement produced important
modifications in it.

Other variations crept in as the needs of effec

tive defense began to outstrip the capabilities of the militia.
The Tudors had revived the English militia in the sixteenth cen
tury as an inexpensive alternative to a large permanent army.

They used

the traditional universal obligation to serve in the defense of the
realm as a basis for sustaining a more manageable body of voluntary
"trained bands."

Thus the general population acted as a reserve force

through the requirement to possess arms, but became primarily a source

6. See especially Quiraby, Background of Napoleonic Warfare, pp. 233-48,
304-20; John Albert Lynn, "The Revolution on the Battlefield: Training
and Tactics of the Armle du Nord" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
California at Los Angeles, 1974) ; and Samuel Anderson Covington, "The
Comite Militalre and the Legislative Reform of the French Army, 17891791" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Arkansas, 1976).
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of financial support through fines in lieu of active duty for the
trained bands.

Geographical organization and central direction came

through county lords lieutenant.?
The first settlements in Virginia, Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay,
and Connecticut all explicitly recruited one or more professional sol
diers to act as military advisors.

The colonists recognized from the

beginning that threats to their security could come from either hostile
natives or rival European powers.

The Jamestown trading post reacted

to danger by organizing itself into a regimental garrison, complete with
companies and squads.

Plymouth, on the advice of Miles Standish, organ

ized four companies of militia within two years of its founding.

The

Massachusetts Bay Colony profited from the experiences of the earlier
settlements.

In 1629 its first expedition, which founded Salem, left

England with a militia company already organized and equipped with the
latest weapons.
During the course of the seventeenth century the colonists adapted
the English militia system to meet their own needs.

Because conditions

7. In addition to the studies of individual militias listed in the
bibliography, the following sources were used in preparing this section:
Darrett B. Rutman, "A Militant New World, 1607-1640: America's First
Generation, Its Martial Spirit, Its Tradition of Arms, Its Militia
Organization, Its Wars" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia,
1959); Patrick Mitchell Malone, "Indian and English Military Systems
in New England in the Seventeenth Century" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Brown
University, 1 9 7 D ; John W. Shy, "A New Look at Colonial Militia,"
William and Mary Quarterly. 3d Ser., 20 (1963), pp. 175-85; Timothy
Breen, "English Origins and New World Development: The Case of the
Covenanted Militia in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts," Past and
Present, 57 (1972), pp. 74-96; and Douglas Edward Leach, Arms for
Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America,
1607-1763 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973).

varied, several regional patterns emerged.

In the Chesapeake Bay area

a plantation economy took root, leading to a dispersed type of settle
ment.

Virginia and Maryland formed their militia companies from all

the residents of a county or other relatively large area.

In New Eng

land a different economy led to the use of towns as the basic residen
tial system.

Each town formed one or more militia companies, according

to its size, as soon as possible after establishing its local govern
ment.

South Carolina's plantation economy was slightly different and

prior experience in Barbados by many of its settlers gave the South
Carolina militia a unique cast.

Following the Barbadian example, it

oriented the institution particularly towards the control of the large
slave population.

Pennsylvania, initially dominated by Quakers, did

not pass a mandatory militia law until 1777.

Differences in the

individual militia systems in part explain the variety of approaches
taken by the colonies when they organized units for the Continental
Army in 1775 and 1776.
Growth introduced problems of control in each colony.
setts, by virtue of its size, solved them first.

Massachu

An increase in the

proportion of noncommissioned officers over European norms allowed for
the formation of subordinate elements, "demi-companies", increasing
tactical flexibility and control.

In December 1636 the Bay Colony

grouped the fifteen existing companies into three regional regiments.
That made Massachusetts the first English-speaking government to adopt
permanent regiments.

Other colonies followed suit:

Maryland and

Plymouth in 1658; Virginia in 1666; and Connecticut in 1672.

In contrast,

standing regiments appeared in the English Army only in the 1640's.

14
American preferences for weapons also reflected modification of
the European heritage.
of the flintlock musket.

Wilderness conditions accentuated the advantages
By 1675 nearly every colony required its

militiamen to own flintlocks rather than matchlocks, completing this
transition a quarter of a century ahead of European armies.

Many of the

colonists hunted, but few ever fought in a formal line of battle.

Their

vollies stressed individual marksmanship rather than the concept of
firing at an area employed in Europe.

A specific byproduct of this

attitude led to the refinement of the rifle by Pennsylvania gunsmiths.
A hunting weapon with German roots, the Pennsylvania rifle was longer
than the standard musket but had a smaller bore (usually .45-caliber).
Grooves in the barrel imparted spin to the ball and allowed a trained
marksman to hit targets up to 400 yards away.

Small units of specialists

called jaegers (hunters) in some German armies employed a shorter,
heavier rifle.

As a military weapon either version proved effective in

skirmishing but its slow rate of fire and lack of a bayonet placed the
rifleman at a distinct disadvantage in open terrain.
By the eighteenth century the colonial militia, like the English
trained bands, armed its men with muskets and based organization on
geography.

The southern colonies with one regiment per county came

closer to the English shire system; the more densely populated northern
colonies normally formed several regiments in each county.

Most colonies

gave each regiment's colonel both administrative and command responsibili
ties and dispensed with the office of county lieutenant.

Local elites

in both the mother country and America dominated militia office-holding,
whether an elective or appointive system was used, just as they control
led all other aspects of society.

Ultimate responsibility for the

15

militia lay in the Crown.

In England it was exercised by the county

lords lieutenant, in America by the governor.

The financial powers

of the lower houses of colonial legislatures did place practical
limits on the governor's prerogatives.
The biggest difference between the English trained bands and the
colonial militia was the latter's more comprehensive membership.
free adult males were exempted by law from participation:

Few

generally

only the clergy, some conscientious objectors, and a handful of special
groups with vital skills.

This inclusiveness resulted from the early

need for local defense, absent in England since the days of the
Spanish Armada.

During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth

centuries the danger to the more settled regions of the colonies sub
sided.

While a structure based on the total male population of an area

was admirable for local defense, it was economically unsuited for ex
tended crises or for offensive operations.

Other institutions emerged,

leaving the militia, in the words of one historian, "a local training
center and replacement pool, a county selective service system and a
O

law enforcing agency, an induction camp and a primitive supply depot."
The seventeenth century Indian wars revealed the offensive limits
of the militia.

As early as the 1620's in Virginia and during New Eng

land's Pequot War, temporary detachments were drawn from the organized
companies for field operations against the Indians.
or drafted quotas formed these units.

Either volunteers

This expedient minimized economic

8. Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy," Military
Affairs, 22 (1958), p. 80.
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dislocation and concentrated field leadership in the hands of the most
experienced officers.

But even that device could create too much dis

ruption to community life, and these provisional militia detachments
were employed primarily in garrisons.
A different type of force completely distinct from the militia
emerged in the 1670's which was more effective for offense.

Hired

volunteers ranged the frontiers, patrolling between outposts and giving
early warning of Indian attack.

Other volunteers combined with friendly

Indians to form units for offensive operations in the deep wilderness
where European tactics were ineffective.

The memoirs of the most

successful leader of these mixed forces, Benjamin Church (1639-1718),
were published by his son in 1716 and represent the first American
military manual.^
The trend away from the militia reached a climax during the
imperial wars against Spanish and French colonies between 1689 and
1762.

Regiments completely separated from the militia system were

raised for specific campaigns.

These units, called Provincials, were

recruited by the governor and legislature of a colony, with appointed
officers, and were patterned after regular British regiments.

They

relied on bounties for recruiting and conferred greater status on the
officers.

Although regiments were raised anew each year in most

colonies a substantial percentage of the officers accumulated years of
of service.

Provincial field officers tended to come from members of

9. Thomas Church, The History of the Great Indian War of 1675 and 1676,
Commonly Called Philip's War. Also, The Old French and Indian Wars,
from 1689 to 1704, ed. by Samuel G. Drake (Hartford: Silas Andrus &
Son, 1854).
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the legislature who had been long-term militia officers.

The company

officers, responsible for the majority of the recruiting, were drawn
from popular junior militia officers with demonstrated military skill s . ^
The most famous Provincial unit was formed by Major Robert Rogers of
New Hampshire during the French and Indian War.

His separate companies

of rangers were recruited throughout the northern colonies and paid
directly by the British Army.

They performed reconnaissance for the

regular forces invading Canada and conducted occasional long-range
forays against the French and their Indian allies.
The American phase of the Seven Years* War, the French and Indian
War (1754-64), was different from earlier imperial wars in one important
way.

Formerly Great Britain had been content to leave North American

fighting to the colonists and had furnished only naval and logistical
aid.

Under William Pitt's ministry that policy was reversed and the

regular British Army carried out the major combat operations.
Provincials were relegated to support and reserve functions.

The
Americans

resented this treatment, particularly when they saw British commanders
like Edward Braddock and James Abercromby perform poorly in the wilder
ness.

The Britons for their part developed a negative opinion of the

fighting qualities of the Provincials.

British recruitment of servants

and impressment of men, food, quarters, and transport created other
tensions.

Although the Anglo-American forces working together con

quered Canada and won important victories in the Caribbean, the close

10. Ranz C. Esbenshade, "Sober, Modest Men of Confined Ideas: The
Officer Corps of Provincial New Hampshire" (Master's Thesis, University
of New Hampshire, 1976).
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contact during the war left much residual bitterness.

After the Peace

of Paris that contributed to a growing breach between the colonies and
the mother country.^

The Coming of the Revolution.

During the decade following the Seven Years' War, the government
in London adopted a series of policies which altered the traditional
relationship between the two portions of the empire.

The colonists,

whose political institutions were rapidly maturing, resented English
interference in what they viewed as internal affairs.

Over the years

many different issues contributed to an escalation of tension.

By 1774

the potential for armed confrontation was real.
One important issue dividing the colonies from England was military
in nature.

After the 1763 peace London decided to create an "American

Establishment" and tax the colonies to pay for it.

This army, patterned

after a similar Irish garrison nearly a century old, enabled the British
to retain a larger peacetime force than British taxpayers would fund.
It also secured Canada and Florida from French or Spanish attack and
acted as a buffer between colonists and Indians.

For Americans it served

none of these purposes, particularly after most of the troops moved from
the frontier to coastal cities to simplify logistics.

12

11. Alan Rogers, Empire and Liberty:
American Resistance to British
Authority, 1755-1763 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1974).
12. John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the
Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1965).
William Alfred Foote, "The American Independent Companies
of the British Army 1664-1764" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cali
fornia at Los Angeles, 1966), pp. 62-71. John R . Alden, General Gage in
America:
Being Principally A History of His Role in the American Revo
lution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), pp. 129-44.
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Increased political tensions, largely resulting from revenue
measures, led the colonists to view the regular regiments as a stan
ding army placed in their midst to enforce unpopular legislation.
They responded in two ways.

American politicians raised in the ideo

logical traditions of the radical Whigs of seventeenth century England
saw the military establishment as an example of the corrupt and uncon
stitutional practices of the British government, a tool of a ministry
out to subvert colonial liberties.

They followed the arguments of

their intellectual parents and turned to the militia as the institution
with which a virtuous citizenry should defend itself.

Their calls for

a revitalized militia hoped to prove that honest American yeomen were
worthy of the rights of Englishment and also to obviate the need for
stationing regulars in the c o l o n i e s . A more militant colonial ele
ment moved to counter force with force.

The Sons of Liberty appeared

in New York in 1765 and 1766 as a paramilitary organization in direct
response to British troop movements, and during the early 1770's an
increasingly larger segment of American opinion turned to the militia
as a possible instrument to oppose the British Army.*^
With the passage of the Townshend Duties Massachusetts became the
focal point of opposition to imperial policies.

London responded by

13. John Todd White, "Standing Armies in Time of War: Republican Theory
and Military Practice During the American Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation,
George Washington University, 1978),
pp. 1-74. Lawrence Delbert Cress,
"The Standing Army, The Militia, and
the New Republic: Changing Attitudes
Toward the Military in American Society, 1768 to 1820"(Ph.D. Disserta
tion, University of Virginia, 1976),
pp. 1-126.
14. Roger Champagne, "The Military Association of the Sons of Liberty,"
New-York Historical Society Quarterly, 41 (1955), pp. 338-50.
Stewart
Lewis Gates, "Disorder and Social Organization: The Militia in Connecti
cut Public Life, 1660-1860" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Connecti
cut, 1975), pp. 35-38.
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shifting several regiments to Boston in 1768.

Although most were

withdrawn after the 1770 Boston Massacre, the damage to British credi
bility in America had been done.

The militants in the colonies convinced

others that the British were corrupt by arguing that the ministry inten
ded to use military force to crush opposition.

More and more leaders

accepted the need to create a force capable of opposing the troops if
they returned in strength.

Individuals who later occupied important

positions in the Continental Army, such as Timothy Bickering, who used
the pseudonym "A Military Citizen", and William Heath, the "Military
Countryman", contributed articles to the Massachusetts press in the
early 1770*s urging militia reforms.

Others organized voluntary mili

tary companies whose members agreed to devote extra time to training.
The 1773 Boston Tea Party created a final phase for these devel
opments.
before.

British troops returned to the town in greater numbers than
Punitive legislation, the Coercive Acts of 1774, furnished

final proof to many in New England of Britain's hostility.

Military

preparations quickened throughout the area, and the First Continental
Congress met at Philadelphia in September to concert the colonies'
actions to obtain a redress of grievances.
efforts to strengthen their militia.

New Englanders began serious

Officers whose primary loyalty lay

with Britain were removed, the tempo of training increased, and by the
autumn of 1774 a few individuals were even calling for the formation of
a unified colonial army of observation which could take the field if

15. Ronald L. Boucher, "The Colonial Militia as a Social Institution:
Salem, Massachusetts 1764-1775," Military Affairs, 37 (1973), pp. 125-6.
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hostilities erupted.1^

Similar trends, although less pronounced,

existed in the middle and southern colonies.
Interest in the militia was matched during 1774 and early 1775 by
a concern for war supplies.

Adam Stephen, later a major general in

the Continental Army, spoke for many in 1774 when he warned Virginia
politicians that artillery, arms, ammunition, and other items were in
short supply in the colonies.

His suggestions to encourage domestic

production and importation from Europe were also made by others who
agreed with him that if enough arms and ammunition were available,
"individuals may suffer, but the gates of hell cannot prevail against
America.

Imports of arms and powder grew to such volume by October

1774 that the British government began to take steps to prohibit them.
Individual colonies also began to remove existing stores beyond the
reach of possible British siezure and took the first official steps to
encourage domestic manufactures.

Massachusetts led in collecting

munitions, just as it did in reforming the militia.

1ft

16. David Ammerman, In The Common Cause: American Response to the Co
ercive Acts of 1774 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1974).
David Richard Millar, "The Militia, The Army, and Independency in Colonial
Massachusetts" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1967), pp. 284-8.
Peter Force, ed., American Archives: A Collection of Authentic Records,
State Papers, Debates, and Other Notices of Public Affairs (9 vols., Wash
ington: H. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839-53), 4th Ser., 1: 73940, 787-8. J. H. Trumbull and Charles C. Hoadley, comps., The Public
Records of the Colony of Connecticut (15 vols., Hartford: The Case, Lock
wood 6, Brainard Co., 1850-90), 14: 296, 308-9, 327-8, 343-6. John Russell
Bartlett, ed., Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plan
tations in New England (9 vols., Providence:
Various publishers, 1856-65),
7: 247, 257-71.
Richard K. Showman, et a l ., eds., The Papers of General
Nathanael Greene (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976- ),
1: 68-76. Historical Magazine, 2d Ser., 7 (1870), pp. 22-26.
17. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 1: 739-40.
18. Ibid., pp. 746, 841-5, 858, 881, 953, 1002, 1022, 1032, 1041-2, 1066,
1077, 1080, 1143-5, 1332-4, 1365-70. Paul H. Smith, et al_., eds.. Letters
of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington: Library of Congress,
1976), 1; 266-71, 298-301.
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The First Continental Congress, meanwhile, rejected a proposal by
Richard Henry Lee of Virginia to form a nationwide militia.

It did

adopt a plan for economic protest, the Continental Association, that
had a vital importance in shaping the machinery of revolution.

It

provided for a boycott of British goods after 1 December 1774 and
authorized the formation of enforcement committees.

These committees

quickly became ^ie facto local governments at both the colony and local
levels and secured political control over the countryside, a control
which imperial authorities were never able to shake.

With this

political control went control over the militia, vital to the patriot
cause throughout the war.

Instead of being cowed by the Coercive Acts,

the colonists were now moving towards armed resistance that finally
erupted at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775.
Thus, in the years immediately prior to 1775 a general trend emer
ged in Great Britain's mainland American colonies.

Tensions built to

the point that the leadership in each colony foresaw the possibility
of violence.

That leadership reacted by gathering war materials and

restoring the militia (or volunteer forces) to a level of readiness
not seen since the early days of settlement.

The British Army's leaders

in America were aware of the colonists' actions, but dismissed them as
"mere b u l l y i n g . G i v e n

these attitudes, the physical presence of

General Thomas Gage's garrison in Boston, and the more advanced state of
preparations in Massachusetts, it is Hot surprising that war began there.

19. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 1: 991-2. Also see Charles
Knowles Bolton, ed., Letters of Hugh Earl Percy from Boston and New York
1774-1776 (Boston: Charles L. Goodspeed, 1902), pp. 35-37; and G. D.
Scull, ed., Memoir and Letters of Captain W. Glanville Evelyn, of the
4th Regiment ("King's Own") from North America, 1774-1776 (Oxford:
James Parker and Co., 1879), pp. 31-37.
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Massachusetts Acts.

The Massachusetts Provincial Congress, meeting as a shadow govern
ment, adopted a comprehensive military program on 26 October 1774 which
was based on the militia.

It created executive committees of safety

and supplies and gave the former the power to order out the militia in
an emergency.

It also directed officers to reorganize their commands

into more efficient units, to conduct new elections, and to drill ac
cording to the latest British manual.

The program included a plan to

form a force of "minutemen" equal to one quarter of the strength of the
militia, a concept derived from earlier special detachments of militia.
The minutemen agreed to undergo additional training and hold themselves
ready to turn out "at a minute's notice."

Jedediah Preble, Artemas

Ward, and Seth Pomeroy, three politicians who had served in the French
and Indian War, were elected as general officers.
younger generals were added:

A month later two

another veteran, John Thomas, and William

Heath, a gifted militia administrator.

During periods of recess the

Committees of Safety and Supplies collected materiel and established
depots.
The Provincial Congress reconvened after new elections in February
1775.

It clarified the Committee of Safety's powers, reappointed the

five generals, and added another politically active veteran, John Whit
comb, as a sixth.

More important, the Congress changed its basic policy

by augmenting the militia with a more permanent force patterned after

20.
Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 1: 830-53, 993-1008, 1365-7.
Millar, "Militia and Independency," pp. 289-90. In November Timothy
Pickering's Easy Plan was reviewed, but was not chosen as the official
Massachusetts drill manual.
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the earlier Provincials.

Regulations for this "Constitutional Army"

were adopted on 5 April.

Three days later a committee report on the

"State of the Province" was adopted by 96 of the 103 members present.
That report stated that "the present dangerous and alarming situation
of our publick affairs, renders it necessary for this Colony to make
preparations for their security and defence by raising and establishing
an Army."

The projected

setts men, and delegates

force was to include more than just Massachu
were sent to the other New England colonies to

arrange for their participation.

On 14 April the Committee of Safety

was instructed to begin selecting field officers for the Massachusetts
contingent.

Once they were chosen they were to assist the committee in

picking captains, who would in turn appoint the subalterns.
was expressed for selecting minuteman officers.

Preference

Following Provincial

precedent the new officers were expected to recruit their companies and
regiments.

21

After initiating this plan for a
Congress adjourned on 15
a war on its hands.

April.

New England army,

theProvincial

When it reassembled on the 22d, it had

The first order of business was accumulating evi

dence to prove to the English people that Gage's troops had been the
aggressors on 19 April.

The Congress then turned its attention to

forming a volunteer army from the men who had massed around Boston fol
lowing the battle.

The Committee of Safety had already taken tentative

steps in this direction by stretching its authority to call out the
militia.

On 21 April the committee approved an enlistment format.

Eight thousand effectives were to serve until 31 December in regiments

21.

Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 1: 1322-66.
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consisting of a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, and nine compa
nies.

The committee planned to have each company consist of 3 officers,

4 sergeants, a drummer, a fifer, and 70 rank and file, but it later
reduced the rank and file to 50.

This decision was preliminary since

final authority rested with the Provincial Congress.

The pre-iexington

plan had been to form the army by apportioning quotas of men among the
various towns, a traditional colonial device.

The committee decided

instead to have the generals survey the men at the siege lines and per
suade them to remain.

Confusion rapidly turned to chaos, and on 23

April General Ward, the actual commander of the siege, suggested that
the Congress use smaller-sized units in order to retain a maximum number
of officers.^
The Provincial Congress incorporated Ward's suggestions in a com
prehensive plan adopted that same day.

It decided to try to raise a

New England army of 30,000 men of which Massachusetts would furnish
13,600.

The regimental organization adopted for the infantry called

for 598 men:

1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1

quartermaster, 1 chaplain, 1 surgeon, 2 surgeon's mates (assistants),
and 10 companies.

Each company was to have a captain, 2 lieutenants,

an ensign, and 55 enlisted men.

On 25 April, following additional dis

cussions with the Committee of Safety, this structure was confirmed with
minor changes.

23

The Congress also accepted the committee's suggestion

that each regiment headed by a general officer have two majors, and pay
scales were approved.

22. Ibid.. 2: 369-70, 744-7, 763-830. The collected testimony was pub
lished as A Narrative of the Excursions and Ravages of the King's Troops
(Worcester: Isaiah Thomas, 1775).
23. See Table 1.
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The Massachusetts army was to have artillerymen as well as infantry
regiments.

As early as 23 February the Committee of Safety had planned

to train artillery companies and distributed field guns to selected
militia regiments.

The Provincial Congress directed the committee on 13

April to form six companies for the planned volunteer army.

The organi

zation adopted on 6 May for a company called for A officers, A sergeants,
A corporals, a drummer, a fifer, and 32 matrosses (artillery privates).
The plan was rescinded four days later, however, and a committee was
appointed to confer with Richard Gridley on the propriety of organizing
a full artillery regiment.

Gridley, hero of the capture of Louisbourg

in 17A5, was acknowledged as the colony's leading artillery expert.
After these talks the Provincial Congress on 12 May authorized a tencompany regiment.

Gridley was given command four days la t e r . ^

The regiment was formed in June, but with only nine companies.
Neither Gridley nor his assistant William Burbeck could completely con
centrate on raising it since they had been appointed on 26 April as the
colony's two engineers.

The Committee of Safety added a logistical

staff and a company of artificers (skilled workmen) for maintenance
duties in June.

The important post of ordnance storekeeper went to

Ezekiel Cheever.

The company officers were drawn heavily from the

several Boston militia artillery companies, particularly Adino Paddock's
which had received extensive training from British artillerists in the
1760 's and was composed overwhelmingly of skilled artisans and Sons of
Liberty.

Two of its members, John Crane and Ebenezer Stevens, had moved

2A. Force, American Archives, Ath Ser., 1: 1362, 1368-9; 2: 7A2-A, 759,
775, 789-90, 797, 801, 807.
See Figure 1.
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to Providence, Rhode Island, in 1774 for economic reasons when Boston's
port was closed.

Their close ties enabled the Rhode Island artillery

men to be merged easily into the regiment in 1776.25
In spite of careful preparations, Massachusetts entered the war
in a state of chaos.

The Provincial Congress and the Committee of

Safety frequently found themselves working at cross purposes.

Confusion

over the size and configuration of the army created duplication of ef
fort, and prospective officers recruited under a variety of authorities.
The militia, especially the minutemen, thanks to their prewar organiza
tion, responded as units to the siege of Boston after the battles of
Lexington and Concord, but they were not prepared to remain in the field
for an extended period of time.

Later arrivals were more inclined to

serve a full term until 31 December.

Order began to emerge in May when

formats for commissions and oaths were codified.

Mustermasters were

appointed to examine enlistment rolls at Cambridge and Roxbury so that
the Committee of Safety could certify officers for commissioning.

Regi

ments emerged with a geographical basis and drew their precedence from
that of the militia area which furnished the majority of their men.

All

commissions were dated 19 May 1775, leaving the touchy matter of seniority
to be settled later.

By June twenty-six infantry regiments had been

25. Ibid., 2: 768, 1349, 1354-6, 1366, 1385, 1393, 1410, 1423-4, 1433-6,
1447-8, 1452-3, 1477-8. John Austin Stevens, "Ebenezer Stevens Lieut.Col. of Artillery in the Continental Army," Magazine of American History.
1 (1877), pp. 588-92. Asa Bird Gardner, "Henry Burbeck: Brevet Briga
dier-General United States Army - Founder of the United States Military
Academy," Magazine of American History, 9 (1883), p. 252.
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certified, in addition to part of a regiment whose status as either a
At
Massachusetts or a New Hampshire unit was unresolved.
On 13 June the Provincial Congress recognized that the Massachusetts
army had achieved relatively final form.

It decided to retain in service

a force of one artillery and twenty-three infantry regiments.

The limit

was raised ten days later when troops recruited specifically for coastal
defense released Edmund Phinney's Cumberland County regiment from that
mission.

The status of the generals was also resolved.

Ward retained

the overall command he had exercised since the outbreak of hostilities,
while John Whitcomb, William Heath, and Ebenezer Frye were designated
major generals.27

Formation of a New England Army.

Committees of correspondence spread the traumatic news of Lexington
and Concord beyond the borders of Massachusetts with remarkable speed.
By 2A April New York City had the details and Philadelphia on the next
day.

In fact, Savannah, the city farthest from the scene of the engage-

ment, received the news on 10 May.

2H

Massachusetts' call for assistance

was answered by the other three New England colonies, its neighbors
most concerned with the outbreak of hostilities.

Within two months

three small armies joined the Massachusetts troops at Boston and a
council of war began strategic coordination.

This regional force paved

26. Force, American Archives, Ath Ser., 2: A61, 52A, 609-10, 663, 693,
7A6-66, 776-7, 790-5, 809-30, 13A7-1518.
27. Ibid., pp. 1395-6, 1A06-9, 1A28, 1A30, 1A33, 1A37, 1AA8-9. The coast
defense troops remained in state service instead of becoming Continentals.
Joseph Warren, who would have been the senior major general, was killed
at Bunker Hill before he received his commission.
28. Frank Luther Mott, "The Newspaper Coverage of Lexington and Concord,"
New England Quarterly, 17 (19AA), pp. A89-505.

the way for the creation of a national institution, the Continental
Army.
New hampshiremen responded as individuals and in small groups to
the news of Lexington.

On 25 April, anticipating additional, more for

mal aid from New Hampshire, the Massachusetts Committee of Safety direc
ted Paul Dudley Sergent of Hillsborough County to organize these indiOQ
viduals into a regiment. 3

Four days earlier the New Hampshire Provin

cial Congress convened in emergency session to consider Massachusetts'
plan for a New England army and decided to send three members to confer
with the Massachusetts Provincial Congress.

The New Hampshire congress

deferred more comprehensive action until that committee returned and
the New Hampshire leadership could mobilize public support and make
on
appropriate financial plans.
On 18 May the Provincial Congress resolved to raise men "to join in
the common cause of defending our just rights and liberties."

Initial

legislation, loosely drawn, created a Committee of Safety and authorized
2,000

men as the colony's quota for the New England army, counting the

individuals already in service at Boston.

The plan to use the same

regimental organization as Massachusetts was scrapped on 22 May for a
more specific proposal.

It created three regiments, one of which was

29. Force, American Archives, Ath Ser., 2: 745, 765. When New Hampshire
did not accept responsibility for Sergent's regiment, Massachusetts did,
although Sergent raised only four companies.
30. Ibid., pp. 377-9, 401, 429-30. Otis G. Hammond, ed., Letters and
Papers of Major-General John Sullivan, Continental Army (3 vols., Con
cord: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1930-39), 1: 58-60. On New
Hampshire's actions in general see Chandler Eastman Potter, Military
History of New Hampshire, from Its Settlement, in 1623, to the Year 1861
(Concord: Adjutant General's Office, 1866), pp. 263-272.

30
formed from the volunteers at Boston.

The volunteers' election of John

Stark, a veteran of P.ogers' Rangers, as colonel was confirmed.

Enoch

Poor of Exeter began recruiting for the second regiment on 24 May.

The

remaining regiment, headed by James Reed of Fitzwilliam, began organi
zing a week later in the eastern counties of Strafford and Rockingham.
Nathaniel I’olsom, a member of the First Continental Congress, received
command of the whole force.
Folsom's original appointment as a brigadier general carried duties
similar to the Massachusetts generals', but no regimental command.

On

6 June New Hampshire placed him under General Ward's overall command and
at the end of the month promoted him to major general.

Jealousy on the

part of the volunteers at Boston, however, limited his authority for a
time.

Minor administrative problems hampered the three regiments from

achieving full internal cohesion until mid-June, and the last of Poor's
companies, detained for local defense, did not reach Boston until early
August.

Although Folsom wanted an artillery company to support his

regiments, there were no officers in New Hampshire qualified to command
one.

The best that the Provincial Congress could do was to send cannon

for the Massachusetts men to use.

32

Rhode Island, still able to use its chartered government, convened
a brief emergency session of its legislature in response to the news of
Lexington and Concord,

On 25 April the Assembly resolved to raise 1,500

men

31. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 519-24, 639-40, 647-60.
See
Table 1.
32. Ibid., pp. 648, 657-9, 868, 1005-7, 1022-3, 1029, 1069-70, 1092,
1177-80, 1529; 4: 1-20. Hammond, Sullivan Papers, 1: 64-65.
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properly armed and disciplined, to continue in this colony,
as an army of observation, to repel any insult or violence
that may be offered to the inhabitants. And also, if it be
necessary for the safety and preservation of Any of the
colonies, to march out of this colony, and join and co-oper
ate with the forces of the neighboring colonies.
Substantive action was deferred until the regular May session.

In the

interim the commander of the Providence County militia brigade offered
Massachusetts the services of his three battalions; other individuals
went off to Boston as volunteers.33
At the May session, the Phode Island Assembly created its own
Army of Observation and a Committee of Safety.

The Rhode Island

contingent formed a full brigade under Brigadier General Nathanael
Greene, a different approach from that of the other New England colo
nies.

Greene's staff included a brigade adjutant and a brigade com

missary responsible for logistics.

Three infantry regiment (two with

eight companies and one with seven) and an artillery company provided
the brigade's strength.

Greene, Acting Governor Nicholas Cooke, and

the Committee of Safety arranged the officers which the Assembly had
appointed.

Seniority was determined by drawing lots, since all com

missions were dated 8 May 1773.

The regiments, which were raised ac

cording to county boundaries, rotated posts of honor to avoid establish
ing a system of precedence.

Thomas Church commanded the regiment from

Bristol and Newport Counties, Daniel Hitchcock the one from Providence
County, and James Mitchell Varnum (an old associate of Greene) the one
from King's and Kent.

Captain (later major) John Crane, the displaced

Bostonian, took charge of the artillery company which contained 4 other

33. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 390, 431.
of the Colony of Rhode Island, 7: 308-11.

Bartlett, Records
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officers, a conductor, 2 sergeants, 2 bombardiers, 4 gunners, 4 corporals, 2 drummers, 2 fifers, and 75 privates.

3b

Companies marched to Boston as soon as possible.

Two of the regi

ments had assembled there by b June when Greene opened his headquarters.
Varnum's regiment arrived several weeks later.

The artillery company,

armed with four field pieces, also arrived in early June.

During June

and July the Assembly resolved various logistical and disciplinary
matters and expanded the brigade's staff by adding a secretary, a baker,
and a chaplain.
regiment.

It also raised six new infantry companies, two for each

Greene, who was given limited powers to fill vacancies, was

placed under the "command and direction" of the commander-in-chief of
the "combined American army" in Massachusetts.35
On 21 April representatives from Massachusetts met with the Connec
ticut Committee of Correspondence at Lebanon, the home of Governor
Jonathan Trumbull.

Trumbull sent his son David to inform Massachusetts

that a special session of the Assembly would meet as soon as possible
and to establish coordination.

While some militia units did march to

Boston on receipt of news of Lexington and Concord, most were advised
to wait until the Assembly could act.

The wisdom of this course was

confirmed by news that, although Israel Putnam was able to assert a
loose hegemony over the volunteers, a formal command structure was needed
before they could become effective.36

3b.

Ibid., pp. 314-29. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 1143-51.
Showman, Greene Papers, 1: 78-79. See Table 1.
35. Ibid.. pp. 81-85. Bartlett, Records of the Colony of Rhode Island,
7: 337-61. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 893-4, 900, 1151-68.
The colony ultimately decided that its troops would serve to 31 December.
36. Ibid., pp. 370-3, 383-4, 423-4.
Wladimir Edgar Hagelin and Ralph
A. Brown, eds., "Connecticut Farmers at Bunker Hill: The Diary of Colonel
Experience Storrs," New England Quarterly, 28 (1955), pp. 84-89.
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The special session convened at Hartford on 26 April, and the next
day the Assembly ordered six regiments raised to serve until 10 Decem
ber, each containing ten 100-man companies.

At the time it was believed

that these 6,000 men represented 25 percent of the colony's militia
strength.

The companies were apportioned among the several counties

according to population.

In its regimental structure Connecticut followed

a large, somewhat older model than the other colonies.

Like Massachu

setts it placed generals in direct command of regiments, and like
Rhode Island it also had field officers commanding companies.

This

left generals directly responsible for both a regiment and a company.
Rather than assigning an extra lieutenant to each field officer's com
pany, Connecticut simply designated the senior lieutenant in each
colonel's company as a captain-lieutenant.

On the other hand, the Con

necticut organization called for each company to contain four officers
instead of the three provided by all other New England jurisdictions.
The Assembly appointed Joseph Spencer and Israel Putnam brigadier gener
als and David Wooster major general, and assigned supply responsibilities
to Joseph Trumbull, the Governor's son, by appointing him Commissary37
General.
During May the Assembly passed legislation that resolved a number
of administrative, disciplinary, and logistical problems.

The office

of regimental adjutant was defined as a separate post, and Samuel Mott
was appointed colony engineer, with the rank of lieutenant colonel.
The Committee of Safety, also known as the Committee of Defense or

37. Trumbull, Records of the Colony of Connecticut, 14: 413-40.
American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 409-22. See Table 1.
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Committee of War, served for the rest of the war as the governor's
executive and advisory body.

The Assembly considered, but rejected,

reorganizing the six regiments into eight to conform in size with those
OO
from the other colonies.
regiments.

A special session in July added two more

These were smaller units with a third fewer privates al-

though they retained the same organization and superstructure.

OQ

Deployment of the Connecticut regiments also followed a pattern
set during earlier wars.

The colony had formerly been responsible

primarily for reinforcing its neighbors, assisting New York to defend
the Albany area and having primary responsibility for protecting western
Massachusetts.

In 1775 Spencer's 2d and Putnam's 3d Connecticut Regi

ments, raised in the north-eastern and north-central portions of the
colony, naturally marched to Boston.

Samuel Parsons' 6th, from the

southeast, followed as soon as the vital port of New London was secure.
Benjamin Hinman's 4th from Litchfield County in the northwest went to
Fort Ticonderoga where the county's men had served in earlier wars.
The 1st under Wooster and the 5th under David Waterbury, coming respec
tively from Fairfield and New Haven Counties in the southwest, were
initially reserved to secure New York City.

In June Governor Trumbull

temporarily placed the men in Massachusetts under the command of General
Ward and the regiments in New York under the orders of the Continental
and New York Provincial C o n g r e s s e s . T h e 7th and 8th also went to Boston.

38. Ibid., pp. 559-76.
15: 1-83.
39. Ibid., pp. 90-109.

Trumbull, Records of the Colony of Connecticut,
Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 1579-90,

1720-1.
40. Ibid., pp. 731, 1002, 1010. Trumbull, Records of the Colony of Con
necticut , 15: 84-89. Richard H. Marcus, "The Connecticut Valley: A Prob
lem in Intercolonial Defense," Military Affairs. 33 (1969), pp. 230-42.
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In this manner, the other three New England colonies responded
favorably to Massachusetts' plan for a joint army.

Although delays

were experienced in fielding their regiments, the regiments benefitted
from the extra time and organized in a rational manner, avoiding the
confusion that had plagued Massachusetts' efforts.

Only the 1st New

Hampshire Regiment, which had also been organized from the volunteers
at Boston, experienced the same organizational troubles as the Massa
chusetts regiments.
For these New England troops raised in the wake of Lexington and
Concord arms and ammunition were in short supply despite recent collec
tion efforts.

Weapons available to the New Englanders were mostly

English military muskets, known colloquially as "Tower" or "Brown Bess"
muskets, left over from earlier wars, and domestically manufactured
hunting weapons.

Gunpowder, lead for musket balls, and paper for car

tridges were critical items.

It would take years for the domestic arms

industry throughout the colonies to become established despite the best
efforts of local governments.

In the interim, imports from France, other

Luropean nations, and Mexico City were sought, but shortages placed
serious limits on the New Englanders' operations.^

It would take a

national effort to overcome them.

41. See especially:
David Lewis Salay, "Arming for War: The Produc
tion of War Material in Pennsylvania for the American Armies of the Revo
lution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Delaware, 1977), pp. 165-240;
James Allen Lewis, "New Spain During the American Revolution, 1779-1783:
A Viceroyalty at War" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1975), p. 52;
Orlando W. Stephenson, "The Supply of Gunpowder in 1776," American His
torical Review, 30 (1925), pp. 271-81; and Neil L. York, "Clandestine
Aid to The American Revolutionary War Effort: A Re-Examination," Mili
tary Affairs, 43 (1979), pp. 26-30.
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Summary.

The New England army assembled around Boston reflected the modifi
cations imposed on European military institutions by nearly two centuries
of American colonial experience.

Its leaders were drawn largely from

the veterans of the French and Indian War and its weaponry and regimen
tal organization strongly revealed the influences of that conflict.

The

emergence of that army, coordinated by Massachusetts, was a microcosm
of the evolution of colonial military institutions.

Its first combat

revealed the strengths and weaknesses of American experience.
Americans first responded to the possibility of armed confrontation
with imperial authorities by strengthening the militia.

Each colony

took steps .to replace aged or unreliable leaders and reorganize units
for greater efficiency.

Training increased.

By 1775 most colonies had

restored the militia to a degree of competence in defensive missions
not seen for a century.

This restoration was influenced by a commitment

to an ideological ideal on the part of the militant leadership of the
protest movement.

That ideal flew in the face of colonial military

history which had clearly demonstrated the militia's impracticality on
major military operations.
As the crisis deepened a segment of American leadership began to
hedge its bets by looking beyond the militia.

At first leaders turned

to provisional militia units which were designed to take the field on
short notice and remain in action for longer periods.

Whether these

units took the form of volunteer companies or "minutemen", they were
derived from the same need to minimize economic disruption that the
seventeenth century colonists had faced.

The New England army which
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came into being at the instigation of Massachusetts moved a step further.
Like the Provincials which served as a model, the army's regiments stood
apart from the militia system, although drawing heavily on it for re
cruits and leadership.
Ideologues could accept these new Provincials because they were
recruited only for a single campaign.
31 December 1775.

Their enlistments expired by

Militants also recognized that, like the Provincials,

the regiments were directly under the control of local revolutionary
governments which represented the people.

This qualification restored

the subordination to civil authority which the British Army practiced
while in Great Britain, but which had been missing from the American
Establishment.

Because only a modest 30,000-man army was called for,

far short of the total military manpower of the New England colonies,
the militants could assume that a virtuous citizenry would serve in ro
tation, obviating the need for a professional force which would be an
anathema.
By July a substantial portion of the total projected force had as
sembled at Boston . ^

Not counting artillery, the New England forces

consisted of twenty-six infantry regiments from Massachusetts and three
each from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut.

On paper they

aggregated 99 field officers, 866 company and 144 staff officers, and
18,538 enlisted men.
levels.

This total was over 2,500 men below authorized

More important, it included 1,600 sick and almost 1,500 more

who were either on furlough or on detached duty.

The regiments were

42. General Return, Main Army, 19 July 1775; Record Group 93, National
Archives.
Several more regiments had not yet reached Boston.
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still only partially

organized, for only nine of those from Massachu

setts had reached 95

percent of strength even on paper.

Five that were

below 80 percent of authorized levels were of questionable combat value.
These deficiencies were due in part to the lack of centralized
control over the army, or rather armies.

Each of the New England colo

nies raised its own force and dispatched it to Boston in response to
Massachusetts' call for assistance.

These forces arrived piecemeal and

were assigned positions and responsibilities according to the needs of
the moment.

The only coordination was furnished by a committee form of

leadership.

A Council of War was established by the Massachusetts com

manders on 20 April,

and senior officers from the other colonies were

added as they became

available.Although it worked closely with the

Massachusetts civil authorities, it did not really command, but merely
developed consensus views.

This arrangement prevented effective plan

ning and blocked the individual regiments from making their needs known.
Incomplete information on the regiments' status proved to be a major
problem in the early months of the Boston si e g e . ^
On 17 June the regional army's first engagement revealed the weak
nesses and strengths inherent in its organization.

The Council of War

decided to apply pressure on the Boston garrison by occupying hills on
Charlestown Peninsula that dominated the town.

It did not prepare an

adequate plan, and committed units piecemeal, with insufficient ammuni
tion and without a clearly delineated chain of command.

The British

decided not to exploit the positional weakness of the New Englanders,

A3. William Henshaw, The orderly book of Colonel William Henshaw, of
the American army, April 20-September 26, 1775 (Boston: A. Williams,
--------- ---------- ----1881), pp. 13-39.
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and instead launched a frontal assault In the hope that this would
create a demoralizing show of force.

From the security of hasty field

works the defenders shattered two attacks with accurate musketry.
third try finally drove them from the peninsula.

A

Sir William Howe,

staggered by a casualty rate of 42 percent, realized that the British
regulars could not afford to let the New Englanders fight from prepared
positions which gave the advantage to New England marksmanship and com
pensated for their weaknesses.

Howe reported to his superiors in

London after the battle, "when 1 look to the consequences of it, in the
loss of so many brave Officers, I do it with horror - The Success is
too dearly bought."

44

The New England army had been defeated, although they had inflic
ted very heavy losses on the enemy.

If they could find solutions to

the problems which the battle highlighted, they could profit from the
defeat.

These solutions required a national army.

The search had

already turned to Philadelphia where the Continental Congress was in
session.

44. John Fortescue, ed., The Correspondence of King George the Third
from 1760 to December 1783 (6 vols., London: Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office, 1887-96), 3: 220-4.

CHAPTER II
THE CONTINENTAL ARMY:
WASHINGTON AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

Formation of a regional army in the first several months after
Lexington was the first phase in the war with England.

Even as the New

Englanders gathered before Boston a more significant step in the crea
tion of a national force took place in Philadelphia.

The Continental

Congress convened there on 10 May 1775 to resume coordination of the
thirteen colonies' efforts to secure British recognition of American
rights.

Already four of those colonies were at war.

News arrived a

week later that Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold had captured Fort Ticonderoga, an event which expanded the dimensions of the conflict and ended
hopes of a swift reconciliation with Britain.

Congress reluctantly

moved to assume direction of the military effort.

Up to that point the

organization of forces followed established colonial precedents, but as
Congress and its agents moved towards an army representing all thirteen
colonies they had to break new ground.

Adoption of the Army.

Military attitudes within Congress derived in part from the particu
lar circumstances of the individual constituencies, but also from the
political attitudes of the delegates themselves.

Conflict began to under

mine the hopes of reconciliation among the handful of members who believed
that their first loyalty lay with Great Britain.
AO

The militants,
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concentrated in the New England delegations but with support in other
colonies, gained the initiative in deliberations by virtue of superior
organization and because British policy played into their hands.

During

May and June the militants sought support from other delegates for Cong
ress to assume responsibility for the existing troops at Boston.

They

successfully removed the stigma that the war was a regional issue largely
because New Yorkers, concerned for the safety of their own colony, sup
ported the creation of a national force.*
The first step in this direction came on 15 May when James Duane
of New York introduced a letter from the local New York City Committee
of One Hundred.

That body, alarmed by a rumor that British troops were

on the way to the city, requested Congressional advice.

Congress recom

mended that the British be left alone as long as they committed no overt
action, but urged the New Yorkers to defend themselves if attacked and
to prevent the troops from erecting any fortifications.

Congress also

used this occasion to appoint a committee to consider the general defen
sive needs of that colony.

The study group included Thomas Lynch and

George Washington, the New York delegation, and militant leader Samuel

2

Adams.

1. Edmund C. Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1941), pp. 64-75. Jonathan Gregory Rossie, The Politics of Command in the
American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1975), pp. 215.
H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974), pp. 34-54, 72-89, 102-8. Henderson
identifies Adams as a Radical; Lynch and Washington as Moderates; and the
New Yorkers as a combination of Moderates and Conservatives.
2. Worthington C. Ford, e d., Journals of the Continental Congress 17741789 (34 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 2: 4953. Paul H. Smith, _et jil., eds., Letters of Delegates to Congress, 17741789 (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976), 1: 351, 353.
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On the next day Congress formed itself into a committee of the whole
to "take into consideration the state of America."^

This was an excep

tionally important parliamentary maneuver since Congress was unsure of
its objectives but acutely aware of the importance of presenting an ap
pearance of unanimity to the world.

As a committee of the whole the

delegates could freely exchange opinions and arrive at a consensus with
no hint of disagreement in the record.
ter degree of secrecy.
served Congress'

They could also maintain a grea-

This arrangement lasted for the next month and

purposes admirably, although it created problems for

historians attempting to reconstruct the flow of events.
The first business considered by the Committee of the Whole was a
motion on 16 May by Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia ally of the Adamses,
for Congress to raise an army.

Lynch and John Dickinson supported Lee,

but opposition came from others, notably Robert R. Livingston and John
Rutledge."*

At this point the delegates knew the Massachusetts plan for

a regional army but assumed that the force at Boston amounted only to
9,000 to 10,000 men.*5

Although the delegates did not act on Lee's pro

posal, it was clear that there was broad support for a defensive military
posture in Congress.
Deliberations on 18 May revealed the impact of the news of the cap
ture of Ticonderoga.

Congress assumed that the British were planning

to use troops stationed in Canada against the colonies, an assumption

3. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 53-54.
4. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 465.
5. Ibid., p. 351. Dickinson, Livingston, and Rutledge all were consider
ably less militant at this point than the New Englanders.
6. Ibid., pp. 356, 366-9.
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that placed the onus of expanding hostilities on London.

Congress in

structed the local committees in Albany and New York City to move mili
tary supplies to safety and to call on New England for assistance in
defending Ticonderoga.^

The next day the report of the committee

studying Duane's motion passed to the Committee of the Whole for con
sideration.^

These events marked a change in sentiment as British ac

tions seemed to confirm the militants' claims of hostile intent.

On 21

May John Adams, a leading militant, reported to colleagues in Massachu
setts "I can guess - that an Army will be posted in New York, and another
in Massachusetts, at the Continental E x p e n s e . T h e

other delegates,

including those who had been reluctant to endorse the use of force, ex
pected formal actions confirming "Continental" or "American" armies
for both Boston and New Y o r k . ^
On 25 May the Committee of the Whole delivered its report on three
specific measures to be recommended to New York.
ded strategic points needed fortification:

Two currently undefen

King's Bridge, which linked

Manhattan to the mainland, and the Hudson Highlands, a zone some forty
miles above the city where hills narrowed the Hudson River and allowed
obstruction of the passage to Albany.

The militia of the colony also

should be brought to a state of readiness.

Finally, the New York

7. Ibid., pp. 356, 358, 362-3, 369-70. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2:
55-56.
8. Ibid., p. 57. A similar procedure on 1 June processed the report of
a committee composed of militants Samuel Adams, Silas Deane, and Thomas
Mifflin and more moderate George Washington, Philip Schuyler, and Lewis
Morris appointed on 27 May to suggest ways and means to procure arms;
Ibid., pp. 67, 74; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 412, 431.
9. Ibid., p. 364.
10. Ibid., pp. 442-3, 445-6, 464-5.
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Provincial Congress should be authorized to raise up to 3,000 men to
serve, under conditions similar to those established by New England,
until 31 December 1775.

They would garrison Ticonderoga and other posts.

The Congress unanimously approved these recommendations on the 26th
after adding a preamble protesting that, although it hoped for reconciliation, it was forced to defend itself.

11

Congress gave New York's

Provincial Congress a free hand in raising and officering the troops.
The only recorded debate was over the size of that force.

The original

recommendation to raise 4,000 was supported by persons of such diverse
views as John and Samuel Adams on the one hand and Edmund Rutledge on
the other, and then was lowered to 3,000 at the insistence of Thomas
McKean and Edmund Pendleton.^

This action clearly indicates the impor

tance Congress placed on reaching a consensus.
On 31 May Congress received a report from Benedict Arnold that
British forces were massing at St. John's at the northern end of Lake
Champlain.

It requested Connecticut to send troops to help secure

T i c o n d e r o g a .

Actually the 4th Connecticut Regiment of approximately

1,000 men had already moved into the area, and this request granted
official approval to the movement.

The delegates deliberately left the

number vague to allow the Connecticut authorities, who were closer and
better informed, freedom of action.

This measure, moving New Englanders

to assume a function intended for the recently authorized New Yorkers,

11. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 59-61, 64-66.
Smith, Letters of
Delegates, 1: 409.
12. Ibid., pp. 407, 410. The preamble appears to have been inserted at
the insistance of the New Jersey delegates, who represented a variety of
views.
13. Ibid., pp. 422-3, 429-30. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 73-74.
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resulted from the delegates' perception of the need for swift action.
Connecticut's men were already in being; the New York Provincial Con
gress had not yet had time to raise its troops.*^*
decisive action came on 14 June 1775 when Congress adopted "the
American continental army."

Following its usual procedure it reached

a consensus in the Committee of the W h o l e . ^
colored the proceedings.*8

A desire for secrecy

The record*^ indicates only that Congress

undertook to raise ten companies of riflemen, approved an enlistment
form for them, and appointed a committee*8 to draft rules and regulations
for "the government of the army."

The delegates' correspondence and

diaries and their subsequent actions make it clear that they really did
much more.

They also accepted responsibility for the existing troops,

believed to number 10,000, and the forces allocated for the defense of
the various points in New York, assumed to be another 5,000 men.*^
At least some men in Congress believed from the beginning that this
force would grow.

20

Better information soon arrived from Boston regar

ding the actual numbers of New Lngland troops.

Congress responded by a

series of increases in the troop ceilings the delegates were willing to
support.

Within a week delegates began referring to 15,000 men at Boston

14. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 423-4, 430-1, 449-50.
15. Ibid., pp. 488-90, 503-4, 507-8, 515-6, 526-7.
16. Ibid., pp. 488-90, 507.
17. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 89-90.
18. Thomas Cushing, George Washington, and Joseph Hewes constituted the
moderate core of this committee, with Philip Schuyler and militant Silas
Deane representing the extremes of political opinion.
19. Ibid., pp. 95, 99. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 486-90, 498500, 502-4, 507-8, 515-6, 519-21, 526-7, 539-40.
20. Ibid., pp. 515-6.

and by early July that total began edging towards 20,000.21

On 19 June

the governnents of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire were
requested to forward to Boston "such of the forces as are already em
bodied, towards their quotas of the troops agreed to be raised by the
New England Colonies", a clear indication of the intent of Congress to
adopt the entire extant regional army.
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Discussions on the next day

indicated that Congress was prepared to support a force at Boston twice
the size of the British garrison and was unwilling to order any existing
units disbanded.

23

Maximum strengths for both the forces in Massachu

setts and New York were finally established on 21 and 22 July, when
solid information was at hand.

These were set respectively at 22,000

and 5,000 men, a total nearly double that envisioned on 14 June.2^*
The "expert riflemen" authorized on 14 June were the first units
raised directly as Continentals.

Congress intended to have ten com

panies serve as a light infantry force at the Boston siege and at the
same time symbolically extend military participation beyond the scene
of immediate conflict.

Six of the companies were allocated to Pennsyl

vania, two to Maryland, and two to Virginia.

Each would have a captain,

3 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, a drummer (or horn player), and
68 privates.

The enlistment period was set at one year, the norm for

Provincials in earlier wars, a period that would expire officially on
1 July 1776.23

21. Ibid.. pp. 516-7, 543-4, 561, 569, 585-6.
22. Ibid.,
pp. 518-22, 539-40. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 99.
23. Ibid., pp. 100-1.
24. Ibid., pp. 202, 207. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1; 662-4.
25. Ibid., pp. 313-5. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 89-90; 5: 432.
On 12 June 1776 the company organization of a rifle company was amended
to include both a drummer and a fifer.
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Responsibility for recruiting the companies was given to the three
colonies' Congressional delegates, who then turned directly to the
county committees of areas noted for skilled marksmen.

The response in

Pennsylvania's western and northern frontier counties was so great that
on 22 June the colony's quota was Increased from six to eight companies,
organized as a regiment.

On 25 June the Pennsylvania delegates, on the

recommendation of the Pennsylvania Assembly, appointed field officers
for the regiment.

Since no staff organization was provided, the neces

sary duties were performed by company officers and volunteers.

On 11

July delegate George Read secured the adoption of a ninth company organ
ized in Lancaster County by his wife's nephew.

In Virginia Daniel

Morgan raised one company in Frederick County and Hugh Stephenson another
in Berkeley County; Michael Cresap's and Thomas Price's companies were
from Frederick County, Maryland.

All thirteen were organized during

late June and early July and raced to Boston where their loose frontier
attitudes created disciplinary problems.2**
Including troops from outside New England gave the desired contin
ental flavor to the Army.

This need to broaden the base of support for

the war also led John Adams to work for the appointment of a southerner
as commander of "all the continental forces, raised, or to be raised,
for the defense of American liberty."

On 15 June Congress unanimously

chose George Washington, a Virginia delegate.

Washington had been ac

tive in the military planning committees and by late May had taken to

26.
Ibid., 2: 103-4, 173. Pennsylvania Archives. 2d Ser., 10: 3-43.
Smith, Letters of Delegates. 1: 491-2, 598-9, 621-5. Read was not a
militant.
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wearing his old uniform.

His colleagues believed that his modesty and

competence qualified him to adjust to the "Temper & Genius" of the New
England troops.

Congress gave Washington the rank of General and

27
Commander-1n-Chief.
Congress clearly respected Washington, for it granted him exten
sive powers combining the functions of a regular British commander with
the latent military responsibilities of a colonial governor.

Congress'

original instructions of 20 June, drafted by Edmund Rutledge and the
militants Richard Henry Lee and John Adams, told him to proceed to Mas
sachusetts, "take charge of the army of the united colonies", and capture
or destroy all armed enemies.

His general instructions were to keep the

army obedient, diligent, and disciplined; his only specific obligation
was to send Congress the first accurate strength return of the army.
The Commander-in-Chief's right to make strategic and tactical decisions
on purely military grounds was limited only by a reference to listening
to the advice of a council of war.

Within a maximum set by Congress,

including volunteers, Washington had the right to determine how many
men to retain, and Congress empowered him to temporarily fill any vacan
cies occurring below the rank of colonel.

Permanent promotions and ap-

pointments could only be made by the colony governments.
Although sectional politics played a role in Washington's selection,
he was in fact the best-qualified native-born American for the job on

27. Ibid., pp. 416-7, 486-99, 507-9, 515-7. Henderson, Party Politics,
pp. 53-54. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2s 91-93, 96-97.
28. Ibid.. pp. 92-93, 96-97, 100-1. John Todd White, "Standing Armies
in Time of War: Republican Theory and Military Practice During the
American Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University,
1978), p . 119.
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strictly military terms.

He had begun his military career in the Vir

ginia militia in 1752 as one of four regional adjutants appointed to
improve training.

During the early phase of the French and Indian War

he served with gallantry as Edward Braddock's volunteer aide at the
battle of the Monongahela, and later as commander of Virginia's two
Provincial regiments defending that colony's frontier,

in 1758 he com

manded a brigade composed of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania units
on John Forbes' expedition against Fort Duquesne, the only American in
that war to command so large a force.

These years furnished invaluable

experience and taught him the importance of discipline, marksmanship,
and professional study.

Exposure to Forbes' seminal ideas on adapting

European tactics to the American wilderness contributed materially to
Washington's military education.

Above all, he came to recognize that

only unyielding commitment to hard work and attention to administrative
detail could keep troops in the field.

29

On 16 June, the day after Washington's appointment, Congress author
ized a variety of other senior officers for its new army.
ironed out again in Committee of the Whole.
were established:

Details were

Five major staff officers

an Adjutant General, a Commissary of Musters, a Pay

master General, a Commissary General, and a Quartermaster General.

They

were expected to assist the Commander-in-Chief with the administration

29. In addition to the standard biographies, the key items furnishing
insight into Washington's military background are: John C. Fitzpatrick,
ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript
Sources 1745-1799 (39 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office,
1931-44), 1; 148-50, 331-6, 466-71, 490-1; 2: 6-19, 295-8; and Oliver
L. Spaulding, Jr., "The Military Studies of George Washington," American
Historical Review. 29 (1924), pp. 675-80.
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of the "grand army".

The forces allocated to New York were already

considered a separate department and were authorized their own Deputy
Quartermaster General and a Deputy Paymaster General.

Three aides and

a military secretary for Washington and a secretary for the separate
New York department, and six engineers (three for each force) completed
the staff.

The other ranks created at this time were major general and

brigadier general.

The number of generals remained uncertain for several

days as Congress debated*

Between 17 and 22 June Congress finally de

cided on four major generals, each with two aides, and eight brigadier
generals.

It fixed these numbers to allow each colony raising troops

a share of the patronage.30

in the succeeding days Congress also took

steps to issue paper money to finance the army, and on 30 June adopted
Articles of War.^*
Selection of subordinate generals and senior staff positions led
to political maneuvering as delegates sought appointments for favorite
sons.

On 17 June Artemas Ward and Charles Lee were elected as the first

and second major generals and Horatio Gates as the Adjutant General.
Ward received seniority because he was in command at Boston and because
Massachusetts furnished the largest single contingent of troops.

Ward

was a Harvard graduate with long years of experience in the Massachusetts
legislature and established whigglsh political credentials.

After two

years of active duty as a field officer in the French and Indian War he
compiled an excellent record as a militia administrator.

Lee and Gates

30. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 93-94, 97, 99, 102-4. Smith, Letters
of Delegates. 1: 503, 509, 518-22, 525-6, 529-30, 533, 535-6, 539-42,
547-8. Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 53-54.
31. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 103, 106, 111-22.
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were professional English officers In their forties who were living in
Virginia on the half-pay (inactive) list.

Both were associates of radi

cals in England and America and had served in the French and Indian War.
Lee had also seen service in Portugal and in the Polish Army.
ended the Seven Years' War as a major in the Caribbean.

Gates

His appointment

as Adjutant General with the rank of brigadier general reflected his
staff experience and was intended to provide Washington with a strong
administrative assistant.

32

Two more major generals were appointed on 19 June to satisfy the
colonies contributing the other large contingents.

Philip Schuyler,

a conservative New York delegate with close ties to Washington, was to
command in his native colony.

A member of the New York elite, the

forty-two year old Schuyler had been a major in the French and Indian
War specializing in logistics.

His experience, political connections,

and extensive business Interests in Albany were particularly valuable
in his new command.

Connecticut's delegation had difficulty agreeing

on a nominee for that colony's major general, but Israel Putnam's status
as a folk-hero eventually outweighed considerations of strict military
seniority, and he received the appointment.

Born in 1718, Putnam was

a relatively old man who had seen extensive service in the French and

32. Smith, Letters of Delegates. Is 503-4, 507-8, 529-30, 533, 537.
Standard biographies are: Charles Martyn, The Life of Artemas Ward The
First Commander-in-Chief of the American Revolution (1921; reprint ed.
Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970); John R. Alden, General
Charles Lee. Traitor or Patriot? (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univer
sity Press, 1951); and Paul David Nelson, General Horatio Gates: A
Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976).
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Indian War, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel.
early, vocal leader of the Sons of Liberty.

He was also an

33

Selection of eight brigadier generals on 22 June was the product of
a compromise.

Congress allotted these positions in proportion to the

relative numbers of men each colony contributed, and in making appointments followed the recommendations of the colony's delegates.
problems, however, by ignoring status and seniority.^

It created

Massachusetts'

Seth Pomeroy, William Heath, and John Thomas were originally elected as
the first, fourth, and sixth brigadier generals.

Washington refrained

from handing them their commissions until Pomeroy declined because of
his age.

Congress was then able to eliminate one problem by restoring

Thomas to seniority, although it did not fill Pomeroy's vacancy.

Thomas,

a surgeon, had been born in 1724 and had served primarily in medical
roles.

Heath, thirteen years younger, was strictly a product of the

militia.
Richard Montgomery of New York became the second ranking brigadier
general.

Montgomery was born in Ireland in 1738, educated at Dublin's

33. Smith, Letters of Delegates. 1: 442-3, 521-2, 529-30, 535, 539-40,
542-3, 555-6, 626-7. Standard biographies are: Martin H. Bush, Revolu
tionary Enigma: A Re-Appraisal of General Philip Schuyler of New York
(Port Washington, N.Y.: Ira J. Friedman, 1969); Don R. Gerlach, Philip
Schuyler and the American Revolution in New York, 1733-1777 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1964); and Increase N. Tarbox, Life of
Israel Putnam ("Old Put"), Major-General in the Continental Army (1876;
reprint ed. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970). Putnam's
election was the only one, other than Washington's, by unanimous vote.
34. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 103-4. Smith, Letters of Delegates.
1: 525-30, 542-3, 651-3, 662-4. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3:
465-7. Peter Force, ed., American Archives: A. Collection of Authentic
Records. State Papers, Debates, and Other Notices of Public Affairs (9
vols., Washington: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839-53), 4th
Ser., 3: H 0 7 - 8 . Rossle, Politics of Command, pp. 16-24.
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Trinity College, and had entered the British Army in 1756.

His combat

service had been in North America and the Caribbean, but he resigned in
1772 when he failed to receive a promotion to major.

He moved to New

York, married into the powerful Livingston family, and in 1775 was elec
ted to the New York Provincial Congress.

His appointment was intended

to complement Schuyler's logistical and administrative skills with
combat leadership.
David Wooster and Joseph Spencer of Connecticut became the third
and fifth brigadier generals.

Wooster was born in 1711 and had served

in Connecticut's navy during King George's War.

A Yale graduate, he

later commanded a regiment in the French and Indian War.
was three years younger, had also served in both wars.

Spencer, who
The two men ini

tially refused to serve under Putnam and had to be cajoled into accepting
their commissions.

Delegate John Sullivan, a thirty-five year old lawyer,

exercised political leverage and became New Hampshire's brigadier general.
Folsom who commanded the first troops raised to aid Boston was passed
over.

Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island became the last of the Continen

tal generals of 1775.
In retrospect the June 1775 decision of the Continental Congress
to create a Continental Army seems remarkably free from political strife.
Militants as well as delegates of a more moderate persuasion supported
each step along the way.

The only arguments were of a nonpartisan nature

and concerned technical details.

That unity of sentiment resulted from

British actions which convinced virtually every delegate of the need to
take defensive measures and from a compromise program that appealed to
every segment of opinion.

Militants, deeply committed to the ideal of

the citizen-soldier, saw the adoption of the short-term New England
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force as the genesis of a yeomanry army.

Others, more concerned with

the practical lessons of the colonial wars, felt that they were forming
an army of Provincials.

Militants were happy that Congress adopted the

army; more conservative delegates could claim that the door was not yet
closed to reconciliation with the mother country.

Adherents of every

view were accommodated in the selection of officers, particularly since
Washington and Schuyler had blank commissions to distribute to the regimental officers.

This device confirmed local selections and yet retained

nominal national control of appointments.

Senior commanders reflected

the prevailing sentiments of each colony, and ranged from the ultramilitant Charles Lee to conservative Philip Schuyler.

In fact, this

desire for consensus glossed over some profound attitudinal differences
within the Army and Congress that would later create internal

tu rm o il.

35

Washington and Schuyler left Philadelphia on 23 June to take up
their new responsibilities.

The Commander-In-Chief reached Cambridge,

Massachusetts, late in the evening on 2 July.

He formally opened his

headquarters the next day.

Washington Takes Command.

Washington arrived at Cambridge with the mission of turning the
armed forces assembled there into a unified army.
needed improvement:

Three major areas

tactical and administrative organization above the

35. Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 53-54. White, "Standing Armies,"
pp. 95-97, 109-10, 112, 119* Lawrence Delbert Cress, "The Standing Army,
The Militia, and the New Republic: Changing Attitudes Toward the Mili
tary in American Society, 1768 to 1820" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Virginia, 1976), pp. 114-38.
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regimental level; a centralized special staff; and a unified system of
discipline.

Washington and the other generals appointed by Congress

were guided in this work by Congress' general directions and by the
model of the British Army.

At the end of 1775, although the troops

still came primarily from the five northernmost colonies, national control
over the Continental Army was well established.
Regiments from the different New England colonies arrived at Boston
in a piecemeal fashion and occupied positions according to the dictates
of terrain and the road network.

Washington brought greater rationality

and control by introducing divisions and brigades as echelons between
his own headquarters and the regiments.

His pattern of organization

was adapted to the specific geographic conditions and personalities he
encountered at Boston.

On 22 July, after some hesitancy because of the

problems over rank and precedence and the lack of positive guidance from
Congress, Washington assigned his available generals to command three
divisions and six brigades, each responsible for a sector of the siege
lines.

36

The British occupied two peninsulas in Boston harbor which

were connected to the mainland by narrow necks.

Ward, with brigades

under Thomas and Spencer, guarded the southern or right wing opposite
Boston Neck.

Lee manned the left wing, shutting off Charlestown Penin

sula with Sullivan*8 and Greene's Brigades.

The third division was held

in the central area of the lines as a reserve force under Washington's
close supervision.

Putnam, whose appointment as a major general created

the thorniest problem, commanded Heath's Brigade and the sixth brigade.

36. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 349, 354-6, 396-7. The
printed version of the 22 July 1775 general order is Incomplete.
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The latter was under the temporary command of the senior colonel because
Pomeroy's vacancy was not filled.
out the siege.

This arrangement was retained through

Each brigade, normally six regiments, defended its own

sector, while the specialized riflemen and artillery remained directly
under Washington's headquarters.
Congress began creating a staff structure on 16 June, but had filled
only one post immediately, appointing Gates as Adjutant General.

Over

the succeeding weeks Congress and Washington selected the other staff
members.^

The primacy Congress accorded the Adjutant General is evi

dent in Gates' immediate appointment and his rank as a general officer.
In the British Army the Adjutant General, working closely with the
civilian Secretary at War, had responsibility for discipline, compila
tion of rolls and rosters, and supervision of drills and clothing.

By

the time of the Revolutionary War the British had also developed a tem
porary staff adjutant general for each major expeditionary force.

This

officer handled guards, details, paperwork (including the transmission
of orders), and the formation of the infantry into the line of battle.
A brigade-level officer, the brigade major, and a detail of sergeants
who acted as messengers assisted him.

This expeditionary officer served

as the model for the Continental Army's Adjutant General.

For his part,

Washington left Gates to establish the Army's internal administrative

37. General background on the duties of staff officers is contained in
the following sat af sources: George Smith, An Universal Military Dic
tionary ... (London: J. Milan, 1779); S. G. P. Ward, Wellington's Head
quarters: A Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula 18091814 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 10-31; and Clifford
Walton, History of the British Standing Army. AP 1660 to 1700 (London:
Harrison and Sons, 1894), pp. 615-29, 637-47.
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procedures, a task he performed efficiently.

In particular, difficulty

in compiling the first strength return, a major portion of Gates' job,
led to the introduction of printed forms and regularized procedures.

38

On 14 September Congress confirmed, with the rank of colonel, the New
York Provincial Congress' selection of Edward Fleming as Deputy Adjutant General for the New York Department.

39

Army administration supervised by the Adjutant General extended to
lower echelons.

British brigade majors were captains temporarily selec

ted by a brigade commander to serve as his liaison officer between the
adjutant general and the regiments.

Since a British Army brigade was

a transitory formation, the office of brigade major was not permanent.
He also supervised the daily working and guard parties of the brigade.
The adjutant paralleled the brigade major on the regimental level.

40

A

junior company officer customarily was assigned this duty in the British
Army in addition to his normal tasks.

He assisted the major, who retained

nominal responsibility for the regimental staff.

In the Continental

Army both the brigade major and the adjutant were initially modeled
after these British precedents with one important exception.

They were

normally set apart as distinct offices rather than additional duties.

38. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 318-9, 328, 335. George A.
Billias, "Horatio Gates: A Professional Soldier," in George A. Billias,
ed., George Washington's Generals (New York: William Morrow and Co.,
1964), pp. 82-84. Charles H. Lesser, The Sinews of Independence: Month
ly Strength Reports of the Continental Army (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1976), pp. xli-xxviii. Record Group 93, National Archives,
contains weekly returns which were maintained as a separate accounting
system to assure accuracy.
39. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 220-3, 249. Force, American Archives,
4th Ser., 2: 1803; 3: 549, 564. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 631; 2:
19-20. Fleming was actually a third choice.
40. Permanent garrisons contained a town major with functions similar
to those of a brigade major.
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Massachusetts had appointed William Henshaw as Ward's adjutant
general and Samuel Brewer as Thomas' on 27 June to service the two
concentrations of Massachusetts troops which had developed.

When Washing

ton informed Congress of his army's command organization on 10 July*
Congress assumed correctly that he had established three geographical
centers.

It therefore authorized three brigade majors.

Washington

accepted the existence of Massachusetts' two adjutants general and Rhode
Island's brigade major as de facto brigade majors and requested Congress
to authorize one for each of the army's six brigades.

In August* when

Congress failed to reply* he acted on his own authority and appointed
David Henly* John Trumbull* and Richard Cary* and confirmed Brewer*
Daniel Box of Rhode Island* and Alexander Scammell.

The pattern estab

lished in these Initial appointments continued throughout the war.

Con

gress normally delegated authority to appoint brigade majors to either
the Commander-in-Chief or the territorial department commanders, who in
turn deferred selection of specific individuals to the brigade commanders.^
The remaining administrative staff also followed British precedent.
Washington and Congress used the Paymaster General* the disburser of
funds, to consolidate Continental control over the Army's finances.

Two

important militant politicians, James Warren of Massachusetts and Jona
than Trumbull* Jr.* of Connecticut* were elected on 27 and 28 July as

41. Force* American Archives* 4th Ser., 2: 581, 783, 1451-2. Ford* Jour
nals of Congress. 2: 190. Smith* Letters of Delegates. Is 662-4; 2: 42.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 3: 320-9, 352-3, 390-9, 425, 427,
456, 461-3. Edmund Cody Burnett* ed.* Letters of Members of the Contin
ental Congress (8 vols., Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington*
1921-36), 3: 262-3. William Henshaw, The orderly book of Colonel Wil
liam Henshaw. of the American army. April 20-September 26, 1775 (Boston:
A. Williams* 1881), p. 13.

the Paymaster General and Deputy Paymaster General for the New York De
partment respectively.

At the end of the siege of Boston Warren declined

to move with the Army to New York.

Congress replaced him on 27 April

1776 with William Palfrey, a Boston merchant who had been John Hancock's
An

business manager and Charles Lee's aide. *

This staff department remained

relatively small and Animportant In the Continental Army.

In the British

Army, where regiments were the property of their colonels, the Paymaster
General served as the channel through which funds were transmitted to
the regiment's civilian commercial agent.

Since most supplies were

issued directly in the Continental Army, the agent system never devel
oped and the Paymaster General concentrated narrowly on disbursing funds
for salaries.
The British Commissary General of Musters (or Mustermaster General)
was the official watchdog who insured that regimental commanders actually
furnished the men and equipment they claimed payment for.
had appointed two mustermasters as early as 6 May.

Massachusetts

As indicated, Congress

included a Mustermaster General in the first set of staff officers, al
though it delegated selection of an individual to Washington.

He chose

Stephen Moylan, a wealthy Irish Catholic merchant from Philadelphia, one
of the earliest volunteers from outside New England.
authorized a deputy for the New York Department.

On 29 July Congress

43

42. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 346-52; 4: 470-3; 5: 11-12.
Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 93, 209-12; 4: 42-44, 296, 314-6. Smith,
Letters of Delegates, 1: 667-8, 682. Henderson, Party Politics, p. 54.
43. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 750, 790-5. Ford, Journals
of Congress. 2: 93, 190, 220-3. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 3:
320-9, 414. Charles Lee, "The Lee Papers," 4 vols., New-York Historical
Soceity Collections for 1871-74, 1: 199-200.
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Commanders' personal staffs, the aides and secretaries authorized
on 16 June, completed the Army's 1775 administrative apparatus.

Fol

lowing British precedent, the Commander-ln-Chlef and the major gener
als selected these Individuals for their political connections as well
as their abilities.

The aides acted as messengers; the military secre

taries performed most of the correspondence duties.

During 1775

Washington's "family," as these individuals were collectively known,
contained various important young politicians or members of powerful
families.

This talented group included at different times Thomas

Mifflin (a militant member of the Pennsylvania delegation in the First
Continental Congress) and Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania, John Trumbull,
a son of Connecticut's Governor, and three Virginians, Edmund Randolph,
George Baylor, and Robert Hanson Harrison.44
British logistical practices divided supervisory responsibilities
between a Commissary General of Stores and Provisions, a civil officer
who was concerned with foodstuffs and the procurement and storage of
general supplies, and the military Quartermaster General who controlled
transportation and forage, as well as the army's marching and camping.
A separate branch handled munitions.

When Washington arrived at Boston,

he reviewed the supply measures undertaken by the several colonies.

He

was most impressed with the work of Joseph Trumbull of Connecticut, the
colony which he expected to furnish a large share of the supplies for
the siege.

On his recommendation Congress appointed Trumbull Commissary

44. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 3: 309-11, 342, 352, 354,
368-9, 419, 425-6, 450-4; 4: 68. Berthold Fernow, "Washington's Mill
tary Family," Magazine of American History, 7 (1881), pp. 81-87.
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General on 19 July.

Washington appointed Philadelphia merchant Thomas

Mi££lin as the Quartermaster General on 14 August, and three days
later, having persuaded Congress to create the office of Commissary
of Artillery to handle that branch's special needs, he continued
Ezekiel Cheever as a Continental officer in the role he had been per
forming for Massachusetts.

A similar organization was created for

Schuyler's force since Congress realized the practical difficulties of
consolidating logistics for such widely separated

a r m ie s .45

At this stage of the war Congress largely left the development of
the logistical apparatus to the judgment of the local commanders, who
relied in turn on British precedents.

The most important official was

the regimental quartermaster, a position that the Continental Army ele
vated from an additional duty to permanent status.

He was responsible

for distributing rations, clothing, and ammunition within the regiment.
He assigned the men their quarters and supervised pitching camp.

A

dally duty detail of about six privates, the "camp color men," assisted
him.

Supplementing the military officers were numerous civilian func

tionaries in the commissariat.

They included such specialists as con

ductors, clerks, storekeepers, laborers, and skilled craftsmen.46

45. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 93, 190. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 3: 309, 320-9, 378-9, 419, 427-8, 514-5. Smith, Letters of
Delegates. 1: 521-2, 529, 632, 641-3, 662-4.
46. For detailed logistical studies see: Victor Leroy Johnson, The
Administration of the American Commissariat During the Revolutionary
War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1941); and Erna Risch,
Supplying Washington's Army (a forthcoming publication of the U.S. Army
Center of Military History). Special studies of British logistics in
clude: Norman Baker, Government and Contractors: The British Treasury
and War Supplies 1775-1783 (London: University of London, 1971); R. A.
Bowler, Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America 17751783 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); and David Syrett,
Shipping and the American War 1775-83: A Study of British Transport
Organization (London: University of London, 1970).
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Medical care formed another area of special support which drew
attention very early in the war.

The regimental surgeon and his one

or two assistants, or mates, provided basic care in the Continental
and British Armies.

Washington, drawing on his French and Indian War

experience, bolstered their efforts by trying to convince the soldiers
of the Importance of sanitation and diet.

Congress followed the lead

taken by Massachusetts, and on 27 July created a centralized hospital
organization and medical supply system.

The New York Department was

later given a similar hospital corps under Dr. Samuel Stringer, an
Albany politician and Schuyler's personal physician.

Dr. Benjamin

Church, a member of the Massachusetts political leadership, was appoin
ted as the first Director General and Chief Physician.

When he was

revealed as a British spy in the autumn, he was replaced by the noted
Philadelphian, Dr. John Morgan.

Under Morgan a major step towards

central control was instituted when regimental medical personnel were
required to pass competency examinations.^
New England, a region with strong religious consciousness,
naturally provided for spiritual as well as physical welfare.

Chaplains

had served on all major expeditions since the Pequot War of 1637, and
the New England clergy had been politically active in the pre-war period.
In 1775 Connecticut and New Hampshire both authorized a chaplain for

47. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 209-11, 249; 3: 297. Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington. 3: 440-1, 449-50; 4: 2-3, 345-6; 5: 125-6. Smith,
Letters of Delegates. 1; 558-9, 662-4. Philip Cash, Medical Men at the
Siege of Boston April. 1775-April. 1776: Problems of the Massachusetts
and Continental Armies (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society,
1973). Richard L. Blanco, "The Development of British Military Medi
cine 1793-1814." Military AffAArs. 38 (1974), pp. 4-10.
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each regiment, while Rhode Island allowed one for Its brigade.
culties arose in Massachusetts.

Diffi

On 20 May it had scrapped a plan to

provide one chaplain for each regiment, deciding instead to accept the
offer of the Congregational1st Church (the colony's officially sup
ported denomination) to provide clergymen on a rotating basis.

Within

two weeks this plan was discarded as unworkable, and the generals and
field officers selected nine official chaplains.

This concept of let

ting the units select chaplains, rather than the authorities assigning
them, became standard procedure in every colony except Georgia and the
Carolines, and was recognized by Congress as well.^®
Regimental organizations contained another type of specialist
that played an important role, although not technically considered a
staff function.
as well.

Companies included a drummer and in most cases a fifer

Unlike modern musicians, these individuals were concerned with

signaling rather than morale and were commonly massed behind the regi
ment in a battle.

The eighteenth-century drum produced a sound that

could be heard at distances of several miles and in groups could carry
over the din of combat.

Standard beats regulated the routine of camp

life and transmitted orders during battle.

Drummers and fifers addi

tionally administered corporal punishment, maintained the regimental
guard room, and assisted the surgeon and quartermaster in evacuating
casualties.

As early as 1777 they began to carry arms, and combat

functions became more important than musical skill as the war progressed.

48. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 766, 815-6, 876, 1384.
Eugene Franklin Williams, "Soldiers of God: Chaplains of the Revolu
tionary War" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1972).
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In 1776 drum and fife majors were added to the regimental staff as
performing musicians with the responsibility for instructing drummers
and fifers.

They received higher pay than their British counterparts.^

Later in the war the "field music" provided by the fifers and drum
mers was supplemented by a few "bands of music."

These were true bands

normally containing up to eight musicians playing a variety of woodwinds
and horns.

Unlike European armies, the Continental Army did not hire

civilians as bandsmen, but allowed soldiers to perform as an additional
duty.

The bands, which were maintained by only a handful of regiments,

were legally the property of the officers of the regiment who pooled
their funds to purchase instruments and pay the musicians.

Even Washing

ton had to ask their permission if he wished a band to perform at a
formal ceremony or at an unofficial dance.
The final type of staff officer proved to be the most difficult to
obtain.

While many civilian occupations required skills which could be

applied in the Army -- for example, merchants were able to step into
various logistical assignments -- military engineering was a highly
technical field.

Americans knew a great deal about civil construction

and could erect simple field works, but they were not on a par with
formally trained European military engineers.

Congress had authorized

Washington and Schuyler each to have one chief engineer and two assis
tants, but neither commander ever found enough suitable candidates.

49. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 181-2; 9: 124-7; H : 335-6,
366-7; 14: 293-4. Simon Vance Anderson, "American Music During the War
of Independence, 1775-1783" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan,
1965). Raoul F. Camus, Military Music of the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976).
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Washington had to make do with a handful of men who were at best gifted
amateurs:

Col. Gridley and Lt. Col. Burbeck of the Artillery Regiment,

Jeduthan Baldwin, and Rufus Putnam.

They created a ring of earthworks

which the British chose not to attack, but could not press a formal
siege of Boston.

Their lack of skill turned operations into a mere

blockade, dictating a strategy of trying to lure the British into costly
frontal attacks and strongly influencing Washington's tactical organization.

50

The final requirement to turn the force at Boston into an army also
involved the creation of special staff officers.

Discipline, the mili

tary system of obedience and Internal control, was an absolute neces
sity for the linear warfare of the eighteenth century.

Washington

arrived at Cambridge to find that charges of misconduct in the battle
of Bunker Hill had been levelled against a number of officers.

He

immediately informed the army that cowardice was
A Crime ... _the most infamous in a Soldier, the most
injourlous
sic_/ to an Army, and the last to be forgiven;
inasmuch as it may, and often does happen, that the
Cowardice of a single officer may prove the Distruction
sic_/ of the whole Army.^1

]_

]_

The Commander-in-Chief's attitudes had been formed during the French and
Indian War by his experiences as a commander of Provincials and an ob
server of the British Army.

They were founded on a deep insight into

50. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 340-1. Force, American
Archives, 2: 767-8, 1436. Lee, "Papers," 1: 199-200. Thomas Williams
Baldwin, ed., The Revolutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin 17751778 (Bangor: De Burians, 1906), pp. 17-29. The British Army began
formal training of its engineers with the founding of the Royal Military
Academy at Woolwich in 1741.
51. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 313-4.
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the nature of American society and the realities of the era.

Washing

ton's ideas on discipline dominated the Continental A r m y . ^
New England's military and civil law both grew from English roots.
Tradition and the Radical Whig Ideology of the region's leaders in
1775 insured that the disciplinary system created for the New England
armies was less draconian than Great Britain's.
Articles of War on 5 April.

Massachusetts approved

In May Connecticut and Rhode Island adop

ted similar codes, while New Hampshire accepted Massachusetts' on
June.

29

Derived from British articles in force since 1765, the fifty-three

clauses defined crimes, punishments, and legal procedures.

Minor of

fenses were punishable by summary action of the regimental commander,
intermediary crimes were subject to a regimental court-martial, and the
most serious were tried at a general court-martial.

Most offenses were

handled with fines or corporal punishment (up to a maximum of thirtynine lashes); only desertion in combat and betraying the password

to the

enemy were subject to the death penalty.
The first Continental Articles of War adopted by Congress on 30
June added sixteen clauses to the basic Massachusetts text.

The extra

articles covered applicability, the preparation of administrative forms,
pardons, suttlers, and the disposition of personal effects of deceased

52. The following discussion is based on: Ford, Journals of Congress,
2: 111-22, 220-3; 3: 331-4; Force. American Archives. 4th Ser., 1:
1350-6; 2: 564-70, 1145-6, 1180; 3: 411-2, 1164; 5th Ser., 1: 576;
Smith, Letters of Delegates, lj 517, 558-9, 584-5; Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington. 3: 320-9, 346-52, 378, 411; 4: 7-13, 22-25, 206-7, 220,
224, 232-3, 527; Robert Harry Berlin, "The Administration of Military
Justice in the Continental Army During the American Revolution, 17751783" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Santa Barbara,
1976); and Maurer Maurer, "Military Justice Under General Washington,"
Military Affairs. 28 (1964), pp. 8-16.

soldiers.

This naterial was contained in the British articles, but

had been omitted by the New Englanders.

The Continental text was

distributed to the troops at Boston on 10 August.
ment developed throughout the summer.

Concern for improve

Following a conference between

a Congressional committee and the staff, sixteen changes were adopted
by Congress on 7 November.

They expanded the list of capital crimes.

The revision, which had been prompted by the realization that under
existing articles treason was not a punishable offense, want into
effect on 1 January 1776.

At this time Washington began serious efforts

to enforce the Continental Articles because lingering doubts over their
legal applicability for men enlisted prior to 14 June were finally
resolved.
Although Washington relied heavily on British precedents and the
unofficial legal advice of William Tudor, he recognized the Importance
of a permanent staff to assist him.

Congress approved his plan to

appoint a judge advocate as a legal advisor and a provost marshal to
enforce camp discipline.

Tudor, a Harvard graduate who had studied

law under John Adams, was appointed on 30 July as the "Judge Advocate
of the Continental Army."

His principal function was supervising trials.

The general supervision of discipline, however, remained a function of
the Adjutant General.

William Marony became the first provost marshal

only on 10 January 1776.

The provost's functions were identical in

both the British and Continental Armies:

maintaining the army jail and

supervising the daily camp guards furnished by line regiments in rota
tion.

The office suffered from a heavy personnel turnover throughout

the war, largely because the provost was required to serve as the Army's
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executioner.

Washington normally selected a sergeant and conferred on

him the temporary rank of captain.
By mid-October 1775 Washington had made great progress in organi
zing, staffing, and disciplining his army, although his correspondence
indicates that he still was not satisfied.

The Mail- Army actually

exceeded the 22,000 men Congress had agreed to support.^

In addition

to the artillery, riflemen, and a handful of separate companies, it
included 27 Infantry regiments from Massachusetts, 5 from Connecticut,
and 3 each from New Hampshire and Rhode Island.

Although each colony's

units had different authorized strengths, most were at least 90 percent
full on paper.

Only eight of the Massachusetts regiments were between

80 and 90 percent complete, while three others fell below 80 percent.
The individual units averaged 474 rank and file, ranging between 364
and 816.

The total infantry rank and file strength of the Main Army

was 19,497.

There were also 690 drummers and fifers, 1,298 sergeants,

934 company officers, i-63 regimental staff officers, and 94 field of
ficers.

Of the total rank and file strength, nearly 2,500 were sick,

750 were on furlough, and 2,400 were detached on various duties.

53.
General Return, Main Army, 17 Oct 1775; Record Group 93, National
Archives. Interpretation of Continental Army strength returns requires
special care in understanding the categories used by the staff. Officers
and noncommissioned officers were counted if present in camp but not if
on detached duties. More complete information was furnished for rank and
file (privates and corporals). Sick were classified as either "present"
(with their unit) or "absent" (in a hospital or on convalescent leave).
"On Command" included all men currently on detached duty, either in the
immediate vicinity of camp or at a distance. A true picture of the com
bat strength of a unit would include the rank and file "present fit for
duty" plus a significant percentage of those on command or sick present:
the former representing men who could be recalled on short notice, the
latter those men capable of bearing arms in a defensive situation. The
sergeants and officers in the company grades also represent a combat
force.

Four of the six brigades contained approximately 2,400 men in
combat strength.
men.

Sullivan's Brigade was slightly larger with 2,700

The largest brigade was Spencer's (3,200) because it contained

two of the large Connecticut regiments and several separate companies.
The relative strengths of the divisions reflected their defensive responsibilities.
400 smaller.

Ward's had the most men (5,600) and Lee's was only

The reserve division under Putnam was the smallest,

containing only 4,800 men, while the 700 riflemen remained outside
the divisional alignment.

This total force was substantial.

It was

equipped with a staff organization and a disciplinary system, and was
grouped into a tactical arrangement which suited its location and mis
sion.

On the other hand the British had not tested it in battle.

Washington finished 1775 unsure of the army's combat potential and
eager to resolve some of the remaining issues relating to its internal
organization.

The War Spreads to Canada.

Congressional control over a military establishment was not limited
to Washington's Main Army in eastern Massachusetts.

The 10 May 1775

seizure of Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain had played an important
role in persuading Congress to take military action.

It also expanded

the horizons of the conflict by resurrecting fears of an invasion from
Canada along the Champlain-Hudson River corridor which had been so
important during the colonial wars.

Unfortunately, the irregulars who

had taken the fort under the leadership of Ethan Allen of the "Green
Mountain Boys" and Benedict Arnold, a Connecticut volunteer acting under
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a Massachusetts commission, quickly melted away.

The fort and its

valuable cannon required more security than the Committee of Corres
pondence of Albany County could provide from the handful of local volun
teer companies at its disposal.

Congress stepped in by assuming re

sponsibility for the 4th Connecticut Regiment which was sent to protect
the area from British counterattack, and by directing New York to raise
3,000 troops.
Washington and Schuyler, commander of the New York
(known for most of the war as the

Department

Northern Department), discussed plans

on their trip north from Philadelphia.

Washington gave his instructions

to Schuyler on 25 June when they parted company at New York City.

The

Commander-in-Chief emphasized organization and the creation of a logis
tical apparatus, but told his subordinate to follow any instructions
that came directly from Congress.

On 20 July Congress formalized their

arrangements, creating the territorial department as one of the basic
command elements of the Continental Army when it instructed Schuyler
to dispose of and employ all the troops in the New York
department in such manner as he may think best for the
protection and defense of these colonies, ... subject
to future orders of the commander in c h i e f . ^
Schuyler's little army contained the 4th Connecticut Regiment, the 1st
and 5th Connecticut Regiments near New York City, and the 3,000 newly
authorized New Yorkers.

His subordinate generals, Montgomery and

Wooster, reflected the two-colony origin of his force.

54. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 194.
55. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 302-4. Force, American
Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 1667-8. Schuyler's first monthly report to
Washington is dated 15 July and includes the department's first return
dated 1 July.
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The New York Provincial Congress, for a variety of reasons, did
not approve a plan for organizing and recruiting its quota until 27
June.

The selection of officers took another three days.

The four

regiments it decided on fell between the extremes of the New England
regiments in size.

Each contained ten companies; each company was com

posed of 3 officers and 72 enlisted men.

The companies were apportioned

to the various counties whose committees of correspondence supervised
recruiting.

This gave the regiments a geographical basis, and their

numerical designations reflected the militia precedence of the counties
which furnished the bulk of the men.^®
Alexander McDougall, a leader of the Sons of Liberty, commanded
the 1st New York Regiment which was raised in New York City.

He had

no military experience, but his radical political credentials were
impeccable.

A substantial proportion of his officers had backgrounds

in either the French and Indian War or in the city's elite volunteer
militia battalion.

The 2d regiment was assigned to Albany, the colony's

other urban area, and the surrounding regions in the north.

Colonel

Goose Van Schaick was the son of a former mayor, and many of the offi
cers came from the Dutch element of the population.

The 3d and 4th

regiments divided the rest of the colony, roughly along the line of the
Hudson River.
3d.

James Clinton, a leader in Ulster County, commanded the

James Holmes and Philip Van Cortlandt, from Westchester and

56. Ibid.. 2: 1259, 1267, 1275, 1280, 1314-28, 1334-5, 1719-20, 1796;
3: 23-25, 525, 527, 532, 1268-9. James Sullivan and Alexander C. Flick,
eds., Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence 1775-1778 (2
vols., Albany: University of the State of New York, 1923-25), 1: 120-1,
140-2. See Table 1.
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Dutchess Counties respectively, became colonel and lieutenant colonel
of the 4th.

In practice, the officers selected for each regiment

represented the prevailing political sentiments of their portion of the
colony.

The colony's newly established Committee of Safety also de

cided to form an artillery company as part of their contingent, and
appointed John Lamb, another New York City Son of Liberty, as its com
mander on 17 July.

The company was raised in the city and organized

on the same pattern as the companies of the Artillery Regiment at
Boston.57
As a reward for Ethan Allen's role in the seizure of Ticonderoga,
the Continental Congress authorised the formation of a special unit for
Schuyler's army.

The Green Mountain Boys were a quasi-independent

group in the area known as the Hampshire Grants (today's Vermont).
Congress recognized that they possessed special skills in wilderness
fighting, but that they were fiercely independent.

Therefore it in

structed Schuyler and the New York Provincial Congress, which deferred
to Schuyler, to allow them to organize seven companies and elect their
own officers.

They were formed into a regiment on the New York pattern,

with the same terms of enlistment as the New Yorkers, but commanded by
a lieutenant colonel rather than a colonel.

To Allen's disgust, Seth

57. Force. American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 1140, 1791, 1811-3; 3: 445,
563. Historical Magazine. 1st Ser., 7 (1863), pp. 194-5. Roger J.
Champagne, Alexander McDougall and the American Revolution in New York
(Schenectady:
New York State American Revolution Bicentennial Commis
sion, 1975), pp. 90-95. Isaac Q. Leake, Memoir of the Life and Times of
General John Lamb (Albany: Munsell, 1850). Rich insight into the crea
tion of these first New York units comes from the papers of McDougall
and Lamb. Both collections are in the New-York Historical Society.
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Warner, a veteran o£ Rogers' Rangers of the French and Indian War,
received command of the small regiment.

58

Schuyler, following Congressional instructions, launched an invasion of Canada on 31 August.

Montgomery was given the primary tacti

cal responsibility for the offensive.

Governor Guy Carleton unsuccess

fully attempted to halt the Americans at St. John's (St. Jean, Quebec),
and then was driven back toward Quebec City before winter weather re
stricted Montgomery'8 movements.

The regiments of Schuyler's army

were supplemented during this offensive by reinforcements from the
French-Canadian population and by Major Timothy Bedel's three companies
of rangers.

New Hampshire had raised the latter men as state troops

during the summer to guard the Connecticut River Valley, and on Washing
ton's advice offered them to Schuyler as soon as it became clear that
the region was not in Immediate danger

.^

Washington launched a second invasion directly from Boston.

This

maneuver not only had the military purpose of complicating Carleton's
defensive problems, but it also enabled Washington to send reinforce
ments to Montgomery by the most direct route.

On 11 September the

Commander-in-Chief gave Benedict Arnold, who had returned to Boston,
command of a special force of 1,100 men drawn from the Main Army.
Three rifle companies (Morgan's from Virginia and Matthew Smith's and

58. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 1339; 3: 529-30, 570-1, 12689. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 105. Smith, Letters of Delegates,
1: 541.
59. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 109-10. Force, American Archives,
4th Ser., 2- 655-7, 1183, 1767; 3: 60, 697, 779. Fitzpatrick. Writings
of Washington, 3: 370-1, 436-9. Otis G. Hammond, ed., Letters and
Papers of Major-General John Sullivan. Continental Army (3 vols., Concord:
New Hampshire Historical Society, 1930-39), 1: 65-68, 71-72.
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William Hendricks' from the Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment) and two pro
visional five-company infantry battalions of New Englanders reached
the banks of the St. Lawrence River on 9 November after an epic trek
through the virgin wilderness of Maine.

Arnold was too weak to attack

the city of Quebec alone and had to wait for Montgomery.

The latter

had paused at Montreal to regroup his disease-riddled ranks.
forces linked outside Quebec on 1 December.

The two

Although Montgomery was

able to persuade some of his troops to extend their enlistments beyond
31 December 1775, many more indicated that they would leave for their
homes at the start of the new year.

Carleton could not be bluffed into

surrendering, and Lamb's field guns were Ineffective against the city's
walls.

Montgomery had to gamble on storming the works, and he made his

attempt on the night of 30-31 December under the cover of a snowstorm.
He was killed, the attack was repulsed, and a wounded Arnold was left
to command the handful of men who continued to blockade the city as
1776 began.

Summary.

By the end of 1775 control over the war effort had passed from the
individual northern colonies to the Continental Congress.

Acting as a

national government that body had appointed general officers, initiated
the development of staff and disciplinary systems, accepted the finan
cial responsibility for existing units and authorized the creation of
others, and formed two major operational commands.

George Washington,

a delegate unanimously chosen as Commander-in-Chief, took charge of the
Main Army which penned the British into Boston.

Philip Schuyler, another
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delegate, led the smaller £orce created to defend New York and later
employed in a preemptive invasion of Canada.
Various conditions prevented Washington and Congress from imposing
a fully rational arrangement during the first months of the war.
had to accept existing forces and react to the flow of events.

They
More

important, they operated within a very special political and ideological
context.

Any action taken needed the support of the militants who had

been most vocal in opposing imperial policy during the previous decade
as well as more moderate elements.

The rhetoric of the period of pro

test vigorously rejected the need for a large "standing army" of regular
soldiers in America and made an intellectual commitment to a virtuous
citizen-soldiery.

The outbreak of hostilities in Massachusetts did not

change this attitude.

In fact Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill

seemed to confirm the assumption that properly motivated militiamen
were adequate for local defense.
Congress carefully stressed that it acted only out of self-defense
in an effort to secure a broad base of support for its swasures.

The

modest size of its army, 27,000 men, and the short period of that army's
enlistment were direct products of American opposition to the notion of
a standing army.

They were also reflections of American experiences in

raising forces during the earlier colonial wars.

The first Continental

Army units thus resembled the Provincials of the French and Indian War
who were raised for a specific term to counter a clearly identified
enemy.

The first units of the Revolutionary War, raised and organized

by the governing bodies of the individual colonies, with the assistance
of local committees of correspondence or safety, were ideologically
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viable because they were responsible to "the people."

Indeed, except

for the rifle companies, the men were technically enlisted in the ser
vice of the various colonial governments which then turned the units
over to Congress.
The first officers of the Continental Army, like the officers who
had commanded the Provincials, came from the leadership of individual
communities.

They were products of the militia system, chosen for their

experience, their ability to recruit, and especially for their political
reliability.

That these leaders mirrored the socio-political elites of

their respective colonies is not surprising.
eighteenth century was deferential.

American society in the

Leadership in every sphere of life

was entrusted to men of merit and wealth because they had the greatest
stake in society.

In return the leaders were obligated to serve society

to the best of their abilities.

If the leaders failed to live up to

their responsibilities they were removed.

The senior officers of the

Continental Army turned out to have a remarkable amount of practical
military experience, largely earned as captains and field officers
during the French and Indian War.
that of their opponents.

This experience was comparable to

In 1775 few of the junior officers in the

British regiments in America had ever heard a shot fired in combat, and
most of the senior officers had little experience beyond the lower field
grades.

The Continental commanders had an advantage in their more flex

ible and open approach to the art of war.

Aware that they had much to

learn, they tended as a group to approach problems with a less rigid
attitude, and, in effect, grew into their jobs.
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Washington, in cooperation with Congress, worked during 1775 to
impose unity and cohesion on the several armies he found at Boston.
His task was made easier by the relative homogeneity of the New England
colonies and by their long tradition of military cooperation.
was made in creating a functional staff.

Progress

Brigades, divisions, and

separate territorial departments formed the pattern of command organi
zation used throughout the war by the Continental Army; all three eche
lons were introduced in 1775.

Washington still had several goals for

1776, particularly standardizing the regimental organization and foster
ing a sense of common identity, but he had made important progress
during his first months of command.

He now turned to the task of re-

enlisting his soldiers directly under Continental auspices and reorgan
izing them into a genuinely Continental institution.

CHAPTER III
THE CONTINENTAL REGIMENTS OF 1776:
BOSTON AND QUEBEC

During 1775* the first year of the War of American Independence,
British Army regulars fought hastily*formed American units in eastern
Massachusetts and in Canada.

Each of the New England colonies raised

its own army in the aftermath of Lexington and Concord, and New York
followed suit with the Continental Congress' encouragement.

Lack of

centralized direction allowed each colony to base its regimental or
ganization on its own particular experience in the earlier imperial
wars.

Congress accepted responsibility for them in June when it es

tablished the Continental Army.

By December Congress, without serious

political disagreement, had created a set of generals, a staff, and a
disciplinary system.

The enlistments of most of the soldiers composing

the field armies besieging Boston and Quebec expired on the last day
of that month.

Congress, George Washington, and the Army's senior

leaders used the reenlistment of those troops to transform the Army
into a unified national force.

In the process they emphasized lessons

derived from the French and Indian War.

Evaluation of the reorganization

raised important ideological issues relating to the military, and led
to the first important political debates later in the year.

Washington's unified Reorganization.

In his first week at Boston George Washington identified several
problems relating to the Continental Army's organization.
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His earliest
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letters to Congress reported these defects and suggested solutions.
Congress realized that enlistments would probably expire before any
changes could produce results, and decided to conduct a thorough in
vestigation rather than taking temporary action.

During the summer

individual delegates visited the Main Army, and in the fall a special
committee held extensive discussions with military and civil leaders
in New England.

Based on that committee's report and Washington's

recommendations a number of major reforms were introduced when the
Army was reorganized for 1776.
Washington's first concern was the weakness of so many of the Mas
sachusetts regiments.

Because the generals unanimously agreed "that no

Dependence can be put on the Militia for a continuance in Camp, or Regu
larity and Discipline during the short time they may stay,"1' calling
out militia units to supplement the Main Army was not a viable alter
native.

Washington attempted to fill the Massachusetts regiments al

though he privately doubted that he would succeed, and as early as 10
July 1775 he suggested that Congress recruit in areas outside of New
England.

In time he also decided that some incompetent officers were

undermining the quality of the rest of the Army.

Washington blamed

this problem on Massachusetts' method of selecting officers and urged
Congress to retain sole control over commissions.

That policy would

have the additional advantage of expanding the geographical base of the
officer corps, a contribution towards making the Army a national

1. Washington to Congress, 10 Jul 1775, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed.,
The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources
1745-1799 (39 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-44),
3: 327.
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institution.

Washington also complained that the differences in the

New England regimental organizations hampered efficient operations.
During an August recess several members of Congress traveled to
Massachusetts for a personal view of their army.

On their return

Congress promised to make improvements when the Army was reorganized
for 1776 and asked Washington to send particular proposals.

On 29

September 1775 the delegates created a special committee to confer with
the Commander*in-Chief, his senior advisors, and officials of the New
England governments.

New England delegates initially interpreted this

action as a criticism of their colonies1 troops, but quickly dropped
their opposition and secured appointments to the committee for delegates
they knew would protect New England's interests.

Militant Benjamin

Franklin of Pennsylvania and the more moderate Thomas Lynch of North
Carolina quickly became members of the committee.

A second ballot

was needed before Benjamin Harrison of Virginia edged out the militant
Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut.
vigorous war effort.

All three delegates selected favored a

The composition of the committee^ appointed to

draft instructions for the investigating committee revealed the broad
base of the Army's support in Congress.
Congress' instructions insured that final action would remain
firmly in its own hands.

The committee, essentially a fact-finding

2. Ibid.. pp. 320-31, 390-400, 433, 450-4, 456-7, 505-13. On 10 July,
the date he submitted his first report, Washington also began a policy
of sending personal letters to members of Congress. These letters trans
mitted opinions which were impolitic to include in official dispatches;
the recipients acted as hi6 agents in securing desired legislation.
3. Militants Samuel Adams of Massachusetts and Richard H. Lee of Vir
ginia, and more conservative delegates John Rutledge of South Carolina,
Thomas Johnson of Maryland, and Robert R. Livingston of New York.

commission, arrived at Headquarters on 15 October.

Its first responsi

bility was to persuade the Connecticut troops to remain until 31 Decem
ber rather than leave on 10 December as their original enlistments
specified, and to convey to Washington the hopes of Congress that an
attack could be made on Boston before the end of the year.

The com

mittee's basic task, however, was to prepare a report for Congress on
the specific measures needed to reorganize the Army, including Schuyler's
troops, for an additional year's service.

They were particularly in

structed to discuss a uniform regimental organization, rates of pay and
rations, additional regulations, and the projected costs of the Army,
and to recommend a specific plan for raising the troops which would
A
retain as many veterans as possible.
Washington prepared for these meetings by collecting written opin
ions from his generals and heads of the staff departments, and by holding
a Council of War on 8 October.

This meeting enabled the Army to develop

a unified position, one which reflected the Commander-in-Chief's per
sonal views.

The officers wanted a new army of at least 20,000 men

organized into 26 infantry regiments, plus riflemen and artillery.
regiment was to be reduced from ten to eight companies.

Each

Each company

was to have a captain, 2 lieutenants, an ensign, A sergeants, A corporals,

A. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 177Ai-789 (3A vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 190A-37), 3:
265-7, 270-2. Paul H. Smith, _et _al., eds., Letters of Delegates to Cong
ress. 177A-1789 (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976), 2: 26-27,
6A-65, 79-86, 112-3. Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress (New
York: Macmillan, 19A1), pp. 101-8. Donald John Proctor, "From Insur
rection to Independence: The Continental Congress and the Military
Launching of the American Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Southern California, 1965), pp. 1A1-3, 151-83.
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a drummer, a fifer, and 76 privates, giving the regiment a total strength
of 728 officers and men.

Eight companies provided better tactical de

ployment in linear warfare and thus represented a step forward.

In

comparison to most of the existing regiments, the new regiment would
have stronger companies but would save money.

The generals begged the

question of how to select the officers because of its "delicacy."'*
These findings and the written staff reports formed the basis for
frank discussions with the Congressional committee and the New England
civilian representatives from 18 to 24 October.

The committee overruled

the generals on only one matter, setting the expiration of enlistments
at 31 December 1776 instead of 1 December.

Both the political and

military leaders agreed that enlistments should be limited to a single
year, so this was not a serious issue.

Washington was promised that

his Main Army would be reinforced before it was given additional re
sponsibility for the defense of New York City.

The committee, exceeding

its authority on the grounds of expediency, allowed him to begin reenlisting his men.

Congress began debating the committee's report on 2

November and completed action on the reorganization within a month.

It

was clearly impressed by the unanimity within the Army and approved the
recommendations with little change.

The committee thus served as the

vehicle for transmitting the Army's ideas to Congress, an important
precedent.**

5. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 7-13. Peter Force, ed., Amer
ican Archives: A Collection of Authentic Records, State Papers. Debates,
and Other Notices of Public Affairs (9 vols., Washington: M. St. Clair
Clarke and Peter Force, 1639-54), 4th Ser., 3: 1039-44. Other topics dis
cussed included pay, rations, conditions of enlistment, and regulations.
6. Ibid.. pp. 1155-67. Smith. Letters of Delegates. 2: 233-8, 243-4,
298, 337-8. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 22-23, 45-47. Ford,
Journals of Congress. 3: 313-4, 318.

83
On A November Congress approved the reorganization o£ 26 regiments
of Infantry with the structure recommended by the generals, as well as
the plan for implementing the reorganization and various administrative
nutters .

7

Brown coats with different colored facings (collar, lapels,

cuffs, and the inside lining of the coattails) to distinguish the regi
ments were established as the basic uniform, a system borrowed from the
red-coated British Army.

Each regiment contained 3 field officers (who

could not also be generals or captains), a small staff, and 8 companies.
Each company had A officers and 2 musicians, plus 8 noncommissioned
officers and 76 privates evenly divided into A squads.
the regiment deployed 6A0 privates and corporals.

At full strength

These combat soldiers

who stood in the ranks with muskets represented a high 88 percent of its
total.

Thirty-two officers and thirty-two sergeants furnished a favorable

ratio of one supervisor to ten rank and file for company-level control.
Although British and American regiments often operated throughout
the war below their nominal levels, a comparison of the official regi
mental organizations reveals some basic philosophical differences and
sheds light on their relative advantages and disadvantages.

The basic

single-battalion British infantry regiment was a far less formidable
organization despite an aggregate strength of 809.

It also had three

field officers on its rolls, but the colonel was a titular officer, the
lieutenant colonel often served as a brigadier, and either he or the

7. Ibid., pp. 321-5, 399. The regimental organization superseded one
established in October for New Jersey and Pennsylvania units by adding
a lieutenant, drummer, fifer, and 8 privates to each company; Ibid.,
pp. 285-6, 291. See Figure 2.
8. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, A: 213-A.
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major were frequently detailed to special duties.

Staff organization

was identical to that originally adopted by the Continentals, but British
chaplains and medical personnel were frequently absent.
had twelve companies.

Each regiment

Two were actually recruiting depots (one each in

England and Ireland), and two were elite flank companies.

The grenadier

company, composed of the largest men, was supposed to be the heavy
striking force placed on the right or honor flank of the regiment.

The

light infantry, originally formed during the Seven Years' War and only
restored as a permanent formation in 1771, were selected for their
agility and were supposed to be either skirmishers or to take post on
the left flank.

By the Revolution, however, the British normally con

solidated the grenadier and light infantry companies into special pro
visional flank battalions.

Commanders tended to use them in normal

combat roles, and since they drew replacements from the line companies,
they drained the best men from the eight companies remaining at the

9
disposal of the regimental commander.
Each British company had the same basic organization:

3 officers,

3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 2 drummers (actually a drummer and a fifer),

9. See Figure 3. Edward E. Curtis, Organization of the British Army in
the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), pp.
1-4, 23-24. Eric Robson, "British Light Infantry in the Mid-Eighteenth
Century: The Effect of American Conditions." Army Quarterly. 63 (1952),
pp. 209-22; and "The Raising of a Regiment in the War of American Inde
pendence," Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 27 (1949),
pp. 107-15^. Secretary at War Barrington to Gen. Gage, 31 Aug 1775; £ Bar
rington's_/ Circular to the Colonels, 26 Aug 1775; to Gen. Howe, 10 Jun
and 18 Oct 1776; Sec. of State Germain to Howe, 3 Sep 1777; Sec. at War
Jenklnson to Gen. Clinton, 5 Dec 1780; Clinton's General Orders for 26
Oct 1780; Headquarters Papers of the British Army in America, #27-29, 206,
288, 660, 3181-2, 3343. These documents are photostatic copies in the
collections of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, Williamsburg, Vir
ginia; the originals were presented in 1957 to the Queen and are currently
Class 30/55, Public Record Office.
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and 56 privates.

Both o£ the £lank companies had two lieutenants

rather than the normal lieutenant and ensign.

Three of the line, or

battalion, companies lacked a captain since the field officers also
held positions as captains.

The granadier company had two fifers, but

the slots were used for the regimental drum and fife majors.

Three

privates in every company were "contingent men," fictitious names car
ried on the regiment's rolls.

Their pay was used as a special fund to

care for the regiment'b widows and orphans.

All of these exceptions,

plus normal detachments and details, drastically reduced the fighting
strength of the regiment.

At best, an ideal rarely approximated, a

British lieutenant colonel could deploy only 514 men, 63 percent of the
theoretical strength.
were musketmen.
ten fighters:

Only 448 (87 percent of the deployable strength)

The British also had roughly one supervisor for every
21 company officers and 24 sergeants.

Although a common heritage produced many apparent similarities in
the eight-company battle formations of the Continental and British
battalions, Washington planned to make his much more powerful.

The

American battalion contained nearly 50 percent more musketmen (640 rather
than 448) without sacrificing control.

In fact, Washington normally

enjoyed a higher ratio of officers to men than his opponents because so
many British officers were absent.1®

Shortages in enlisted men plagued

both armies, but the additional problems of transatlantic communications
made procuring replacements particularly troublesome for the British.11

10. Germain to Howe, 14 Jan 1777; Barrington to Howe, 24 Feb 1777; Howe
to Barrington, 1 Jun 1777; British Headquarters Papers, #371, 411, 552.
11. Germain to Howe, 19 Apr, 18 May, and 3 Sep 1777; to Clinton, 21 Mar
1778; Jenkinson to Clinton, 5 Sep 1780 and 5 Dec 1781; Ibid., #496, 530,
660, 1031, 2993, 3181.
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The differences in regimental organization reflected deliberate
doctrinal choices.

Britain, Influenced by Frederick the Great and its

own experience in the Seven Years' War, produced a regiment tailored to
formal European battle.

It deployed its battalion companies in three

ranks to achieve the density needed for a bayonet charge.

12

The Con

tinentals turned instead to their colonial tradition of aimed fire and
the lessons of the French and Indian War for inspiration.

They adopted

a formation using only two ranks to bring all 640 muskets into effec
tive play.

The Continental unit had a frontage twice the size (320

men to 150) of a British battalion and a volley in which all 640 shots
counted.

The fire of the British third rank was so ineffective that in

a volley a battalion could only hope for 300 shots.
The American regimental staff expanded during 1776 as it became more
refined and the Continental Army's administration became more sophisti
cated.

In the original planning the staff consisted of a chaplain, a

surgeon, and a surgeon's mate, with the functions of adjutant and quar
termaster being carried out by subalterns as additional duties.

The

hospital staff screened all medical candidates since Washington con
sidered it "a matter of too much importance, to intrust the Wounds and

12. Clinton to Germain, 14 May 1779; Ibid., #1999. Richard Glover,
Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, i-9(>3), pp. 112-22. J. F. C. Fuller,
British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century (London: Hutchinson 6
Co., 1925), pp. 79-92, 124-57, 193. Benjamin Franklin Stevens, ed.,
General Sir William Howe's Orderly Book ... (1890; reprint ed. Port Wash
ington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970), pp. 132, 145-6, 294. By 1778 the
British shifted to two ranks to compensate for personnel shortages and
lack of firepower: William B. Willcox, ed., The American Rebellion:
Sir
Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns, 1775-1782 ... (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1954), p. 95n.
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1o
Lives of officers, and Soldiers, to unskilled Surgeons.11

At Washing

ton's request five additional specialists were added on 16 July.

A

paymaster relieved the combat officers of the burden of financial book
keeping.

The drum and fife majors supervised the musicians, the sergeant

major assumed administrative responsibilities as the adjutant's enlisted
assistant, and the quartermaster sergeant became the quartermaster's
helper.

The adjutant and quartermaster also became full-time specialists.

This staff expansion in fact formalized ad hoc u s a g e . ^
The only real problem came in establishing the role of the chaplain.
Washington wished to attract more capable men by improving the job's
status.

He recommended that Congress raise their salaries and assign

each to minister to two regiments.

This was approved, but the events

of the coming campaign proved that it was impractical and Congress
authorized each regiment to have its own.
by deteriorating battlefield conditions.
the same throughout the war:

Implementation was limited
The chaplain's duties remained

moral and spiritual guidance; assisting

the surgeon; and, like the civilian ministers who were so important in
American local life, political indoctrination.

One major accomplishment

of the Continental Army's chaplain corps was its freedom from denomina
tional friction.

A Roman Catholic priest became an Army chaplain, an

event unthinkable in 1774.^5

13. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 345.
14. Ibid., 5: 238, 337, 410, 441. Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 416;
4: 242-3; 5: 418, 479, 563; 6: 862; 8: 426-7.
15. Ibid., 4: 61; 5: 522. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 197-8,
205, 307-8; 5: 192-3, 244-5.
Eugene Franklin Williams, "Soldiers of God:
Chaplains of the Revolutionary War" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Texas Christian
University, 1972), pp. 69, 95-101, 111-33.
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Even as Congress was acting on the new regimental organization and
related matters Washington set the reorganization of the Main Army in
train.

On the basis of the committee's preliminary instructions he con

ducted a survey of the officer corps to find out how many planned to
remain in service.

By 1 November Adjutant General Gates compiled pre

liminary statistics.1** The overall response was encouraging:
authorized 1,465 officers intended to stay.
of 1,286 were favorable:

751 of the

Among combat officers 641

78 field grade and 563 company grade.

Twenty-

six regiments required 78 field officers and 832 company officers, so
only minor adjustments were necessary to account for a full complement
of the former.

The creation of a second lieutenant position caused

some problems since most colonies had not had this rank in 1775, while
a surplus of captains existed.

Massachusetts had an excess of candidates

in the higher grades, the other colonies somewhat of a shortage.
Washington and his generals selected the field officers on 2 Novem
ber.

Because a more detailed evaluation was required, choice of the

remaining officers was delegated to groups composed of the brigadier
generals and field officers of each brigade.
right to review all arrangements.

Washington retained the

Consideration in the selection of

company officers was extended to those who had been absent from camp at
the time of the survey or who had changed their minds and decided to
continue in service, and to qualified sergeants.

Washington reluctantly

abandoned his desire to mingle officers from all colonies in each regiment

16. See Table 2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 36-37, 43-45,
58-59, 145-7. The returns are in Record Group 93, National Archives.
The riflemen were not included in the statistics since their service did
not expire until 1 July 1776.

TABLE 2
INITIAL RECRUITMENT OF OFFICERS FOR 1776

Captains

First

195

188

45

135

Total Unwilling to Serve

4

5

5

112

107

63

92

Total Absent

4

5

4

53

60

16

37

Total Vacant

5

1

1

13

21

6

31

1775 Brand Total of Officers

37

37

38

373

376

130

295

Authorized for 1776

26

26

26

208

208

208

208

Willing to Serve

2

2

3

12

12

0

11

Authorized 1776

2

2

2

16

16

16

16

Willing to Serve

3

2

2

14

14

0

17

Authorized 1776

3

3

3

24

24

24

24

Willing to Serve

4

2

3

24

22

15

10

Connecticut

Massachusetts

Authorized 1776
Willing to Serve
Authorized 1776

Ensigns

New Hampshire

Lieutenants

Rhode Island

Second

Majors
28

Lieutenants

Lieutenant
26

Colonels

Colonels
24

Total Willing to Serve

5

5

5

40

40

40

40

15

20

20

145

140

30

97

16

16

16

128

128

128

128

This table is compiled from the 1 November 1775 series of four returns
entitled "Return of The Commissioned Officers in The Army of The
United Colonies ..." in Record Group 93, National Archives.
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when it proved to be extremely unpopular.

The arrangements were gradu

ally completed, and reenlistment began on 13 November 1775.

Recruiting

parties, liberal furloughs, and elimination of arrears in pay were all
employed in an effort to fill the regiments before 1 Ja n u a r y . ^

The

new enlistments were expressly in the Continental Army, not in the
individual colonies' armed forces as in 1775.
Washington implemented the reorganization of the Main Army on 1
January 1776:
This day giving commencement to the new army, which, in
every point of view is entirely Continental, ... His
Excellency hopes that the Importance of the great Cause
we are engaged in, will be deeply impressed upon every
Man's mind, and wishes it to be considered, that an Army
without Order, Regularity and Discipline, is no better
than a Commission'd Mob.
Each Infantry regiment was assigned a numerical designation as a "Con
tinental Regiment" based on its colonel's relative seniority.^8

New

Hampshire's three regiments of 1775 under Colonels James Reed, John
Stark, and Enoch Poor became the 2d, 5th, and 8th Continental Regiments.
The officer ranks were filled through promotions and some new appoint
ments. 19
Rhode Island retained a quota of 1,500 men, organized into two in
stead of three regiments.

General Greene, working closely with his

brother Jacob (a member of the colony's Committee of Safety) and Governor
Cooke, used the reduction to purge the officer ranks.

Varnum's and

17. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, A: 73, 77, 81-88, 94-96, 99103, 108-11, 116, 120-3, 145-9, 153-4. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 2:
96. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 3: 1333-4.
18. Ibid., 4th Ser., 4: 633-46. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington,
4: 202-7. The quotation comes from General Orders for 1 Jan on p. 202.
19. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 8; 5th Ser., 3: 1035-8.
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Hitchcock's regiments were retained as the 9th and 11th Continental
Regiments.

Church's was disbanded because Greene judged its officers

to be poor disciplinarians.

A handful of its officers, such as Major

Henry Sherburne, were used to fill the two regiments or were placed in
units from other colonies.

20

Connecticut sent five regiments to Boston in 1775 and three to
Canada.

Since the colony's quota for 1776 consisted of five regiments,

the cadres at Boston were used to form the 10th, 17th, 19th, 20th, and
22d Continental Regiments.
ly.

All modified their geographical bases slight

Some sergeants were promoted to ensigns, and a few random individu

als, particularly veterans of the four companies that had been sent to
Boston when their regiments went to Canada, rounded out the officer
21
complement. *•
Massachusetts faced different problems in making the transition.
Washington assigned it a quota of 11,648 men, about 2,000 fewer than
the colony had set for itself in 1775, but only 16 regiments instead of
the existing 27.

According to their competence, officers were selected

in proportion to the number of men the 1775 regiments furnished.

The

number of companies determined the allocation of field officers.

Where

a regiment could be reorganized from an existing one, it was held to
gether.

In most cases, however, a single regiment could not furnish

20. Rhode Island Historical Society Collections, 7 (1867), pp. 117-8.
Richard K. Showman, _et al., eds., The Papers of General Nathanael Greene
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Rhode Island
Historical Society, 1976- ), 1: 124, 134-7, 147-8, 154-65.
21. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 3: 1110-1, J. H. Trumbull and
Charles C. Hoadley, eds., The Public Papers of the Colony of Connecticut
(15 vols., Hartford: Various publishers, 1850-90), 15: 183-4, 202.
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eight full companies; therefore companies from several were merged, with
the assignment of field officers reflecting the proportions from each.
The reorganization involved New England's artillerymen as well as
its infantry, combining Gridley's Massachusetts regiment and John Crane's
Rhode Island company into a single regiment.

On 17 November Congress

named Henry Knox, a Boston bookseller whose volunteer service had im
pressed Washington, to replace Gridley as the artillery commander.

After

debate William Burbeck and John Mason were confirmed as lieutenant
colonels and Crane and New York's John Lamb as majors.

The former were

Gridley's field officers in 1775; the latter two had commanded the
separate companies with distinction.

Congress ruled on 2 December that

the regiment should consist of these five officers and twelve companies,
but left further organizational details to the Army.

The regiment's

staff was similar to that of an infantry regiment but included provision
for cadets undergoing on-the-job training.
officers and 58 enlisted men.

Each company contained 5

Eight noncommissioned officers, 8 bombar

diers, and 8 gunners were allowed, but Knox followed a policy of actual
ly filling those positions in proportion to the real strength of the
company.

Bombardiers, gunners, and matrosses were all privates, but the

gunners and bombardiers were specialists who received higher pay.^2
In Great Britain the Royal Artillery was technically a separate
armmd service, a precedent which the Continentals deliberately avoided.

22.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. A: 74, 120, 140-1, 158, 161,
460; 5: 34-35. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 4; 633-4. Artillery
Returns for 1776; Record Group 93, National Archives. Ford, Journals of
Congress, 3: 309, 359, 399. The separate company in the Hudson Highlands
had the same organization, but 60 matrosses in deference to the added
needs of detached duty.
See Figure 4.
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It consisted of a single regiment organized as four eight-company (in
creased in 1779 to ten) battalions.

In peacetime each company contained

5 officers and about 50 men, but expanded in wartime to 6 officers, 4
sergeants, 4 corporals, 9 bombardiers, 18 gunners, 2 drummers, and 73
matrosses.
units.

Both the battalion and the company were administrative

Tactical flexibility was preserved by organizing provisional

artillery "brigades" with crews for eight to ten guns.

23

Knox's companies were smaller than British ones on a war footing,
but were organized more symmetrically.
istrative rather than a tactical entity.

The regiment remained an admin
Although he did not adopt the

"brigade" style, Knox distributed his companies in 1776 to man specific
fortifications or batteries and had them camp with nearby infantry units.
Later in the year detachments consisting of one or two officers and the
crews of several guns were assigned to infantry brigades to furnish
direct field artillery su p port.^

By the summer of 1776 the shortage

of adequately trained artillerists became a serious problem.

Knox pre

pared a plan to form a second regiment which received Congressional
approval on 24 July, but events of the campaign prevented action being
taken to fill i t . ^
The Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment and the four associated Virginia
and Maryland companies were not reorganized because their original terms

23. Curtis, British Army in the Revolution, pp. 6, 33-50. Horatio
Rogers, ed.. Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books ... (Albany: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1884), pp. 110, 154-9, 179-82, 216-20, 250-4. Capt. John
Stewart, "Disposition of Three Heavy Brigades of Field Brass Artillery,"
13 Sep 1782; British Headquarters Papers, #5597.
24. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 38, 406-7. Force, American
Archives. 4th Ser., 6: 920-1; 5th Ser., 2: 1096-7; 3: 873.
25. Ibid.. 4th Ser., 6: 921; 5th Ser., 1; 502. Ford, Journals of Cong
ress. 5: 606-7. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 134-5, 322-4.
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did not expire until 1 July 1776.

The regiment did assume a new desig

nation to conform with the infantry regiments:

its continuity and

original enlistment as Continentals gave it primacy and the designation
1st Continental Regiment.

Washington continued to use it as a special

reserve force, although two of its nine companies had been sent to
Quebec.

The operational attachment of the

two Maryland companies allowed it to carry

one remaining Virginia and
out its unique role.

In the

spring Washington

and Congress planned its reorganization for a two-year

term of service.

Reenlistment was ordered on 17 June 1776, but the

reorganization was hampered by combat requirements.
The reorganization's planning phase was short and smooth.

Congress

and the Army both agreed on the general policy and the specifics of the
reorganization, and the new arrangement of officers was swiftly drawn up.
A real crisis came when Washington implemented the reenlistment phase on
13 November.

Indeed, he became so upset by the slow progress that on 4

January 1776 he complained to Congress that:
It is not in
the pages of History perhaps to furnisha case
like ours. To maintain a post within
musket shot ofthe Enemy
... and at the same time disband one Army and recruit another
within that distance of twenty odd British regiments, is more
than probably ever was attempted: But if we succeed as well
in the latter, as we have hitherto in
the former, I shall
think it the most fortunate event of my whole l i f e . ^
New England civil and military leaders had been very confident during
the October planning that the troop6 would reenlist rapidly.

A large

26. Ibid., 4: 501-2; 5: 109, 501. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 188,
284; 5: 452. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 4: 633-4; 5: 1433.
Showman, Greene Papers, 1: 336-8. On 31 August it was provisionally
grouped with elements of the Pennsylvania Flying Camp to offset losses.
27. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 208. In a private letter
to Joseph Reed he mused "How it will end, God in his great goodness will
direct. I am thankful for his protection to this time;" Ibid.. pp. 211-2.
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segment of that group believed fervently in the doctrines of Radical
Whig ideology as it related to the military.

They believed that the

virtue of America's militia-trained citizenry would create widespread
willingness to serve in the Army, and felt that the response to Lexing
ton confirmed the validity of this assumption.^

Despite a wide range

of measures adopted to encourage the men, reality was quite different.
By 30 December only 9,649 men had signed up, an average of fewer than
1,400 a week.

Another 2,808 enlisted by 3 February, dropping the weekly

average for the first part of the new year below 600.

The Commander-in-

Chief began to urge the New England governments to fill their regiments
by instituting a form of a draft .

^9

Congress recognized the manpower

problem and on 16 January removed the restrictions on reenlisting free
Negroes.

Depending on their personal attitudes, unit commanders opened

their ranks to this new source of recruits.^®
During the transition period Washington filled the gaps in his
lines with militiamen called up for limited periods.

The first of these

were about 4,000 New Hampshire and Massachusetts men furnished during
late December when Washington anticipated that Connecticut's Continentals
might depart.
January.

The recruiting problem led him to issue a new call on 16

He asked for provisional regiments on the Continental pattern

28. John Todd White, "Standing Armies in Time of War: Republican Theory
and Military Practice During the American Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation,
George Washington University, 1978), pp. 95-97, 109-10, 128-35.
29. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 172-4, 210-1, 227, 240-51.
General Return of the Troops of The Continental Army Inlisted upon the New
Establishment, n.d.; Record Group 93, National Archives.
30. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 60. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing-,
ton, 4: 193-5. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 2: 67. David 0. White, Con
necticut's Black Soldiers 1775-1783 (Chester, Ct.: Pequot Press, 1973).
Although the generals had been opposed to Negroes in the Army, the more
telling objections had come from Edward Rutledge and other southern dele
gates.
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to serve for a longer period, until 1 April.

New Hampshire had General

Sullivan organize its regiment from the companies already at Boston.
Connecticut furnished four regiments and Massachusetts six by calling
on quotas from the towns closest to Boston.
A second aspect of the crisis was the December discovery that many
of the Army*8 firearms were not suited for sustained military use.

Under

the guise of an inspection Washington paraded the Connecticut units on
9 December, a day before their original enlistments expired, so that he
could confiscate sound weapons from owners he feared would depart.

The

New England governments were bombarded with requests for any available
arms, particularly British "Brown Besses," and letters were sent to
Schuyler and Montgomery begging them for material captured in Canada.
This shortage and related ammunition problems persisted during early
1776, but by the summer the crisis had p a s s e d . ^
In early March the troops at Boston emerged from the period of
greatest danger.

Excluding artillery, Washington had twenty-seven

Continental Regiments.

They contained 828 officers, 694 sergeants, 365

drummers and fifers, and 12,510 rank and file.
added 400 more officers and 6,500 enlisted men.

Militia reinforcements
The Main Army was back

31. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 189-91, 227-8, 246-51, 257-8.
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 7, 221, 932-3, 1233-4, 1272-1312,
1410-68; 5: 14-17. Otis G. Hammond, ed., Letters and Papers of MajorGeneral John Sullivan. Continental Army (3 vols., Concord: New Hampshire
Historical Society, 1930-39), 1: 129-34, 165-87.
32. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 150-3, 231, 235-9, 242,
246-51, 264, 325-7, 345-7. A 24 Jun 1776 return for 17 regiments at New
York City (about 9,100 men) showed that 76 percent had arms rated good
and only 9 percent lacked them. Shortages were concentrated in the 1st
and 3d New York Regiments not yet fully reorganized and the 20th Conti*
nental Regiment whose colonel (Arnold) had never been present. Force,
American Archives. 4th Ser., 6: 1121-2.
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roughly to its 1775 strength In raw numbers.

Just under 3,000 of the

Continentals were sick at that time, although only 10 percent of them
were hospitalized.

Thirteen hundred more, including the entire 14th

Continental Regiment, were on detached duties.
reorganized infantry regiments

All of the twenty-five

on the siege lines were over half-strength.

One had recruited over 90 percent of its rank and file goal, ten others
were at least three-quarters full, and only five were below 60 percent.
In terms of real combat force half of the regiments were over the 400-man
level and only one below 300.
had turned the c o r n e r . ^

The regiments were not yet full, but they

Washington was profoundly shaken by the crisis.

On 9 February he summarized the lessons of the reorganization for Con
gress:
To go into an enumeration of all the Evils we have experienced
in this late great change of the Army ... would greatly exceed
the bounds of a letter.
... I shall with all due deference,
take the freedom to give it as my opinion, that if the Congress
have any reason to believe, there will be occasion for Troops
another year ... they would jave money, and_have Infinitely
better Troops if they were J to enlist men_/ for and during
the war.
... The trouble and perplexity of disbanding one
Army and raising another at the same Instant, and in such a
critical situation as the last was, is ... such as no man, who
has experienced it once, will ever undergo a g a i n . ^

The Canadian Department.

The Congressional committee sent to Cambridge to discuss the reor
ganization of the Army was instructed to deal with the troops in the
Northern Department as well as those in eastern Massachusetts.

With

33. General Return, Main Army, 2 Mar 1776; Record Group 93, National
Archives.
34. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 317-8.
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Washington's approbation they limited their talks to the Main Army,
realizing that the two field forces faced unique problems.

In fact,

Philip Schuyler's reorganization difficulties dwarfed Washington's.

His

troops were not concentrated in a single small area, and the various
parts of his command were in different situations.

A special committee

went to Schuyler's headquarters to begin the reorganization, but events
left the northern area in a state of flux until July.
On 11 October 1775 Congress told Schuyler to encourage the Cana
dians to join the Revolution.

It particularly stressed a guarantee of

religious freedom for Roman Catholics, a major concession for American
Protestants to make.

Congress even authorized Schuyler to organize a

Continental regiment from Canadians who were willing to join his army.
It also told him to confer with his senior officers and develop a plan
for raising the troops needed to defend Canada and the forts on Lake
Champlain during the coming winter. 35

on 2

November Congress selected

delegates to visit Schuyler and aid him in the reorganization.

Three

New Englanders initially composed this committee's membership;

mili

tants Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut and John Langdon of New Hampshire,
and the more conservative Robert Treat Paine of Massachusetts.

Dyer

fell ill and on 8 November Congress replaced him with New York's
Robert R. Livingston, a moderate on the issue of independence who was
General Montgomery's brother-in-law.36

35. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 284-5, 298. Smith, Letters of
Delegates, 2: 161-2. Schuyler's instructions were drafted by a commit
tee which included three militants, John Adams, Samuel Chase, and Silas
Deane, and two more cautious delegates, John Rutledge and Robert R.
Livingston.
36. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 312, 317-8, 339. Smith, Letters of
Delegates. 2; 281.Burnett, Continental Congress, pp. 108-12.
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Because the need for action was more immediate, this committee's
instructions Included somewhat broader powers.

It was able to take

specific steps to encourage the Canadians and to solve logistical prob
lems.

Primarily, however, it was formed to collect data about the

garrison needed for Canada and the forts in northern New York.

It

carried information to Schuyler about the newly-approved regimental
organization and rates of pay, as well as blank commissions for the
Canadian regiment.

Schuyler was instructed to reenllst as many of the

department's men as possible and to raise any others he needed to complete the conquest of Canada in New England and New York.

37

The com

mittee set out on 12 November and reached Tlconderoga on the 28th
after conducting an inspection of the forts in the Hudson Highlands.
It discovered to its pleasure that Schuyler and Montgomery (who had
been promoted to major general on 9 December) had already begun the
reorganization.

The committee blessed their actions, gathered the li

mited information that was available, and on 23 December submitted its
report to Congress.
Congress acted on the report on 8 January 1776, before it learned
of Montgomery's defeat at Quebec.

It displayed the same unanimity in

its actions that it had in deciding to send the two committees.

The

report accepted Schuyler's opinion that 3,000 men were needed for the
winter and recommended raising three regiments, Including the Canadians.

37. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 339-41, 350. Smith, Letters of
Delegates. 2: 326. The instructions were drafted by a committee com
posed of militants John Adams, Silas Deane, and Richard H. Lee, and two
more cautious delegates: Thomas Lynch and John Jay of New York.
38. Ibid.. pp. 327n, 368, 377-9, 397-8, 407-8, 411-3. Ford. Journals
of Congress. 3: 418, 446-52.

Congress took note of some of the negative aspects of the report, in*
eluding the news that Warner's and Bedel's men had gone home and that
other units had suffered heavy attrition, and approved a garrison of
nine regiments (about 6,500 men).
the committee:

Three were units set in train by

the Canadian regiment being recruited by James Living

ston and two regiments formed from the veterans of 1775.
reinforced by six new organizations.

These were

New York, New Hampshire, and

Connecticut were each told to raise a regiment for Canadian service.
The remainder of the garrison came from regiments currently being formed
in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

All nine had the same structure as

Washington's reorganized infantry regiments.
The generals did not form the two veteran regiments until 15 April
1776.

In November Montgomery had regrouped his forces for the drive on

Montreal by persuading part of his men to extend their enlistments from
December until mid-April and releasing the rest to ease his logistical
burdens.

The New York regiments remained nominally intact, and the 1st

Connecticut Regiment gained additional personnel.

The men for the

latter came from disbanding the 4th and 5th Connecticut Regiments and
transferring the men who extended.

When the prolonged enlistments ex

pired the two new regiments were formed.

Like Washington, Schuyler

hoped to mix officers from several colonies in each regiment.

He wanted

one regiment to consist of five companies from New York and three from
Massachusetts, and the other of four companies from New Hampshire, three
from Connecticut, and one from New York.

Wooster found this scheme
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Impractical, just as Washington had.

Instead he formed one from New

York veterans under Major John Nicholson of the old 3d New York Regi
ment.

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Elmore, who had transferred from the

4th to the reorganized 1st Connecticut Regiment, commanded the other.
It used a Connecticut cadre with a leavening of other New Englanders.
Both regiments finished the 1776 campaign in the Mohawk Valley after
suffering heavy losses in Canada.

40

The new regiments organized in the north followed a course slightly
different from what Congress planned.

Schuyler had begun reorganizing

the old Albany-area 2d New York Regiment as soon as he learned of Mont
gomery's death, and he and Colonel Van Schaick swiftly assembled it as
the regiment from New York.

41

Washington received Schuyler's report of

the defeat at Quebec on 18 January, before he learned of Congress'
actions on 8 January.

Washington immediately convened a Council of War

with delegate John Adams attending as an observer.

This Council recom

mended diverting three of the militia regiments requested for service
at Boston:

one each from Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts.

Washington wrote to those colonies on the next day, but recommended that
the regiments be raised as Continentals for a full year's service

40. Ibid.. 5: 472, 615. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 362-3,
386-7. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 4: 1216-9; 5: 549-50; 5th
Ser., 1; 1083, 1153; 2: 857-8. Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas
Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 1: 436-47.
Lt. Col. Rudolphus Ritzema to Col. Alexander McDougall, 19 Nov 1775;
McDougall Papers, New-York Historical Society. Brig. Gen. Wooster to
Congress, 10 Apr 1776; Papers of the Continental Congress, Record Group
360, National Archives. Berthold Fernow, ed., New York in the Revolu
tion (2 vols., Albany: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1887), 1: 52, 74.
41. Schuyler to McDougall, 25 Jan 1776; McDougall Papers, New-York
Historical Society. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 4: 1094; 5:
294, 301, 312, 330-1, 1467-9. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3: 300-1.

101
Instead o£ as militia for a shorter period.

The first two regiments

were considered the ones authorized by Congress, and that body subseix

quently accepted the Massachusetts unit as well.

2

All three of the New England regiments were recruited, as Washing
ton recommended, in the areas closest to Canada and were filled fairly
rapidly.

Connecticut had anticipated the need for additional troops

and formed its regiment in Litchfield County which had a tradition from
earlier wars of sending men to serve at Lake Champlain.

A handful of

officers were veterans of the old Ath Connecticut Regiment, but most,
including Colonel Charles Burrall, entered Continental service for the
first time.

Captain Timothy Bigelow's company from Hartford County was

equipped as artillery rather than as infantry.^
New Hampshire assembled its regiment at Coos (Haverhill) and marched
it overland before the spring thaw opened Lake Champlain for water trans
port.

Timothy Bedel was made its commander in recognition of his ranger

service the previous year.

In May Major Isaac Butterfield ignominiously

surrendered most of the regiment to an inferior force at The Cedars.

He

and Bedel were courtmartialled for cowardice and banned from ever ser
ving again.

Bedel, who was not present at the battle, successfully

appealed and later served on the northern frontier.

A2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, A: 25A-61. Ford, Journals of
Congress. A: 99-100.
A3. Trumbull, Connecticut Colony Papers, 15: 225-7, A06-7. Force,
American Archives, 5th Ser., 3: 117A-5.
AA. Ibid.. Ath Ser., A: 1A-18, 810-1; 5th Ser., 1: 167-9, 7A7-8. Fitz
patrick, Writings of Washington, A: 302-3. Hammond, Sullivan Papers.
1: 169-72, 271-7. Gen. Gates to Bedel, A Mar 1778; Gates Papers, NewYork Historical Society.
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Colonel Elisha Porter, a popular western Massachusetts leader,
raised that colony's regiment with five companies from Hampshire County
and three from Berkshire.

Quotas were assigned to each town.

The se

lection of staff and company officers was left to local leaders and the
field officers, who were themselves major politicians from the two
counties.

This expedient hastened organization, but it created admin-

istrative headaches.

45

Montgomery had received significant Canadian assistance during
1775.

On 19 November he directed his wife's kinsman, James Livingston,

to begin raising the regiment of Canadians authorized by Congress.
Livingston, a New Yorker who had married a woman from Montreal and set
tled at Chambly, formed his unit at nearby Pointe Olivier and moved it
up to Quebec in December .

^

Other Canadians who had been expelled from

the city by Governor Carleton also began to recruit men, although only
one group ultimately had success .

^

45. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 1270-5, 1298-9, 1404-8.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 324-5. Gen. Ward to Congress,
3 Feb 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives. Appleton Morgan, ed.,
"The Diary of Colonel Elisha Porter of Hadley, Massachusetts.
...",
Magazine of American History, 30 (1893), pp. 185-206.
46. Montgomery to Schuyler, 19 Nov and 5 Dec 1775; Arnold to Congress,
11 Jan 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives. Invaluable sources
for the Canadian regiments' formation are: George Francis Gilman Stan
ley, CanadaJLmj«JedJLJL77^^
(Toronto: Hakkert, 1973); Gustave Lanctot, Canada & the American Revolution 1774-1783. trans. by Margaret M.
Cameron (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); and Allen
S. Everest, Moses Hazen and the Canadian Refugees in the American Revo
lution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1976).
47. Arnold to Congress, 12 Jan 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives.
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 5: 550. Ford, Journals of Congress,
4: 223, 238-9. Smith, Letters of Delegates. 3: 459. The Chevalier de
St. Aulaire and Quebec barber Jeremy Duggan, who had Arnold's support,
were authorized on 21 and 28 Mar 1776 to raise separate Canadian ranger
companies (one and three respectively), but neither was successful.
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Edward Antil, son of a former Chief Justice of New Jersey, was one
of those exiles.

He carried the news of Montgomery's death from Quebec

to Congress and used the opportunity to recommend Moses Hazen as a
popular local leader.

Hazen was a native of New Hampshire who had served

as a captain in Rogers' Rangers during the French and Indian War.

Al

though he had been allowed to purchase a lieutenancy in the 44th Foot,
he had been forced Into retirement in 1763 and settled in Canada.

After

marrying a French-Canadian woman he became an economic and social leader
in the Richelieu Valley.

Hazen arrived in Philadelphia shortly after

Antil, and on 20 January 1776 they secured authorization to raise a
second Canadian regiment.

Unlike Livingston's, the new unit was pat

terned after the French regiments of the Seven Years' War.

Its 1,000

rank and file were organized in four battalions, each with five fiftyman c ompanies.^
Colonel Hazen and Lieutenant Colonel Antil returned to Canada and
on 10 February organized the 2d Canadian Regiment.

Only half of the

men were recruited, primarily in the Richelieu and St. Lawrence Valleys,
before the pro-American sympathies of the Canadian populace subsided.
Many French veterans of the French and Indian War who had remained as
settlers in Canada in 1763 joined the unit.

Hazen's personal financial

backing of the regiment during this period gave it a special status for
the remainder of the war.

Congress allowed him to retain a proprietary

interest in the regiment until he was reimbursed, and since he never

48. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 75, 78.
3: 112-3, 154, 161, 169.

Smith, Letters of Delegates,
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was, it remained under his control and retained its unique four-battalion organization.

4Q

Both regiments drew heavily from the French-Canadian population for
their enlisted strength.

The majority of the officers, however, came

from the English-speaking minority in Canada.

Most of this latter group

were native-born Americans like the two colonels and were active in the
small Canadian Revolutionary movement.

The French segment of the popu

lation tended to be neutral, although the influential clergy supported
the Crown.

Bishop Briand of Quebec excommunicated Catholic Canadians

who supported the Americans, including Frangois-Louis Chartier de Lotbiniere, a Recollet priest who served as Livingston's chaplain.

In

addition to this spiritual hardship, the summer evacuation of Canada
forced the regiments and their families into exile.

Both regiments had

to be withdrawn from the front lines to reorganize:

Livingston's in

the Mohawk Valley and Hazen's at Albany.

50

Congress reacted swiftly to the news of the disaster at Quebec.
In addition to officially adding the 2d Canadian Regiment and Porter's
Regiment to the Canadian garrison, it asked Washington to transfer one
of his regiments and a general officer from Boston.

On 17 January 1776

Congress finally clarified the command situation by completing the trans
formation of the invasion force into a separate territorial department.

49. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 811-2; 6: 900; 8: 589; 19: 427-9.
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 5: 751-3. Pennsylvania Archives.
1st Ser., 8: 17-20. Board of War Report, 28 Jun 1781; Record Group 360,
National Archives. Gates to (7 Congress), (? Oct 1778); Hazen to Gates,
28 Jan 1779 and 12 Dec 1782; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
50. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 645. Force, American Archives. 5th
Ser., 1: 797-800, 977, 1143-4. Gates' General Orders, 21 Jul 1776 (After
Orders); Gates' Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society. Hazen to Maj.
Gen. Steuben, 11 and 24 Feb 1780; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical
Society.
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Since it believed that Schuyler did not desire the Quebec assignment,
Congress ordered him to shift his headquarters to New York City and
Charles Lee to go to Canada and organize a department staff.

Wooster

was considered to be "too infirm" to be permanently assigned to the
duty that he was exercising on a temporary basis.
set out he was reassigned.

But before Lee could

On 6 March Congress promoted John Thomas,

the senior brigadier general, to major general and assigned him as Lee's
replacement.
2 May.

Thomas formally assumed command from Wooster at Quebec on

In the interim Congress reconsidered its previous instructions

to Schuyler and ordered him to remain at Albany where he could super
vise the logistical support for Canada in addition to performing his
other duties.^1
During January Congress also considered the needs of the non-Cana
dian portion of the old New York Department.

On the 19th of that month

New York was again authorized to raise four Continental regiments for
its defense.

The colony'6 Provincial Congress allocated company quotas

to the Individual counties on 15 February and submitted nominations for
field officers to the Continental Congress for commissioning in March.
Three of the regiments were assembled from 1775 veterans.

McDougall's

1st New York Regiment continued to be principally a New York City unit.
Since the 2d had already been reorganized by Van Schaick, the old 3d
and 4th were redesignated as the 2d and 3d respectively.

James Clinton

51. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 70-71, 73, 99-100, 157-8, 186-7,
240-1. Smith, Letters of Delegates. 3: 108-9, 116-7, 121-4, 355-6, 3778, 381-3. Charles Lee, "The Lee Papers," New-York Historical Society
Collections for 1871-74, 1: 251-3, 271-2, 303-8, 343-4.
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continued to command the former, drawn primarily from Ulster County and
Long Island.

Dutchess and Westchester Counties furnished the bulk of

the 3d, while a new Ath was raised in Albany and the other northern
areas.

Schuyler gradually released the remaining cadres from Canada,

a practice which retarded recruiting but which was a compromise with
tactical considerations.

The 1st assembled at New York, the Ath at

Albany, and the 2d and 3d in the Hudson Highlands.

Schuyler retained

the Ath in northern New York, while the 2d assumed garrison responsi
bilities in the Highlands and the 1st and 3d served at New York

C i t y . 52

Canada, however, continued to attract more of Congress' attention.
Knowing that the spring thaw that cleared Lake Champlain would also
open the St. Lawrence River to the British, Congress and Washington
ordered additional reinforcements to the north.

Brigadier General Wil

liam Thompson arrived in mid-May with the 8th, 15th, 24th, and 25th
Continental Regiments, but those New Englanders were immediately dis
abled by an outbreak of smallpox.

Brigadier General John Sullivan

reached St. John's with a second force on 31 May.

It consisted of New

Hampshire's 2d and 5th Continental Regiments, the 2d New Jersey Regiment,
and the 4th (less many of its companies) and 6th Pennsylvania Battalions.
Sullivan found that Thomas had been stricken with smallpox on 21 May and

52. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 69, 190, 238. Smith, Letters of
Delegates. 3: 77-80, 102-3, 300-1, 381-3, 459. Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington. 5: 7-11. James Sullivan and Alexander C. Flick, eds.,
Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence 1775-1778 (2 vols.,
Albany: University of the State of New York, 1923-25), 1: 343-8. Force,
American Archives, 4th Ser., 4: 1081-2; 5: 251-3, 267-80, 301, 314-8,
946-7, 968, 1439-40, 1467-9, 1498-9. Historical Magazine. 1st Ser., Sup
plement IV (1866), pp. 110-1. The reorganization of the 1st can be
traced in intimate detail in the Alexander McDougall Papers, New-York
Historical Society.
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had turned temporary command over to Thompson.

When Thomas died on 2

June, Sullivan by virtue of his seniority inherited command of the de
partment.^
The arrival of a British relief force from Europe under Major Gen
eral John Burgoyne forced the Continentals to abandon the siege of
Quebec in early May 1776.

The British, Brunswick, and Hesse-Hanau

regulars slowly pushed Sullivan's men back.

The Continentals' main

body reached Crown Point on 1 July, ending American hopes of making
Canada the fourteenth colony.

The effort had probably been beyond the

Continental Army's logistical capability and ruined many regiments.

A

dispirited Sullivan complained that "I am Sufficiently mortified & Sin
cerely wish I had never seen this fatal country."^
Congress had reacted to the deteriorating situation in Canada on
17 June before Sullivan's withdrawal.

A special diplomatic mission

sent to the Canadians in the spring had held extensive discussions with
the military leaders in Canada.

Delegates Benjamin Franklin and Samuel

Chase were accompanied on that inspection by Charles and John Carroll,
two brothers who were leaders in the Maryland Catholic community.

Their

June report led to major command changes and revealed for the first time
a partisan split in Congress with respect to the military situation.
Congress appointed Horatio Gates as the new commanding general of "the

53. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 236, 302. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 4: 495-7, 500, 519-21, 526, 531; 5: 15, 132-3. Hammond,
Sullivan Papers, 1: 212-4.
54. Ibid., pp. 242-3, 250-4, 271-7. Also see Martin Bush. Revolution
ary Enigma: A Re-appraisal of General Philip Schuyler of New York (Port
Washington, N.Y.: Ira J. Friedman, 1969), pp. 56-62.
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Troops of the United Colonies in Canada" and endowed him with extensive
emergency powers to reorganize the department staff and suspend incom
petent officers.

Gates' selection was based on his reputation as an

organizer and administrator.

Political considerations also came into

play, and became more pronounced after Gates arrived at Crown Point on
5 July and relieved Sullivan.^
The change in command, which nearly precipitated Sullivan's resig
nation, reflected a growing concern among New England delegates over
the lack of.success in the north.

Since most of those delegates es

poused the Radical Whig Ideological view of the military, they believed
that the failure resulted from a lack of virtue.

It was only natural

for them to reject the current generals and turn to Gates, who held
similar attitudes, to lead a moral regeneration of the northern army.
Interwoven with ideological considerations were factors of regionalism
and family connection.

The shift in preponderance after 1775 from New

York units to New Englanders gave the delegates from that region a
greater interest and voice in the department's affairs.

Friction be

tween key officers within the department who were related to leading
politicians magnified these problems.

55. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 151-2, 215-9, 233; 5: 436, 448-53.
Edmund Cody Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress
(8 vols., Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921-36), 1:
486-7; 2: 16-17, 29-34. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 173-5,
547-51. Hammond, Sullivan Papers, 1: 280-1. The political context for
the Northern Department command in 1776 is discussed in Jonathan Gregory
Rossie, The Politics of Command in the American Revolution (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1975), pp. 97-134; and H. James Henderson,
Party Politics in the Continental Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Co., 1974), pp. 112-7.
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Gates commanded a territorial department that no longer existed,
however, and on 8 July Congress ruled that he came under Schuyler's
command.

As a practical matter Schuyler allowed Gates a large measure

of autonomy at Ticonderoga by staying at Albany and concentrating on
logistics and affairs in the Mohawk Valley.

Gates' "Northern Army"

contained the majority of the department's combat troops and was charged
with developing a fortress complex in the Ticonderoga area.

Benedict

Arnold and David Waterbury, both of whom had commanded ships as civili
ans, were placed in command of the Lake Champlain naval squadron.

On

20 July Gates created a brigade organization for the units at Ticondero
ga.

Following the advice of his senior officers and his own experience

at Boston he assigned units from the same or adjacent colonies to homo
geneous brigades to minimize friction,

Arnold, the only brigadier

general, commanded one of the four brigades.

The others were given to

three senior colonels.^
Reorganization also involved the formation of two new units from
veteran 1775 cadres.
another regiment.
three years.

On 21 June Congress ordered New York to raise

Unlike earlier units, this regiment wa6 enlisted for

Command was given to Major Lewis Dubois of Nicholson's

Regiment as a reward for his excellent service during the winter.

Dis

putes over the appointment of the other officers and their relative
seniority prevented it from becoming fully operational.

Congress

56. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 526. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing
ton, 5: 222-4, 257. Gates' General Orders for 20 Jul and 11 Aug 1776;
Gates' Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society. Gates to Hancock, 16
and 29 Jul and 6 Aug 1776; Lieut. Col. Hartley to Gates, 10 Jul 1776;
Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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authorized a second regiment, also for three years, on 5 July.

Its

cadre, Seth Warner's Green Mountain Boys, had begun reorganizing in
February, but a shortage of cash limited recruiting until November .

^

Since Knox's Artillery Regiment was designed to support the Main
Army, Schuyler relied primarily on separate artillery companies.

The

remnants of John Lamb's 1775 company voluntarily reenlisted under Lieu
tenant Isaiah Wool.

They were reinforced in the spring by Stevens' and

Eustis' companies of Knox's regiment, Bigelow's company in Burrall's
Regiment, and a Pennsylvania company.

That colony had misinterpreted

a Congressional resolution and directed engineer Bernard Romans to re
cruit an artillery company for service in Canada.

Congress accepted it,

and it marched north under the actual command of Captaln-Lieutenant
Gibbs Jones.

New York also raised two new artillery companies in New

York City, although neither wound up supporting Schuyler as the colony
had originally intended.

Sebastian Bauman's was a Continental unit cre

ated to garrison fortifications in the Hudson Highlands.

Alexander

Hamilton's company of state troops spent most of 1776 under Knox's opera
tional control and on 17 March 1777 was formally transferred to the
C O

Continental Army.

57. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 177; 5: 471-2, 479, 481, 518-9, 761.
Burnett, Letters of Congress. 1: 506-7, 510-3. Force, American Archives,
4th Ser., 4: 588-9, 852-3, 1131; 5th Ser., 1: 7l7, 1390-9. Nathan Clark
to Schuyler, 16 Jul 1776; Warner to Gates, 26 Apr 1777; Gates Papers,
New-York Historical Society.
58. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 309; 4: 74, 99. Force, American Ar
chives. 4th Ser., 3: 1289-90, 1315-6; 4: 1026, 1058, 1068, 1567-9; 5:
303, 316, 378, 389-90, 536, 730-2, 1416, 1436; 6: 1336, 1339, 1412; 5th
Ser., 1: 660-1, 1509. W. T. R. Saffell, Records of the Revolutionary
War ... (3d ed., Baltimore: Charles E. Saffell, 1894), pp. 178-81. Har
old C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton
(26 vols., New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-79), 1: 187-8,
199-200.
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The Northern Department finally stabilized during the pause in
operations caused by the contest for naval control of Lake Champlain.
In January Congress planned for a forward Canadian Department of nine
regiments (6,500 men) supported by the Northern Department's four
regiments defending the area from New York City to Lake George with
2,900 men.

By August the Canadian Department no longer existed and the

Northern Department's responsibilities stopped just south of Albany.
Its troops remained divided into two major groups:

Gates' field army

garrisoning the Ticonderoga complex and Schuyler's rear echelon sustaining communications and controlling the Mohawk Valley.
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Gates commanded a force consisting, exclusive of artillery, of
fifteen Continental infantry regiments and one separate rifle company,
plus six regiments of militia.

It contained 386 officers, 333 sergeants,

143 drummers and fifers, and 6,262 rank and file, a total roughly equi
valent to the number originally intended for Canada.

True combat strength

was about 4,000 Continentals, including the detachment manning the
fleet, because nearly 2,200 were sick, another 1,000 on detached duties,
and 185 on furlough.

Only three of the Continental regiments were over

three-quarters full, even on paper, and ten were between half and twothirds complete.

This deficiency significantly reduced the units' ef

fectiveness in open battle, but was less of a problem in garrison.

The

militia added about 200 more officers and over 3,500 enlisted men, most
of whom were still fit.
Gates had the six strongest regiments originally assigned to the
Canadian garrison or added during January by Congress.

He also had the

59. General Return, Northern Department, 24 Aug 1776; Gates Papers, NewYork Historical Society. The return contains complete data only for the
units directly under Gates.
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four regiments sent north under Thompson and five of the six that ac
companied S u l l i v a n . S c h u y l e r retained direct command of the four
regiments which had served the longest in Canada and consequently were
in the worst shape.

He also had the two regiments raised by New York

in the Albany region (Van Schaick's and the 4th New York Regiment), the
3d New Jersey Regiment from Sullivan's force, and the two new regiments
just beginning their organization.
his troops.

Three militia regiments supplemented

Schuyler had only three Continental regiments which were

even reasonably effective and certainly controlled fewer than the 3,000
effectives he had originally been promised.

This force was sufficient,

however, for his reduced defensive responsibilities.

Summary.

Congress and the Army's leaders worked closely together during the
autumn of 1775 to prepare for the coming year.

They intended to elimi

nate organizational problems revealed during the preceding months and
hoped to make the transition smooth.

The cornerstone of their work

came from Congress' approval of a standard infantry regiment designed
by Washington and his generals.

Unlike the British Army which was

heavily influenced by the European phase of the Seven Years' War, the
Continentals took advantage of more pertinant Anglo-American experiences
in the imperial wars, particularly the French and Indian War.

The new

standard regiment represented a very powerful force with a simplified
organization.

It dispensed with the various special companies of a

60. In May Schuyler had diverted the 3d New Jersey Regiment to the Mo
hawk Valley when Sullivan passed through Albany.
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British regiment, which wasted manpower from an American perspective.
The Continental regiment's high ratio of officers to enlisted men recog
nized the greater need for control under American conditions.

Its or

ganization and use of a two-rank battle formation emphasized American
faith in musketry rather than shock action.
Adopting a standard regiment solved one problem revealed during
1775.

Implementing the reorganization raised new difficulties.

Both

Washington and Schuyler hoped to emphasize national identification by
mingling personnel from several colonies in each regiment.

Opposition

from the officers and men alike ended that concept, although Washington
at least retained the word "Continental" in the designation of his regi
ments.

A greater source of trouble was the recurrence in 1776 of the

problem of regiments falling short of their authorized strength.

Few of

the new units ever reached maximum legal size, and many took excessive
time to achieve minimum levels of efficiency.

In the future the nation's

leaders would have to adjust policies to deal with this condition.
Washington's Main Army at Boston was able to survive the crisis
caused by slow enlistments by calling on a sizeable contingent of militia
reinforcements.

Slow but steady recruiting raised that army by March

1776 to a level where it could begin to apply pressure on General Howe
in Boston.

British evacuation of the town on 17 March gave the Commander-

in-Chief his first victory.
military effort in Canada.

On the other hand, defeat marked the American
Despite several major attempts to reinforce

the field army in that theater, it was still driven all the way to Ti
conderoga, and many units ended up in shambles from attrition and dis
ease.

Schuyler and Gates survived the immediate crisis, but their bi

ckering for hegemony carried ominous overtones for the future.

CHAPTER IV
AN ARMY TRULY CONTINENTAL:
EXPANDING PARTICIPATION

Improvisation marked the military situation in 1775; expansion
typified 1776.

In the first year the five northern colonies each cre

ated an army by drawing on their individual experiences.

The Continen

tal Congress and the military leaders also improvised when they formed
the Continental Army from those forces.

The next year the Army expanded

to involve more than the forces engaged in Canada, northern New York,
and at Boston.

Although combat elsewhere was limited, the remaining

colonies all raised regiments.

The increase in participation necessi

tated a major change in the Army's command arrangement.

That change and

the movement of the Main Army from Boston to New York City led in turn
to a staff expansion.

The Southern Colonies.

Virginia, the Carolines, and Georgia began 1775 free from British
occupation.

They had defiant royal governors to contend with, however,

and Florida's regular garrison posed a continued threat.

Like their

northern neighbors the southern colonies formed new governments which
raised troops whenever the deposed governors gathered military or naval
forces.

Because these early efforts were undertaken with minimal super

vision from the Continental Congress, the southern regiments followed
various models of organization.

Since the south lacked New England's
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homogeneity and similarity of experience in the colonial wars, its units
experienced greater structural diversity until Congress provided direction.
The aggressiveness of Governor John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore,
pushed Virginia to act first.

In March 1775 the extra-legal Virginia

Convention decided not to raise regular troops as the militant Patrick
Henry proposed, but instead encouraged the formation of local volunteer
units.

News from Massachusetts produced a change in attitude by July

when the Convention reconvened.

Although general agreement existed on

the need for military action, debates over precise measures lasted until
21 August.

The original proposal called for each county to organize a

fifty-man company for a total force of 3,000 to A,000 men.

Less militant

opinion produced a modification which scaled down the regular force and
supplemented it with less expensive minuteroen.

The compromise adopted

by the Convention divided the colony into sixteen military districts,
each under a district committee responsible for organizing the troops.
The mainland districts raised a total of fifteen companies of regulars
and fifteen ten-company minuteman battalions.

The Eastern Shore did

not form a regular company, but it was authorized a somewhat larger
minuteman regiment.

The minutemen represented a local defense force

within the militia system, and replaced the earlier volunteer companies.
The Convention also created a Committee of Safety, adopted Articles of
War, and endorsed the current British drill manual.1

1. William J. Van Screevan, _et al., eds., Revolutionary Virginia: The
Road to Independence (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia,
1973), 3: 319-43, 392-409, 427-9, 450-9, 471-2, 497-504. William
Waller Henning, ed., The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the
Laws of Virginia ... (14 vols., Richmond: J.&G. Cochran, 1821), 9: 9-48.
Robert A. Rutland, ed., The Papers of George Mason 1725-1792 (3 vols.,
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 1; 245-57.
Virginia Gazette (Purdie), 25 Aug 1775.
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The fifteen regular companies (about 1,020 men) reported to Williams
burg and on 21 October 1775 formed two regiments.

The 1st Virginia Regi

ment under Patrick Henry, the colony's new commander-in-chief, contained
two rifle companies and six musket companies.

William Woodford's 2d also

had two rifle companies but only five with muskets.

The rifle companies

came from the frontier and served as light infantry while the musketmen
represented the older areas of the colony.

Each company contained a

captain, 2 lieutenants, an ensign, 3 sergeants, a drummer, a fifer, and
68 rank and file.

District committees selected the company officers while

the Convention appointed three field officers for each regiment.

Staffs

consisted of a chaplain, a surgeon with two mates, an adjutant, a paymas
ter who doubled as mustermaster, a quartermaster, and a sergeant major.
The leaders of Virginia's first two regiments carried impressive political
credentials although only four field officers had significant combat ex
perience.

Most of the captains were too young to have served in the French

and Indian War but came from the colony's leading families.
The compromise which created the regiments also included five separate
companies to garrison strategic frontier posts.

Captain John Neville ex

ercised overall command from Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh).
large:

Four were rather

a captain, 3 lieutenants, an ensign, 4 sergeants, 2 drummers, 2

fifers, and 100 rank and file.
25 enlisted men.

The fifth had only a single lieutenant and

Two companies manned Fort Pitt while the smallest held

the outpost at the mouth of the Wheeling River (Fort Fincastle).

All three

2. Brent Tarter, ed., "The Orderly Book of the Second Virginia Regiment,
September 27, 1775-April 15, 1776." Virginia Magazine of History and Bi
ography, 85 (1977), pp. 170-1.
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came from the West Augusta District, the north-western frontier.

Another

company from Botetourt County defended Point Pleasant on the Kanawha
River.

The remaining company secured its home county of Fincastle in

the south-west.

These companies drew on the precedent of the British

Army's use of independent companies for remote colonial garrisons.

3

Skirmishing between the Virginians and Dunmore's forces erupted in
Hampton Roads during the fall.

The Convention reacted by passing new

legislation on 11 January 1776 which essentially bypassed the minutemen
as a major combat force.

It added seventy-two more companies of regulars,

expanding the two existing regiments to ten companies apiece, forming
six more of the same size, and establishing the 9th Virginia Regiment as
a special seven-company regiment for the Eastern Shore.

This legislation

added a sergeant to the basic company and created some minor staff posi
tions.

It envisioned a large regiment with seven companies armed with

muskets and three with rifles.

The new companies enlisted their men for

a longer period, until 10 April 1778.

Individual counties appointed the

company officers and raised the men.^
The Committee of Safety assigned the expanded military force to
specific defensive sectors.

Pairs of regiments occupied coastal areas

divided by the James, York, and Rappahannock Rivers.

It also assigned

the companies to regiments on a regional basis, although the rifle compa
nies still came from the frontier counties.

The Convention made the 8th

3. Van Screevan, Revolutionary Virginia, 3: 343, 404. Reuben Gold
Thwaites and Louis Phelps Kellogg, eds., The Revolution on the Upper Ohio.
1775-1777 (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1912), pp. 12-17.
4. Henning, Statutes at Large. 9: 75-92. Van Screevan, Revolutionary
Virginia, 4: 467-9, 497-9. Peter Force, ed., American Archives: A Col
lection of Authentic Records. State Papers, Debates, and Other Notices of
Public Affairs (9 vols., Washington: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force,
1839-53), 4th Ser., 4: 78, 83, 118. See Table 3.
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Virginia Regiment unique by directing that it be raised by the GermanAmerican community in the Shenandoah Valley.

Field officers for the

new regiments had a great deal of experience, six of the seven colonels
having served with Washington in the French and Indian War.

Company

officers and many of the enlisted men came from the minuteman battalions.'*
All nine regiments, an artillery company, and the frontier companies
were raised as state troops for the defense of Virginia and its neighbors.
That condition, the ten-company organization, and the short one- or twoyear enlistments made them similar to earlier Provincials.

The colony

could not sustain the financial burden of such a large force, however,
and asked Congress to transfer the regiments to the Continental Army.
On 28 December 1775 Congress, which wanted to broaden the Army's geo
graphical base, authorized six regiments from Virginia.

Prolonged nego

tiations between the two governments followed and eventually all nine
regiments were accepted.

Virginia did not alter its regimental organi

zation to conform to Continental standards, nor did it alter the men's
terms of enlistment.

It did require the officers to exchange colony for

Continental commissions, leading to a few resignations.

When Virginia

also asked Congress to appoint general officers to command these troops,
Henry's lack of military experience became a sensitive political issue.
Washington blocked Henry's promotion, leading to Henry's resignation and
return to politics.

5.
William
Manuscripts
8: 75-149.
Statutes at
1528, 1556.

In his place Congress elected two men who had served

P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other
... ( H vols., Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1875-93),
The 9th expanded to ten companies on 18 May; see Henning,
Large, 9: 135-8; and Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 6:
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under Washington as brigadier generals:

Andrew Lewis on 1 March and

Hugh Mercer on 5 June.**
The artillery company authorized on 1 December 1775 consisted of
a captain, 3 lieutenants, a sergeant, 4 bombardiers, 8 gunners, and 48
matrosses.

On 13 February the Committee of Safety selected James Innis

as captain and Charles Harrison, Edward Carrington, and Samuel Denney
as lieutenants.

Congress adopted the company on 19 March and soon after

told Captain Dohicky Arundel, a French volunteer, to raise another in
Virginia.

Innis transferred to the infantry because he lacked the tech

nical background for artillery service.

Arundel then attempted to merge

the two companies, but before he could do so, was killed on 12 July
while experimenting with a mortar.

Although the two companies worked

closely together, they remained separate.^
In May Virginia reorganized the frontier defense companies, re
taining them as state troops.

Two large companies were filled by re-

enlisting men at Fort Pitt and Point Pleasant.

A third was organized

6. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 17741789 (34 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 3:
463; 4: 132, 181, 235; 5: 420, 466, 649. Edmund Cody Burnett, ed.. Let
ters of Members of the Continental Congress (8 vols., Washington: Car
negie Institution of Washington, 1921-36), 1: 346-8, 369, 407-8; 2: 31-32.
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 116-7; 5th Ser., 1; 719-22. John
C. Fitzpatrick, ed.. The Writings of George Washington from the Original
Manuscript Sources 1745-1799 (39 vols.. Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1931-44), 4: 379-84. Van Screevan, Revolutionary Virginia. 4:
421-2, 470-1. Julian P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Prince
ton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 1; 482-4.
7. Henning, Statutes at Large. 9: 75-92. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4:
212, 364. Virginia Gazette (Purdie), 16 Feb and 12 Jul 1776. Charles
Campbell, ed., The Orderly Book of that Portion of the American Army Sta
tioned at or Near Williamsburg ... (Richmond: Privately printed, i860),
pp. 26-27, 36-37. Charles Lee, "The Lee Papers," New-York Historical
Society Collections for 1871-74, 1: 367-8, 416-7, 440-3, 477-80.
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in Botetourt to reinforce Point Pleasant.

Hampshire and Augusta Counties

raised new, smaller companies (3 officers, 3 sergeants, a drummer, a
fifer, and 50 rank and file) to garrison Wheeling and a post on the
Little Kanawha River.
mand.

Neville, promoted to major, retained overall com

The same legislation reorganized the 1st and 2d Virginia Regiments

for three year enlistments.®

Virginia's regular forces were more than a

match for Lord Dunmore, who by August withdrew to New York.
North Carolina's revolutionary leadership lacked the Virginians'
confidence in its base of popular support and turned to outside assis
tance much sooner.

The colony contained a large body of recent Scottish

immigrants who were still loyal to the Crown.

Old political grievances

left Tidewater planters unsure of backcountry cooperation.

On 26 June

1775 the North Carolina delegates secured a Congressional promise to fund
9
a force of 1,000 men.

This gesture of support gave the colony's leaders

the confidence to act.
The North Carolina Provincial Congress also organized military dis
tricts similar to Virginia's.

To supplement the Continentals, each of

the six districts raised a ten-company battalion of minutemen.

On 1

September the Provincial Congress arranged the Continentals into two
regiments, each consisting of three field officers, an adjutant, and ten
companies.

The company organization for both the Continentals and the

8. Henning, Statutes at Large. 9: 135-8. Force, American Archives. 4th
Ser., 6: 1532, 1556, 1568. Henry Read Mcllwaine, et al., eds., Journals
of the Council of the State of Virginia (4 vols., Richmond: Virginia
State Library, 1931-67), 1: 97, 108, 148, 173.
9. Ford, Journals of Congress. 2: 107; 3: 330. Paul H. Smith, et a l .»
eds., Letters of Delegates to Congress. 1774-1789 (Washington: Library
of Congress, 1976), 1: 545.
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minutemen was similar to that of the Virginia minutemen:
sergeants, and 50 rank and file.

3 officers, 3

To expedite recruiting, North Caro

lina disbanded its volunteer companies formed earlier.
companies assembled at Salisbury beginning in October.*®

The Continental
The Provincial

Congress developed the plan as a compromise between sectional interests.
The east received two regular regiments to defend the coastline from
naval attack.

Less threatened areas relied on less expensive minutemen.

On 28 November 1775 the Continental Congress ordered both regiments
reorganized on the new Continental structure.
January and two more on 26 March.

A third was added on 16

The Provincial Congress accepted the

increased quota and on 9 April ordered the three new regiments raised
for a term of two-and-a-half years.

It soon added a sixth.

Each mili

tary district recruited five,companies, and the colony at large assumed
responsibility for the other two companies needed.

North Carolina de

viated from the Continental structure by omitting the fife major from
the regimental staff and adding a commissary of stores, an armorer, and
a wagonmaster.

Congress rewarded the colony for its promptness in 1775

by promoting Colonels James Moore and Robert Howe to brigadier general
on 1 March 1776.**
Members concerned for the security of the coast pressed the Provin
cial Congress to add another regular regiment with six companies, but
General Moore was able to have the plan modified on 29 April.

Instead

10. Force. American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 255-70; 3: 181-210, 679, 108794.
11. Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 387-8; 4: 59, 181, 237. Smith, Let
ters of Delegates. 3: 102-3, 310-1, 315-8, 440. Force, American Archives.
4th Ser., 4: 299-308; 5: 68, 859-60, 1315-68; 6: 1443-58.
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of a single regiment it created five independent companies of state
troops to defend specific points.

Two were the same size as the Con

tinental companies, but the other three contained only sixty privates.
On 3 May a 24-man company was added to garrison a frontier fort.

The

Continental Congress accepted the 6th North Carolina Regiment on 7 May
and subsequently adopted three troops of light horse and an artillery
company raised by the colony during the summer, but not the independent
,
*2
companies.
South Carolina's situation contained factors similar to North Caro
lina's and Virginia's.

It also faced Tidewater-versus-backcountry ten

sions, but its leadership was more secure politically than North Caro
lina's.

Its Provincial Congress decided to raise regular state troops

rather than turning immediately to the Continental Congress.

As a

regional compromise on 4 June 1775 it created two 750-man infantry
regiments for Tidewater defense and a third regiment of 450 mounted
rangers to protect the frontier.

Since there was no immediate threat of

invasion the companies were limited to cadre strength.
companies recruited only thirty men apiece.

The nine ranger

The limit left the two in

fantry regiments each with ten fifty-man companies, making them similar
in practice to the minutemen in North Carolina and Virginia.
for commissions became intense.

Competition

Several ranger companies even mutinied

when a Tidewater officer was assigned as their regimental

commander.

*3

12. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 331-3; 5: 623-4; 8: 567. Burnett,
Letters of Congress, 1: 448.
13. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 897, 953-4. William Moultrie,
Memoirs of the American Revolution ... (2 vols., New York: David Longworth, 1802), 1; 64-65. R. W. Gibbes, ed.. Documentary History of the
American Revolution (3 vols., Columbia: Banner Steam-Power Press, 185357), Vol. A, pp. 104-5.

During the winter the Provincial Congress expanded its forces.

An

artillery regiment, small but highly specialized, was established to
man the fortifications at Charleston, and the 4th South Carolina Regi
ment was quickly filled by drawing key personnel from the city's elite
militia artillerymen.

On 22 February 1776 the three original regiments

were finally allowed to recruit to full strength and shortly thereafter
two new rifle regiments were added.

The 5th South Carolina Regiment,

recruited in the Tidewater, had seven companies; the 6th only five.

It

was raised along the northwestern frontier where many of the inhabitants,
including its commander, Thomas Sumter, were former Virginians.

Each

rifle company was unusually large, containing four officers and one hun
dred men.

Artillery companies were allocated for Fort Lyttleton (Port

Royal) and Georgetown with strengths individually tailored to the de
fensive needs of each locale.*^
Congress directed South Carolina to raise three Continental regi
ments under the standard infantry structure on 4 November 1775.

A

second act on 25 March 1776 increased the quota to five regiments.

The

colony did not immediately transfer its units to the Continental Army and
tried instead simply to delegate operational control over them.
rejected that alternative.

Congress

On 18 June it finally decreed that all of the

regiments except the rangers had been adopted by the earlier acts.

As a

major concession, however, it promised the colony not to send more than
one-third of the troops outside South Carolina without prior notice.

The

rangers and a similar Georgia unit were adopted on 24 July with a special

14.
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 27-76; 5: 561-615. Moultrie,
Memoirs, 1: 93, 126-7. Gibbes, Documentary History. Vol. A, pp. 246-8.
See Table 3 and Figure 5.
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organization and the requirement that the men serve on foot as well as
on horseback.

Additional legislation was required to restore the six

regiments to proper

seniority.

Georgia, like North Carolina, required Congressional support before
it risked military action.

It had only 3,000 males of military age and

was the colony most exposed to outside attack.

When Congress authorized

South Carolina's three regiments on 4 November 1775 it also directed
Georgia to raise a standard infantry regiment.

Because communication

with the colony took so long, its Provincial Congress was allowed to
appoint all officers, not just company*grades.

Political factions within

the colony fought for control of the regiment until a compromise gave
command to Lachlan McIntosh, leader of the Scottish element.

Savannah

mercantile interests gained the other two field officer positions, while
most of the company-level appointments went to sons of planters known as
the "Country Party."

The latter group controlled the local government

and subsequently caused senior Continental officers trouble by asserting
a right to meddle in the regiment's affairs.
McIntosh began raising the regiment in February 1776, arming one
of the companies with rifles.

He correctly anticipated that limited

15. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 325-7; 4: 235; 5: 461-6, 606-7, 760.
Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3: 440. Moultrie, Memoirs, 1: 141. Force,
American Archives. 5th Ser., 1; 631-2. Lee, "Papers," 2: 10-12, 37-39,
57, 173, 199-202, 251, 254. Jack D. Cross, ed., "Letters of Thomas
Pinckney, 1775-1780," South Carolina Historical Magazine, 58 (1957),
pp. 29-30.
16. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 325-7. Allen D. Candler, ed., The
Revolutionary Records of the State of Georgia (3 vols., Atlanta:
Frank
lin- Turner Co., 1908), 1: 77-78, 273. tee, "Papers," 2: 216-29, 254.
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 1553; 6: 1159-60. Lilia M. Hawes,
ed., "The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1799." Georgia Historical
Quarterly. 39 (1955), p. 53.
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resources would hamper his efforts.

General Lee and the colony's leaders

asked Congress to offset Georgia's lack of manpower by raising six regi
ments elsewhere and assigning them to defend the colony.

Before their

recommendations reached Congress, it voted to have Georgia raise two
additional regiments and two artillery companies.

On 24 July it also

adopted the colony's four troops of horse and expanded them into a ran
ger regiment.

Recruiting was slow, despite permission to canvass North

Carolina and Virginia.

Low bounties, long enlistments, and a fear that

Georgia's climate was fatal caused problems for the infantry.

The ranger

regiment did better and was on duty by October 1 7 7 6 . ^
In many respects the first year of southern military effort paral
leled New England's in 1775.

Each colony raised its own force either

independently or with Congressional encouragement.

Individual differen

ces appeared in regimental structure although a ten-company, 500-man
formation had general appeal.
of the Continental Army.
<

The units gradually were adopted as part

Two key differences set the south apart.

The

region, with less manpower to spare from a plantation economy, turned
quickly to enlistments longer than a single year.

Many of the colonies

also resisted surrendering full control over their units to a distant
government in Philadelphia, and all refused to conform completely to
the standard infantry regimental organization.

17. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 521-2, 606-7. Lee, "Papers," 2: 48'
49, 107-17, 241-5, 249. Candler, Revolutionary Records of Georgia. 1:
124, 194-9, 213. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 1159-61; 5:
1106-9; 5th Ser., 1: 6-8. Hawes, "McIntosh Papers," 38 (1954), pp. 16L
6, 253-7.
"Letters Colonial and Revolutionary," Pennsylvania Magazine
of History and Biography. 42 (1918), pp. 77-78.
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By July 1776 Georgia had one regiment nearing full strength and a
ranger regiment partially organized.

North Carolina was held by three

regiments, two troops of horse, and an artillery company, while eight
regiments and two artillery companies defended Virginia's Tidewater and
five companies its frontier.

The major troop concentration in the south

was at Charleston, threatened by a British force under General Clinton.
All six South Carolina regiments were there along with the 8th Virginia,
the 1st, 2d, and 3d North Carolina Regiments, and a troop of North Caro
lina horse.

Excluding the artillery the nine Continental regiments ag

gregated 269 officers and 3,453 enlisted men.

About 500 men were sick

and nearly 100 others were on furlough, leaving the force well below
authorized levels.

The three North Carolina regiments were about half

strength, the 8th Virginia about three-quarters full.

The three senior

South Carolina regiments averaged about 350 men apiece, but the newer
5th and 6th were still under 300.

18

Recruiting problems clearly posed

a greater problem in the south than in Washington's Main Army.
Fortunately for the revolutionaries the southern troops did not
face as serious a threat during 1776 as they had feared.

Virginia bested

Governor Dunmore, and North Carolina crushed a Loyalist uprising at
Moore's Creek Bridge.

Joint forces of Virginia and the Carolinas, mostly

militia, defeated the Cherokee Indians, and the Charleston garrison re
pulsed Clinton's amphibious force.
hurt the Continental Army.

The ease of these successes actually

Southern leaders, steeped in Whig ideological

commitment to militia saw these victories as proof that local forces were

18.

Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 1: 631-2.
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sufficient for their defense

and didnot give their full

taining their Continental regiments.

support

to sus

When Major General Lee, who was in

overall command in the south, left in the autumn of 1776 he recognized
that "It is not impossible that the late repulse of the Enemy _/ Clinton_/
may be fatal to us.
,,

,

table sleep."

We seem

now all

sunk into a most secure and comfor-

19

The Middle Colonies.

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, the central colo
nies, also joined the Continental Army during 1776 as part of Congress'
expansion of the military effort.

Like the south, this area had a more

diverse ethnic composition than New England.

On the other hand, it lay

puch closer to the seat of national authority in Philadelphia.

Proximity

simplified communication and enabled the governments of these colonies
to cooperate better with Congress.

They largely avoided the variety of

unit structures which plagued the initial efforts of the other colonies,
for example.

Easy communication also kept them from raising troops until

they received instructions from Congress.

While this control saved the

colonies unnecessary expense, it raised for the first time an Important
question of who should make initial appointments of officers.
The first troops requested from the Middle Colonies, other than the
riflemen called forth in June of 1775, were two regiments from New Jersey.

19. Lee, "Papers," 2: 105-6. Also see John Todd White, "Standing Armies
in Time of War: Republican Theory and Military Practice During the AmerL
can Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, George Washington University, 1978),
pp. 109-10; and Robert Loyal Ganyard, "North Carolina During the American
Revolution: The First Phase, 1774-1777" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke Uni
versity, 1963), p. 340.
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Congress, anticipating a British attack on New York City, on 9 October
1775 asked the New Jersey Provincial Congress for troops to replace the
New York regiments which had marched into Canada.

New Jersey asserted

the right of each colony to name all the officers in a unit because,
knowing its own citizens, it could select men who would be most effective.
Delegates in Congress who were committed to safeguarding local govern
ment supported New Jersey's position, but the debate was won by those
who hoped to strengthen Congress' role as a national government.
practice Congress followed a compromise.

In

Company officers were selected

by the colonial governments who also nominated candidates for the field
officers.

Congress elected the candidates endorsed by the colonies and

issued commissions to all officers.^
Congress subsequently clarified other aspects of the commissioning
process.

Officers elected on the same day took seniority according to

the order in which their names appeared in the minutes of Congress.

A

promotion made to fill a vacancy carried an effective date retroactive
to the time the vacancy occurred.

Congress also steadfastly maintained

its right to promote officers without regard to seniority in cases of ex
ceptional merit.

Delegates from the middle and southern colonies willing

ly agreed because they knew that strict adherence to seniority would allow
New England to dominate Army leadership.

21

20. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 285-9, 305, 335, 429. Smith, Letters
of Delegates. 2: 147-8, 155-6, 171, 253, 489-90. Force, American Archives,
4th Ser., 3: 1051, 1224-5, 1240. William Livingston to Stirling, 8 Nov
1775; William Alexander Papers (hereafter referred to as the Stirling Pa
pers), New-York Historical Society. Jonathan Gregory Rossle, The Politics
of Command in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1975), pp. 26-30, 61-74.
21. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 29, 342; 6: 864. Burnett, Letters of
Congress. 2: 14.
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With policy established, Congress appointed distinguished men as
New Jersey's field officers.

Lord Stirling, commanding the 1st New

Jersey Regiment, and William Maxwell, colonel of the 2d, were veterans
of the French and Indian War, militia colonels, and Important politicians.
The sixteen companies to be raised by the Provincial Congress were ap
portioned among the counties according to militia strength.

Organiza

tion of the regiments reflected the longstanding subdivisions of the
colony.

East Jersey, the northeastern portion, filled the 1st, while

West Jersey, the southwest, furnished the 2d.

22

William Livingston, a New Jersey delegate soon to be the governor,
secured authorization for a third regiment when Congress ordered the 2d
to Canada.

The new commander, Ellas Dayton, had the same military and

political credentials as the two earlier colonels.

This regiment organi

zed during the early spring on a colony-wide basis.

At the same time the

Provincial Congress disbanded its minutemen and created two companies of
artillery.

These companies, one for East Jersey and one for West, were

regular state troops designed to support the militia.

Congress rejected

New Jersey's efforts to have them adopted as Continentals.
turned down a request for two more infantry regiments.

It also

23

Congress soon promoted Stirling to brigadier general and Lieutenant
Colonel William Winds succeeded him as commander of the 1st New Jersey
Regiment.

In an unusual step, Matthias Ogden (who went to Boston as a

22. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 3: 1234-44; 4: 164-6, 288, 294-5.
American-born William Alexander's claim to the Earldom of Stirling had
been recognized in Scotland, but rejected by the British House of Lords.
23. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 47, 123, 181n. Smith, Letters of
Delegates. 3: 77-80, 306, 310-1, 318-9. Force, American Archives, 4th
Ser., 4: 664, 1391, 1580-1624.
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volunteer) was inserted as the new lieutenant colonel.

The 1st and 3d

went to New York, although two companies of the latter were briefly
diverted to protect Cape May.

Washington later sent both regiments

north, where the 1st joined the 2d in Canada while the 3d nerved in the
Mohawk Valley.

24

Pennsylvania, like New Jersey, had been relatively untouched by
operations in 1775.

Because it lacked a mandatory militia, the Quaker-

dominated colony relied on volunteers, known as Associators.

The colo

nial Assembly, still the legal governing body, assumed responsibility
for supervising the Associators on 30 June 1775.

Under the leadership

of Benjamin Franklin, the colony's Committee of Safety worked vigorously
to accumulate supplies and by the end of September published a set of
rules and regulations.

Since the colony had a large German-speaking

minority, the regulations were printed in that language as well as in
English.2^
Congress pushed the colony to further activity on 12 October 1775
by authorizing it to raise a regiment.

The Assembly appointed company

officers who began recruiting almost immediately.
not selected until November.

Field officers were

The companies were enlisted across the

colony and assembled in the capital on 11 January 1776.

At that time

the officers forced the aging Colonel John Bull to resign.

John DeHaas,

24. Stirling to Samuel Tucker, 3 Mar 1776; Tucker to Stirling, 7 Mar 1776;
Stirling Papers, New-York Historical Society. Stirling to Congress, 5 and
19 Feb 1776; Papers of the Continental Congress, Record Group 360, National
Archives. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 188, 204, 291. Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington. 4: 526.
25. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 2: 1771-7; 3: 496, .501-11, 870-1.
Pennsylvania Archives. 8th Ser., 8: 7245-7, 7351-2, 7369-80, 7384.

131
another veteran of the French and Indian War, replaced him and marched
the regiment to Q u e b e c . ^
On 9 December 1775 Congress authorized four more regiments.

Field

officers recommended by the Committee of Safety were appointed in early
January.

Counties raised the companies which were grouped into regiments

on a geographical basis.

For unknown reasons, Congress allowed the colo

ny to designate its regiments anachronistically as the 1st through 5th
Pennsylvania Battalions.

Cumberland County's local committee of safety

petitioned the colony's committee to allocate it a full regiment, and
Congress rewarded this enthusiasm on 4 January 1776 by directing Penn
sylvania to raise another regiment there.

Officers for it received com

missions according to the county's recommendations.^

one company of

each regiment, except the 1st, had rifles instead of muskets.

Captain

John Nelson's independent rifle company was attached during 1776 to the
1st Pennsylvania Battalion as compensation.

That company had been or

ganized by the Berks County committee and accepted by Congress on 30
January.

28

Pennsylvania hoped to have a voice in the use of its regiments by

2Q

having them serve as a unified brigade.*

That course would allow time

to train the junior officers, who were inexperienced but considered

26. Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 291, 370. Pennsylvania Archives, 8th
Ser., 8: 7306-8, 7314, 7324-5, 7345, 7456.
27. Ibid.. 1st Ser., 4: 693-4, 711. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser.,
4 : 501, 5 0 7 - H .
Smith, Letters of Delegates. 3: 13-14, 20-21, 27-28.
Ford, Journals of Congress. 3s 418; 4: 23-24, 29-31, 47-48.
28. Ibid., 4: 29, 101-2, 207. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3: 167. In
1777 Nelson's company was absorbed by the 5th Pennsylvania Regiment.
29. William Thompson to unknown, 25 Jan 1776, in Pennsylvania Magazine
of History and Biography, 35 (1911), pp. 304-6.
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"pretty generally men of some Education, capable of becoming good offi
cers, _/ and_/ willing to do their duty."3®
ted systematic deployment.

The Canadian crisis preven

Congress quickly ordered the 1st, 2d, and

4th (under Franklin's protege Anthony Wayne) to the north.

A shortage

of arms delayed the movement of the others and led Congress to toy with
the idea of arming Robert Magaw's 5th with pikes instead of muskets.

The

6th later reached Canada, but the 3d and 5th went only as far as New York
City.31
During the summer Congress authorized Pennsylvania to raise two more
regiments for special missions.

Westmoreland County on its own authority

had formed an Independent company to protect its frontier.

On 16 June

1776 this unit, one hundred men under Captain Van Swearingen, was accep
ted by the Assembly as state troops and stationed at Kittaning.

Congress

also became concerned with preserving the neutrality of Indians in the
area.

On 11 July it ordered Schuyler to raise a regiment to garrison

several key points in New York and Pennsylvania, including Kittaning.
Seven of the companies were raised in Westmoreland County and the eighth
in adjacent Bedford.

Swearingen's company became part of the regiment.

Aneas Mackay, a former commander of a British independent company living
in Westmoreland, was appointed colonel on 20 July.

Mackay was successful

in recruiting men, but a food shortage prevented concentration of the
regiment until mid-December.

32

30. Lee, "Papers," lj 303-8.
31. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 163, 204, 2l5; 5: 431.
Force, Ameri
can Archives, 4th Ser., 5: 435-6; 6: 664. Smith, Letters of Delegates,
3: 376, 381-5, 420.
32. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 6: 1284; 5th Ser., 2: 7-9. Penn
sylvania Archives. 1st Ser., 5: 92-93, 135; 8th Ser., 8: 7535-6. Ford,
Journals of Congress. 5: 542, 562, 596, 759-60.
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Mackay's regiment was not responsible for the defense of the colo
ny's northern border in Northumberland and Northampton Counties.
Congress authorized a second regiment to secure that region on 23 August
1776.

It contained only six companies under the command of Lieutenant

Colonel William Cook and did not complete organization in time to participate in operations in 1776.

33

Congress actually provided the equivalent

of a full regiment for that stretch of Pennsylvania's frontier by author
izing two separate companies at the same time for the Wyoming Valley.
The Valley, today part of Pennsylvania, was claimed by both Connecticut
and Pennsylvania, with the former colony exercising effective control.
It organized the companies under Captains Robert Durkee and Samuel
Ransom of Wyoming.

34

Delaware also responded promptly when Congress assigned it a single
regiment of Continentals on 9 December 1775.

Company officers were

appointed on 13 January, and six days later Congress approved the field
officers.

The regiment assembled at Dover in March and began training

under the tutelage of Adjutant Thomas Holland, a former British captain.
Several companies skirmished with landing parties from the frigate Roe
buck while protecting Delaware's coastline, but the bulk of the regiment
lacked weapons until July.

It picked up muskets in Philadelphia and in

August set out for the Main Army.

35

33. Ibid., p. 699. Pennsylvania Archives, 1st Ser., 5: 84-85. Force,
American Archives, 5th Ser., 2: 16, 28, 35, 60.
34. Ford, Journals of Congress, 5: 699, 70l; 6: 1024. Charles J. Hoadley,
et a l . , eds., The Public Records of the State of Connecticut (11 vols.,
Hartford: Various publishers, 1894-1967), 1: 7.
35. Force. American Archives. 4th Ser., 5: 745-6, 814-5, 1173; 5th Ser.,
1: 739-41; 2: 881-2.
Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 418; 4: 68-69, 251;
5: 520, 596, 631. Henry Hobart Bellas, ed., Personal Recollections of
Captain Enoch Anderson ... (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware,
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Maryland patterned its defense bill of 14 August 1775 on Virginia's.
The colony was not in any immediate danger, however, and merely reor
ganized its militia and established minutemen.

Lord Dunmore's activity

in the Chesapeake Bay caused the Maryland Convention to reconsider that
decision.

On 1 January 1776 the concept of raising regular troops re

ceived approval.
with Btate troops.

Two weeks later the Convention replaced the minutemen
One regiment contained the nine companies from the

northern and western parts of the colony.

It was organized along lines

similar to Continental regiments except for the addition of a second
major and a light infantry company.

The light company had rifles instead

of muskets and a third lieutenant instead of an ensign.

It contained 64

privates, somewhat more than the line companies, but the total number in
the regiment was the same as in a regiment of eight 68-man companies.
Seven of the remaining separate companies were infantry with a larger
number of privates; two others were artillery (with the same organization)
to defend Annapolis and Baltimore.

36

The officers came from the political leadership of the colony.
Colonel William Smallwood, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Ware, and four
captains sat in the Convention.

Both majors had prior service:

Thomas

Price commanded one of the Continental rifle companies of 1775 and Mordecai Gist organized the colony's first volunteer company in 1774.

The

regiment and three of the Infantry companies reached New York on 9 August
and joined Washington.

The remaining four companies under Major Price

36. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 3: 108-12; 4: 728-35, 744-53; 5:
1528. Archives of Maryland. 18: 4-20. See Table 3.
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did not join them until 19 September when they could be spared from
coastal defense.

Congress formally assigned Maryland a quota of two

Continental regiments on 17 August 1776.

The colony decided instead

to transfer the regiment and independent infantry companies without
providing a second regimental staff.

37

Two other regiments were raised during the summer of 1776, primarily
in the middle colonies, as cooperative ventures.
the use of German auxiliaries in that year.

The British introduced

Propagandists denounced the

"Hessian mercenaries" and cited them as proof of the corruption of the
British political system.

They also prompted Congress to begin enlisting

troops for longer periods, and to make specific efforts to mobilize the
German-American population.
Battalion.

38

On 25 May Congress created the German

Native-born and immigrant Germans were enlisted in Maryland

and Pennsylvania for three year terms.
companies.

Each colony furnished four

The three field officers came from the revolutionary leader

ship in the German communities in those colonies.

Congress added a ninth

company from Pennsylvania on 17 July as a direct result of Washington's
recommendation of John David Woelper, then a lieutenant in the 3d PennQQ
sylvania Battalion, who had served in the French and Indian War.
The other joint unit was authorized on 17 June as the Maryland and
Virginia Rifle Regiment.

Like the 1st Continental Regiment, on which it

37. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 6: 1474, 1507; 5th Ser., 3: 87.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 416; 6: 72. Ford, Journals of
Congress, 5: 665-6.
38. White, "Standing Armies," pp. 143-4.
39. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 392; 5: 487-8, 526, 571, 590, 825-6.
Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 6: 1508; 5th Ser., 1: 124, 186-7,
1284, 1293, 1334-6.
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was modelled, Its cadre came from the rifle companies of 1775.

Daniel

Morgan'8 Virginia company had been captured at Quebec, but the other
Virginia company and both Maryland ones were in service at New York and
were reenlisted.

Four additional companies were raised in Virginia and

three in Maryland, all in the northwestern parts of their respective
colonies.

Captains Hugh Stephenson, Moses Rawlings, and Otho Holland

Williams became the regimental field officers, retaining their relative
seniority.

The regiment was captured in November at Fort Washington,

however, before all of the companies had a chance to join it.

40

During late 1775 and 1776 the four central colonies accepted the
obligation to raise over 11,000 men for the common military effort.

New

Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware formed ten regiments for Congress.
Maryland organized the equivalent of two more regiments as state troops,
but at Congress' request transferred them to the Continental Army.

Four

others were added during the summer of 1776, two of which were jointly
recruited by adjacent colonies.

Like the initial units recruited else

where, these regiments attracted men of talent, influence, and experience
as officers.

Except for Maryland, which behaved more like Virginia than

the other middle colonies, each concentrated on improving its militia at
first and turned to regular troops only at the request of Congress.

That

fact eliminated the variation in organizational models that was a problem
in the other regions.

Once the issue of appointing officers was resolved,

40. Ibid.. 5th Ser., I; 31-32, 183, 251, 1335-7, 1343. Ford, Journals of
Congress. 5: 452, 486, 529, 540, 741. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington,
5: 202, 216; 6: 128. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 1: 518.
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the middle colonies' regiments blended easily into the regular Army.
Seven of them went north.

The equivalent of six others joined Washing

ton's Main Army at New York City.

The Departments and the Main Army.

Adding new regiments from the southern and middle colonies greatly
expanded the size of the Continental Army during 1776.

At the same time

military operations spread beyond eastern Massachusetts and Canada.
Congress and Washington reacted to these new conditions by improving on
the basic command and staff organizations created during 1775.

The New

York and Canadian Departments served as a model for dividing the nation
into a system of territorial commands.

New departments and the transfer

of the Main Army to New York City led in turn to a larger staff.

Although

the size of the Army was greatly increased during early 1776, additional
demands during the summer forced Congress to raise still more men.

It

chose to tap other resources to meet that need.
The south, particularly Virginia, initiated the expansion of the
command structure by requesting general officers for its new regiments.
Congress appointed a committee "to consider into what departments the
middle and southern colonies ought to be formed, in order that military
operations ... may be carried on in a regular and systematic manner.
Following the committee's recommendations, Congress created two new ter
ritorial departments on 27 February 1776.

Virginia, the Carollnas, and

41. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 132-3. The committee represented every
shade of opinion in Congress, including the militant John Penn, the more
conservative James Wilson, and three members (Thomas Lynch, Benjamin Har
rison, and Robert Alexander) who generally followed a middle course on
questions of resistance.
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Georgia became the Southern Department.

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela

ware, and Maryland, added to New York, formed the Middle Department,
which remained under Schuyler.

Three days later Congress placed Charles

Lee in command of the Southern Department and elected six brigadier
generals for the new departments.

Appropriate staff assistants were

subsequently appointed for e a c h . ^
Washington remained the Commander-in-Chief with personal command of
the "Military District" of New England.
partment.

Canada represented a fourth de

Congress intended to assign each department a major general

and two brigadier generals, but the attempt at symmetry was unsuccessful.
Lee's Southern Department immediately received two additional brigadier
generals because it covered so large an area, and Washington's Main Army
retained three major and six brigadier generals.^
and resignations followed.

Transfers, promotions,

New appointments to fill vacancies included

Frederick de Woedtke who claimed to be a Prussian general.

His election

on 16 March 1776 as brigadier general for the Canadian Department was the
first appointment as a general officer of a foreign volunteer.^*
When Henry Knox accumulated enough heavy artillery, Washington occu
pied dominant positions on Dorchester Heights, rendering Boston untenable

42. Ibid., pp. 174, 181, 187, 236, 241, 243, 331-2, 364-5. Smith. Letters
of Delegates, 3: 252, 346-7, 459. The brigadier gaaerals for the Southern
Department were John Armstrong of Pennsylvania, Andrew Lewis of Virginia,
and James Moore and Robert Howe of North Carolina. William Thompson of
Pennsylvania and Lord Stirling of New Jersey were assigned to Schuyler in
the new Middle Department.
43. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 47. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing
ton, 4: 374, 381-2.
44. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 186, 209-20. Smith, Letters of Dele
gates , 3: 384-5. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 221-3.
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for the British, who evacuated it on 17 March 1776.

Washington correctly

guessed that General Howe would attack New York City next, as soon as the
British could regroup their forces.
that city over a period of weeks.

The Main Army moved by brigades to
The regiments marched overland to Nor

wich, Connecticut, embarked in coastal shipping, and sailed down Long
Island Sound.

Washington opened his headquarters at New York on 14

April, and three days later the last units arrived from Boston.
With this move Washington became commander of the Middle Department.
Schuyler reverted to command of the reorganized Northern Department in
northern New York.

Major General Artemas Ward wished to resign, but was

persuaded to accept command of the new Eastern Department encompassing
New England for the time being.

His forces consisted of a company of

Knox's artillery regiment and five Massachusetts infantry regiments.
Four, the 8th, 16th, 18th, and 27th Continental Regiments, protected
Boston.

The 14th remained at the Marblehead naval b a s e . ^

Washington continued the Main Army's organization of three divisions
and six brigades in January 1776.

The average size of a brigade remained

the same, although each now contained only four or five of the larger
regiments.

When the army moved to New York it gained some regiments from

the middle colonies, but left five behind in Massachusetts.

Shortly

thereafter it sent the equivalent of two brigades to the north.

In April

Washington regrouped the remaining regiments under the one major and four

45. Ward to Congress, 22 Mar 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives.
Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 300; 5: 694; 6: 931. Fitzpatrick, Wri
tings of Washington. 4: 467-70; 5: 1-4. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 1:
450-2, 505-6. C. Harvey Gardiner, ed., A Study in Dissent; The WarrenGerry Correspondence 1776-1792 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
Ere88, 1968), pp. 16-19.
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brigadier generals left with the Main Army.

Each of the four brigades

contained four or five regiments and defended a specific area or terrain
feature.

That arrangement, and the exemption of the artillery from the

brigades, were characteristics of the 1775 brigade system, although
Washington did alter the arrangement employed at Boston in one respect.
At New York he placed the riflemen in the brigade responsible for the
most advanced positions where their special skills had greater value.
Key personnel changes as well as the expansion to service the new
territorial departments highlighted the history of the Army staff in
1776.

Adjutant General Gates and Muster Master General Stephen Moylan,

for example, were promoted to larger assignments during the year.

Joseph

Reed accepted the Adjutant General's office with the rank of colonel, and
his former law student, Gunning Bedford, moved up from Deputy Muster
Master General.

Their close relationship Insured that the two main ad-

ministrative sections continued to cooperate.
to improve the quality of staff work.

47

Washington also worked

He instituted a comprehensive re

porting system that kept headquarters informed about the day-to-day
status of the Army.

48

That data gave the Continentals an edge in accurate

planning over the British, who lacked a cohesive, functioning adminlstrative network.

49

46. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 275, 512-3, 535-6; 5: 36-37.
47. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 177, 187, 236, 311, 315; 5: 419, 460;
6: 933.
48. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 202-7, 223. Ford, Journals
of Congress. 10: 124. Richard K. Showman, et al., eds.. The Papers of
General Nathanael Greene (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
for the Rhode Island Historical Society, 1976), 1: 264-5. In 1776
reports required a ream of paper a month for each regiment.
49. Charles Jenkinson to Henry Clinton, 5 Apr and 23 Nov 1779 and 5 Feb
1781; British Headquarters Papers, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, 4
1894, 2443, and 3320.
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Washington18 aides and secretaries served as another element in the
Army's administrative chain.
and personnel changes.

During 1776 they also experienced expansion

Increased pay and a Congressional decision to give

the Commander-in-Chief's aides the rank of lieutenant colonel (major gener
als' aides were majors) eased some of the problems caused by career aspir
ations.

The addition of a fourth aide in August compensated for the

growth in Washington's correspondence after the move to New York.^®
new special unit formed on 12 March supplemented the aides.

A

The Commander-

in-Chief's Guard, a company-sized element, protected Washington's person
and the Army's cash and official papers.

Adjutant Caleb Gibbs of the 14th

Continental Regiment became its captain and took on the burdens of super
vising the headquarters' household.

Washington's nephew, Lieutenant

George Lewis, became the other officer of the guard.
Comparable expansion took place in the logistical and medical spheres.
Two developments in 1776 improved support for the troops.

Congress re

placed the individual colonies as the procurer of clothing and, under the
general supervision of the Quartermaster General, issued it to the troops
at cost.

The system followed American exoerlence in the colonial wars

rather than the British policy of allowing colonels to deal directly with
civilian contractors.

Designed for the small army of January 1776, the

plan suffered a partial collapse when the Army expanded.

Eventually

Washington had to abandon his hope for standardized uniforms.

52

50. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 3 H ; 5: 418, 613. Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington. 4: 287, 369, 381; 5: 50, 165, 337-8, 481.
51. Ibid.. 4: 387-8; 5: 50, 125. Carlos E. Godfrey, The Commander-inChief's Guard Revolutionary War (Washington: Stevenson-Smith, 1904), pp.
19, 35-38.
52. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 57, 85, 87, 96, 155, 195, 341,
385; 5: 21, 130, 336. The plan included regimental flags keyed to the color
of each unit's coat facings.
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The second innovation came on 29 June 1776.

Washington organized a

provisional regiment from the labor troops under the command of Barrackmaster Jonathan Brewer, a former colonel, and Deputy Quartermaster General
John Parke.

The hired or enlisted craftsmen continued to perform main

tenance and construction duties, but now were organized into twelve com
panies for possible emergency combat service.

Each fifty-man company

had a temporary captain and two lieutenants, mostly either former enlis
ted men or civilians.

The artisans formed companies according to trades:

seven of carpenters, three of smiths, one of naval carpenters, and a
general maintenance company.

The regiment dissolved in November.

53

Competent military engineers were too rare to allow each department
to have several.

Washington brought only Rufus Putnam and Jeduthan Bald

win to New York.

Putnam served as the Main Army's chief engineer with a

catch-as-catch-can collection of assistants detailed from the line regi
ments.

Baldwin moved to Ticonderoga to supervise similar arrangements in

the Northern Department.

Both men received commissions as engineer

colonels during the year, although the lack of true training as military
engineers created weaknesses in overly ambitious fortifications at New
York and Ticonderoga.

Fort Washington, the major work on Manhattan, later

was stormed in a single day.

54

Congress capped the expansion of the Army by creating a special
standing committee to assume the burden of routine military supervision.

53. Ibid., 5: 197, 270. Force. American Archives, 5th Ser., 1; 765-6.
54. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 630, 732. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 5: 5, 11, 108, 412. Thomas Williams Baldwin, ed., The Revo
lutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin 1775-1778 (Bangor: De Burians, 1906), pp. 17-34, 62-63.

143
Edward Rutledge, echoing Washington's concerns, suggested on 24 January
1776 that Congress establish a War Office similar to Britain's.

Congress

appointed a committee to study the matter^** and finally formed a "Board
of War and Ordnance" on 12 June.

Five delegates,*’*’ assisted by Richard

Peters as a permanent secretary, began functioning on 21 June.

In ad

dition to performing various administrative functions, the Board prepared
recommendations on matters of military policy which were submitted to the
full Congress.

The major tasks of the Board included supervision of

prisoners of war, the compilation of a master roster of commissioned of
ficers, monitoring returns of men and materiel, and developing reference
files of military correspondence.^

Washington greeted this development

with joy, calling it "an Event of great importance ...
recorded as such in the Historic Page."

J

which_/ will be

58

The military expansion in early 1776 and the improvements in the
Continental Army's command and staff organization that it prompted none
theless fell short of the defensive needs of the nation by the summer.
Britain vastly Increased the military and naval strength committed to sup
pressing the Revolution, massing forces at St. John's in Canada and es
pecially at New York.

The first pressure to add still more men to the

55. Interest in and support for the Board was widespread in Congress. The
original committee to investigate the concept Included militants Franklin,
Samuel Ward, and Samuel Adams, plus more moderate delegates Thomas Lynch,
Benjamin Harrison, Edward Rutledge, and Robert Morris. The resolution was
drafted by a committee appointed on 20 March which Included James Duane
and Thomas Johnson plus militant Richard H. Lee.
56. Militants John Adams and Roger Sherman; Rutledge and JameB Wilson who
generally adopted more conservative positions; and Harrison.
57. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 85, 215; 5: 434, 438. Smith, Letters of
Delegates. 3: 148. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 5: 128-9, 200-1.
58. Ibid.. p. 159.
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Continental Army's rolls came from New England.

A Congressional study

in May indicated that the Eastern Department needed a garrison of 6,000
men.

On H

May Congress ordered Ward's five regiments to recruit to full

strength, adopted two regiments of Rhode Island state troops, and three
days later directed the other three New England governments to raise one
regiment apiece.

59

Washington's basic policy throughout the war called for keeping the
Continentals concentrated and leaving local defense to "the Militia, or
other Internal Strength of each Province."**®

The New England governments

initially used short-term independent companies to protect key harbors,
but on 31 October 1775 Rhode Island took a different course by raising a
500-man regiment of state troops as its source of "Internal Strength."
In January the force expanded to two 750-man, 12-company regiments, which
freed Ward from responsibility for defending Newport and Providence.

New

Hampshire's new Continental regiment was intended to garrison Portsmouth,
but chaos resulted from attempting to use state troops as a cadre, and
Colonel Nicholas Long made no recruiting progress until August.

Connec

ticut raised its regiment under Colonel Andrew Ward in the Hartford area
and northeastern portions of the state, and then added two regiments of
state troops to take over the burden of local defense when it marched
out of the state.

Massachusetts did not raise its regiment, but instead

placed three regiments of recently formed state troops (two of infantry

59. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 311, 344-7, 355, 357, 360. Burnett,
Letters of Congress. 2: 78-79. Harry Alonzo Cushing, ed., The Writings
of Samuel Adams (4 vols., New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), 3: 28890.
60. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 3: 379-80. Also see pp. 486-7.
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and one of artillery) under General Ward's command with the restriction
that they could not be sent outside Massachusetts.**^
Congress' plans for a 6,000-man Eastern Department became a dead
letter by summer as operations elsewhere became more important.

Three of

the new regiments and all five regiments of the original New England gar
rison soon shifted to either Ticonderoga or New York.

During conferences

in May Washington and Congress concluded that the Army needed a two-to-one
numerical advantage to defend both places successfully.

Between 1 and 3

June Congress called for the additional men needed to achieve that ratio.
Ticonderoga received an allocation of 6,000 militia and New York another
13,800.

A third force, the 10,000-man Flying Camp, was set aside as a

mobile reserve stationed in New Jersey.

In deciding on militia rather

than still more Continental regiments, Congress acted on practical and
ideological reasons.

Militia could take to the field quicker, and many

delegates also believed that America faced a crisis which demanded full
participation by the society.

To individuals of this point of view the

militia, not the regular army, was the military institution of the peo-

61. John Russell Bartlett, ed., Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and
Providence Plantations in New England (9 vols., Providence: Various pub
lishers, 1856-65), 7: 376, 384-6, 403-4, 410, 415, 432-8, 492-3, 537-8,
554, 599-600, 606-9. Rhode Island Historical Society Collections. 6: 1412, 154-5, 160-3, 170-3. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 1: 28-29, 4849, 62-68, 991; 2: 805-6. J. H. Trumbull and Charles C. Hoadley, comps.,
The Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut (15 vols., Hartford: The
Case, Lockwood & Brainard Co., 1850-90), 15: 296-305, 416-7, 434, 485-7,
514-6.
62. Ford, Journals of Congress. 4: 399-401, 410-4. Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington. 5: 56-58, 78n, 218-24.
63. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 1: 492-4. H. James Henderson, Party
Politics in the Continental Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1974), p. 104. White, "Standing Armies," pp. 95-110.
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All of the colonies from Maryland northward responded to this call,
although few furnished their full quotas of militia.

Pennsylvania's

contribution to the Flying Camp Included two special units of state
troops, totalling ly500 men.
departing Continentals.

They had been created in March to replace

The colony planned to use the two-battalion

Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment either on the frontier or in defense
of eastern Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania State Musketry Battalion to
defend Philadelphia from British regulars.

64

The state troops also in

cluded an artillery contingent which was not sent to the Flying Camp, but
retained near Philadelphia to guard the fortifications on the Delaware
River.

A small company under Thomas Proctor established in October 1775

expanded in May to one hundred men.

As a result of its men's distinguished

service as volunteers on the Continental Navy's Hornet in an engagement
with the frigate Roebuck. Pennsylvania further expanded its artillery
force to two large companies.

In October those men were ordered to be

reenlisted for the duration of the war.

65

The reinforcements of militia, and of several new Continental regi
ments which arrived in New York during the summer, increased the size of
the Main Army.

Although the militia had their own "Provincial" brigadier

generals, Washington had a pressing need for extra senior officers to
which Congress responded on 9 August by promoting Heath, Spencer, Sullivan,
and Greene to major general, and adding six new brigadier generals.

Of

the original 1775 brigadier generals only Wooster was not promoted; Congress

64. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 4: 1573-5; 6: 961. Pennsylvania
Archives, 1st Ser., 4: 780; 8th Ser., 8: 7429-46, 7461-5. See Table 3.
65. Ibid.. 1st Ser., 4: 751-2; 5: 33. Force, American Archives. 4th Ser.,
3: 1819-20, 1828; 4: 524; 5th Ser., 1; 1317; 2: 69, 80, 97.
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punished him for quarrelsome conduct in Canada.

The new brigadier gener

als replaced men promoted, killed, or captured.

In almost every case the

senior colonel from the same state was promoted.
als were added in September.66
to reorganized his brigades.

Other brigadier gener

The additional generals enabled Washington
In August the eight brigades of militia and

four of Continentals were formed into three "Grand Divisions," each tai
lored to a specific defensive mission and containing both militiamen and
Continentals.

Although other brigades were added, that basic pattern

prevailed for the remainder of the campaign.

67

In mid-September the Main Army's fourteen infantry brigades contained
31,000 officers and men.

68

Over 7,000 were sick, although most of those

were not so ill as to be hospitalized.
duties.

Another 3,500 were on detached

Of the total strength, 57 percent came from 36 regiments of

militia and 4 of state troops.

The remainder, 25 Continental regiments,

accounted for 674 officers, 103 regimental staff officers, 602 sergeants,
314 drummers and fifers, and 11,590 rank and file.

Only slightly more

than half of the Continental rank and file were carried as present and
fit for duty:

3,153 were sick and 2,356 "on command."

Of those on

special duties nearly two-thirds were Continentals rather than militia
because they had better training.

All regiments were reasonably complete.

Half were over three-quarters full, including the sick and detailed

66. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 5: 379-81. Burnett, Letters of
Congress, 2: 45-57. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 597, 641; 6: 898.
67. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 422-3, 501-3; 6: 3-4, 207-8.
68. General Return, Main Army, 14 Sep 1776; Record Group 93, National
Archives. This return does not include the Flying Camp or various regi
ments, such as the Delaware Regiment, not physically with their brigades
on that day.
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personnel.

The eight which fell below two-thirds had special reasons

for their status.

The 1st Continental Regiment was in the process of

reorganizing, and the others all had suffered heavy casualties in the
battle of Long Island a few weeks earlier.

Overall these figures indi

cate that Washington had a large army under his command, although only
a fraction of it could be considered trained, reliable troops.

On the

other hand, his regular regiments were reasonably close to their designed
strength and had an organizational potential for efficient battlefield
duty.

Summary.

The original plans worked out by Congress, Washington, and Schuyler
projected a small Continental Army for 1776.

Twenty-six infantry, one

rifle, and one artillery regiment were allocated to the Main Army and
another nine infantry regiments to the army in Canada and northern New
York.

Standard tables of organization insured that the regiments would

have a uniformity lacking in 1775.

Events during 1776 and Congress'

willingness to include every colony in the military effort soon outran
the original modest plan.

Great Britain committed major forces from

Europe which expanded the scope and intensity of the conflict.

Congress

and the individual colonies reacted by adding additional units to the
Army.
The haphazard growth in the number of regiments, conditioned by a
changing military situation and political questions, eventually produced
a national military institution in a geographical sense.

Congress es

tablished a network of territorial departments and added general officers
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and staff personnel to provide a national command organization.

Although

many of the newer regiments also adopted the standard regimental struc
ture, differences prevailed in some units due to special circumstances
involved in their creation.

Bringing them into conformity was the major

remaining task required to make the Army a national institution in every
sense.
Units concentrated in the north, at Charleston, and especially at
New York City during 1776 represented more colonies than those assembled
at Boston and in Canada in 1775.

Despite the loss of homogeneity, the

major field armies worked well together.

The troops in the far north

suffered a humiliating repulse in Canada, but stabilized after withdrawing
to Ticonderoga.

The Southern Department easily defeated tentative efforts

to restore royal authority in that region.

Washington's Main Army drove

the enemy from Boston, but was less successful in its defense of New York.
The latter campaign Included a series of battlefield defeats and the loss
of the vital port city.

Howe outgeneralled Washington, and his British

and German regulars for the most part performed more efficiently in combat
than the mixed force of militia and Continentals.

Howe's 15 September

landing at Kip's Bay, scattering two militia brigades in a rout, marked
the low point of the campaign for the Americans.
On the next day, however, a relatively minor skirmish at Harlem
Heights began the restoration of Continental morale.

Lieutenant Colonel

Thomas Knowlton's recently formed provisional ranger unit, supported by
the rifle companies of the 3d Virginia Regiment, and later by other units,
defeated a British force which included the elite 42d Foot (Black Watch).
Other skirmishes at Pelham and Mamaroneck, and individual performances by
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units even in battles which ended in defeat, contributed to a restoration
of confidence.

Washington planned to Incorporate the lessons he learned

in this campaign when the
gesin arms and

Army was reorganized for the coming year.

the development of better teamwork

Chan

in larger units, ra

ther than major change in the regimental structure, figured prominently
in his plans.

The other key concept which emerged from the campaign was

a realization that militiamen were not prepared for extensive service
with the field armies.

As Washington told Congress,

1 am persuaded and as fully convinced, as I am of any one
fact that has happened, that our Liberties must of necessity
be greatly hazarded,
If not entirely lost, If their defence
is left to any but a
permanent standing Army, I mean one to
exist during the War. ^

69.

Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6; 5.

CHAPTER V
AN ARMY FOR THE WAR:

1777

Enlistments for most of the Continentals expired on 31 December
1776.

Congress and Washington, remembering the problems of the previous

winter's reorganization, began preparations during the early fall.

They

profited from experience by starting sooner and by retaining the idea of
planning through military-Congressional conferences.

The new reorganiza

tion applied to troops from every state, producing comprehensive legis
lation to rationalize the ad hoc growth of the previous year.

The nearly

unanimous decision to recruit men for the duration of the war, rather
than the single-year term typical earlier, formed the central premise of
the new plan.

It was approved in September and modified somewhat during

the winter to adjust to changes necessitated by the final phase of the
1776 campaign.

Other modifications came in 1777 as the Main Army gained

its first experience with mobile rather than static operations.

In 1777

the Continental Army reached its maximum size in terms of units.

Other

than a handful of special-type organizations, problems thereafter related
to sustaining strength rather than growth.

The Eighty-Eight Battalion Resolve.

Congress made the basic decisions about the size and nature of the
Continental Army of 1777 during September and early October of 1776.
Delegates of different political backgrounds agreed on the general
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outlines of a new policy.

Extensive discussions in committee took place

before consensus on precise details appeared.

The original proposal

adopted by Congress settled on the size of the Army and apportioned it
among the several states, establishing conditions of enlistment and com
pensation for the officers and men.

Congress also approved amendments

to the Articles of War to improve discipline.
Americans had adamantly opposed long enlistments during the first
year and a half of the Revolution.

In addition to the precedent of short

enlistments for the Provincials, most politicians believed in the ideal
of a militia of citizen-soldiers rather than a "standing army."

That

attitude began to change during the summer of 1776, and even Whiggish
John Adams conceded that the newly independent nation needed "A regular
Army, and the most masterly Discipline, because ... without these We
cannot reasonably hope to be a powerful, a prosperous, or a free People."
The 1776 campaign proved that the Revolutionary militia system, like its
colonial predecessor, could not furnish large bodies of men for extended
periods.

The change in Congress' attitude began during the summer when

the newly authorized units were recruited for three years' service.

By

the fall delegates universally agreed to rely on a large body of trained
and disciplined Continentals to compete with the British and German
regulars on the battlefield.

2
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Once Congress decided in favor of a long-term army it directed the
Board of War to draft a comprehensive plan.
document on 9 September 1776.

The Board submitted that

Congress devoted the next week to deba

ting and amending it in committee of the whole.

Discussion of specific

details relating to enlistments, bounties, and the allocation of quotas
consumed the time.

The final legislation, known as the "eighty-eight

battalion resolve," called for eighty-eight regiments of Infantry under
the structure approved for use in 1776.

Congress' estimates of the

military population of each state governed the quotas of regiments.^

The

delegates Intended to have most existing regiments reenlist their men.
They approved cash bonuses and liberal poBt-war land grants as incentives
in the face of the much longer terms of service.

As in the past, Congress

retained commissioning powers but allowed the states to select all regi
mental officers.

The states also had to arm, clothe, and equip the regi

ments, and could withhold part of the men's pay to cover the cost of
A
uniforms.
Longer enlistments allowed the Army to improve training and discipline.
Modification of the Articles of War also contributed to better discipline.
Washington decided during the summer that the existing Articles lacked
deterrent effect, and he sent Judge Advocate William Tudor to Philadel
phia to present his case.

Tudor and a Congressional committee which in

cluded some of the finest legal minds in America^ produced the revision

3. See Table 4.
4. Worthington C. Ford, ed.. Journals of the Continental Congress 17741789 (34 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 5: 729,
747, 749, 751, 756-7, 762-3. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 2: 82-83, 8889, 95-100, 102, 105-7.
5. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson carried out the majority of the work
of this committee.
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adopted on 20 September.

It expanded the number of articles by more

closely copying the British articles and restoring material deleted in
former versions.

The central changes added to the list of capital crimes

and increased the maximum corporal punishment from thirty-nine lashes to
one hundred.

This version remained in effect for the rest of the war.

Accompanying legislation commissioned Tudor as a lieutenant colonel and
authorized deputy judge advocates to assist with mounting casework.*’
Washington wrote a letter to Congress on 24 September, before he
learned of these resolutions, requesting immediate action to reorganize
the Army for the new year and to Improve discipline.

It was an eloquent

appeal which overcame the last lingering objections in Congress, but it
also raised some new Issues.

In particular Washington asked the delegates

to increase the pay scales of officers and to furnish free uniforms to the
men.

Congress increased officers' salaries on 7 October and approved an

annual uniform allowance on the next day.^
The Commander-in-Chief'8 concern was to complete the reorganization
before winter fragmented the Army.

He wanted Congress to have the states

send legislative committees to headquarters and to Ticonderoga to Insure
that the most qualified officers were retained.

Congress agreed, and when

some committees did not appear promptly, allowed Washington and Schuyler
to act in place of them.

When November brought news that Massachusetts

6. Ibid., 2: 54-57. Ford. Journals of Congress. 5: 788-807; 7; 265-6.
Peter Force, ed., American Archives: A Collection of Authentic Records.
State Papers. Debates, and Other Notices of Public Affairs (9 vols., Washing
ton: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839-53), 5th Ser., 1: 576.
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Origi
nal Manuscript Sources 1745-1799 (39 vols., Washington: Government Prin
ting Office, 1931-44), 5: 194-5; 6: 91-92, 125, 147, 151.
7. Ibid., 6: 106-16. Ford. Journals of Congress. 5: 853-6.
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had promised to supplement the pay of Its enlisted men and that other
states were considering similar action, Washington warned that such a
course was unwise over the long term, and Congress agreed.

On 12 Novem

ber the practice was forbidden, but the option of shorter three-year
enlistments received approval as another incentive to recruiting.**
Operations around New York did not halt after the battle of White
Plains.

Instead, they interrupted the reorganization and eventually

caused major changes in the master plan.

On 12 November Washington di

vided the Main A m y to guard against several possible courses of British
action.

General Lee, recently returned from the south, remained east of

the Hudson River to protect approaches to New England.
over to New Jersey to reinforce the Flying Camp.

Washington crossed

General Heath's division

marched into the Hudson Highlands, a mountainous zone some forty miles
above New York City, to preserve communications between the two larger
forces.

As early as 8 November 1775 Congress recognized that the High

lands deserved to be fortified because it was the only place along the
river between Albany and the sea where warships could be stopped.

A com-

mondant of the fortifications, at first a colonel but later a brigadier
general, had been the senior Continental officer in the region during most
of 1776.

Heath's assignment transformed the region into a de-facto ter

ritorial department, a status which its strategic importance preserved for
9
the rest of the war.

8. Ibid., 5: 854-6; 6: 920-1, 944-5. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 2: 1156, 139-41, 143-4, 154-9. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 6: 152-6,
186-90 , 200-1, 271-3 , 289-90.
9. Ibid.. 5: 10-11, 123, 138-9, 317-9, 340-1, 435-6; 6: 242-5, 257-8, 2847; 16: 150-4. Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 337-8. Robert K. Wright, Jr.,
"Too Little, Too Late: The Campaign of 1777 in the Hudson Highlands" (Mas
ter's Thesis, College of William and Mary, 1971), pp. 30-40.
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Howe captured Fort Washington on 16 November, depriving Washington
of its large garrison and upsetting the balance of forces.

He continued

with an Invasion of New Jersey which chased Washington across the Dela
ware River on 8 December.

A second British force from New York captured

Newport, Rhode Island, the same day.

As soon as Howe decided that

Washington was safe on the Pennsylvania side of the river, he halted the
campaign and ordered his troops into winter quarters.
Trenton, one of the most advanced outposts, was garrisoned by a re
inforced Hessian Brigade under Colonel Johann Rail.

Rail's regiments were

among the best in the German auxiliary forces serving the British, but they
were worn out, seriously short of officers, and handicapped by a cumbersome
structure.

Hesse-Cassel modeled its army on Prussia's, giving each infan

try regiment two five-company battalions plus a grenadier company.

The

British had altered that formation before the regiments left Europe, de
taching the grenadier companies to form four four-company grenadier bat
talions and dividing each regiment into two single-battalion regiments.
In comparison with British and American units, the revised Hessian regi
ment lacked enough officers for its large enlisted strength.

It contained

five companies for administrative purposes, but fought in eight platoons.
Before it could engage, it needed time to regroup into platoons.

At

Trenton the Hessians were billeted by company.*®

10. Bernard A. Uhlendorf, ed., Revolution in America: Confidential Let
ters and Journals, 1776-1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the
Hessian Forces (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 6-17,
72-79. Ernst Kipping, Die Truppen von Hessian-Kassel ... 1776-1783
(Darmstadt: Wehr und Wissen Verlagsgesellchaft M. B. H., 1965), pp. 2728. Treaty between Great Britain and Hesse-Cassel, 15 Jan 1776 (copy);
British Headquarters Papers, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, #10. See
Figure 6.
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The invasion of New Jersey threatened Philadelphia and the exis
tence of the Main Army.

Washington ordered Lee to come to his aid, but

the latter followed an independent strategy until he was captured.

Major

General John Sullivan assumed command of Lee's three brigades and marched
them to headquarters without further i n c i d e n t . S c h u y l e r and Gates in
the Northern Department responded much more quickly.

On 18 November most

of the regiments in that department had already started south to reorgan
ize, leaving Colonel Anthony Wayne in command of a winter garrison at
Ticonderoga.

On 26 November Schuyler diverted them to Washington.

Four

arrived at headquarters on 20 December, the same day as Sullivan, while
three others established a camp at Morristown, New Jersey, to threaten
British rear areas.

12

Washington, reinforced by these Continentals and by Pennsylvania and
New Jersey militia, moved quickly to restore morale and public confidence.
He sent Generals Spencer and Arnold, but no troops, to rally New England
militia near Newport.
weakness at Trenton.

Patrols probing the banks of the Delaware uncovered
On the night of 25-26 December a partially regrouped

and resupplied Main Army crossed back into New Jersey.

Part of the coun

terattack had to be cancelled because of bad weather, but the main body
virtually destroyed Rail's brigade.
was mauled near Princeton.

On 3 January a second enemy brigade

Washington then proceeded to Morristown,

11. Otis G. Hammond, ed., Letters and Papers of Major-General John Sulli
van. Continental Army (4 vols., Concord: New Hampshire Historical Society,
1930-39), Is 302.
12. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 3: 1125, 1260. Gates' General
Orders for 5-18 Nov 1776; Gates' Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society.
Gates to Schuyler, 30 Sep; to Ward, 9 Nov; to Hancock, 27 Nov; to Col. Jo
seph Vose, 8 Dec; to Washington, 12 Dec; Robert Harrison to Gates, 26 Nov;
Schuyler to Gates, 26 Nov; St. Clair to Gates, 27 Nov; Heath to Gates, 14
Dec 1776; Horatio Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington, 6: 414-6, 419.
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having completely outmaneuvered his opponents and forced them to with
draw into a small bridgehead around New Brunswick.
In a period of little more than a week Washington's small, veteran
cadre shattered two British brigades, restored morale, and recovered most
of New Jersey.

The Germans lost their aura of invincibility and for the

rest of the war were underused by the British.

Individual officers who

performed well during the crisis became Washington's trusted subordinates.
This brief campaign introduced the Continental Army to mobile warfare
after nearly two years of static operations at Boston and New York.
Washington spent the next several months digesting its lessons.

The most

important of those lessons was the value of a brigade composed of several
infantry regiments supported by an artillery company.

Hereafter it became

the basic element of the Main Army.

Rounding Out the Army.

The retreat through New Jersey made Washington acutely aware of Howe's
numerical strength and his advantage in artillery and cavalry.

In a series

of letters to Congress during December the Commander-in-Chief pressed for
more men.

Additional infantry regiments, more artillery, and a force of

cavalry headed the list of needs which he outlined.

Congress, shaken by

the crisis and near defeat, acted on these requests by the end of the month.
As a result, the Continental Army became a more balanced force which
Washington could organize into elements capable of competing in open battle.
The requests which Washington sent to Congress represented the views
of his generals as well as his own opinions.

Increasing the number of in

fantry regiments from the 88 authorized on 16 September to a minimum of
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110 lay at the heart of Washington's proposals.

Because the invasion of

New Jersey probably would prevent that state from recruiting its quota,
he accepted New York's offer to raise a fifth regiment and instructed all
recruiting parties to enlist as many men as possible without regard for
quotas.

Henry Knox, whom Washington recommended for promotion to briga

dier general, submitted a plan to expand the artillery to five regiments
to support the larger number of Infantry regiments.

Washington thought

five excessive, but when he asked Congress for more Infantry he included
a request for three regiments of artillery.

He also desired a force of

cavalry, several new staff officers, and enough generals to make one
brigadier general available for every three regiments and one major
general for every three brigades.

1*1

Congress did not act immediately because it was moving to Baltimore
for greater security.

On 27 December, however, it complied exactly with

Washington'8 suggestions.

Knox was promoted and Washington empowered to

add the necessary staff officers.

Congress ordered the Commander-in-Chief

to develop a comprehensive system for promotions, specifying that officers
should rise by seniority:

regimentally to the rank of captain and within

a state's "line" through the field grades.

A state's line consisted of

its quota of infantry regiments established in September.

Most Important,

Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis; and
having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigour, and uprightness
of General Washington, do, hereby, Resolve. That General
Washington shall be, and he is hereby, vested with full, ample,
and complete powers to raise and collect together, in the most
speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of these United
State6, 16 battalions of Infantry, in addition to those already

13.
Ibid.. 6: 332-3, 350-1, 379-84, 400-9.
Ser., 3: 1310—4.

Force, American Archives. 5th
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voted by Congress; to appoint officers for the said bat
talions; to raise, officer, and equip three thousand
light horse; three regiments of artillery, and a corps
of engineers, and to establish their pay ... .
The "Sixteen Additional Regiments," artillery, and light horse
represented a new type of force different from the September regiments.
Unlike previous Continental units, these were not organized by the indi
vidual state governments but were directly under the Commander-in-Chief's
control.

The sixteen infantry regiments, added to the eighty-eight of

the September resolve and six approved the previous summer without re
spect to a single state, produced a total of one hundred and ten.

The

six regiments became known as "extra" regiments to distinguish them from
the state lines and the sixteen "addltionals."

Warner's (largely from

the Vermont area) and the 1st and 2d Canadian Regiments remained as extras
for the remainder of their existence.
absorbed into state lines.

The other three were basically

Dubois' Regiment, primarily recruited in New

York, became part of the expanded line of that state.

The German Battalion

and the remnants of the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment contained the
equivalent of a regiment of men from Maryland, which never raised an eighth
regiment, contending that those two units should count towards its Sep
tember q u o t a . ^
Washington had expected favorable Congressional action and began
recruiting even before he learned of the new resolve.

On 21 December he

14. Ford, Journals of Congress. 6: 1040, 1043-6. A companion piece of
legislation authorized establishment of a magazine and ammunition labora
tory at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
15. Harry Alonzo Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams (4 vols., New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), 3: 342-6. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 7: 138.
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told General William Maxwell to offer competent officers omitted from
New Jersey's reorganization commissions as company commanders if they
would recruit at least fifty men apiece.

The same offer was made on 24

December to Samuel Griffin, a staff officer from the Flying Camp.

When

Congress eventually authorized the additional regiments and Washington
began to organize them after settling into quarters at Morristown, he
followed a pattern outlined in these December experiments.

In particular,

he used the regiments to provide for officers who he felt had been passed
over by state legislatures for reasons other than military merit.

Top

positions were given to officers who performed distinguished staff duty
during 1776.

Washington also believed that Congress intended to have

the regiments apportioned according to geography and acted accordingly.^^
Because New England had a lower line quota in 1777 than in 1776,
potentially forcing out many good officers, Washington assigned it seven
of the additional regiments, the largest group given to any region.
Since Boston did not furnish a regiment in 1775 or 1776, Washington se
lected Henry Jackson, a citizen with a strong military reputation, to com
mand a regiment allocated to the town.
Boston's Independent Company of Cadets.

Jackson's key officers came from
A second Massachusetts regiment

went to Lieutenant Colonel William Lee of the 14th Continental Regiment.
The 14th declined to reenlist as a regiment in the 1777 reorganization,
but enough officers and men remained to justify using it as a cadre.

The

third regiment for Massachusetts went to Deputy Adjutant General David
Henley, whose broad base of contacts promised recruiting success.

All

16.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 6: 415-6, 429-30; 7: 417-9.
Table 4.

See

three regiments remained at Boston during 1777 because they received a
low priority in the competition for recruits with the line and artillery
_ 17
regiments.
Two other Deputy Adjutants General, Ezekiel Cornell of Rhode Island
and Alexander Scammell of New Hampshire, turned down offers of New Eng
land additional regiments.

Cornell chose to command his state's brigade

of state troops, Scammell the 3d New Hampshire Regiment.
came with the Connecticut portion of the program.

Greater success

Samuel Blatchley Webb,

one of Washington's aides, raised a regiment there with support from the
state government.

Connecticut also combined with Rhode Island to raise

the last of the New England regiments.

Henry Sherburne of Rhode Island

received that command as a reward for gallantry at The Cedars.

Although

the regiment took the field in 1777, it never organized all its companies.
State affiliation was less clear in the case of the five regiments
Washington allocated to the middle states.

In contrast to New England,

where there was a large body of former Continentals to draw on, Washington
selected officers in the middle states from among veterans of the Bummer's
militia forces.
regiment.

Colonel William Malcolm of New York City received one

General George Clinton and his brigade major Albert Pawling

(who became the new regiment's major) raised four of its companies in
the city.

General Armstrong organized the other four in Pennsylvania.

The regiment did not assemble as a unit until October.

Two veteran New

Jersey militia leaders, David Forman and Oliver Spencer, raised regiments

17. Ibid.. 6: 433, 499-500; 7: 86-87, 136-40, 165-6.
former commander of the elite militia Cadets.
18. Ibid.. 6: 499, 505-6; 7: 11, 132-3.

John Hancock was a
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with New Jersey cadres.

Forman's built on the preliminary work of Griffin,

who declined command; Spencer's on Maxwell's efforts.
The other two regiments recruited primarily in Pennsylvania, but drew
from neighboring areas as well.

On the recommendation of Richard Henry

Lee, Washington gave command of one to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Hartley
of the 6th Pennsylvania Battalion.

Acting Adjutant General Morgan Connor

(the major of the 1st Continental Regiment) became lieutenant colonel
when James Wilkinson, a Northern Department staff officer, declined.

Like

most of the commanders of the additional regiments, Hartley was allowed
wide latitude in selecting his junior officers.

Lieutenant Colonel John

Patton of the Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment, who had served with dis
tinction at New York in 1776, was rewarded with the other regiment. Assis
tant Quartermaster General John Parke and Brigade Major Peter Scull became his field officers.

20

Washington avoided criticism that he favored his native south by com
missioning few officers in the additional regiments from that region.
Since Georgia and the Carolinas were outside the sphere of his immediate
command, he omitted them altogether, and Maryland's contribution to the
extra regiments exempted it from the addltionals.

Initially Washington

allotted only two regiments to Virginia, both to close associates:
aide William Grayson and the noted frontiersman Nathaniel Gist.
recruited in northern Virginia and nearby Maryland.

his

Grayson

Washington planned

to use Gist's unit as a special light infantry regiment with four

19. Ibid.. 6: 476, 494; 7: 33-34, 93, 191, 389; 9: 364, 461.
20. Ibid., 6: 490, 493, 498-9; 7: 60n, 374-5. Ford, Journals of Conxress.
12: 1225-6.
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companies of rangers from the southern frontier and up to 500 attached
southern Indian scouts.

The Indians also would serve as hostages for

their tribes' good behavior.

The Commander-In-Chief reluctantly added a

third Virginia additional regiment two months later.

Lord Stirling had

grouped three volunteer Virginia companies into a provisional battalion
under Captain Charles Mynn Thruston, a powerful political leader from the
Shenandoah Valley.

When they performed well in northern New Jersey,

Washington told Thruston to recruit a regiment in north-western Virginia.

91

Washington never attempted to raise all sixteen additional regiments.
He stopped short of the maximum Congress allowed because of serious re
cruiting problems.

Although some of the additional regiments enjoyed more

success than others, none could compete on an equal footing with regiments
of the state lines.

22

Congress itself secured the final additional regi

ment on 17 June 1777 when it approved North Carolina's offer to raise
another regiment under Colonel Abraham Sheppard.

Because at least 300

men had to report to Washington within a reasonable period under the terms
of the authorization, the regiment soon disappeared through absorption.^
The three artillery regiments authorized on 27 December, like the
additionals, represented an expansion rather than the addition of a com
pletely new element to the Army.

Since the September quotas made no men

tion of artillery, Washington presumably was free to use one or two of the
eighty-eight regiments for that purpose.

During December, however,

21. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 6: 491-2, 494-6; 7: 6-7, 11-12,
102 , 201-2 , 229 , 295-7 , 307-8.
22. Scammell to Frederick Steuben, 25 Sep 1779; Steuben Papers, New-York
Historical Society.
23. Ford, Journals of Congress. 8: 475.
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Colonel Knox prepared a plan for as many as five artillery regiments to
support every geographical region, not just the Main Army.

On his own

authority Washington ordered Knox to begin recruiting three regiments
while he submitted a request for the additional number to Congress.
The 1777 artillery regiment, like the infantry, followed the same
general organization that prevailed in 1776.

Congress did not change the

allocation of staff or company officers and left the regiment divided into
a dozen companies.

It did make two changes.

The number of field officers

in a regiment dropped from five to three because the net increase allowed
for flexibility to handle major detachments from the Main Army.
second change regrouped the enlisted men.

The

A company now contained 6

sergeants, 6 corporals, 6 bombardiers, 6 gunners, and 28 matrosses.

This

arrangement provided balanced crews for up to six guns, plus a company
ammunition section.
Knox began recruiting after the Trenton campaign.

He left Major

Thomas Proctor to support the Main Army with the Pennsylvania and New
York state artillery companies plus Captain Sebastian Bauman's Continental
company.

This plan freed the officers of the 1776 regiment to begin re

cruiting two regiments around cadres of veterans.

John Lamb, recently

released from captivity, recruited in the area between Connecticut and
Philadelphia.

Nine of his companies organized in the spring:

Connecticut, 3 in New York, and 2 in Pennsylvania.
rounded out the regiment:

four in

Three existing units

Captains Bauman's and Alexander Hamilton's

companies (the latter now under John Doughty of New Jersey), plus the

24. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 3: 1314.
of Washington. 6: 401.

Fitzpatrick, Writings
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original 1775 company reorganized under Isaiah Wool.

John Cranet a native

Bostonian, raised nine companies for his regiment in Massachusetts, where
Ebenezer Stevens assembled three other companies for the Northern Depart
ment.

Stevens never understood that technically he was part of Crane's

regiment and believed throughout 1777 that he commanded a separate corps,
including a company of artificers whom he recruited at Albany to perform
maintenance.

25

Washington and Knox intended to organize their third regiment around
Proctor's Pennsylvanians, supplemented by companies from New Jersey and
Maryland, making it in effect a Middle Department regiment.

Pennsylvania

undermined them by expanding its state artillery into a ten-company regi
ment under Proctor on 6 February 1777.

The state did transfer the regi

ment to the Continental Army in the summer.

The net effect of this se

quence of events left Proctor's regiment with only ten companies instead
of the twelve Knox intended.

2(%

Two other regiments in the Southern De

partment provided the total of five Knox envisioned.
South Carolina Regiment.

One was the 4th

The other Congress created on 26 November 1776

by expanding the two existing Virginia companies into a ten-company regi
ment under Colonel Charles H arr i s o n . ^

25. Ibid.. 7: 82, 138-9, 263, 467; 8: 276, 460; 12: 71-72; 18: 303-4.
John Lamb to Washington, 12 Mar 1779; to a Board of General Officers, 6
Aug 1779; Knox to Lamb, 22 Jan, 13 and 20 Apr,
24
May 1777 and 17
Jan 1778;
Eleazer Oswald to Lamb, 16 Feb, 7 Apr,
17 Jun,
23
Jul1777; Crane
toWa
shington, 16 Mar 1779 (copy); Report of Board of General Officers, t Aug
1779; John Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society.
26. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 386, 415; 15: 80-81. Pennsyl
vania Archives. 1st Ser., 5: 234-5, 357, 451, 455; 6: 676-7; 7: 121; 2d
Ser., 1: 713. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 2: 427. Ford, Journals of
Congress. 8: 482-3, 551, 564; 12: 865.
27. Ibid., 6: 981, 995; 8: 396, 514, 655. Fitzpatrick. Writings of Wa
shington. 8: 117; 9: 332; 10: 520. Virginia Gazette (Dixon and Hunter),
28 Feb 1777. Each company had 4 officers, 1 sergeant, 4 corporals, 4
bombardiers, 8 gunners, and 48 matrosses.
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Knox's proposal also encompassed the special logistical requirements
of his branch.

He wanted Congress to create a supporting company of ar

tificers, regroup the staff of the Commissary of Military Stores, and
establish laboratories and a foundry so that the Army could produce its
own cannon, ammunition, and related items.

Until those facilities came

into service, he and Washington recommended that Congress Import weapons
from Europe.

Their goal was a mobile train of brass field pieces in pro

portions which corresponded to European concepts:

100 3-pounders, 50 6-

pounders, and 50 12-pounders, plus a number of heavier 18- and 24-pounders
for general support and siege needs.
Congress located the foundry at Philadelphia and the laboratories at
Springfield, Massachusetts, and Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Both laboratories

served throughout the war as ordnance depots for army operations in the
northern half of the country.
former.

Knox personally supervised setting up the

The somewhat larger Carlisle establishment came under Lieutenant

Colonel Banjamin Flower, formerly the commissary of military stores for
the Flying Camp.

Flower recruited two companies of ordnance technicians

and repairmen who, unlike the hired artisans of earlier years, were sol
diers.

Captain Isaac Coren commanded a standard artillery company at

Carlisle.

The second company, led by a master carpenter, kept the Main

Army's artillery park in working o r d e r . ^
During the winter Knox and Washington addressed the problem of im
proving the mobility of the field artillery so that it could accompany

28. Ford, Journals of Congress. 6: 963. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing
ton. 6: 280-2; 7: 83.
29. Ibid.. 6: 474; 7: 18-23; 8: 38. Pennsylvania Archives. 1st Ser., 5:
209-10.
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the Infantry,

in the Trenton campaign each Infantry brigade drew support

from a company of artillery with two to four guns.

This successful con

cept remained a fixture of the Continental Army for the rest of the war.
The brigade's company, preferably from the same state as the infantry,
selected armament to fit its particular mission.

The normal allocation

in 1777 was two 6-pounders, although this weapon required the largest
crew of any field piece.

Other companies served in the artillery park,

or general reserve, or manned heavy garrison artillery in fortifications.
Doctrine specified that the artillerists concentrate their fire on enemy
infantry.

This placed a premium on rate of fire and maneuverability

rather than range.

30

Up until this time the Continental Army relied on three sources for
its cannon:

old guns already in the colonies, captured British weapons,

and iron guns produced domestically.

American craftsmen produced 30,000

tons of iron a year by 1775 and quickly turned to military production.
Unfortunately, few available weapons from these sources met battlefield
needs.

Iron cannon and old British pieces in particular weighed so much

that they could only be used in permanent fortifications.

Washington

counted on foreign imports and the new Philadelphia foundry to provide
the lighter brass guns for direct support of the field armies.

31

30. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6: 364, 454; 8: 100-1, 175, 235,
318-21, 396-9, 457-8; 9: 290. Oswald to Lamb, 17 and 25 Jun, 23 and 25 Jul,
and 14 Aug 1777; Robert Walker to Lamb, 21 Jul 1777; Andrew Moodle to Lamb,
9 May 1777; Knox to Lamb, 2 Dec 1777; Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society.
31. Keach Johnson, "The Genesis of the Baltimore Ironworks," Journal of
Southern History, 19 (1953), pp. 151-79. Irene D. Neu, "The Iron Planta
tions of Colonial New York." New York History, 33 (1952), pp. 3-24. Spen
cer C. Tucker, "Cannon Founders of the American Revolution," National De
fense, 60 (Jul-Aug 1975), pp. 33-37. David Lewis Salay, "Arming for War:
The Production of War Material in Pennsylvania for the American Armies of the
Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Delaware, 1977), pp. 202,
241-75. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 69; 8: 37*
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The imports came mostly from France.

That nation, with some Spanish

help, used the firm of Hortalez and Company as a channel for transmitting
clandestine aid to the Americans.

During the war the French government

furnished over 200 artillery pieces, over 100,000 1763-model Charleville
muskets, and other vital military supplies to the United States.

The

first significant shipment, one of several by Hortalez and Company, ar
rived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in April, 1777.

Knox judged the 23

French 4-pounders too cumbersome for American conditions and sent them
to Springfield to be melted down and recast.
rectly to the Main Army.

The other cannon went di-

32

Continental Army artillerymen turned to a British tactical handbook
when they cast their own guns, or when they remounted imports on improved
carriages.

John Muller's Treatise of Artillery first appeared in 1757 as

a textbook for the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich.

The Americans

published an edition at Philadelphia in 1779 specifically for the Contin
ental Artillery.

Actually, Muller's proposals proved more important to

the Americans than to the British, who never gave them formal approval.
Part of Muller's appeal came from his innovative ideas for mobile iron
guns and part from his detailed instructions for casting and for construct!ng light carriages. J

32. Ibid., 8: 2-3, 37, 254, 318-9. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 2: 2189, 591. Force, American Archives, 5th Ser., 1: 1011-23. Neil L. York,
"Clandestine Aid and The American Revolutionary War Effort: A Re-Examina
tion," MiUtarjr_Affairs, 43 (1979), pp. 26-30.
33. John Muller, A Treatise of Artillery ... (3d ed., London: John
Millan, 1780; reprinted with introduction by Harold L. Peterson, Ottawa:
Museum Restoration Service, 1965), pp. v-xxv. Bauman to Lamb, 25 Jun 1779;
Samuel Shaw to Bauman, 17 Feb 1777; Sebastian Bauman Papers, New-York
Historical Society.
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The emphasis on mobility seen in the reorganization of the artil
lery extended as well in a third element added by the legislation adop
ted on 27 December.

Unlike the additional infantry regiments and expan

ded artillery, 3,000 light dragoons represented a novel element in the
Continental Army.

While in Europe cavalry remained an offensive force

which could win battles with a thundering charge, the nature of the ter
rain in America eliminated the need for such a heavy force during the
colonial period, although troopers served as scouts or messengers.

By

the start of the Revolution a few colonies had regiments of mounted men,
but they acted as mobile infantry rather than as true cavalry.

The costs

associated with maintaining a horse insured that such units included only
the social elite.
During the middle of the century renewed European interest in recon
naissance and skirmishing led to a limited return of the light horseman.
The British sent two regiments, the 16th and 17th Light Dragoons, to
America.

Each consisted of six troops, a titular colonel, a lieutenant

colonel, a major, an adjutant, a chaplain, and a surgeon.

A troop initial

ly contained a captain, a lieutenant, a cornet, a quartermaster, 2 ser
geants, 2 corporals, 1 hautboy (drummer), and 38 privates.

In the spring

of 1776 each troop added another cornet, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 30
privates.

General Howe had the option of mounting the augmentation with

local horses or using them as light infantry.

One German cavalry regiment,

the Brunswick Dragoon Regiment von Rledesel, served in Canada as infantry.^

34. Barrington to Gage, 31 Aug 1775; to Howe, 29 Jan 1776 and 16 Apr 1777;
British Headquarters Papers, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, #27, 114, 491.
Force, American Archives. 4th Ser., 6: 271-3. Rledesel's regiment had 4
troops, each with 3 officers and 75 men, plus a staff of 8 officers and 16
men.
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The Continental Army's static operations in 1775 and early 1776 did
not require a cavalry force, although Congress toyed with the idea sever
al times.

Even the Southern Department's ranger regiments served as

mounted infantry rather than true cavalry.

It was during the later phase

of the New York campaign that Washington decided he needed horsemen for
reconnaissance duty.

The effectiveness of Major Elisha Sheldon's detach

ment of Connecticut mounted militia and the Intimidation of some of the
American infantry by the British dragoons prompted Washington to request
OC
permission to recruit Continental light horsemen.
Congress' initial response came on 25 November 1776 when it called
upon Virginia for the use of its six troops of light horse.

Major The-

odorlc Bland had raised them as state troops during the summer.

Each

troop contained 3 officers, 3 corporals, a drummer, a trumpeter, and 29
privates.

The state transferred them to the Continental Army, and in

March 1777 Bland reenlisted them as a Continental regiment .

^

At Washing

ton's suggestion Congress on 12 December 1776 also directed Sheldon to
raise a Continental regiment of light dragoons.

Washington gave Sheldon,

and the other two regimental commanders, the same free hand in selecting
junior officers that he accorded to the commanders of the additional in
fantry regiments.

He interpreted the resolve of 27 December as including

35. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 5: 163-4, 236-7, 242, 324; 6: 39,
230-1. Smith, Letters of Delegates. 1: 587, 590-1. Ford, Journals of
Congress, 2: 173, 238; 5: 606-7.
36. Ibid., 6: 980; 7: 34. Burnett. Letters of Congress, 2: 269. Fitz
patrick, Writings of Washington. 6: 456-7; 7: 103, 338-9. William Waller
Henning, ed., The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of all the Laws
of Virginia ... (14 vols., Richmond: J. & G. Cochran, 1821), 9: 135-8,
141-3. H. R. Mcllwaine et al., eds.. Journals of the Council of the State
of Virginia (4 vols., Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1931-67), 1; 153,
254-5, 269, 288. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 6: 1531, 1556; 5th
Ser., 3: 1270.
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Bland's and Sheldon's men, and decided to try and raise from scratch
only two regiments rather than the full quota of 3,000 men.

One of the

new regiments went at Congress' request to Washington's aide George
Baylor who carried the news of Trenton to Baltimore.
Stephen Moylan.

The other went to

37

On 14 March 1777 Congress approved a regimental organization for the
light dragoons developed by Washington.
staff, and 6 troops for each regiment.

It provided 3 field officers, a
Every troop contained 3 officers,

6 noncommissioned officers, a trumpeter, and 34 privates.

One of the

sergeants specialized in logistics while two of the privates drew higher
pay for serving as armorer and farrier.

The regimental staff, similar to

an infantry regiment's, also contained a riding instructor and a saddler
to keep leather gear in repair.

Four supernumaries were cadets undergoing

training and served the colonel as messengers.

The Continental light dra

goon regiment specialized even more than the British regiment in reconnais
sance missions.

Its organization strengthened the ability of each troop

to conduct independent operations, anticipating the need for dispersion
during actual service.

38

Washington believed that the light dragoons' mission was reconnais
sance, not combat.

Because of this he waited only reliable, native-born

recruits and inconspicuous horses.

These high standards, special

37. Ford, Journals of Congress. 6: 1025; 7: 7. Burnett, Letters of
Congress, 2: 176. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6: 350-1, 384-8,
483-4; 7: 51, 193-4, 304-5.
38. Ibid.. 12: 290. Hammond, Sullivan Papers. 1; 403. Ford, Journals
of Congress, 7: 178-9; 9: 869. See Figure 7. Sheldon's regiment had a
slightly different configuration from the other three until 5 Nov 1777.
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equipment, and long training periods all contributed to the lengthy
period needed to complete the regiments.

Moylan's regiment organized

at Philadelphia specifically to have access to the Army's main supply
center.

The fact that three of the four regiments came from Virginia

and Connecticut, the two colonies noted for raising horses in the eighteenth century, indicated the importance of supply factors in Washington's
allocation of the regiments .

^

Congress created the additional infantry, artillery, and light dra
goon regiments on 27 December 1776 at Washington's request.

Tactical

operations in late 1776 demonstrated the need for these units as the Main
Army faced European-style open warfare for the first time.

Unlike the

regiments of the state lines, the new units organized directly under
Continental authority.

Washington carefully allocated them to recruiting

areas where they complemented the state lines and used officers left out
of the state lines as cadres.

During the spring the line regiments and

the newer units assembled at various rendezvous.

Moulding them into a

coordinated military machine which Incorporated the lessons of the Trenton
campaign became the major task of Washington and his generals.

Fielding the New Army.

While Washington formed the new regiments, the Individual state
governments reorganized their lines.

Congress intended to have them con

form for the first time to a single pattern.

It also wanted them to make

39. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 123, 214-5, 219-20, 324, 368,
421; 8: 53-54, 136, 264-5.
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maximum use of veterans.

Particular attitudes and problems in some

states, however, blocked compliance in every detail.

In the spring

the troops reported to various strategic locations to begin the 1777
campaign.

There Washington and the department commanders marshalled

them into brigades and divisions.

During this period Congress and the

military leaders also modified the Army's staff and support organiza
tions to meet the needs of the larger force.
The deep south had

the easiest time adjusting to the new quotas

because regiments from that area remained at home as the Southern De
partment's combat force.

Georgia did not reduce to the single regiment

of the 16 September quota, but retained the one ranger and four infantry
units authorized in 1776.

Despite some losses as original enlistments

expired, aggressive recruiting as far away as Pennsylvania brought all
five regiments into the

field.^

South Carolina kept its six regiments,

converting the two rifle regiments to normal infantry and exchanging
half of the 3d regiment's rifles for muskets.

The 4th remained an ar

tillery regiment, and absorbed the separate artillery companies.^
North Carolina and Virginia transferred their regiments to the Main
Army, following a trend started in 1776.

Since the current enlistments

of the six North Carolina and nine Virginia regiments lasted until 1778

40. Lilia M. Hawes, ed., "The Papers of Lachlan McIntosh, 1774-1799,"
Georgia Historical Quarterly. 38 (1954), pp. 256-7, 266-7, 357-9, 363-7.
Margaret Godley, ed., "Minutes of the Executive Council, May 7 Through
October 14, 1777," Ibid., 34 (1950), pp. 110-3. Ford, Journals of
Congress, 9: 782-3.
41. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 3: 49-54, 66, 68, 72-76. Burnett,
Letters of Congress. 2: 452. Jack L. Cross, ed., "Letters of Thomas
Pinckney, 1775-1780," South Carolina Historical Magazine. 58 (1957), pp.
77-79.
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they only had to recall detachments serving In South Carolina before
departing.

Although North Carolina thought its new quota was unreal-

istically high, it went ahead and raised three new regiments.

The re

sult was that when the nine arrived in Philadelphia in early July, they
contained only 131 officers and 963 enlisted men instead of the 7,000
called for on paper.
had veteran cadres.

42

Virginia added six new regiments, two of which

Daniel Morgan built his H t h Virginia Regiment

around the survivors of his 1775 rifle company plus the five Vitginia
companies of the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment.

The state fron

tier companies reenlisted as Continentals as part of the 12th.

Virginia

retained its ten-company regimental formation for all fifteen regiments
and also recruited men only for a three-year term, not for the duration
as Congress preferred.

The effort to recruit these regiments, two separ

ate Continental companies for the frontier, and three regiments of state
troops exhausted Virginia's manpower resources.

43

The middle states faced different problems, for existing units were
on duty outside their home states and under enlistments which expired at
the start of the year or shortly thereafter.

The states turned to legis

lative liaison committees to prepare new arrangements which retained the
1776 regiments and added new ones as necessary.

The new regiments de

pended on veterans from the militia or state troops, particularly the

42. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 733-4; 6: 1043-4; 7: 21, 52, 90-91,
133. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 1: 1384. Burnett, Letters of
Congress, 2: 95-97. Returns of Troops at Philadelphia, 7 and 8 Jul 1777;
Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
43. Henning, Statutes at Large, 9s 179-84, 192-8, 210-1, 213-4. Mcll-t
waine, Journals of the Council of State, 1: 250, 270-1, 310, 321, 325,
337-40, 368.
"Correspondence of Colonel James Wood," Tyler's Quarterly
Historical and Genealogical Magazine. 3 (1921), pp. 38-40.
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Flying Camp, for their cadres.

This expedient caused some turmoil be

cause of arguments over rank, but it allowed all of the 1777 regiments
to start with experienced nuclei.
Delaware's reorganization consisted of filling vacancies in its
single regiment and reenllsting the men.
more complex.

44

Maryland's problems were

The state argued that its quota was unrealistically high

and made an effort to raise just seven regiments.

The original 1776

regiment and attached companies regrouped respectively as the 1st and 2d
Maryland Regiments.
the 4th through 7th.
sources.

The four Flying Camp regiments furnished cadres for
The 3d assembled its officers from a variety of

45

Officers from New Jersey and Pennsylvania readily remained in ser
vice, but the problems caused by regiments remaining in the Ticonderoga
winter garrison slowed reorganization for both states.

New Jersey re

filled its three regiments and added a fourth from militia veterans.

To

relieve the Continental officers from combat duties while the reorgani
zation took place it formed four temporary state battalions during the
winter.^

The 1st Continental Regiment, six Pennsylvania Battalions,

and Mackey's frontier regiment became the 1st through 8th Pennsylvania
Regiments.

Three new regiments joined them, with the 9th and 10th drawing

44. Joseph Brown Turner, ed., The Journal and Order Book of Captain Ro
bert Kirkwood ... (Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1910),
pp. 4-6. Henry Hobart Bellas, ed., Personal Recollections of Captain
Enoch Anderson ... (Wilmington: Historical Society
ofDelaware, 1896),
pp. 7, 26-29. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington.
6: 485.
45. Ibid.. 7: 397. Archives of Maryland. 18: 76-292. Force,American
Archives. 5th Ser., 3: 120-1, 125, 132, 163-4, 182.
46. Ibid., 5th Ser., 2: 1258-9; 3: 1316, 1449, 1474-5. Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington. 6: 81-82; 7: 27, 200-1. Schuyler to Gates, 13
Nov 1776; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.

177
experienced officers from the two state troops regiments organized in
1776.

The U t h was completely new.

Cook's frontier regiment, which was

just starting to recruit, expanded to eight companies as the l 2 t h . ^
The two state regiments consolidated into a single ten-company regiment
since the men's enlistments did not expire until 1778.

On 10 June 1777

it transferred to the Continental Army as the 13th Pennsylvania Regiment.

Aft

New York and New England units had already served for two full cam
paigns, more than the units from the southern or middle states.

Casual

ties, normal attrition, and lower quotas made their reorganization more
comprehensive.

New York reduced its line from seven to five regiments.

The loss of Manhattan and Long Island led the state to disband the old
1st New York Regiment, consolidate the two regiments from the Albany
area, and renumber the line regiments to reflect their commanders' rela
tive seniority.

Nicholson's Regiment disbanded, but Dubois' became the

nucleus for the new 3d under Peter Gansevoort.

Colonel Dubois himself

raised a new 5th New York Regiment when Congress authorized a higher
quota for the state on 30 November 1776.

49

47. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 9: 90. Force, American Archives,
5th Ser., 2: 92, 94; 3: 195-200. Pennsylvania Archives. 1st Ser., 5s 4041, 51, 176-7, 522-3, 545; 7: 583-5; 2d Ser., 1; 41-42, 51-52, 717-8; 10:
7, 106; 4th Ser., 3: 656-7. Charles J. Stille, Major-General Anthony
Wayne and the Pennsylvania Line in the Continental Army (Philadelphia: J.
B. Lippincott, 1893), pp. 39-40, 43-48, 54. Francis Johnston to Gates,
20 Feb 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
48. Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 2: 80-81, 92-94. Pennsylvania
Archives. 1st Ser., 5: 103-4, 107, 112, 318, 357. Ford. Journals of
Congress. 8: 482-3. Pennsylvania Council of Safety to Gates, 4 Mar 1777;
Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
49. Ford, Journals of Congress. 6: 994; 8: 710-1. Force, American Ar
chives, 5th Ser., 3: 206-11, 247-9, 312-20, 366-7. New York State, Calen
dar of Historical Manuscripts, Relating to the War of the Revolution ...
(2 vols., Albany: Weed, Parsons, and Co., 1863-68), 2: 31-53.
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Connecticut's quota remained eight regiments, but the legislature
sought the best possible officers regardless of the nature of their
prior service and broke up all existing units.

The officers retained

then recruited according to a new geographical arrangement.

Although

the state offered extra land grants to stimulate enlistments, it could
not obtain substantial numbers of men until April.

SO

Rhode Island drop

ped from four regiments to two by employing the same device used during
the previous year's reduction.

The 9th and 11th Continental Regiments

became, through reenlistment, the 1st and 2d Rhode Island Regiments with
the best officers from the disbanded regiments filling vacancies.

A

brigade of state troops competed for recruits, but compensated by helping
to contain the British forces in Newport.^1

New Hampshire used its three

Continental Regiments as cadres in the same manner as Rhode I s l a n d . ^
Massachusetts' quota of fifteen regiments reduced by two the number
in service during 1776.

One legislative committee directed the formation

of seven regiments from men on duty at New York, trying to preserve unit
continuity, while a second went to Ticonderoga to arrange five more in

50. Charles J. Hoadley, jet al., comps., The Public Records of the State
of Connecticut (11 vols., Hartford: Various publishers, 1894-1967), 1:
12-16, 26, 65-70, 165-8. Charles S. Hall, Life and Letters of Samuel
Holden Parsons ... (Binghamton, N.Y.: Otseningo Publishing Co., 1905),
pp. 92-93. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Correspondence and Journals of Sam
uel Blachley Webb (3 vols., New York: Privately printed, 1893-94), 1:
189- 2 H .
Force, American Archives. 5th Ser., 2: 957-61; 3: 799, 899, 1433.
51. Richard K. Showman, _et al., eds., The Papers of General Nathanael
Greene (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 1;
307-8, 317, 360-4. John Russell Bartlett, ed.. Records of the Colony of
Rhode Island ... (9 vols., Providence: Various Publishers, 1854-65), 8:
10-ll, 20, 30-33, 103-4, 126-7, 140-1, 172-3, 192-3. Rhode Island His
torical Society Collections. 6: 175, 183-5. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 6: 200-2, 274; 7: 42-44, 349-51.
52. Hammond, Sullivan Papers. 1: 317-22. Force, American Archives. 5th
Ser., 2: 1175-7; 3: 624-5, 646-7, 796-8, 1125.

the same manner.

Three others were organized within the state.

Heath, Ward, and Gates provided advice to the committees.

Generals

When recruiting

tapered off the legislature firBt proposed offering additional pay, but

the idea was rejected by Congress.
limited draft in April.

The legislature then turned to a

The state's efforts raised 7,816 men, mostly

for the line regiments, by early July.

The average number of recruits

for each regiment was 470, with four surpassing the 600-man level and
only four falling below 400.

53

The reorganized regiments assembled in three primary locations in
the spring of 1777.

Ticonderoga and Peekskill (in the Hudson Highlands)

had obvious strategic importance.

Troops at those points protected im

portant fortifications and denied the Hudson River to the British.

Mor

ristown, Washington's headquarters, served as the other rendezvous be
cause it protected Philadelphia from an overland advance from New York
City.

Once the regiments reached these objectives Washington and the

commanders of the Northern and Highlands Departments assembled them into
brigades and divisions, the primary formations used in 1777 to maneuver
the Continental Army.
Washington in January planned for a brigade to have three full in
fantry regiments (over 2,200 men) and a company of artillery, and for a
division to have three brigades.

When he asked Congress to appoint ad

ditional general officers to command these formations, he also requested
three lieutenant generals to act as senior commanders.

Many delegates

53. Ibid., 5th Ser., 3: 399-400, 414-5, 494-6, 507-8, 711-3, 1030, 10834, 1170. C. Harvey Gardiner, ed., A Study in Dissent: The Warren-Gerry
Correspondence 1776-1792 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1968), pp. 59-60. Joseph Avery's Return of Men Enlisted by Massachusetts,
10 Jul 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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considered the new rank a threat to republican virtue, and Congress re
jected the Idea.

It did appoint 6 new major and 14 brigadier generals,

but only alter considerable political maneuvering on the part of delegates advancing the careers of Individuals.

54

The Main Army drew most of its resources from the middle states,
plus the regiments transferred from the Southern Department.

Although

many of the regiments reported to headquarters in company-sized detach
ments over a period of months and others still had not appeared, enough
men were on hand by mid-May to allow the Commander-in-Chief to proceed
with revised plans.

Thirty-eight infantry regiments from Virginia,

Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey plus various detachments
accounted by that time for 673 officers, 708 sergeants, 241 drummers and
fifers, and 8,378 rank and file.
were over half strength.

Only about a third of the regiments

Washington adjusted to this problem, as well

as a shortage of generals, by establishing ten permanent brigades between
11 and 22 May.

Each contained 4 or 5 regiments, from the same state

where possible, and an artillery company.

The arrangement established

four Virginia, three Pennsylvania, one New Jersey, and two Maryland
Brigades.

Two brigades formed a division.^

The brigade staff consisted

of an aide, a brigade major, a brigade quartermaster, and a chaplain (who
replaced the regimental chaplains).

The division staff included the

54. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 7: 49-51. Ford, Journals of
Congress, 7: 90, 133, 141-2, 203, 213, 256, 323; 8: 624; 9: 823. Burnett,
Letters of Congress. 2: 261-3, 269-75, 287-8, 291-2, 299-301, 311-2.
55. Weekly Return, Main Army, 21 May 1777; Record Group 93, National
Archives. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 7: 236, 278-9, 396-7,
447-8, 451-2; 8: 40-41, 49-50, 88-89, 97-101, 170-2; 9: 103-4, 149.
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major general's aides, a quartermaster officer, and a conductor of mili
tary stores who repaired small arms and prepared ammunition.^
Although reflecting an acute shortage of troops, this formation
allowed Washington great flexibility.

During the summer divisions shif

ted along the main roads between Morristown and Philadelphia as the
British appeared to threaten either the Hudson Highlands or the Delaware
Bay.

In a detached role Washington expected a division to harass the

enemy advance and buy time for the rest of the army to concentrate.*^
In battle he deployed the Main Army in a double line.
consisted of two or more divisions abreast.

The First Line

The Second Line deployed

to the rear and provided depth to absorb shock.

The Left Wing and the

Right Wing each contained portions of both lines and were used to allow
an intermediate level of command between Washington and the divisions.
By December 1777 the Order of Battle approached European complexity.
brigades deployed in the First Line and six in the Second.
brigade was held in general reserve.

Ten

One additional

Each wing also used two light dra

goon regiments and supporting separate infantry formations, both militia
and Continentals, for flank security or skirmishing.

58

Improved arms and training reinforced the advantages inherent in the
new tactical organization.

The 1763 model French Army musket, known col

loquially as the "Charleville," became the Continental Army's standard

56. Ibid.. 8: 203-4, 337. Ford, Journals of Congress, 8: 390, 609. Ham
mond, Sullivan Papers, 1: 352.
57. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 62-64. Note the similarity
between Washington's use of the division as a force capable of limited in
dependent action and Napoleon's use of the corps as described in Stephen
T. Ross, "The Development of the Combat Division in Eighteenth-Century
French Armies," French Historical Studies, 4 (1965), pp. 84-94.
58. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 296-7; 10: 94-95, 138-9.
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Infantry weapon.

This .69 caliber smoothbore, firing a 1-ounce ball,

had greater range and was more durable, reliable, and accurate than the
English "Brown Bess."

It was an ideal weapon for the Continentals since

their infantry organization placed a premium on musketry rather than
shock action.

59

manual of arms.

Training stressed battlefield maneuvers rather than the
New standing regulations introduced during the summer

improved marching, the baggage train, and guard duty, all vital to maneuverabllity.
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Under Washington's guidance the Highlands and Northern Departments
instituted divisions and brigades to take advantage of the Improved
musket and training.

These organizations also facilitated the movement

of reserves from one area to another.

At first Washington intended to

send the Massachusetts and New Hampshire regiments to the Northern De
partment and use New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island units to garri
son the Highlands.

Since New England was in no immediate danger, the

Eastern Department needed only three Massachusetts additional regiments
to stiffen available militia and state troops.

But recruiting and vari

ous emergency problems gradually altered that neat plan.***

59. Arcadi Gluckman, United States Muskets, Rifles and Carbines (Harris
burg: The Stackpole Co., 1959), pp. 55-61. James E. Hicks and Fred Por
ter Todd, "United States Military Shoulder Arms, 1795-1935," Military Af
fairs, 2 (1938), pp. 37-42, 175-6. Harold L. Peterson. Arms and Armor in
Colonial America 1526-1783 (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1956), pp. 1708, 190-2. Rebecca and Philip Katcher, "The Pennsylvania Division, 1780,"
Military Collector and Historian. 27 (1975), p. 120. Ernst Kipping and
Samuel S. Smith, eds., At General Howe's Side: The Diary of ... Captain
Friedrich von Muenchhausen (Monmouth Beach, N.J.: Philip Freneau Press,
1974), p. 14,
60. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 227-31, 250-1, 255-6, 344-9;
9: 79-80.
61. Ibid.. 7: 125, 272-8, 282-3, 424, 485-6; 8: 6-7, 35, 43, 101-3. Wil
liam Abbatt, ed., Memoirs of Major-General William Heath ... (New York:
William Abbatt, 1901), pp. 104-11. Gates to Hancock, 2 May 1777; Gates
Papers, New-York Historical Society.

183
By mid-May, with units still arriving, the Highlands Department had
3 New York, 8 Connecticut, and 6 Massachusetts infantry regiments plus
Webb's Additional Regiment and the leading detachments of Rhode Islanders.
The Continentals included 156 officers, 197 sergeants, 94 drummers and
fifers, and 2,502 rank and file.

Strength continued to mount, allowing

Israel Putnam to institute brigades shortly after he assumed command of
the department in early June.

By 5 August, despite numerous transfers

of units to the Main Army and Northern Department, he had two divisions,
each with two brigades.

Schuyler's Northern Department finally wound up

with four brigades from Massachusetts and one from New Hampshire.

It did

not need a divisional organization as long as the troops were tied to the
defense of Ticonderoga.
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The new tactical organization of the field armies required more ad
ministrative and support organization to gain full value.

It made the

Adjutant General more important as the chief administrative officer, but
Joseph Reed resigned the post at the start of the year.

Washington

limped along with temporary appointments until he persuaded Colonel Timo
thy Pickering of the Massachusetts militia to accept the assignment.

His

hard work restored order to the strength reporting system by the fall.
An expansion of the mustering department made Pickering's job easier.
It provided a deputy mustermaster for each territorial department and

62.
Weekly Returns, Highlands Department, 17 and 24 May 1777; Alexander
McDougall Papers, New-York Historical Society. Worthington C. Ford, ed.,
General Orders Issued by Major-General Israel Putnam. When In Command of
the Highlands ... (Brooklyn: Historical Printing Club, 1893), pp. 1, H 12, 23-25, 46-47. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 7: 354-5, 485-6;
8: 51, 234-5, 276-8, 450; 9: 34-35. Hugh Hughes to Gates; Gates to Col.
Van Schaick, both 19 Aug 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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enough subordinate officials to muster every unit once a month.

63

The

cross-checks established by this system and the program of preparing
weekly and monthly returns separately eventually gave Washington and
Congress reliable and timely data for strategic planning.
Washington also had to reorganize his personal staff to handle the
increased correspondence and messenger requirements.

He conducted a

search for influential young men with secretarial skills and a willing
ness to work to replace the aides who took positions in the additional
regiments and dragoons.

The search was successful, adding such talented

individuals as Alexander Hamilton, Richard Kidder Meade, and John Laurens
to the household during 1777.
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Washington also used the new office of

Commissary General of Prisoners, created on 27 December 1776, to relieve
part of the headquarters burden.

Its nominal function related to the care

of enemy prisoners and of Americans held captive by the British.

Under

Elias Boudinot it coordinated intelligence activities as well.**^
Logistical and medical staff departments all reorganized during 1777
for greater efficiency and better support of the field armies.

The Com

missary Department split into specialized purchasing and issuing depart
ments.

The Quartermaster Department regrouped its personnel into sections

to handle transportation, quarters, forage, and baking.

A new section,

the Clothier General's Department and associated Commissary of Hides,

63. Ford, Journals of Congress. 7: 204, 221-2, 253, 322. Hammond, Sul
livan Papers, 1: 418, 433. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 5,
67-68, 218, 336-7, 381-2, 447-8; 8: 114-6, 264.
64. Ibid., 6: 487; 7: 41, 161, 2l8, 280. Douglas S. Freeman, George
Washington: A Biography (7 vols., New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1947-57), 4: 391-2.
65. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 383, 417-8. Ford, Journals
of Congress. 8: 421-2.
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handled the responsibilities arising from Congress' decision to directly
clothe the troops.

The hides department converted raw hides left over

from the cattle consumed by the Army into needed leather products.****
Resumption of British offensive operations in the summer tested
the new arrangement of departments, divisions, and brigades, and the
enlarged staff.
partment.

As expected, the first blow fell on the Northern De

General John Burgoyne's British and German regulars quickly

reduced Ticonderoga, although General Arthur St. Clair was able to evacu
ate the garrison.

Schuyler's systematic destruction of the roads leading

south from the lakes broke down Burgoyne's already insufficient transport
organization and bought the Northern Department time to regroup and draw
reinforcements from the south.

Schuyler set plans in motion which led

to later defeats of British detachments in the Mohawk Valley and at
Bennington.
The fall of Ticonderoga had a more important political impact than
a military one.

The more radical delegates in Congress distrusted Schuy

ler and had made one effort to unseat him in 1776, and a second in May
1777.

Both failed because Schuyler's military reputation was strong

enough to win support from most of the more conservative southern and
central states' delegates.
reputation went with it.

But when Ticonderoga was lost, Schuyler's
Congress recalled him on 3l July, and appointed

Gates as his replacement four days later.

Although there were personal

and sectional factors at play in this Incident, there was a compelling
undercurrent of ideology at work, too.

The Army's requests had been met

66. Ibid.. 5: 839-40; 6: 880-1, 1051-2; 7: 231-7, 244-5, 323, 355-9; 8:
434-43, 452, 469-70, 610. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 247-9,
420-2; 8: 16, 25; 10: 45-46, 80-81, 183-8, 243-6.
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during the winter by Congress without significant opposition.

The dele

gates who had formerly favored a military reliance on militia or short
term troops conceded to advocates of a standing army only because re
sults were promised.

When disaster struck they counterattacked.

Gates'

supporters were finally able to topple Schuyler by arguing that the only
significant reinforcements the Northern Department could receive would
be New England militiamen, who would serve under Gates but not under

e v ,
67
Schuyler.
In fact, however, several brigades of Continentals moved north from
the Highlands Department and one vital unit hurried up from the Main
Army.

This unit was a provisional rifle corps which Washington organized

under Colonel Morgan on 13 June.

The men, primarily Virginians and Penn

sylvanians, were selected for their marksmanship and their skirmishing
skills.

Like Knowlton's 1776 rangers, the corps acted with the Main Army

as a picked body of light infantry.

In the north Morgan worked with a

provisional light infantry detachment under Major Henry Dearborn which
Schuyler had organized before his relief.

Together they quickly intimi

dated Burgoyne's Indians and left the British without reconnaissance
forces.**®
Gates went on to inflict two defeats on Burgoyne, cut him off from
Ticonderoga, and force him to surrender on 17 October.

Saratoga was

67. Ibid., 9: 8-9. Ford, Journals of Congress, 7: 202-3, 362-4; 8: 375,
590, 596, 604. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 2: 209-12, 336-7, 351-2,
376-7, 382-6, 424-6, 429-30, 440-1, 445, 465. Paul David Nelson, General
Horatio Gates: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1976), pp. 80-107. Henderson. Party Politics, pp. 104, 112-8.
White, "Standing Armies," pp. 199-201.
68. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 156, 236-7, 246; 9: 70-71,
78. Lloyd A. Brown and Howard H. Peckham, eds., Revolutionary War Jour
nals of Henry Dearborn 1775-1783 (Chicago: Caxton Club, 1939), pp. 100-13.

unquestionably a smashing victory, bagging nearly 6,000 enemy soldiers
and massive quantities of stores and arms.

Militia had turned out to

serve under Gates, swelling the Northern Department forces to 1,698 of
ficers and 20,652 men by the time of the surrender, not including various
artificers, batteauxmen, and the 700-odd riflemen.

That total is mis

leading since most of the actual combat was carried out by the much smal
ler contingent of Continentals.
forces were regulars:

Less than a third of the department's

15 Massachusetts, 1 Canadian, 3 New Hampshire, and

2 New York regiments plus detachments of cavalry, artillery, and rifle
men.

Only five of the thirteen brigades were Continental, and three of

them had militia regiments attached.

The total Continental infantry con

tingent amounted to 52 field, 457 company, and 72 staff officers, 526
sergeants, 262 drummers and fifers, and 7,644 rank and file.

Only some

5,000 were combat effectives.®^
Part of Gates' strength had come from the Hudson Highlands, which
also sent three brigades to the Main Army.

By October Putnam had only

General Parsons' 1st Connecticut Brigade as a field force and the 5th New
York Regiment and part of Lamb's artillery as fort garrisons.

General

Sir Henry Clinton took advantage of this weakness and captured the main
forts on 6 October, after a hard fight.

The defeat did not have a

69. Various returns located in the Gates Papers, New-York Historical
Society, must be consulted to determine the exact breakdown of his
strength by component. These include: General Return, Northern Depart
ment, 16 Oct 1777; State of the Army at Saratoga, 17 Oct 1777; Return
of Continental Troops at Van Schaick's Island, 7_Sep l777;_and Brigade
Returns for Paterson's, Nixon's, and Shepard's J Glover's_/ Brigades,
25-26 Oct 1777. Very important to the correct interpretation of the
returns is Deputy Mustermaster General Richard Varlck's 10 Sep 1777
report on the inspections and musters he had just completed also in the
Gates Papers.
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permanent effect on the Continental Army because Clinton returned to
New York City when he learned of Burgoyne's surrender.^
Washington's Main Army also suffered defeat during the 1777 cam
paign.

Howe decided to attack Philadelphia from the rear and landed

after a long sea voyage at Head of Elk, Maryland.

A provisional light

infantry force organized by Washington to replace the rifle corps haras
sed Howe's advance, but could not stop i t . ^

Washington stood and fought

at Brandywine on 11 September but was outflanked by Howe.

Washington

prevented a catastrophe by shifting units from his unengaged flank and
withdrew under the cover of an aggressive rear-guard action.

Execution

of this difficult maneuver impressed the professional German officers
serving with Howe, but it did not prevent the loss of Philadelphia on
26 September.^
On the night of 3-4 October the Continentals counterattacked.

Be

cause Howe had gradually fragmented his army in an effort to hold open
communications to the fleet in the lower Delaware River, Washington
devised an intricate plan similar to the one he used at Trenton to strike
an encampment at Germantown.

Excellent march discipline and intelligence

allowed the leading brigades to overrun the 2d Battalion of Light Infan
try and drive back other units.

One astonished German officer saw

70. Wright, "Too Little, Too Late," pp. 73-88. Transcript of the Court
of Inquiry into Putnam's Conduct, 5 Apr 1778; McDougall Papers, New-York
Historical Society.
71. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 9: 145, 148-9, 162-3, 172-3.
72. Uhlendorf, Revolution in America, pp. 1-27. Kipping and Smith, At
Howe'8 Side, pp. 31-32. Henry Lee, Memoirs of the War in the Southern
Department of the United States, ed. by Robert E. Lee (New York: Uni
versity Publishing Co., 1869), pp. 89-90.
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"something I had never seen before, namely the English in full flight."

73

When confusion and the staunch British defense of the stone Chew House
robbed the attack of some of its momentum, Washington withdrew.

Howe

spent the next month and a half clearing the defenders out of the forti
fications along the Delaware below Philadelphia.
By early November the Main Army contained a dozen Continental bri
gades plus a smattering of militia.

Its combined Infantry strength came

to 1,167 officers and 15,927 men, about half of the Continental Army's
total force.

Officers included 82 of field grade, 865 of company grade,

and 220 on regimental staffs.

Sergeants accounted for 1,009 of the

enlisted men and fifers and drummers another 523, leaving 14,395 rank
and file.

About 4,500 were sick and another 2,100 on command, mostly in

the river forts or related duties.

Washington's actual combat strength

was probably about 10,000 men, too few to continue an active campaign.
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After calling for reinforcements from Gates, he went into winter quarters
at Valley Forge on 20 December.

Summary.

The Continentals camped at Valley Forge in December 1777 superfi
cially resembled the men who retreated through New Jersey a year earlier.
Both armies looked back on months of defeats and hardships.
ences held greater significance.

The differ

As permanent bodies, the regiments of

73. Kipping and Smith, At Howe's Side, pp. 38-39. Also see Uhlendorf,
Revolution in America, pp. 5-27 and Justin Winsor, ed., "Col. John Eager
Howard's Account of the Battle of Germantown," Maryland Historical Maga
zine. 4 (1909), pp. 314-20.
74. Weekly Return, Main Army, 3 Nov 1777; Record Group 93, National
Archives.
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1777 did not have to undergo another dangerous reorganization.

Accumu

lated experience enabled the Army to incorporate lessons from the Trenton
campaign, and Washington could anticipate further improvement following
l777's actions.
The army of 1777 began to move away from a traditional colonial
force and resemble the balanced combined arms organization of many Euro
pean armies, although it still lacked sophistication.
more mobile in 1777 than in 1776.

It clearly was

The permanent brigades represented

the single most important innovation, enabling Washington partially to
offset British control of the sea by shifting reserves from one depart
ment to another.

Lack of resources or errors in generalship caused most

of the defeats in 1777, not a lack of fighting ability on the part of in
dividual regiments.

Basic organization appeared to be sound, although

training and doctrine continued to lag.
Washington anticipated a rosier future on Christmas Day 1777 than
he had a year earlier.

He knew that his army could fight, and even beat,

the British under favorable conditions.

One of his remaining problems

was to insure that it won consistently.

The other was more complicated.

Congress voted a large standing army with some 119 regiments.
have contained over 90,000 men, but fell far short.
ted him to produce results with that force.

It should

Yet Congress expec

Beginning in 1778 Washing

ton's problems related to preserving and filling the army rather than
expanding it.

The arena for that struggle was in Congress.

CHAPTER VI
PROFESSIONALISM:

NEW INFLUENCES FROM EUROPE

The winter encampment at Valley Forge played an extremely important
role in the history o£ the Continental Army.

Congress and the Army's

leaders used their first winter without problems of rebuilding to review
the campaign of 1777.

Two very different points of view emerged.

One

group believed that the Army should improve its battlefield performance
by returning to the earlier model drawn from two centuries of Anglo-Ameri
can experience.

The other sought inspiration from European, particularly

French, professional soldiers and military writers.

The struggle between

the groups for political domination reached a brief but intense peak
during the first months of 1778.

Neither side won clear predominance,

but over the next year and a half Washington secured adoption of many
reforms based on new European ideas.

This period witnessed the gradual

transformation of the Continental Army into a professional eighteenthcentury fighting force.

Valley Forge.

Congress approved an army to serve for the duration of the war in
September 1776.

It accepted a major departure from American tradition

without serious opposition because military commanders insisted that
victory could be won only if they had such a force.

Three months later

the delegates increased the size of the Army for the same reason.
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They
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expected the permanent army to produce results.

During 1777 the Main

Army lost most of its battles, but Gates won a smashing victory with the
assistance of large militia forces.

Policy debates during the winter

involved two basic interpretations of the lessons of the 1777 campaign.
One group of delegates, supported by some army leaders, remained
committed to the militant republican attitudes of 1775.

They remained

suspicious of a standing army and believed that victory could only come
from a total commitment on the part of the population.
to be a proof of their assumption.

Saratoga appeared

During the 1777-1778 winter they

argued for a program which marked a return to the concepts of the 1776
campaign:

a small Continental Army resembling the colonial Provincials,

supplemented for major battles by a large militia force.

Washington,

most of the senior officers, and another group of delegates followed a
more cautious and pragmatic course.

They believed that the transformation

begun during 1777 was correct, that the Continentals had fought well at
Brandywine, Germantown, and Saratoga.
improvements.
tion.^

Their program called for further

Neither faction won a complete endorsement for its posi

The central issues of the winter debate related to the overall

direction of military affairs, professionalization of the officer corps,
and the size of the Army.

1. General information on the political and ideological context is con
tained in H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974), pp. 54, 102-5, 118-24; and John
Todd White, "Standing Armies in Time of War: Republican Theory and Mili
tary Practice During the American Revolution" (Ph.D. Dissertation, George
Washington University, 1978), pp. 199-201, 207, 224-61, 277-8. The first
military historian to question this issue in print is Paul David Nelson
in "Citizen Soldiers or Regulars: The Views of American General Officers
on the Military Establishment, 1775-1781," Military Affairs, 43 (October
1979), pp. 126-32.

The policy debate began with the Board of War.

The original Board,

a standing committee of Congress, simply could not cope with the volume
of business and as early as April 1777 recommended redefinition of the
Board as a permanent administrative body.

The delegates approved a

version of that concept on 17 October 1777 which called for three perma
nent members and a clerical staff.

In addition to the administrative

functions of the Congressional committee the Board became responsible
for supervising recruiting, prisoners, and weapons production.

It also

became the sole official channel for Congress' dealings with the Army and
the states on military matters.

On 7 November Congress named Quartermas

ter General Thomas Mifflin, Adjutant General Timothy Pickering, and
Robert H. Harrison, Washington's Military Secretary, as the members.
Harrison promptly declined.2
Mifflin reported first and immediately took an active role.

His

early influence derived in part from the fact that one of the Board's
first tasks involved reorganizing the Quartermaster Department.

He per

suaded Congress to expand the Board to five members on 24 November and
recommended Horatio Gates and Richard Peters (the secretary of the old
Board) for the new vacancies.

Congress appointed both and replaced Har

rison with former Commissary General Joseph Trumbull.

At Mifflin's sug

gestion it also named Gates as President of the Board and allowed him to
retain his rank and right to field command.

In a sense the appointments

2. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress 17741789 (34 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-37), 7:
241-2; 8: 474n, 563; 9: 809-11, 818-20, 874, 936, 971. Edmund Cody Bur
nett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress (8 vols.,
Washington:
Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1921-36), 2: 52.
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reflected a desire to select individuals with expertise in specific staff
areas.

On the other hand, all five members came out of the militant po

litical tradition of the early 1770's.^
Gates took up his new duties in January 1778.

He arrived in York,

Pennsylvania, with glowing praise for his Saratoga triumph still flowing
from various delegates and army officers.

He also knew that Congress

had initiated investigations into the losses of the forts in the High
lands and along the Delaware River and had openly criticized Washington
for not confiscating supplies from Pennsylvania civilians to keep them
out of enemy hands.^

Pushed by Mifflin, some of the delegates, and a

handful of other disgruntled officers, Gates attempted to convert the
Board of War into an agency to control military operations.
Colonel Moses Hazen suggested to Gates in October 1777 a method for
capitalizing on the Saratoga victory.

A small force could attack Mon

treal in the winter when ice neutralized British warships on Lake Cham
plain and complete the conquest of Canada in the spring with reinforce
ments.

Brigadier General John Stark independently convinced Congress to

approve a small raid by militia volunteers on the St. John's naval base.
Gates, working through the Board, convinced Congress in January to ex
pand the raid into an "irruption" into Canada along Hazen's lines.
Board assumed complete control over the operation.

The

At Gates' suggestion

3. Ibid., 2: 574-6. Ford, Journals of Congress, 9: 941, 959-63, 971-2.
Pennsylvania Archives, 1st Ser., 6: 35.
4. James Lovell to Gates, 5 Oct and 27Nov; Joseph Reed
to Gates, 30 Oct;
James Wilkinson to Gates, 4 Nov; Gliphalet Dyer to Gates, 5 Nov; Thomas
Conway to Gates, H Nov; Thomas Mifflin
to Gates, 17 and 27 Nov 1777;
Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society. Ford, Journals of Congress,
9: 972, 975-6, 1013-5.
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Congress named Major General the Marquis de Lafayette as the expedition's
commander, assisted by Major General Thomas Conway, Stark, and Hazen.'*
Conway, an Irish veteran of the French Army, became openly critical
of Washington during the late fall.

On 13 December 1777 Congress pro

moted him, over a number of senior brigadier generals, to the rank of
major general and named him inspector general.

Conway planned to make

that new office a field agent of the Board, but Washington effectively
froze him out of any role within the Main Army.^

Gates then selected

him for the Canadian expedition, assuming that he would be the real com
mander.

Lafayette was expected to be a figurehead.

Lafayette had a

limited military background but was definitely not a political novice.
He refused to participate in an activity which undermined Washington's
authority as Commander-in-chief.

He objected to Conway and insisted

that orders for the expedition pass through Washington rather than
through the Board.

He even threatened to return to the French court if

these demands were not met.

This strong support for Washington brought

the project to an end and Congress cancelled the invasion on 2 March.^

5. Ibid., 9: 999-1001; 10: 84-85, 87. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 3:
124-30. Hazen to Gates, 26 Oct; James Duane to Gates, 16 Dec; Gates to
Col. John Greaton, 28 Dec 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
Stanley J. Idzerda, et al., eds., Lafayette in the Age of the American
Revolution ... (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 1: xxivxxvi, 169-72, 204-7, 2l3-8, 245-385.
6. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the
Original Manuscript Sources 1745-1799 (39 vols., Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1931-44), 9: 387-90; 10: 39, 226-8, 236-7. Conway to
Gates, 11 Nov 1777 and 4 Jan 1778; Gates Papers, New-York Historical
Society. Ford, Journals of Congress, 9: 1026.
7. Ibid., 10: 107, 216-7, 253-4. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 3: 63-65.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, H : 113-4. Greene to McDougall, 5
Feb 1778; Alexander McDougall Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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The demise of the "Irruption" and Congressional airing of Conway's
criticism of Washington ended the challenge to Washington's leadership
of the Army.

Conway was ostracised, and when he submitted his resigna

tion in a ploy to regain stature Congress quickly accepted it.

Gates,

realizing that a majority in Congress would not reduce the Commander-inChief's role, abandoned the Presidency of the Board to return to a field
command in the north.

Mifflin, in turn, was pressured into resigning on

17 August 1778, and the Board of War reverted to a purely administrative
role.

These decisions solidified Washington's authority as the single
O

voice of the Army on matters of military policy.

Apart from political

considerations, if Gates' Board had developed in the manner he and Mifflin
intended, it would have served as a vehicle for returning the Continental
Army to the relatively small cadre of 1776 and would have effectively in
creased the role of the militia in combat situations.

Washington, on the

other hand, continued to work for a Continental Army which carried out
the basic combat function of the Revolution with limited outside help, a
policy implicit in the resolve of 16 September 1776.
Washington'8 first effort to advance his ideas centered on profes
sionalizing the officer corps.

In the British Army, and most of its

European counterparts, an officer who wished to leave the army could sell

8. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10: 236-7, 410-1; 11: 493-4; 14:
383-6. Ford, Journals of Congress, 10: 399; 11: 520, 802. Burnett, Let
ters of Congress. 3: 20-25, 28-31, 39-40, 42, 48, 141-2, 209-11, 487-9.
Mifflin to Gates, 28 Nov 1777; Gates to Washington, 8 Dec 1777 and 23 Jan
and 17 Feb 1778; Pickering to Gates, 26 Aug 1778; Gate6 to Congress, 11
Dec 1777; Walter Stewart to Gates, 12 Feb 1778; Gates Papers, New-York
Historical Society. Greene to McDougall, 25 Jan and 16 Apr 1778; Varnum
to McDougall, 7 Feb 1778; McDougall to Greene, 14 Feb 1778; McDougall
Papers, New-York Historical Society.
S. Weir Mitchell, "Historical Notes
of Dr. Benjamin Rush, 1777," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biogra
phy, 27 (1903), p. 147. John Laurens, The Army Correspondence of Colonel
John Laurens ... (New York: Bradford Club, 1867), pp. 80-88, 98-101.
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his commission (under government supervision) and use the proceeds as
retirement income.

Officers involuntarily separated in peacetime re

ductions remained in a form of reserve status and drew half of their
normal pay.

Washington and his senior advisors believed that the Con

tinental Army needed a similar program to attract able officers and ade
quately compensate them for inflation and economic loss.

During the

1777-1778 winter financial problems forced many officers to leave the
service.

Unfortunately, politicians with ideological objections to

standing armies distrusted any measures such as half-pay which would
create, as James Lovell put it, "a set of haughty idle imperious Scanq
dalizers of industrious Citizens and Farmers."
On 10 January 1778 Congress decided to send a "Committee of Con
ference" to Valley Forge to discuss this issue and other matters rela
ting to efficiency and economy in the Army.

The committee's proponents

wanted it to consist of members of the Board of War as well as delegates.
But when the tide of Congressional opinion turned against the Board,
participation in the committee was limited to delegates, led by Francis
Dana and Gouveneur Morris.

Although the members nominally represented

a cross-section of opinion, they were in reality pragmatists open to
Washington's i d e a s . ^

During the extensive discussions with Washington

9. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 3: 31-33. Also see: Ibid., 2: 585-6;
3: 34, 153-6; Greene to McDougall, 25 Jan 1778; McDougall Papers, NewYork Historical Society; Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 102-4, 120-4;
and White, "Standing Armies," pp. 277-8.
10. Ford, Journals of Congress, 10: 39-41, 67. Henderson, Party Poli
tics, pp. 120-1. Dana and Nathaniel Folsom were New Englanders but not
from the militant core of that region's delegations; Joseph Reed was a
pragmatist whose military service with Washington had weakened his ties
to the militants; and Morris and Charles Carroll were established sup
porters of Washington. The Board representatives were to have been Gates,
Mifflin, and Pickering.
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and his advisors from 28 January to 12 March, the committee gradually
turned to formulating policy by preparing recommendations for numerous
reforms.

It filled the role Mifflin and Gates Intended for the Board of

War, but with one major difference:

it echoed Washington's positions.

Congress rejected some of its suggestions, including the peacetime sale
of commissions and half-pay.

Intense lobbying by Washington and the

committee did secure a compromise on the latter point.

On 15 May 1778

Congress promised that officers serving to the end of the war would re
ceive seven years of half pay to ease the transition to civilian life
while enlisted men would receive a lump sum of eighty dollars.
The committee's second major objective was to reconcile the exten
sive army approved in the 1776 resolves with the reality of the 1777 cam
paign.

Most regiments started 1777 below full strength.

Subsequent

rank and file losses forced Washington to issue muskets to sergeants and
junior officers to compensate.

In spite of shortcomings in the number

of enlisted men, most regiments contained nearly full complements of of
ficers, and Washington hoped to procure enough replacements to fill every
unit.

Since Congress lacked the legal power to enact a draft, which was

the only practical way to obtain as many men as Washington needed, the
committee received instructions to look for ways to consolidate units,
trim surplus officers, and reduce quotas to realistic levels.

12

11. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 3: 61-115, 123-4, 131, 160-3, 212-3,
219-21, 244-5, 255-6. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, H : 285-6,
290-2, 415. Max M. Mintz, Gouveneur Morris and the American Revolution
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 9 I-I0 I. Ford, Jour
nals of Congress, 10: 285-6, 300-1; 11; 502-3.
12. Ibid., 8: 593-5, 670; 9: 930; 10: 39-40. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 8: 440; 9: 365-7, 406-7; 10: 125-6, 153, 195, 197-8, 205,
221-5; 11: 236-40.
"Plan for a Re-Organization of the Continental Army,"
Historical Magazine, 2d Ser., 3 (1868), pp. 270-3.
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By the start of February 1778 the committee found that the Main
Army contained the majority of the Continentals.

Georgia and South

Carolina units and Harrison's Artillery Regiment served in the south,
and the equivalent of three brigades remained in the Highlands and
Northern Departments.

All of the other regiments, a force which should

have exceeded 60,000 men, were either at Valley Forge or its outposts.
The infantrymen in the fifteen brigades at Valley Forge accounted for
990 officers, 931 sergeants, 642 drummers and fifers, and 17,491 rank
and file.

Only 7,600 rank and file remained completely fit for duty,

and a third of them were on detachments.

Almost 5,000 were sick, 1,100

on furlough, and 3,700 who were healthy lacked either shoes or clothes
and could not be used in combat.

The portions of three artillery regi

ments at Valley Forge contained 117 officers and 810 men; the four regiments of light dragoons at Trenton another 70 officers and 438 men.

13

The committee faced a situation in which the Main Army had only about
a third of its authorized strength.
The press of other business prevented Congress from implementing
substantive reforms before the start of the 1778 campaign.

On 26 Febru

ary, on the advice of the committee, it did recommend that the states in
stitute a comprehensive recruiting organization and a system of nine-month
drafts to fill quotas.

It also reduced Rhode Island's quota for the cam

paign to a single full regiment and Pennsylvania's to ten regiments.^
More lasting legislation came in May and involved basic revisions of the
organization for the various types of regiments.

The economy-directed

13. General Return, Main Army, 9 Feb 1778; Record Group 93, National Ar
chives. It does not include two brigades wintering at Wilmington.
14. Ford, Journals of Congress. 10: 199-203.
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resolve of 27 May 1778 reduced the maximum size of most regiments to
levels easier to fill and particularly cut the number of officers in
each.

Washington, satisfied with the old structure, had hoped to avoid

these changes.

On the other hand, the resolve created two new types of

units specifically requested by the Commander-in-chief
The basic change came in the infantry regiment.

After first rejec

ting a radically different organizational model suggested by Major Gener
al Charles Lee,1** Congress adopted a structure which moved back towards
the British regiment.

Each regiment gained a ninth company as a perma

nent light infantry company, but reduced the total number of officers
from 40 to 29 and enlisted strength from 692 to 5 5 3 . ^

Through attri

tion each regiment would eliminate its colonel leaving only two field
officers.

This structure also simplified prisoner of war exchanges since

a British colonel was not a combat officer.

The other major reduction

came in the staff where the adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster
ceased to be separate positions.

Subalterns from line companies assumed

the duties of the former two offices as additional tasks, while one of
the captains, elected by the unit officers, doubled as paymaster.

All

three received extra compensation.
Within each company one lieutenant was eliminated, and several cap
tains in the regiment lost their positions as the field officers, like

15. Ibid., 11: 538-43, 570, 633-4; 12: 1154-60. Burnett, Letters of
Congress. 3: 263-6, 407, 431-2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11:
475-6; 12: 30-35, 60-62, 274-5. Idzerda, Lafayette, 1; 284-5.
16. Charles Lee, "The Lee Papers," New-York Historical Society Collec
tions for 1871-74, 2: 382-9. Ford, Journals of Congress, 11: 514-5.
Lee's plan was derived from the "legion" of Marshal Maurice de Saxe; an
earlier version is in Worthington C. Ford, ed., Correspondence and Jour
nals of Samuel Blachley Webb (3 vols., New York: Privately printed, 189394), 1: 84-87.
17. See Figure 8.
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their British counterparts, assumed command of companies.

If the regi

ment still had a colonel, the senior lieutenant, as captain-lieutenant,
exercised practical control over his company.

Each company also lost a

sergeant and a corporal from the organization approved in 1776, paral
leling the reduction in officers.
third, from 76 to 53.

The number of privates was cut by a

Rank and file strength, the true power of the

company, fell from 80 to 56.

A regiment now deployed for combat, if it

retained its light company, with a bayonet strength of 504 out of a total
of 582.

If, as was normally the case, the light company was detached,

the strength dropped to 448, roughly on a par with a British regiment.
Congress created a regiment which cost $270 per month less than
the 1776 regiment in salaries alone, but which was only 70 percent as
strong.

Its combat efficiency was even lower since two or three companies

had only two officers and the reduced staff no longer furnished a pool of
spare officers to replace casualties in combat.

Except for the creation

of the permanent light infantry company the new regiment was inferior to
the old one on paper as a battlefield force.

Congress viewed the changes

as important from a financial point of view, and also as an acceptable
compromise with the reality of the recruiting levels experienced during
1777.

Washington knew the theoretical advantages, particularly in the

area of tactical control, of the old structure, but he also recognized
the importance of reaching an agreement with Congress on the nature of
the army which the nation would support.

He accepted Congress' decisions

on regimental structure although he remained opposed to that body's insistance on using line officers for staff duties outside the regiment,
another new departure in the May resolve.
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The artillery regiment underwent less change.

It gained a third

second lieutenant for each company, but lost the spare staff officers
in a change which paralleled the transformation of the Infantry regi
ment's staff.
regiment.
expanded.

1-8

Similar staff reductions took place in the light dragoon
Unlike the infantry, however, the cavalry structure was

Each troop added a second lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal,

and 22 privates.

The fouT regimental supernumaries and the troop ar

morer were eliminated.

A new troop called for 4 officers and 64 enlisted

men, nearly double the 1777 size.
and 386 men.

The new regiment required 29 officers

This increase brought the ratio iof officers to enlisted

men in the mounted arm into a more economical arrangement in Congress'
eyes.
Although implementation of the new organization was a gradual pro
cess, the 27 May 1778 resolve completed Congress' direct role at Valley
Forge.

The delegates began the winter with the contrast between Saratoga

and Washington's loss of Philadelphia fresh in their minds.

One group

believed that Gates' success was due to a combination of Continentals
and militia.

Their program, which initially won majority support, amoun

ted to a return to the policies of 1776.

They expanded the role of the

Board of War and filled it with military men who supported their position,
planning to use the Board as an instrument of change.

Washington stood

off that challenge to his leadership, but lost his own battle for perma
nent half-pay and the sale of commissions.

A majority in Congress also

overruled Washington's mild objections to a reduction in the size of the
authorized Army.

18.

See Figure 9.
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to a British model for infantry regiments.

On the other hand, Washing

ton's influence with the committee at Valley Forge limited the change
in the artillery and actually strengthened the cavalry.

The resolve

also added two new types of units which Washington requested as part of
his effort to recast the Army on a French model.

Foreign Advisers.

Washington, too, spent the winter at Valley Forge considering the
lessons of the 1777 campaign.

He decided that the Continentals needed

to adopt many characteristics of European military organization to im
prove on their past performance.

Personal experience and his reading

of military textbooks played a role in this decision, but expert advice
from a number of foreign volunteers was almost as influential.

The

first impact of this new concept came in the form of a dramatic improve
ment in the Army's engineering efforts.

It was also reflected in its

mounted arm and in the creation of a variety of special units.
Established tradition in Europe allowed officers to serve in the
armies of other nations to win glory, gain promotions, and taste adven
ture.

In 1776 a number of Individuals came to America for these reasons.

Many claimed to have technical expertise and made exorbitant demands for
high rank, but turned out to be frauds.

Congress' hopes that Germans

could recruit in the German-American community and that Frenchmen could
attract Canadians proved groundless.

Since most of the early officer

volunteers were not fluent in English they could not be assigned to line
units.

Particularly incompetent performances came from two men who ser

ved as brigadier generals in the Northern Department in 1776:

Frederick
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William de Woedtke, a former Prussian officer, and a Frenchman, MatthiasAlexis, the Chevalier de La Rochefermoy.

19

Congress brought about a subtle change in the quality of the volun
teers when it dispatched Silas Deane to France in the summer of 1776.
Deane and his fellow diplomats secured the services of three groups of
professional soldiers.

On the advice of Caron de Beaumarchais of Hor-

talez and Company and General Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval (the century's
leading artillery expert) Deane contracted with Philip Charles Jean
Baptiste Tronson du Coudray to organize and lead the first of these
groups.

Coudray, despite extravagant claims, was a minor military

theorist and protege of Gribeauval whose French rank was equivalent to
an artillery major.

Deane granted him a contract which promised virtu

ally a free hand in artillery and engineering operations, the rank of
major general, and the title of General of Artillery and Ordnance.
Coudray's group arrived in America in the late spring of 1777 and proved
to be rather undistinguished.

Congress commissioned two members, Conway

and Philippe-Hubert, the Chevalier de Preudhomme de Borre, brigadier
generals.

It finessed the storm of protest which arose when the Army

thought that Coudray might replace Knox by commissioning the Frenchman
as Inspector General of Ordnance and Military Manufactories rather than
General of Artillery and Ordnance.

Coudray's death in the fall in an

19. Idzerda, Lafayette. 1; 68-87. Chevalier Dubuisson des Hayes later
commented that the first volunteers were "officers who are deeply in
debt, and some of them have been discharged from their units." He criti
cized the governors of the French West Indies for deliberately sending
them to America with inflated credentials as a way to rid themselves of
troublesome individuals.
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accident ended any chance that he might have made a contribution to the
Revolution, and both brigadier generals resigned within a year.^0
A second group of technical experts came to America through the
efforts of the French Minister of War, the Comte de Saint-Germain.

He

formally "loaned" four military engineers to the Continental Army.

In

contrast to the previous volunteers, the contracts given to these men
promised commissions only one grade higher than their French rank, and
the men were carefully selected for real skills.

Their leader, Louis le

Begue de Presle Duportail, recently revised the engineer regulations
for the French Army, and on 8 July 1777 Congress commissioned him as a
colonel, giving him command over all engineers shortly thereafter.

His

obvious skill and cooperative attitude led to his promotion on 17 Novem
ber to brigadier general, giving him status equivalent to General Knox's.
Duportail's group quickly unmasked Coudray's false claims to technical
training as an engineer.
The third contingent consisted of proteges of the Comte de Broglie,
one of France's top commanders.

Deane offered a major general's com

mission to the group's leader, Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette,
because of his powerful connections in the French court.

A similar

20. Peter Force, ed., American Archives: A Collection of Authentic Re
cords. State Papers, Debates, and Other Notices of Public Affairs (9 vols.,
Washington: M. St. Clair Clarke and Peter Force, 1839-53), 5th Ser., 1:
1011-23; 2: 283-5. Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American Inde
pendence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1789 (Princeton: Prince
ton University Press, 1975), pp. 30-49. Idzerda, Lafayette, 1; 11.
Lafayette described Coudray as "a clever but imprudent man, a good of
ficer but vain to the point of folly."
21. Elizabeth S. Kite, Brigadier-General Louis Leb^gue Duportail:
Commondant of Engineers in the Continental Army 1777-1783 (Washington:
Instltut Fran^ais de Washington, 1933), pp. 2-34.
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offer went to Bavarian-born Johannes de Kalb, a grizzled veteran of the
French army.

Deane promised this group assignments in the infantry

rather than the technical services.

Unfortunately, by the time they

reached Philadelphia the temper of Congress and the Army had turned and
they were coldly received at first.

Lafayette's personal enthusiasm,

the group's offer to serve as unpaid volunteers, and demonstrations of
competence eventually earned most of them commissions.

22

The immediate impact of these foreign volunteers came in the field
of military engineering.

Americans could not match the training of

British engineers at the Woolwich school, let alone that of the French
who perfected the science of military engineering.

Because of this,

most of the early European volunteers received engineer commissions in
the Continental Army although few had formal training or could perform
useful service.

The single exception, a young Polish captain named

Andrew Thaddeus Bonaventure Kosciuszko, had received formal training in
France.

Congress commissioned him as a colonel of engineers on 18 Octo

ber 1776.23
Although Washington included a request for a coherently organized
corps of engineers in his plans for the 1777 army, and Congress author
ized him to form such a body in its resolve of 27 December 1776, the
shortage of proficient engineers prevented him from taking any action.
Colonel Rufus Putnam, the best American engineer, returned to infantry

22. Idzerda, Lafayette, xxiv-xxvi, 7-12, 17-18, 33-36, 53-56, 68-87, 14550. Lafayette actually was a cavalry captain in a reserve status without
combat experience, but as de Kalb later commented was a gifted natural
soldier.
23. Ford, Journals of Congress. 5: 565, 614-5, 656; 6: 888. Miecislaus
Haiman, Kosciuszko in the American Revolution (New York: Polish Insti
tute of Arts and Sciences in America* 1943), pp. 1-11.
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duty and a more cautious Congress halted the commissioning of untested
volunteers.

Until Duportail*s group reached Philadelphia, the Army had

only Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin, Kosciuszko, and a number of infantry or
artillery officers detailed to engineering duty.

24

Duportail's emer

gence as a trusted expert gave the Army a standard on which to judge
Europeans for professional merit for the first time.

He secured the

services of men such as Jean de Murnan, who had talent but whose career
in the French Army was blocked by court intrigue.

25

One of the first improvements the engineers made was the formation
of a bridging train to improve the Army's mobility.

On the night of 11-

12 December 1777 they constructed two bridges over the Schuylkill
River at Swede's Ford.
rafts.

One consisted of a roadbed laid across floating

The other was constructed by placing 36 wagons in the shallows

and stringing rails across them.

Later more sophisticated flat-bottomed

pontons with special wheeled carriages were constructed at Albany, which
in 1781 accompanied the Army to Yorktown.

26

tribution involved permanent fortifications.

The second technical con
After the defeats of 1777

Washington concentrated his resources on the field army.

He only re

fortified the Hudson Highlands to serve as the Main Army's strategic

24. Force, American Archives, 5th Ser., 2: 549-50, 892-3. Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington. 6: 160-1; 7: 102-6; 8: 380-2. Thomas Williams
Baldwin, ed., The Revolutionary Journal of Col. Jeduthan Baldwin 17751778 (Bangor: De Burians, 1906), pp. 102-3. Ford, Journals of Congress,
8: 380. Fran^ois-Louis Teisseidre, the Marquis de Fleury's 2 May 1777
commission as captain was the only new appointment in early 1777.
25. Ibid., 8: 571; 9: 932; 13: 57-58. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 2:
417-21.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10: 35. Kite, Duportail,
pp. 50-52.
26. Amos Perry, ed., "Dr. Albigence Waldo, Surgeon in the Continental
Army," Historical Magazine. 5 (1861), p. 131. John B. Reeves, ed., "Ex
tracts from the Letter-Books of Lieutenant Enos Reeves, of the Pennsylvania
Line, " Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 20 (1896), pp.
458-9.
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pivot.

From the winter of 1777-1778 until the end of the war a major

part of the engineer corps worked on the fortress complex at West Point.
Duportail's engineers avoided the single large fort which could be lost
in one stroke and erected a complex of small, mutually-supporting works
for defense in d e p t h . ^
At Valley Forge Duportail proposed to supplement the officer en
gineers with companies of trained combat engineers.

Following European

custom he called them companies of sappers and miners.

Sappers received

special pay for digging the entrenchments (saps) of a formal siege;
miners constructed underground tunnels.

The companies could execute

small projects or supervise infantry details in more extensive under
takings.

Washington particularly liked Duportail's plan to train the

officers as apprentice engineers, insuring a steady supply of nativeborn engineers for the first time.

Congress approved forming three com

panies on 27 May 1778, but implementation took longer.

Washington ap

pointed the officers on 2 August 1779, after Duportail had personally
interviewed the candidates, and transferred literate, intelligent enlis
ted men from infantry regiments a year later.

Each company was authorized

1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, and 60 privates.

9ft

Congress took the final step to regularize the engineers on 11 March
1779.

In response to Washington's continued pressure it resolved "that

27. Kite, Duportail, pp. 47-50, 60-72. Haiman, Kosciuszko, pp. 43-47.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, H : 297-8.
28. Ibid., 10: 433; 11: 239; 12: 40, 241, 311-2; 14: 235; 15: 103, 4912; 16: 36; 17: 443-5; 19: 224. Ford, Journals of Congress, H :
541-2;
16: 133. Joseph Plumb Martin, Private Yankee Doodle ..., ed. by George
F. Scheer (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1962), pp. 194-6. By compari
son the British did not start to form their Royal Military Artificers
until 1787.
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the engineers in the service of the United States shall
be formed into a corps, styled the 'corps of engineers,'
and shall take rank and enjoy the same rights, honours,
and privileges, with the other troops on the continental
establishment.
This legislation gave the engineers the status of a branch of the Con
tinental Army.
tillery.

They received the same pay and prerogatives as the ar

As commandant Duportail supervised the engineer officers and

companies of sappers and miners, functioned as a special advisor to the
Commander-in-Chief, and made the assignment of individual officers to
specific posts prior to the start of each year's campaign.

30

Indirect French influence effected a separate section of topogra
phical engineers.

Following the Seven Years' War France had begun

rigorous training of a small topographical corps, the Ingenieurs Geographes (distinct from the Corps Royal du Genie).

They were responsible

for preparing a systematic library of maps for reference in planning
operations.

31

accurate maps.

As a former surveyor Washington understood the value of
On 19 July 1777 he asked for a topographical staff; six

days later Congress told him to appoint a "geographer and surveyor of
the roads, to take sketches of the country, the seat of war" and neces
sary subordinates.

Robert Erskine accepted the job but did not report

to headquarters until June 1778.

Erskine, a Scot who came to New Jersey

in 1771, was a famous civil engineer and inventor.

Until he died of

29. Ford, Journals of Congress, 13: 305-6.
30. Ibid., 14: 570-1. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 12: 376-7;
14: 160-1; 16: 21-23, 37, 46-48. Kite, Duportail, pp. 125-31.
31. J. B. Hawley, jit _al., Mapping the American Revolutionary War (Chi
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 32-36, 68-75. Howard C.
Rice, Jr. and Anne S. K. Brown, eds., The American Campaigns of Rochambeau's Army ... (2 vols., Princeton and Providence: Princeton and Brown
University Presses, 1972), 1; 191-219; 2: 3-5, 111-20.
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pneumonia on 2 October 1780 Erskine coordinated up to six survey teams
from his home at Ringwood Forge.

He and his successors transformed the

raw data into a comprehensive survey of the Main Army's area of opera
tions.

The resulting maps matched French standards of accuracy and

were vastly superior as a planning resource to anything available to
British commanders.

32

Washington intended to have another foreign volunteer upgrade the
effectiveness of the mounted arm in the way Duportail improved the en
gineers.

Congress answered his long-standing request for a cavalry

commander on a par with Knox on 15 September 1777.

Casimir Pulaski, a

fiery Pole, became the Commander of Horse with the rank of brigadier
general.

Louis de Fleury soon became his brigade major, and the four

light dragoon regiments went into winter quarters at Trenton in 17771778.

Washington and Pulaski used the winter to begin transforming the

troopers from a reconnaissance force into an offensive weapon.

Pulaski

established a riding school to train horses and men in European-style
shock action including cut-and-thrust saber tactics.

The dragoon regi

ment reorganization authorized on 27 May 1778 suited a battle mission
better than patrolling.

Unfortunately, Pulaski had clashed with his

American officers and resigned as Commander of Horse a month earlier.
Washington never found a replacement, and the strategic changes after

32. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 7: 65; 8: 372, 443, 495-6; 11;
246; 12: 21; 14: 182-3; 23: 68-69. Ford, Journals of Congress. 8: 580;
18: 1118; 20: 475-6, 738. The maps are in the Erskine-De Witt Collec
tion, New-York Historical Society. British Headquarters Maps are in the
Henry Clinton Papers, William L. Clements Library, University of Michi
gan (copies in the New-York Historical Society).
Simeon De Witt suc
ceeded Erskine in the north and Thomas Hutchings in the south.
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Monmouth returned the light dragoons to a reconnaissance role when the
British declined to fight open battles as they had in 1776 and 1777.

33

While the dragoons did not complete their transformation into a
true European cavalry force, the Continental Army introduced a number
of light units patterned after the partisan cojirs which had emerged in
the Seven Years' War.

Major Nicholas Dietrich, Baron de Ottendorf, a

Saxon veteran of the Prussian Army, commanded the first of these units.
On 5 December 1776 Congress ordered him to recruit a company of chas
seurs (light infantry) and two of jaegers (riflemen).

A large propor

tion of the officers for Ottendorf's four companies (the extra company
was added in April) were foreign volunteers but the enlisted men came
from the German-American community.

Ottendorf, however, deserted in

the spring of 1777, and Congress placed Charles Armand Tuffin, the Mar
quis de la Rouerie, in command.

It also told Armand on 19 May to raise

a partisan corps of 200 Frenchmen, but Armand did not fill that unit
until 1778.3A
When Pulaski resigned command of the cavalry Congress allowed him
to raise an "independent corps."

It consisted of a troop of 68 lancers

and 200 light infantry organized into a "legion."

The cadre of the

troop came from the light dragoons he trained at Trenton in special

33. Ford, Journals of Congress. 8: 745; 12: 897, 941. Burnett, Letters
of Congress, 3: 408. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 7: 51, 190-1;
9: 143-4, 305; 10: 234-6; 11; 446; 12: 228, 276, 490; 13: 14-15. Samuel
Hay to William Irvine, 14 Nov 1777; Historical Magazine. 3 (1859), p.
283. Gates to Washington, 23 May 1778; Benjamin Tallmadge to Gates, 1
Jun 1778; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
34. Ford, Journals of Congress. 6: 1007; 7: 186, 346. Fitzpatrick, Wri
tings of Washington. 6: 324; 8: 91-92, 224-6; 9: 162. New-York Histori
cal Society Collections for 1915, pp. 566-9. W. T. R. Saffell, Records
of the Revolutionary War ... (3d ed., Baltimore: Charles E. Saffell,
1894), pp. 219-21.
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lance tactics.

On 7 April 1778 Congress rewarded Captain Henry Lee for

excellent service on the outpost lines around Philadelphia by allowing
him to organize a similar unit.

Lee's troop of the 1st Continental

Light Dragoons was withdrawn from the regiment and expanded into two
troops; a third was added on 28 May.

Lee, now a major, used the small

light dragoon troop organization of 1777 which was appropriate for the
reconnaissance and raiding missions that the partisans performed.

Armand

finally recruited his Free and Independent Chasseurs after Congress ap
proved an organization for it on 25 June 1778.

It consisted of three

large companies based on Marshal Saxe's legionary concept.

Each con

tained 4 officers, 8 noncommissioned officers, 2 drummers (or horn players), and 128 privates.

35

By the end of the 1778 campaign the Main Army had three partisan
corps.

Lee's was entirely mounted and composed of native Americans.

Pulaski's, usually operating in conjunction with Ottendorf's remnants,
was a combined arms unit mixing Americans and foreigners.
completely infantry and heavily foreign.

Armand's was

Washington reviewed their per

formance and concluded that the most efficient partisan organization
contained equal numbers of mounted and dismounted men.

At his request

Congress annexed Captain Allen McLane's company (formerly of Patton's
Additional Regiment) to Lee's unit on 13 July 1779 and on 14 February
1780 increased Lee's corps by another 70 men to form three mounted and

35. Ford, Journals of Congress. 10: 29l, 294, 314-5, 364; 11; 545, 6425.
Gates to Washington, 24 Jun and 13 Jul 1778; Gates Papers, New-York
Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. H : 80-82,
205-6 , 230; 12: 152-3 , 470; 13: 41-43.
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three dismounted troops.

The success of this expedient led Congress to

rescind an earlier directive and on 23 February 1780 to consolidate
Pulaski's and Armand's corps.

36

A special mounted police unit, the Marechaussie Corps, authorized
on 27 May 1778, represented another European concept without Anglo-Ameri
can precedent.

It consisted of 5 officers, a clerk, 8 noncommissioned

officers, 2 trumpeters, and 47 privates (4 of whom served as execution
ers).

The corps assisted the Provost Marshal in maintaining order in

camp and on the march.

In combat it took station behind the Second

Line to provide rear security and prevent desertion.

Captain Bartholomew

Von Heer, a Prussian veteran, recruited Pennsylvania-Germans from Berks
and Lancaster Counties.

The unit contributed to the general Improvement

in the Army's internal order and discipline.

37

The Army's other police unit arose from expediency rather than Euro
pean inspiration.

It merely guarded prisoners of war, a function normally

performed by militia.

Burgoyne's army did not surrender unconditionally:

the "Saratoga Convention" only stipulated that the regiments had to leave
North America and not return unless exchanged.

When the British failed

to honor some of the minor provisions, Congress suspected that Howe would
renounce the agreement.

It detained the regiments and in the fall of

36. Ibid., 14: 65, 74-79; 15: 233, 242, 345; 17: 450-2, 496-7. Ford,
Journals of Congress. 13: 132, 143, 181; 14: 822-3; 15: 1418; 16: 159,
187. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 4: 45, 55, 58-59, 67. Armand to
Gates, 25 Jul 1780; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
37. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11: 443; 12: 26-27, 241; 13:
61-63, 68-70; 19: 41. Ford, Journals of Congress, 11: 541, 729. Von
Heer to Steuben, 31 Dec 1779; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical So
ciety.
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op
1778 transferred them to Charlottesville, Virginia, for better security.
Instead of using militia guards, Virginia decided to raise a 600-man
regiment under surplus Continental officers.
ment of Guards on 9 January 1779.

Congress adopted the Regi

The unit remained under the governor's

control, rather than under the operational command of the commander of
the Southern Department, until it disbanded in stages between 10 April
and 9 June 1781 as the "Convention Army" moved to Maryland.

39

The Corps of Invalids, a specialized unit established in 1777, also
reflected a desire to professionalize the Continental Army.

Great Bri

tain used separate companies of men not fit for field duty to garrison
fortifications in the home islands.

The Invalids performed a similar

mission in the Continental Army, freeing combat units from defending
depots.

On 20 June 1777 Congress authorized Colonel Lewis Nicola, a

strong proponent of the concept, to organize the corps.

Congress went

beyond British precedent by directing Nicola to set up a "Military
School for Young Gentlemen" to train ensigns for assignment to line
regiments and to conduct recruiting and training of replacements.
Detachments were organized at Philadelphia and Boston during 1777 and

38. Ford, Journals of Congress. 9: 1058-64; 10: 13-17; 12: 902, 1016-8.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 10: 10, 56-58; 13: 131-2, 218-20,
274-5, 289-91, 308, 3 H - 3 .
Paul H. Smith, ^t al., eds., Letters of Dele
gates to Congress, 1774-1789 (Washington: Library of Congress, 1976),
2: 436. The British violated a similar agreement, the Convention of
Kloster Kampen, in the Seven Years' War.
39. Ford, Journals of Congress, 13: 42-43. Julian P. Boyd, ed., The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1951), 3: 155-6, 191-2; 4: 252-3, 565, 603-5; 5: 147, 333-4, 408-9,
426-8, 661-2; 6: 66-67. William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia
State Papers and other Manuscripts (11 vols., Richmond: Commonwealth of
Virginia, 1875-93), 2: 574. Henry Read Mcllwalne, ed.. Official Letters
of the Governors of the State of Virginia (3 vols., Richmond: Virginia
State Library, 1926-29), 1; 347-9, 355.
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1778.

The regiment never fulfilled its training function, but it per

formed valuable garrison duty until the end of the war, especially at
40
West Point.
The growing sophistication of the Continental Army, inspired in
part by foreign volunteers, also showed in improved organization of sup
port troops.

Following Coudray's detah in the fall of 1777, Washington,

Knox, and the Commissary General of Military Stores, Benjamin Flower,
moved to upgrade the Army's ordnance staff.

On 11 November 1777 Congress

added two more artillery artificer companies.

Knox and Washington hoped

to group the companies into a regiment for better administration and
assign detachments to each division at the start of the 1778 campaign
to maintain small arms.

On 11 February 1778 Congress consolidated re

sponsibility for ordnance, munitions, military equipment, and repair of
weapons under Flower who also became commander of the Artillery Artificer
Regiment.

The two old companies, the two new ones, a fifth company ad

ded in the spring, and veterans of Lieutenant Colonel Ebenezer Stevens'
maintenance company formed the regiment.

Its officers held special com

missions which restricted their authority to the regiment, a wise precaution since they actually were technicians.

41

40. Pennsylvania Archives. 1st Ser., 7: 255. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 9: 28-29, 283-4; 10: 11, 152; 12: 69, 280; 22: 121, 236-42.
Ford, Journals of Congress. 7: 288-9; 8: 485-6, 554-6. Nicola to Congress,
2 Oct 1777; Record Group 360, National Archives. Howard R. Carraso, ed.,
"Unpublished Letters of Colonel Lewis Nicola, Revolutionary Soldier,"
Pennsylvania History, 13 (1946), p. 274. Nicola's reputation was based on
a translation of the Chevalier de Clairac's L'Ingenieur de campagne; or.
field engineer ... (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1776) and his own A Treatise
of military exercise, calculated for the use of Americans ... (Philadel
phia: Styner and Ci6t, 1776).
41. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 8: 8; 10: 277-80. Ford, Jour
nals of Congress. 7: 179; 9: 891-2; 10: 119, 144-50; 15: 1398-9. Artil
lery Brigade Orders, 25 Aug 1778; Artillery Brigade Orderly Books, NewYork Historical Society. The detachments operated mobile repair shops.

Congress did not make the Military Stores Department subordinate
to Knox as Washington wished.
Board of War.

It remained under the supervision of the

Repeated pressure from Washington and Knox did lead to

the creation of the Field Commissary, a new officer directly supporting
the Main Army.

Other improvements in cooperation between ordnance of

ficials and the artillery served to increase technical skills.

Artillery

officers received practical training at ordnance depots on a rotating
basis.

Another new office, the Surveyor of Ordnance, put an artillery

colonel officially within the ordnance staff which made the technical
service more responsive to the needs of the troops in the field.

John

Lamb, the colonel with the greatest technical proficiency, served as
_ „
42
the Surveyor.
During the summer of 1778 Washington returned to a concept used in
1776 but discarded in 1777.

The skilled workmen serving in the Quarter

master General's Department were assembled in provisional "companies ,11
or work crews, under the supervision of Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin.

Since

Baldwin demonstrated an aptitude for supervising construction parties,
the assignment conveniently removed him from a position where he might
quarrel with the French engineers.

The artificers carried out construc

tion at West Point, maintained the Army's wheeled vehicles, and served
as pioneers to mend roads during marches.

When the Artillery Artificer

Regiment proved successful, Congress directed Washington on 11 November
1779 to permanently arrange for a Quartermaster Artificer Regiment.

The

42.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 12: 273-4; 13: 489; 14: 68 ; 15:
79-80; 17: 170; 20: 445. Ford, Journals of Congress, 13: 201-6; 17:
724-5, 793; 18: 1093; 25: 540-1. Lamb to Knox, 19 Jun 1779; John Lamb
Letterbook, New-York Historical Society.
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new unit observed most of the same restrictions as Flower's, and ultimately contained nine companies.

43

The foreign volunteers who arrived in America after 1776 contribu
ted to the broadening and sophistication of the Continental Army.

Their

technical skills enabled Washington and Congress to implement improve
ments planned, in some cases, as early as the 1776-1777 winter.

The

most immediate contribution was a professional engineer service, both
combat and topographical.

Foreigners staffed the former almost exclu

sively; the latter combined French inspiration with practical American
surveying.

European concepts of cavalry combat lapsed because they did

not fit American conditions after Monmouth, but foreign volunteers and
partisan theory added several contingents of light troops to the Army.
Among the special supporting units which Washington and Congress formed,
foreign inspiration and example had direct Impact on the Marechauss^e
and Invalids and indirectly justified the others.

The greatest foreign

contribution, however, came in training and administration.

The Introduction of European Theories.

The foreign volunteers expanded the professional horizons of the
Continental Army by bringing ideas recently developed by European
theorists to the attention of American officers.

In large part, how

ever, they merely reinforced an intellectual growth already begun by
Washington and other concerned military leaders.

43. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 12: 246-7; 13: 73; 14: 2l2; 18:
1-2. Ford, Journals of Congress. 15: 1261-2, 1276; 16: 2l2. Baldwin to
Captain _/ Peter_7 Mills, 10 Sep 1778; Gates Papers, New-York Historical
Society.
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During the eighteenth century armies developed the ability to
maneuver in new ways, particularly after the Seven Years War.

This

battlefield transformation was preceeded by a significant theoretical
debate.

Experiences in the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven

Years' War impelled officers, especially the French, to seek better ways
to handle armies in the field.

The British Army, the major institutional

Influence on the Americans prior to Valley Forge, lagged behind most
other nations in the development of new doctrine.

British officers

learned on the job, contributed few books containing original thought,
and by and large even failed to read available European works.

AA

Most British authors p»ior to the Revolution produced mere drill
manuals rather than profound theoretical volumes.

The two most important

manuals early in the century repeated the best aspects of the Duke of
Marlborough's army:

Humphrey Bland's A Treatise of Military Discipline

in 1727 and Richard Kane's Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne in
1745.

Under the Duke of Cumberland and Field Marshal Ligonier the Bri

tish came under the influence of Prussia.

This trend appeared first in

a series of translations of Prussian regulations by William Fawcett in
1754 and 1757, and Fawcett's 1757 translation of Malosti de Martemont's
The Spirit of the Modern System of War, by a Prussian General Officer.

44. The basic sources for understanding eighteenth century military
theory are: Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare: The
Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth Century France (New York: Co
lumbia University Press, 1957); Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation:
The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer
sity Press, 1963); and J. F. C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the
Eighteenth Century (London: Hutchinson £> Co., 1925). Also see Ira D.
Gruber, "British Strategy: The Theory and Practice of Eighteenth-Cen
tury Warfare" in Don Higginbotham, ed., Considerations on the Revolution
ary War: Selected Essays (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1978), pp.
14-31.
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A Prussian-inspired drill regulation was issued in 1757 and expanded by
amendments adopted in 1759.

That regulation led to the publication of

Adjutant General Edward Harvey's The Manual exercise, as ordered by his
majesty in 1764.

"The '64" remained the official British drill until

1795, although laxly enforced.
manuals with some appeal:

British writers produced two other drill

Campbell Dalrymple's A Military Essay in

1761; and William Windham's and George Townshend's Norfolk Discipline,
a simplified volume published in 1759 for militia use.

45

Three other Englishmen authored widely-read volumes in the 1760's
and early 1770's.

In 1768 a collection of miscellaneous orders and

notes Major General James Wolfe prepared, mostly while a regimental com
mander, appeared posthumously under the title Instructions to Young Of
ficers.

It contained no systematic theory.

William Young was a proli

fic author of volumes dealing with drill, fortifications, and outpost
duty.

Wolfe's material reappeared in 1771 in conjunction with Young's

collected works as Manoeuvres, or practical observations on the art of
war.

A similar two-volume compendium by Thomas Simes, The Military

guide for young officers, followed a year later.

These books served

only to Introduce junior officers to routine regimental life.
True European theorists wanted to find a system of warfare which
extracted the maximum value from the weapons and soldiers available to
the standing armies of the century.

Proponents of linear warfare (1'ordre

mince) dominated the early part of the century and considered Frederick

45. Rex Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Llgonier: A Story of the British
Army 1702-1770 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 32n, 34, 57n,
218. Fuller, British Light Infantry, pp. 79-86. David Chandler, The Art
of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: Hippocrene Press, 1976),
pp. 106-7, H 7 .
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the Great as the foremost practitioner of their school.

After 1760

translations of his Instructions for his Generals became quite popular.
Frederick's battlefield success came from his personal genius and ca
pacity for hard work, and the Instructions remained essentially sterile
because it did not contain a well-rounded theory of war.

46

The first alternative, 1'ordre profond, argued that infantry formed
in dense columns could successfully attack lines of infantry by ignoring
musketry and relying on shock effect and the bayonet.

The major expo

nents of this rather Impractical school were Chevalier Jean-Charles de
Folard (1669-1752), Joly de Maizeroy (1719-80), and Francois-Jean de
Graindorge d'Orgeville de Mesnil-Durand (1729-99).

Eventually the French

worked out a practical solution in the form of 1 'ordre mixte.

That

school combined the line and column to meet the tactical requirements
of a variety of circumstances in a flexible manner.

It also stressed

training men to perform both line and light infantry missions.

Jacques

Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert's 1772 Essai general de tactique be
came the most important military book of the century.

Most French offi

cers became disciples of the mixed order by the end of 1778 even though
it was not formally espoused by the French Army until 1791.**^

46. Peter Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform 1807-1815 (Prince
ton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 13-15. Thomas R. Phillips,
trans., Frederick the Great: Instructions for his Generals (Harrisburg:
Stackpole Co., 1944), pp. 9-10.
47. See especially Quimby, Background of Napoleonic Warfare, pp. 233-48,
304-20; John Albert Lynn, "The Revolution on the Battlefield: Training
and Tactics of the Arm^e du Nord" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cali
fornia at Los Angeles, 1974); and Samuel Anderson Covington, "The Comite
Militaire and the Legislative Reform of the French Army, 1789-1791"
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Arkansas, 1976).
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North America had little Impact on European writers prior to the
Revolution because its terrain and Indian adversaries were not relevant
to European conditions.

Americans, however, imported or reprinted many

British, French, and German works and avidly read them.

48

One major

group of volumes covered technical artillery and engineering subjects.
John Muller, the Woolwich instructor, wrote many volumes which enjoyed
a wide popularity, particularly his Treatise of Artillery (1757) and
Treatise Containing the Elementary Part of Fortification (1756).

A

Both

Muller and Lewis Nicola, later the commander of the Invalids, produced
translations of Louis Andrl de la Maime, the Chevalier de Clalrac's
Field Engineer (in 1758 and 1776 respectively) which were frequently
read.

Other key books included:

Benjamin Robin's New Principles of

Gunnery (1742); Guillaume Le Blonde's Treatise of Artillery (1746) and
Military Engineer (1759); Charles Vallancey's translation of M. de Bonneauville's An Essay on Fortifications (1757); J. C. Pleydell's Essay
on Field Fortification (1768); and a 1776 Philadelphia compendium, The
Art of W a r , which included writings of Jean-Florent de Valli^re (16671759).

Muller, Pleydell, and Robins remained basic texts for Woolwich

into the 1790's, and the technical writings available to Americans generally conformed to British preferences.

49

48. The following survey is based particularly on Charles Evans, et al.,
eds., American Bibliography (14 vols., Chicago and Worcester: Various
publishers, 1903-59); Appleton P. C. Griffin, comp.. A Catalogue of the
Washington Collection in the Boston Athenaeum (Boston: Boston Athenaeum,
1897); and Henry Knox, A Catalogue of books imported and to be sold by
Henry Knox (Boston: For Henry Knox, 1772). See the bibliography for a
list of military works prior to 1784 of American imprint.
49. Glover, Peninsular Preparation, pp. 211-3. Force, American Archives,
4th Ser., 5: 7l7.

Drill manuals constituted the largest category of imports and re
prints.

The popularity of Bland's Treatise through the opening phase of

the French and Indian War extended to America, where a dozen editions
appeared between 1743 and 1759.

Connecticut officially adopted Bland

for militia use in 1743 and only discarded it in 1769 when officers
complained that it was "prolix and encumbered with many useless motions."

50

American publishers printed two editions of Fawcett's translation of the
Prussian infantry drill and four of Cumberland's regulation during 1757
and 1758.

In 1776 they also produced single editions of Simes' Military

guide, Dalrymple's Military Essay, and the Earl of Cavan's minor work,
A New system of military Discipline.

Washington himself owned copies of

Bland, Cavan, Simes, Windham's Norfolk Discipline, and Young's Manoeuvres.
Simes received semi-official endorsement from Pennsylvania and North Caro
lina officials during the Revolution .^1

Windham became popular in New

England where five editions appeared between 1768 and 1775.
chusetts and Connecticut adopted it for official militia use.

Both Massa
Although

it simplified regular drills somewhat, Windham's manual of arms still in
cluded 50 commands and 155 separate motions, 24 of which related to firing.
A large part of the book's value to Americans came from the numerous

50. J. H. Trumbull and Charles C. Hoadley, comps., The Public Papers of
the Colony of Connecticut (15 vols., Hartford: The Case, Lockwood &
Brainard Co., 1850-90), 8 : 568; 13: 190. John Lamb Letterbook, New-York
Historical Society, passim. Edward Braddock, Major General Edward Braddock's Orderly Books ... 1755 ... (Cumberland, Md.: Will H. Lowdermilk,
1878), pp. 5-10, 54-55. King Lawrence Parker, "Anglo-American Wilderness
Campaigning 1754-1764: Logistical and Tactical Developments" (Ph.D. Dis
sertation, Columbia University, 1970), p. I38n.
51. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 5: 717; 5th Ser., 1: 1386. Pal
mer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 1: 394.
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references to various classical and contemporary European authors.

52

Wolfe's Instructions appeared in three editions in America during the
Revolution, two of which were joint bindings with either Young or
Harvey.

Americans did not reprint Frederick the Great's Instructions,

but most of the Continental Army's key generals had read an imported
edition .53
Harvey's 1764 Regulations became the paramount manual for American
officers from 1766 until 1777.

Nineteen imprints appeared in cities

stretching from Boston to Williamsburg, most in 1774, 1775, and 1776.
The volunteer companies prior to Lexington rated it highly, and Massa
chusetts and Rhode Island officially adopted it for militia use in 1774.
Virginia, North Carolina, and Connecticut followed suit the next year
for militia and Continentals.

Harvey became the most popular work for

Continental officers serving in the Main Army in 1776 and on 18 July
1777 Brigadier Generals McDougall and Parsons, with Washington's blessing,
made its use mandatory for their brigades.

54
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53. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Defences of Philadelphia in 1777 (Brooklyn:
Historical Printing Club, 1897), pp. 229-31, 248-56. Graham Philip Dolan,
"Major General William Heath and the First Years of the American Revolu
tion" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1966), p. 153.
54. Boyd, Jefferson Papers. 1: 160-2. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser.,
1*. 843-5, 848-9, 1145; 5th Ser., 1: 1386. Ford, Webb Journal, 1: 247.
Smith, Letters of Delegates. 1: 298-301. Trumbull, Colonial Records of
Connecticut, 15: 195. William L. Saunders, ed., The Colonial Records of
North Carolina (10 vols., Raleigh: Various publishers, 1886-90), 10: 198.
Richard K. Showman, et al., eds., The Papers of General Nathanael Greene
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 1; 70-71.
John Russell Bartlett, ed., Records of the Colony of Rhode Island ... (9
vols., Providence: Various publishers, 1854-65), 7: 269-71. William Wal
ler Henning, ed., The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of all the
Laws of Virginia ... (14 vols., Richmond: J. & G. Cochran, 1821), 9: 9-35.
Worthington C. Ford, ed., General Orders Issued by Major General Putnam
1777 (Brooklyn: Historical Printing Club, 1893), p. 31.

224
In 1775 and 1776 a number of American officers also produced drill
manuals which modified various British and Prussian systems.

Timothy

Pickering, at the time a Massachusetts militia colonel but later the
Continental Army's Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, published
the most widely known manual in 1775.

His An Easy plan of discipline for

a militia modified Windham's Norfolk Discipline and gained some currency
among units besieging Boston, although Massachusetts rejected it as an
official manual .55

Thomas Hanson of the Philadelphia Associators and

briefly of the 12th Pennsylvania Regiment published a two-volume work,
The Prussian evolutions in actual engagements ....

Washington obtained

copies of both of these works as soon as they appeared.

The next year,

1776, Lewis Nicola published his A Treatise of military exercise, calcu
lated for the use of the Americans, and Adjutant Thomas Davis of the 1st
Virginia Regiment brought out a brief handbook, A Treatise on the military
duty.

Neither work enjoyed the readership of Pickering's or Hanson's.

One significant exception to the lack of innovation among the Bri
tish appeared in North America during the French and Indian War.

Gener

als John Forbes and Henri Bouquet (a Swiss serving the British) turned
to several European thinkers to solve the problem of operating with regu
lar troops in the American wilderness.

Forbes based his successful cam

paign against Fort Duquesne on the Commentaires sur les Memoires de Montecuculi of Lancelot, Comte Turpin de Crisse.

Bouquet refined Forbes'

techniques during Pontiac's rebellion by also consulting Maurice, Comte

55. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 1; 1003-4, 1008. Edward Field,
Revolutionary Defences in Rhode Island (Providence: Preston and Rounds,
1896), pp. 37-38. John Womack Wright, "Pickering's Letter on Washington,"
Tyler's Quarterly, 7 (1925), p. 16.
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de Saxe's Mes reveries, a posthumous work published in French and Eng
lish in 1757.

Bouquet's "Reflections on War with the Savages of North

America" appeared in 1765 as an appendix to William Smith's A Historical
Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians in the Year HDCCLX1V.
Raimond di Montecuculi (1609-81), Crissl, and Saxe all saw the Roman
conquest of Celtic and Germanic barbarians as proof that regular troops
adequately trained in line and light infantry missions could defeat
masses of loosely disciplined irregulars in wilderness conditions.

Out

side of Saxe these authors did not enjoy wide influence in European
circles, and even Saxe tended to be eclectic rather than systematic in
his writings.5**
Americans, particularly Washington who served as one of Forbes'
brigade commanders in the 1758 campaign, paid a great deal of attention
to the application of the Criss^-Saxe-Forbes-Bouquet line of thought.
One of Washington's friends from the Fort Duquesne campaign, Captain Jo
seph Otway, published a translation of Crisse in 1761 which Washington
quickly obtained, along with the William Fawcett 1757 translation of
Saxe.

Knox, Greene, Wayne, and a host of other officers down to the

lowest ranks in the Continental Army also paid attention to Saxe because
they recognized that his arguments were particularly applicable to the
American situation.

They took special interest in Saxe's references to

56.
Quimby, Napoleonic Warfare, pp. 41-62. Fuller, British Light In
fantry, pp. 97-98. Parker, "Wilderness Campaigning," pp. 252-342. Thomas
R. Phillips, trans.. Reveries on the Art of War (Harrisburg: Military
Service Publishing Co., 1944), passim.
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aimed musketry in skirmishing action, and to his emphasis on joint
training by infantry, artillery, and c a v a lry.^
Americans displayed an intense interest in another group of rela
tively minor European theoretical works.

Austrian introduction of light

troops during the middle of the century forced all other armies to de
velop similar bodies to counter them, and a school of theory on the pro
per organization and handling of partisans in "petite guerre" grew up.
Central works from the partisan school imported or reprinted in America
included Roger Stevenson's Military instructions for ... carrying on the
petite guerre, M. de Jenny's The Partisan; or the Art of Making War in
Detachments, and especially M. de Grandmaison's La petite guerre, the
text which Frederick the Great preferred.

Americans such as Henry

Jackson believed that partisan operations suited the "natural genius"
displayed by American rangers during the French and Indian War.

They

also had one significant native American text, Thomas Church's 1716
account of his father's campaigns against the Indians during King Philip's
War and King William's War.

Benjamin Church (1639-1718) was a master of

using Indian-European teams to counter hostile Indians in the wilderness,
and the account served as a tactical case book.

58
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(Hartford: Silas Andrus 6 Son, 1854).
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Few native-born Americans secured commissions in the British Army
during or after the French and Indian War.

Individuals, like Washington,

who were interested in a military career had to turn to reading to re
place regular service.

This fact probably explains the extensive array

of imported or reprinted military volumes that appeared in America in the
1760's and 1770's.

Most of the individuals who remained in important

leadership positions in the Continental Army by 1777 knew the general
issues behind European theoretical debates and read many of the important
authors whose works existed in translation.

The accumulated American ex

perience in colonial wars colored their preferences to a very high degree.
Problems with a terrain that covered wider areas and contained more obsta
cles than Europe's and the particular differences which arose from fighting
Indians made Saxe and exponents of partisan operations more important to
American generals than to their English counterparts.

American traditions

demanded emphasis on flexibility, marksmanship, and simplicity.
In November 1775, Washington wrote to William Woodford, then colonel
of the 2d Virginia Regiment but soon to become a brigadier general, out
lining the essentials of successful military leadership.

He also men

tioned the five works which he felt constituted the basic texts:
Crisse, Stevenson, Jenny, and Young.

Harvey,

The list reflected availability,

but it also indicated the importance of flexibility.

On 8 May 1777

59. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 4: 80-81. Also see John Adams to
William Tudor, 12 Oct 1775; Adams Papers, Publication forthcoming (copy fur
nished to author by Robert J. Taylor, editor-in-chief, 30 Nov 1976); Spaul
ding, "Military Studies," pp. 675-80; Ford, Defences of Philadelphia, pp.
179-88, 193-7, 229-31, 272-6; and Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2:
385-6. Greene supparized American attitudes in Dec 1777 when he wrote Wa
shington "Experience is the best of schools and the safest guide in human
affairs - yet I am no advocate for blindly following all the maxims of Euro
pean policy, but where reason corresponds with what custom has long sancti
fied, we may safely copy their example"; Ford, Defences of Philadelphia, pp.
248-56.
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Washington expressly ordered all Continental officers to read "Military
Authors" in their spare time.
noted that they obeyed.

French and Hessian professional soldiers

Captain Johann Ewald, who became a leading theor

ist of light infantry after the Revolution, commented that this fact ser
ved as "a true indication that the officers of this army studied the art
of war while in camp, which was not the case with the opponents of the
Americans."

60

At about the same time that he directed the officers to expand their
professional horizons, Washington moved to establish a standard system of
"discipline, maneuvers, evolutions,

£

and__/ regulations for guards" which

every unit would follow, an important development to improve battlefield
performance.

The advent of the 1777 campaign prevented Washington from

doing more than preliminary work on the regulations, although subordinate
commanders worked hard on practicing rudimentary battlefield maneuvers.
Foreign volunteers noted the lack of uniformity, and at Valley Forge a
number worked on the problem.

Thomas-Antoine, the Chevalier de Mauduit

du Plessis, a graduate of the rigorous French artillery school at Grenoble
who proved his valor at Germantown and Fort Mifflin, introduced the Army's
leaders to Guibert's wri t i ngs.^

Frederick Steuben played an even more

Important role.

60. Quoted in Fuller, British Light Infantry, pp. 152-3. Also see C.
Fiske Harris, ed., "Diary of a French Officer 1781 ...." Magazine of Ameri
can History. 7 (1881), p. 295; and Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington.
8 : 29.
61. Ibid., 8 : 40-41, 108, 255, 268-9; 9: 362-4; 11; 163. Ford. Putnam Or
ders. pp. 28-29. Idzerda, Lafayette, 1: 73-87, 91-103. Laurens, Army Cor
respondence. pp. 109-12, 134-41. Capt. George Fleming to Maj. Sebastian
Bauman, 6 Feb 1778; Sebastian Bauman Papers, New-York Historical Society.
As early as 18 Aug 1775 the 1st New York Regiment trained by "rejecting
for the present, every motion & movement that will not be conductive or
necessary in action"; McDougall to Maj. Herman Zedwitz, 18 Aug 1775; McDougall Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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The Contributions of Steuben.

"The Baron," as Frederick Wilhelm Augustus "von" Steuben became
known, synthesized official doctrine, trained the Main Army, and created
a new element in the administrative staff which melded Americans and
Europeans to produce uniformity and competence on the battlefield.

He

began his military career as a junior Prussian infantry officer and for
ten years learned how to train troops.

In 1757 he became the principal

staff officer of Johann von Mayr's frei korps, a special partisan unit
organized to counter Austrian light troops.

This duty exposed him to a

less rigid form of military organization and gave valuable administrative
experience.

Steuben continued to rise through staff assignments until

1762 when he became a member of Frederick the Great's special corps of
aides and received the best staff training available in the eighteenth
century.

Army politics forced his retirement in 1764 as a captain, and

he spent the next decade out of the military.

62

During 1777 Steuben, using the Comte de Saint-Germain as an inter
mediary, offered his services to Benjamin Franklin.

The three men pre

pared credentials falsely identifying Steuben as a lieutenant general.
Congress accepted his offer to serve as a volunteer without rank, and on
23 February 1778 he arrived at Valley Forge.

Washington asked him to in

spect the troops and talk to the senior officers.

When Steuben reported

that they were the finest raw material for an army that he had ever seen,
Washington told him to prepare the drill regulations planned in 1777.

62.
Steuben's claim to be a baron appears to be groundless; his family's
use of the ennobling preposition "von" clearly was. In America Steuben
habitually used the French form "de" rather than the Germanic "von."
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Steuben analyzed the existing practices, primarily based on Harvey, and
compared them to various European systems.

As he later told Franklin:

circumstances ... obliged me to deviate from the Principles
adopted in the European Armies, ... Young as We are, We
have already our Prejudices as the most ancient Nations,
£
and_ / the prepossession in favor of the British service,
has obliged me to comply with many Things, which are
against my Principles.^3
Steuben's genius created an entirely new system in which he borrowed
elements from British, Prussian, and American practices.

The drill em

phasized a simple manual of arms, improved execution, new techniques of
marching, and use of the bayonet.

A column of fours replaced single-file

marching to produce more compact formations and better deployment on bat
tlefields.

The standard pace became the Prussian norm of 75 two-foot

steps per minute, not the English standard of 60.

Officers, not noncom-

missioned officers, now had the responsibility for drilling the men.

64

On 19 March 1778 Steuben began instructing a special "Model Company"
in the new system.

His colorful curses, delivered in a variety of langua

ges, amused the large crowds that assembled each day at Valley Forge to
witness the spectacle.

The cursing actually was a calculated psycho

logical device designed to smooth adoption of the drill.

Members of the

model company and selected officers extended the instruction to all units
at Valley Forge within six weeks, and later to the rest of the Army.
Steuben drew on many sources in compiling his drill, which impressed
foreign observers with its efficiency and originality.^

63. Steuben to Franklin, 28 Sep 1779; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical
Society. Also see Laurens, Army Correspondence, pp. 131-3, 145-9.
64. Idzerda, Lafayette, 1; 73-87, 91-103. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 11: 233, 335-6, 399-401; 12: 4-7.
65. Ibid., 11: 163-4; 13: 342. Jean Baptiste Ternant to Steuben, 20 Jan
and 9 Mar 1779; William Davies to Steuben, 17 Oct 1778; Steuben Papers,
New-York Historical Society. Harris, "Diary," pp. 294-5.
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Steuben did not limit himself to the manual of arms, but also pro
duced a simple, efficient method for maneuvering on the battlefield.
Like Guibert and other French theoreticians of the ordre mixte school
he used both the column and the line for tactical flexibility.

Divisions

and brigades practiced marching in closed columns for speed and control,
and rapidly deployed into line for musket fire or bayonet work.

Skir

mishers, either light infantry companies or details from line companies,
covered the columns during advance or withdrawal.

They specifically

kept one hundred yards (the effective range of musket fire) from the col
umn to prevent enemy harassment of the main body.

As soon as the columns

deployed into line the skirmishers withdrew through gaps between regiments
to reform.

The men maintained silence when marching, a practice which

particularly impressed French officers .

^

,

In the fall of 1778, after the battle of Monmouth, a board of general
officers reviewed the drill.

Washington agreed to their single suggested

Improvement and replaced the traditional command "Present!" with "Take
Sight!" as the order immediately preceeding "Fire!"

The change emphasized

the Continental Army's continued reliance on marksmanship.^

After polish

ing by Steuben, the drill received Congress' approval on 29 March 1779
and was published by the Board of War.
ceived a copy.

Virtually every army officer re

Although Steuben hoped to have it classified as a state

secret, as Frederick's Instructions had been, Washington overruled him.
Copies of the drill went to every state government in the hope that the

66 .

Pennsylvania Archives. 2d Ser., 11: 290-1, 304, 320-2, 410-1. Harris,
"Diary," p. 295.
67. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 8 : 268; 12: 360. Gates' notes
of the 26 Aug 1778 board meeting are in the Gates Papers, New-York His
torical Society.
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various state militias would also adopt it and allow men to receive
basic training before they became Continentals.®®
The Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the
United States Part 1 (better known as The Blue Book) covered all aspects
of infantry service.

It specified that a regiment deploy tactically in

eight companies, each under its own officers to prevent the type of con
fusion that crippled the Hessians at Trenton.

A regiment with more than

160 files (i.e. 320 corporals and privates) formed two four-company bat
talions; those with fewer than 80 files (160 men) either temporarily com
bined with
of battle.

second small regiment or did not take a place in the line

p

A special twelve-man color guard gave each regimental comman

der an emergency reserve force.

The light infantry company deployed as

skirmishers or went into a provisional light infantry battalion.

The

column became the standard maneuver formation; training emphasized
movement through broken terrain and rapid deployment into line.

69

Other chapters of the Regulations improved the efficiency of the
trains to let the Army move without encumbrance but still be able to fight
a sustained engagement immediately.
health and morale.
tal business.

Routine of army life emphasized

Administration insured sustained concern for regimen

An appendix clearly explained the functions of every

68. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14: 151-2, 227-31, 369, 444-6,
488-9; 15: 46-49; 16: 432-3, 447, 449, 468, Ford, Journals of Congress,
13: 384-5.
Charles Thomson to Steuben, 5 Apr; John Jay to Steuben, 6 Apr;
Pickering to Steuben, 26 May, 19 Jun and 12 Jul; Peter Scull to Steuben,
26 Jun and 27 Jul; Ternant to Steuben, 29 Sep 1779 and 7 Jan 1780;
Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.
69.
Steuben, Regulations (Philadelphia: Styner and Cist, 1779). At
least seven other editions appeared by 1785. Figure 10 shows the regi
ment's disposition.
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individual in a regiment from its commander to the lowest private.
Senior noncommissioned officers received training to replace staff of
ficers in an emergency or to supervise the four squads that formed each
company.

The progressive attitude of the regulations culminated in the

dramatic direction that a captain's
first object should be, to gain the love of his men, by
treating them with every possible kindness and humanity,
enquiring into their complaints, and when well founded,
seeing them redressed. He should know every man of his
company by name and character.7°
Steuben's contribution to the professionalism of the Continental
Army did not stop with the Blue Book.

He also gave substance to a new

staff office:

Between 1778 and 1780 this office

the Inspector General.

grew, and Steuben emerged as Washington's ^Je facto chief of staff.

The

office originated in a proposal by Baron d'Arendt, commander of the Ger
man Battalion, and the Main Army's Council of War endorsed it as a way
to effectively employ foreign volunteers.

Congress' authorization on

13 December 1777 for two inspectors general, one of whom was to be Con
way, radically altered the concept.

Legislation required the inspectors,

presumably one each for the Main Army and the Northern-Highlands area,
to "see that every officer and soldier be instructed in the exercise and
manoeuvres which may be established by the Board of War."

Their other

duties, "agreeable to the practice of the best disciplined European
Armies," related to discipline, paperwork, and investigation of fraud.

70. A second volume, "Baron von Steuben Regulations for the Cavalry or
Corps Legionaire" was completed in manuscript by Steuben on 22 Dec 1780,
but not published.
It minutely parallels the infantry regulations, and
is in the Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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They reported to Congress directly, not to the Commander-In-Chief .7*1
Washington ignored Conway and used Steuben's superior credentials as a
European expert to regain control over this office.

On 28 March 1778

he appointed Steuben as temporary Inspector General pending Congressional
approval.

Four sub-inspectors acted as division-level assistants.

One

major from each brigade extended the inspector system to that echelon.
Their first duty involved implementing Steuben's drill.

72

The arrange

ment worked so well that on 5 May 1778 Congress approved it and commis
sioned Steuben as a major general, the rank Washington lobbied privately
for .73
When the Main Army marched out of Valley Forge Washington used the
sub-inspectors as divisional adjutants general.

He also reaffirmed that

tactical command remained with the unit commanders.
insured that drills followed official Army doctrine.

Inspectors simply
New legislation on

18 February 1779 stated that there would only be one Inspector General
who ranked as a major general and remained responsible for drafting
regulations.

He now conducted inspections on the authority of the Comman

der- in-Chief or commanding officer of a territorial department, and re
ported through those commanders to the Board of War.

Brigade inspectors

(majors) absorbed the functions of the brigade majors and became the

71. Ford, Journals of Congress. 9: 1023-6. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 10: 249-50. Laurens, Army Correspondence, pp. 98-101. Bur
nett, Letters of Congress, 3: 20-25.
72. Conway to Gates, 11 Nov 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical So
ciety. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 10: 226-7; H : 108, 132, 163,
173-4, 313, 335-6; 12: 66- 68 . Laurens. Army Correspondence, pp. 109-12,
131-49. A fifth sub-inspector, Fleury, was added on 27 April 1778 and
subsequently sent to Wilmington to instruct the Maryland division.
73. Ford, Journals of Congress, 11: 465-6, 498-500, 728-9; 12: 1010.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11: 329-31, 366. The Chevalier de
la Neuville briefly served in the north as the second inspector.
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senior staff officers In each brigade.

Sub-inspectors (lieutenant

colonels) continued to perform similarly at the division level.

They

also acted as adjutants general for wings of the Main Army and for ter
ritorial departments.

In the temporary absence of the Adjutant General

the senior sub-inspector replaced h i m .^1
Colonel Alexander Scammell replaced Timothy Pickering as Adjutant
General on 5 January 1778.
the Army's paperwork.

He worked closely with Steuben to standardize

They developed printed forms for most of the rou

tine regimental and brigade bookkeeping chores and even issued individual
"blank books" to each soldier for personal records.

Their partnership

paved the way for the gradual merger of the two major staff agencies.
Steuben developed policy while Scammel concentrated on routine adminis
tration.

Congress agreed that consolidation made sense, and on 17 May

1779 reduced the Adjutant General's department to the Adjutant General,
two assistants, and a clerk.
office.The

They operated the Headquarters orderly

Inspector General gradually rendered the mustering depart

ment redundant as well.

On 12 January 1780 Congress abolished i t . ^

Consolidation of Steuben's staff hegemony came on 25 September 1780.
New legislation officially designated the Adjutant General as the

74. Ibid., 12: 16, 66- 68 , 438-44; 14: 444-6; 15: 129-31, 288-90, 293,
475-6.
Peters to Steuben, 2 Jun 1778; William Davies to Steuben, 18 Jun
and 21 and 26 Jul 1779; Sub-Inspectors to Steuben, 20 Jun 1779; Steuben
Papers, New-York Historical Society. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 4: 41.
Ford, Journals of Congress. 11: 819-23; 13: H I , 196-200.
75. Ibid., 14: 600-1. Davies to Steuben, 26 Jul 1779; Scammell to Steu
ben, 22 Sep 1779; Benjamin Walker to Steuben, 2 Feb and 10 Mar 1780;
Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 10: 80-82, 245, 297, 332-3; 14: 224-7, 486; 15: 356-8; 16:
11-13; 17: 99-100, 495-6.
76. Ibid., 14: 120-1; 16: 134-6; 18: 64. Ford, Journals of Congress,
13: 403-4; 16: 47.
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Assistant Inspector General for the Main Array.

It also authorized in

spectors for artillery, cavalry, and militia on active duty with the
Continental A r m y . ^

Under Steuben the inspectors assumed duties similar

to modern chiefs of staff.
cant opposition.

The emergence, surprisingly, lacked signifi

Changes in personnel and the growth of Washington's

immediate staff weakened the Adjutant General, the one official in a
position to challenge the new hegemony.

Steuben's close relationships

with the two final Adjutants General, Scammell and Brigadier General
Edward Hand, cemented the arrangement.

The rise of the Inspector Gener

al stands in contrast to Europe where either the Adjutant General or
Quartermaster General became paramount.

It shows the flexibility that

the Continentals exercised in their use of European precedents.
borrowed where appropriate, but were not afraid to experiment.

They

78

The Reorganization of 1778-1779 in Practice.

The 1778 campaign opened before Washington could implement the or
ganizational changes mandated on 27 May 1778, but after Steuben, Duportail,
and the other foreign volunteers began contributing to the maturity of
the Continental Army.

France's declaration of war on Great Britain pushed

the War of American Independence into a global struggle in which North
America faded in importance.

The first impact of the strategic change

came in the British decision to evacuate Philadelphia rather than risk

77. Ibid., 17: 764-70; 18: 855-61.
78. S. G. P. Ward, Wellington's Headquarters: A Study of the Administra
tive Problems in the Peninsula 1809-1814 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1957), pp. 130-1. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), pp. 56, 144-61.
"Instructions relatives
au Department des Inspecteurs de l'armee"; Steuben Papers, New-York His
torical Society.
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losing New York City.

Washington set out from Valley Forge and on 28

June caught up with Sir Henry Clinton's troops at Monmouth, New Jersey.
General Charles Lee, recently exchanged, failed to grasp the change In
the effectiveness of the Continental Army since his capture In December
1776.

As a result he mishandled the start of the battle and Washington

had to settle for a hard-fought draw.

Clinton reached New York City

without further Incident and Washington moved on to White Plains where
the Main Army joined forces with the troops from the Highlands and
prepared for further action.
During the year that followed Monmouth Washington and Congress gra
dually Implemented the 27 May 1778 organizational changes.
on a state-by-state basis.

Action came

Various factors Influenced the timing of each

reorganization and Its specific arrangement.

Recruiting success, the

strength of the regiments, and location all played a role.

On 9 March

1779, after a careful review, Congress reduced the state lines to a paper
total of 80 infantry regiments by lowering New Jersey's quota to 3, Penn
sylvania's to 11, Virginia's to 11, North Carolina's to 6 , and Georgia's
to o n e . ^
New Hampshire's regiments adopted the new structure on 23 December
1778, Connecticut's on 11 July 1779, and most of Massachusetts' on 22
July 1779.

The three strongest regiments of the remaining Massachusetts

brigade reorganized on 1 August 1779 when they rejoined the Main Army
after detached duty In Rhode Island; Bigelow's and Alden's Regiments
somewhat later.

The Massachusetts regiments received numerical designations

79. Ford, Journals of Congress. 3: 108-9, 143, 298-9. Burnett, Letters
of Congress. 4: 377-9. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 13: 485-91;
14: 3-12, 26-32, 71-72, 86-87.
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on 1 August for the first time since 1776.

Washington numbered them
OA

according to the relative seniority of their colonels.
The Commander-in-Chlef established the New York Brigade on 22 July
1778 but continued to use it primarily to defend New York's frontier.
All five New York regiments reorganized later, on 30 May 1779.

Congress

allowed New Jersey to reduce its quota to three regiments in 1778 but
the 4th New Jersey Regiment did not disband until 7 February 1779.

Its

personnel went to the remaining regiments which reorganized on that date.

81

Although Congress decided to reduce Pennsylvania's quota to ten regiments
on 26 February 1778, it did transfer Hartley's Additional Regiment on 27
March as a new 11th Pennsylvania Regiment since Hartley was a popular
recruiter.

The reduction actually came on 22 July 1778, allowing the

Pennsylvania units to adopt the new structure well in advance of the
other states' regiments.

82

Maryland and Delaware regiments enjoyed

successful recruiting during the winter they spent at Wilmington and did
go

not reorganize until 12 May 1779.
Virginia loaned the 1st and 2d Virginia State Regiments to the
Continental Army to replace 1777 losses.

Washington's main problem

80. Ibid.. 15: 342, 406, 461-2; 16: 33-34, 51-53; 17: 15-16. Inspection
Report, Glover's Brigade, 18 Aug 1779; Gates Papers, New-York Historical
Society. Ford, Journals of Congress. 15: 1033.
81. Ibid., 10: 361. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 3: 109. Undated 1778
return of recruiting officers; William Alexander (hereafter Stirling)
Papers, New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington.
12: 216; 13: 264-5; 14: 73-74, 414-6; 20: 295-6.
82. Ibid., 12: 215-8. Pennsylvania Archives. 2d Ser., 11: 307-8, 336-7.
Burnett, Letters of Congress. 3: 123-4. Stille, Wayne, pp. 125-6, 158-9,
175-7. Ford, Journals of Congress. 10: 288; 13: 298-9.
83. Ibid., 12: 1225-6; 13: 58. Henry Hobart Bellas, ed.. Personal Recol
lections of Captain Enoch Anderson ... (Wilmington: Historical Society
of Delaware, 1896), pp. 53-55. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 10:
360; 15: 46-47, 265-7.
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Involved reenllsting the veterans of the senior nine Virginia regiments
whose terms of service expired at Valley Forge.

He experimented with a

series of provisional reorganisations, Including reducing the Virginia
line to three brigades on 22 July 1778.

Permanent reorganisation came

on 12 May 1779 when the eight weakest Virginia regiments with the Main
Army consolidated to form four and Washington renumbered the line.

On

5 May 1779 he ordered General Scott, who was in charge of recruiting in
the state, to organize all available officers, convalescents, and re
cruits into three new provisional regiments as reinforcements for the
Southern Department.

The first marched from Petersburg under Colonel

Richard Parker in October and reached Charleston on 5 December.
William Heth's unit arrived there on 7 April 1780.

Colonel

The last, under Colonel

Abraham Buford, failed to reach that city before it fell, but suffered
defeat at The Waxhaws shortly afterwards.
North Carolina's nine regiments joined the Main Army in 1777 so
weak that their field officers recommended transferring all enlisted men
to the three most senior units.

On 29 May 1778 Congress ordered the

transfer and in addition directed the state to use the surplus officers
to form four new regiments for a total of seven.

Late in 1778 the cadres

of the newer units went to South Carolina as provisional reinforcements.
The 3d North Carolina Regiment returned home in the spring of 1779 to

84. Ibid.. 9: 329, 367, 481-2; 10; 54-56, 153, 254-5; 12; 79-81, 139,
215-7, 279; 14: 72, 498-9; 15: 17-19, 46.
"Revolutionary Orders For the
Main Army under Washington, 1778-1779." Virginia Magazine of History and
Biography. 17 (1910), pp. 417-8. Samuel W. Pennypacker, ed., Valley Forge
Orderly Book of General George Weedon ... (New York: Dodd, Meade and Co.,
1902), p p . 80, 206-7. Palmer. Calendar~of Virginia State Papers, 1; 319.
Edward McCrady, The History of South Carolina in the Revolution (2 vols.,
New York: Macmillan Co., 1902), 1: 427. Ford. Journals of Congress. 8 :
737; 9: 967.
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recruit, leaving only the 1st and 2d with the Main Array.

The latter

reorganized under the new structure on 22 July 1779.®^
Although they did not serve in the north, the Georgia and South
Carolina forces also declined in strength.

Idleness, climate, and the

expiration of enlistments all took their toll.

A full company of the

1st South Carolina Regiment, serving as marines, died on 8 March 1778
when the frigate Randolph blew up during an engagement with the British
battleship Yarmouth off Barbados.

The remnants of Georgia's troops

suffered virtual annihilation during the winter of 1778-1779 when the
British overran that state in a new offensive.

Congress finally empow

ered Major General Benjamin Lincoln, who assumed command of the Southern
Department on 4 December 1778, to consolidate the two lines and reform
the regiments under the new structure.
blocked action until 20 January 1780.

Local political jealousies
Lincoln reorganized the Georgia

units, which existed only on paper, as one infantry regiment and one of
mounted rangers.
three of Infantry.

South Carolina's formed one artillery regiment and
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Congress concentrated reductions and economies on the separate com
panies and Additional Regiments.

These generally started out understrength

85. Ibid.. 11: 550-1; 13: 14-15, 132, 385; 14: 560-1. Fitzpatrick. Wri
tings of Washington. 10: 268-9; 12: 8 ; 15: 462. Burnett, Letters of Con
gress, 3: 382-4, 426.
86 . Ibid.. 3: 359-61; 5 : 34-35. Ford, Journals of Congress. 10: 159-65;
12: 951; 14; 631; 16: 26-27, 156. Allen D. Candler, ed., The Revolutionary
Records of the State of Georgia (3 vols., Atlanta: Franklin-Turner Co.,
1908), 2: 38-39, 185-9. William Moultrie. Memoirs of the American Revo
lution ... (2 vols., New York: David Longworth, 1802), 1; 198-9; 2: 114.
R. W. Gibbes, ed., Documentary History of the American Revolution (3 vols.,
New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1853-57), C: 6 . Lincoln to Congress, 19
Dec 1778; Record Group 360, National Archives. Ternant to Steuben, 7 Jan
1780; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.

and lacked the political support of the state lines.

Congress normally

consolidated units drawn from the same or adjacent areas, retired ex
cess officers, and transferred the consolidated unit to a state line if
possible.

Patton's and Hartley's Additional Regiments plus the four

Pennsylvania companies of Malcolm's became the H t h Pennsylvania Regi
ment of 1779.

Spencer's Additional Regiment absorbed the other four

companies of Malcolm's.

Virginia's three Additional Regiments consoli

dated on 22 April 1779 under Colonel Nathaniel Gist.

Massachusetts'

three combined under Colonel Henry Jackson on 24 July 1779 as the 16th
Massachusetts Regiment.
the same day.

Webb's became the 9th Connecticut Regiment on

On the other hand Sherburne's had to disband on 1 May 1780.

Its personnel transferred to Webb's, Jackson's, and the 2d Rhode Island
Regiment depending on native state.

When the 1st Canadian Regiment could

not join the New York line it reduced to five small companies.

The 2d

Canadian Regiment, however, continued under its special four-battalion
configuration.®^
Rhode Island's infantry reorganization represented a unique solution
to its manpower problems.

Most states turned to their Negro inhabitants,

slave or free, when recruiting lagged among Caucasians.

Most of the time

the blacks served in integrated units performing the same duties as other
Continentals, but Rhode Island tried a different approach.

In January

87. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 11: 126; 13: 55; 14: 176, 180-1,
263, 354, 401-3, 426, 464; 16: 3-4, 112-3; 18: 319, 455, 462-3; l9:_241-3._
Ford, Journals of Congress. 12: 1225; 13: 58. Gates to Congress, £ ? 0 ct_/
1778; Hazen to Gates, 23 Jan 1779; Jacques Laframboise e t al., to Gates,
16 Sep 1779; Gates to Washington, 24 Sep 1779; Gates Papers, New-York
Historical Society.
Scammell to Steuben, 25 Sep 1779; Hazen to Steuben,
11 Feb 1780; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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1778 the 1st Rhode Island Regiment transferred Its privates to the 2d,
and the officers and noncommissioned officers returned home to refill
the 1st primarily with Negroes.

The state government purchased slaves

who wished to enlist from their owners, promising them emancipation at
the end of the war.

Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, Washington's aide,

persuaded Congress to approve a similar plan for South Carolina on 29

OO
March 1779, but the state refused to implement it.
The formation of permanent light Infantry companies during the
reorganization simplified Washington's task of organizing special strike
forces.

In 1779 four provisional light Infantry regiments under General

Wayne achieved a smashing success in a night attack on Stony Point.

The

following year six light battalions operated as a division under Lafay
ette.

The use of special light infantry forces seemed to run counter to

the European influence that permeated the Army at Valley Forge.

Gulbert

and Saxe, for example, stressed the value of training Infantrymen for
both line and light infantry roles.

In fact, the Continentals did train

every individual in a regiment to perform both missions, while the light
corps used standard linear formations as well as s k i r m i s h i n g . * ^

88. Bartlett, Colonial Records of Rhode Island, 8 : 358-61, 399, 526, 640-1.
Rhode Island Historical Society Collections, 6 : 209-10. Laurens, Army
Correspondence, pp. 114-8. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 4: 121-4, 289.
Ford, Journals of Congress. 13: 386-8. David 0. White, Connecticut's
Black Soldiers 1775-1783 (Chester: Pequot Press, 1973), pp. 17-19, 29-31.
89. Wayne to Irvine, 7 Jun 1779; Wayne Transcripts, New York Public Li
brary. Davies to Steuben, 31 May 1779; Scammell to Steuben, 22 Jul 1780;
Hamilton to Steuben, 23 Jul 1780; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical So
ciety. In 1780 the light companies of the 1st and 3d Pennsylvania Regi
ments drew rifles and served as a special body within the light corps
under Major James Parr.
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Washington and Knox implemented the artillery portion of the re
organization with less difficulty than the Infantry part.

The only

major organizational impact came when Maryland's separate companies
joined Harrison's Virginia regiment, provisionally in 1778 and perma
nently on 9 May 1780.

Maryland raised three large artillery companies

(4 officers and 102 enlisted men each) as state troops, but formally
transferred them to the Continental Army in late 1777.

90

Assigning

numerical designations to the artillery regiments created more diffi
culty than any other phase of the reorganization.

Washington needed

two boards of general officers to resolve seniority disputes.

In August

1779 the generals decided that neither Lamb nor Crane could claim con
tinuity from Knox's regiment.

Harrison's therefore became the 1st Con

tinental Artillery Regiment and Proctor's the 4th based on the dates of
their Continental authorization.

The others drew lots to settle senior-

lty, with Lamb's becoming the 2d and Carne's the 3d.
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Knox stabilized the weapons of the artillery arm at Valley Forge.
He planned to have four brass 3- or 6-pounders for each brigade.

An ar

tillery park for general support Included two 24-pounders, four 12-poun
ders, four 8-lnch and eight 5-inch howitzers, and ten smaller fieldpleces.
The unmanned reserve of 24-, 12-, 6-, and 3-pounders moved with the Main
Army's trains while a siege battery of heavy iron guns and mortars stayed

90. Archives of Maryland, 18: 315-6, 571-8, 596-7. Ford, Journals of
Congress. 9: 822; 10: 253. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 10: 360,
520; 18: 31-32, 277-9.
91. Ibid.. 12: 458-9; 15: 170-1; 16: 76, 173. Doughty to Lamb, 27 Jan
1778; Oswald to Lamb, 7 Jun 1778; Charles Thomson to Arnold (copy), 29
Aug 1778; Lamb to Washington, 12 Mar 1779; Crane to Washington (copy),
16 Mar 1779; Lamb to Board, 6 Aug 1779; Board of General Officers' Report,
8 Aug 1779; Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society. Knox to Stevens,
7 Jan 1778; Ebenezer Stevens Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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at Carlisle and Springfield.

French imports, captured British guns, and

pieces produced in America, all mounted on Muller-style carriages, exis
ted in surplus numbers by 1778.

Knox even had to abandon a plan in 1780

to standardize fieldpleces with French 4-pounders (the most efficient
combination of mobility and firepower) because he could not waste the
massive stockpile of stores on hand for 6- and 3 - p o u n d e r s . C o m p a n i e s
were rotated among the brigades, large garrisons, and the artillery park
to maintain proper cross-training.

Knox established a program of in

struction and endorsed the theory that field artillery should fire at
Infantry targets.
tremely effective.

During the battle of Monmouth this tactic proved ex93

Forage problems and changed strategic considerations led Washington
to scatter the light dragoon regiments in late 1778, and they never
again assembled as a brigade.
began to appear.

Serious shortages of men and horses also

Washington considered, but abandoned, the idea of arm

ing the troopers with blunderbusses in 1779 to Increase their firepower.
A more practical suggestion originated with Major Benjamin Tallmadge of
the 2d Continental Light Dragoons.

Since new recruits could be found

92. Knox to Lamb, 19 Jul 1778; Lamb to Udney Hay and George Mavlns, both
1 Jun 1778; Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society. Bauman to Lamb, 25
Jun 1779; Bauman Papers, New-York Historical Society. Knox to Board of
War (copy), 1 Mar 1780; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.
Fitzpatrick, Wrltinas of Washington, 10: 486-7; H ; 112-3; 13: 317-8;
14: 329; 18: 244-5; 21; 24.
93. Ibid.. 12: 131; 13: 418; 15: 187, 429-30; 17: 215-6. Lamb to Knox,
30 Apr 1778; Knox to Lamb, 11 May 1778, 29 Jun 1779, 31 Jul and 1 and 3
Aug 1780; Oswald to Lamb, 7 Jun 1778; Samuel Shaw to Lamb, 3 Jul 1779;
Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society. Artillery Brigade Orders, 25
Aug 1778; Artillery Brigade Orderly Books, New-York Historical Society.
Bernard A, Uhlendorf, ed., Revolution in America ... (New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 189-93.
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more easily than mounts, he suggested that they be equipped temporarily
as light infantry.

Washington ordered the 2d to implement this plan on

14 August 1779, and on 24 September told Colonel Stephen Moylan's 4th
to do the same.

The 1st and 3d Continental Light Dragoons transferred

to the Southern Department in 1776.

They did not use the Infantry ex

pedient but rather served throughout the rest of the southern campaigns
QA
as a composite mounted unit under Lieutenant Colonel William Washington.
Implementing the 27 May 1778 resolve took a year.
changes only in the infantry regiments.

It produced major

Steuben's Blue Book and the

other Improvements in training and support increased the effectiveness
of officers and men, partially compensating for the weaknesses Inherent
in the new regimental structure.

The artillery merely improved extant

forms and practices, while the mounted army and partisans reverted to
reconnaissance duty.

The permanent brigade consisting of several infan

try regiments and an artillery company remained the basic tactical element
of the Army.

Washington improved it by adding to the specialized staff

serving the brigade commander.

The brigade Inspector, functioning as

chief of staff, controlled a maintenance section under a conductor of
military stores, a logistical section under a brigade quartermaster and
a brigade commissary, and an administrative section.

The division, though

a less permanent unit of organization, had a comparable staff.

95

94. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 13: 207-8, 219-20, 284, 339-40;
14: 302-3, 331, 390, 469; 15: 121-2; 16: 93-95, 329-30; 17: 135-6, 211-3.
Ford, Journals of Congress. 12: 1193-4; 14: 560.
95. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 15: 101-3, 362-3. Idzerda,
Lafayette. I: 191-3.
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During that same period the Army's territorial department structure
stabilized.

96

Washington exercised effective control over all operations

outside the south.

The Main Army continued to function as the principal

force, eliminating the need for a distinct Middle Department command.
The Northern and Highlands Departments remained separate commands but
operated in close conjunction with the Main Army.

The former normally

contained the equivalent of a reinforced brigade; the latter a reinforced
division.

The Eastern Department's field army kept watch over the British

in Newport with New England militia and state troops, reinforced by one
or more Continental brigades.

The newest territorial department, esta

blished in 1777, was the Western Department.

It protected the western

frontiers of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania but received only two
Q7
regiments in 1778 and remained a minor command.

Through 1778 the

Southern Department contained essentially only Georgia and South Carolina
units.

Summary.

By July 1779 the Continental Army achieved the status of a competent,
well-trained force.
Southern Department

Excluding the two thousand or so effectives in the
98

and a handful of regiments in Isolated frontier

garrisons in the Northern and Western Departments, Washington had about
25,000 officers and raen.^

The Main Army and Highlands Department contained

96. Knox to Lamb, 22 Aug 1780; Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society.
Lovell to Gates, 23 May 1777; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
97. Ford, Journals of Congress. 7: 247-9. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. H : 439-41; 12: 200-1.
98. Lincoln to Congress, 1 Sep 1779; Record Group 360, National Archives.
99. Monthly Return, Main Army, Jul 1779; Record Group 93, National Ar
chives.

thirteen brigades stationed in the vicinity of New York City and four
more under Sullivan attacking Indian villages in the Mohawk Valley.
Those 17 brigades' infantry contingents averaged about 65 officers, 80
sergeants, 50 drummers and flfers, and 1,000 rank and file apiece, all
of whom were available for combat.

Their aggregate strength in July

included 107 field, 737 company, and 260 staff officers, 1,409 sergeants,
and 871 drummers and fifers fit and present with their regiments.

Another

78 field, 629 company, and 51 staff officers and 492 sergeants, drummers,
and fifers were sick, prisoners, or detached.

Nearly 14,000 rank and file

were on duty with the line companies; most of the 2,600 others "on command"
served with the light infantry corps.
sick.

Fewer than 2,000 rank and file were

The force in Rhode Island contained 142 Infantry officers and 2,255

enlisted men.

Artillery with the Main Army and in the Highlands and Eas

tern Departments accounted for another 200 or so officers and almost 2,000
men.

Together, these troops represented a sizeable combat force, although

they probably amounted to only half of the strength called for on paper.
Congress' decision to cut costs by using line officers to perform staff
duties at echelons above the regiment employed 13 field and 209 company
officers, a significant diversion of Washington's battlefield resources.
Doctrine and training extracted the maximum value from the troops, but
full quotas would have materially expanded the force at Washington's dis
posal .
After Monmouth, units in the northern half of the country saw limited
combat.

The variety of conditions under which portions of the Main Army

successfully engaged the enemy demonstrated the value of the professional
skills nurtured by Washington and Steuben.

In 1779 highly successful
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operations against the Iroquois Indians by General Sullivan and Wayne's
nighttime bayonet assault on Stony Point demonstrated the Army's flexi
bility.

l780's battles at Springfield, New Jersey, showed conclusively

that a single brigade under its self-contained organization could suc
cessfully stand off a superior force until the rest of the Main Army
could arrive.

100

Britain'8 decision to shift offensive operations to the southern
states in part reflected the difficulty in successfully engaging the
Main Army.

The shift did force Congress to transfer units from the north.

Both remaining North Carolina regiments arrived at Charleston on 3 March
1780 where they rejoined the 3d which had been filled again.

The Vir

ginia line (minus one regiment stationed at Fort Pitt) followed.

Briga

dier General William Woodford reached Charleston on 6 April 1780 with
the 1st, 2d, and 3d Virginia Regiments at full strength and the others
with officer cadres only.*®1

These units and the Georgia and South Caro

lina remnants surrendered on 12 May 1780 when Charleston fell, the worst
defeat the Continental Army suffered during the entire Revolution.

Still,

the sustained 42-day defense of an Inferior position demonstrated the Army's
ability to fight.

Sophisticated use of artillery crossfire and ricochet

techniques held the British at bay until jaeger sniper fire silenced the

100. Washington's use of the brigade is identical to the role of the di
vision in Guibert's writings and the corps in Napoleon's campaigns.
101. Ford, Journals of Congress. 15: 1087, 1256, 1347. Burnett, Letters of
Congress, 4: 322-3, 419-20, 428-9. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 16:
360, 382, 473; 17: 124, 134-5, 151, 175, 206-8, 228, 236-8, 242-3, 309.
Moultrie, Memoirs. 2: 67, 114.
102. Kite, Duportall. pp. 172-5. Bernard A. Uhlendorf, ed., The Siege of
Charleston ... (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1938). Julius F.
Sachse, trans., "Extracts from the Letter-Book of Captain Johann Heinrichs
..., 1778-1780," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 22 (1898),
pp. 137-70.

249
On 5 April 1780 General de Kalb received orders to inarch the Mary
land division and the 1st Continental Artillery Regiment to reinforce
the south.

De Kalb provisionally reorganized the division on 15 July

for greater efficiency since it now represented the only Continental
force in the department.

He formed his infantry into four full eight-

company regiments and sent the surplus officers home to recruit.

On 24

July General Gates arrived as the new Southern Department commander.

103

Gates led the division and reinforcing militia to crushing defeat at
Camden.

De Kalb's Continentals fought very well until they were over

whelmed when the militia broke and uncovered their flank.

After the bat

tle, the division's superior training enabled General Smallwood to reas
semble it quickly as a provisional regiment with two four-company battalions and two light Infantry companies.

104

On 18 January 1778 Captain Johann Heinrichs of the Hesse-Cassel
jaegers commented in a letter to the Hessian Minister of State "Nor is
their standing army to be dispised ... J

it only_/ requires Time and good

leadership to make them formidable."

The accuracy of this observation

was clear.

The Continental Army came of age between 1778 and 1780.

Regi

ments trained by Washington and Steuben continued to suffer from shortages
of personnel but fought well under a wide range of conditions.

The Army's

103. Ford, Journals of Congress. 16: 329; 17: 508. Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington. 17: 228-9; 18: 198-9, 204, 269; 19: 78-79. De Kalb to Board
of War (copy), 6 Jun 1780; to Gates, 16 Jul 1780; Board of War to Gates,
15 Jun 1780; Gates to Caswell, 25 Jul 1780; de Kalb's Division Orders, 15
Jul 1780; Return, 22 Jul 1780; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
104. Williams to Steuben, 12 Oct 1780; Gist to Steuben, 12 Oct 1780;
Return, 1 Oct 1780; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society. Gates to
Washington, 3 Sep 1780; Return, 23 Sep 1780; Gates Papers, New-York His
torical Society.
105. Sachse, "Heinrichs Letter-Book," pp. 137-40.
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organization achieved sophistication; its leadership down to the con*
pany level emerged as an experienced, tough, and competent group with
few exceptions.

The "Europeanization" of the Continental Army evolved

from foreign volunteers and the wisdom of Washington and other American
leaders in selecting only those concepts which they realized would
work in the American situation.

CHAPTER VII
PERSEVERANCE TO VICTORY

The first years of the War of American Independence witnessed the
growth of the Continental Army from a small nucleus patterned after the
Provincials of earlier wars into a long-term force which included men
from every state as well as foreign volunteers.

The latter, particularly

Steuben and Duportail, contributed European military theory and training
skills to go with practical American experience.

Beginning at Valley

Forge that blend produced a complex and relatively sophisticated organi
zation which solved the purely military problems that faced the Continen
tal Army.

During the final years of the Revolution a recurring problem

with recruiting and the general collapse of the American economy forced
retrenchment.

The Continental Army eventually disappeared as a standing

military force, but first it triumphed at Yorktown and then it disbanded
without undermining the government.

Economy and the 1781 Reorganization.

Congress' plan for reorganization in 1778 emphasized reduction of
expenses and adjustment of quotas to more realistic levels.

Those goals

continued to be an important consideration in succeeding years despite
the weakening of the Main Army as units transferred to the Southern De
partment to counter a growing British danger.

By October 1780, as the

original three-year enlistments threatened to expire, the Army was
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clearly under great pressure.

New efforts to conform to realistic

limitations and still extract a maximum advantage from available re
sources produced a major realignment of military force.
In January 1780 Robert R. Livingston, a delegate with a strong con
cern for the Army, suggested increasing efficiency by reducing the infan
try to sixty full regiments.

Surplus officers would retire on full pay,

subject to recall to fill vacancies, eliminating the cost of allowances.
Washington and Steuben persuaded Congress to avoid a major reorganiza
tion at that time.

Washington argued that it was not necessary until

enough French naval and economic aid became available to make a major
offensive possible.

He did take the opportunity to point out deficien

cies in the existing regimental structure.

Congress decided on 9 Febru

ary not to disband any regiments and established quotas to place 35,211
men in the field for the coming campaign.

Congress based that figure on

Steuben's report that anticipated operations required a minimum of 36
rank and file per company, or a total of 324 for each infantry regiment.
That plan produced 21,000 infantry, 2,000 artillery, and 1,000 cavalry
for field armies plus sufficient supporting troops and garrisons.1
At the time of these discussions the Continental Army actually con
tained approximately that number of officers and men.

The Southern

1. Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Journals of the Continental Congress
1774-1789 (34 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904-37),
15: 1357-9, 1369, 1376-7, 1393-6; 16: 36-38, 80-83, H O , 117-20, 123, 125-8,
146-51, 178-80, 287. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George
Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources 1745-1799 (39 vols.,
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1931-44), 16: 78-79; 17: 172,
407-8, 431-6, 504-6; 18: 202-4, 207-11. Edmund Cody Burnett, ed., Letters
and Members of the Continental Congress (8 vols., Washington:
Carnegie
Institution of Washington, 1921-36), 5: 33, 92-93. Steuben's undated
1780 memorandum; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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Department held all the troops from Georgia and the Carolines, the three
provisional Virginia regiments, two regiments of dragoons, and Pulaski's
corps.

The equivalent of a brigade of Continentals served in the Eastern

Department while the Northern and Western Departments each had about two
regiments.

Sixteen brigades plus supporting troops, the heart of the

Army's fighting strength, manned the Main Army and the Highlands Depart
ment.

Excluding the New Hampshire Brigade at Danbury, Connecticut,

Washington's infantry included 168 field, 1,209 company, and 273 staff
officers; 1,650 sergeants; 1,579 drummers and fifers; and 14,673 rank and
file.

Artillery added 180 officers and 1,190 enlisted men, cavalry ano

ther 64 officers and 672 men.

More significant, those brigades lacked

331 officers, 3l5 sergeants, 242 drummers and fifers, and 13,353 rank
and file.^
In the spring Washington began to hope that the Continentals and an
expected French force under the Comte de Rochambeau could attack New York
City.

He redoubled recruiting efforts and prepared to call for militia.

Rochambeau'8 troops reached Newport, Rhode Island, too debilitated from
the sea voyage to participate in action in 1780.
cancelled his plans.

Washington reluctantly

By September, despite transfers of the Virginia,

Maryland, and Delaware regiments to the south, Washington still controlled
a dozen Continental brigades, supporting units, and a number of separate
garrisons.

His infantry now included 169 field, 1,091 company, and 261

staff officers; 1,381 sergeants; 774 drummers and fifers; and 17,232
rank and file.

Three artillery regiments added 140 officers and 1,097

men; cavalry somewhat more than 500 of all ranks.

2.

Militia on duty in

Monthly Return, Main Army, Jan 1780; Record Group 93, National Archives.
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New York and Rhode Island amounted to 181 officers and 3,192 men.
Shortages remained acute, particularly among ensigns, artillery second
lieutenants, and enlisted men.

The infantry lacked 372 officers, 384

sergeants, 340 drummers and fifers, and 12,718 rank and file; the artil
lery regiments 77 officers and 652 men.

Equally important, over 200

infantry officers detailed to perform staff duties did not serve with
their regiments.
Washington's ability to compensate for transfers through recruiting
came in part from close cooperation with a Congressional committee.

It

journeyed to headquarters in late spring to investigate logistical prob
lems but had a secondary mission to recommend ways to cut expenses by unit
reductions and reorganizations.

The committee members, Philip Schuyler,

John Mathews, and Nathaniel Peabody, interpreted their mandate broadly
and gradually came to view themselves as a permanent executive agency
working in harmony with the Army.

A majority of delegates disagreed with

the committee's outspoken statements and recalled it on 11 August.

On

the other hand its recommendations formed the basis for a series of fall
reorganizations of the various staff departments.

4

In 1780 the Continental Army received a series of major blows:

the

fall of Charlestoa, the debacle at Camden, and the terrible shock of
Benedict Arnold's treason.

In August Washington pushed Congress to act

3. Monthly Return, Main Army, Sep 1780; Ibid.
4. Ford, Journals of Congress. 16: 75-79, 293-312, 332-3, 350-7, 362;
17: 472, 522-3, 528, 579-80, 589-90, 604-5, 607-8, 719-20; 18: 878-88,
1109-H.
Burnett, Letters of Congress, 5: 80, 89-92, 114, 126-78, 222,
343, 372-4. H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Con
gress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974), pp. 247-58. Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington. 18: 207-11, 356-8, 416-9, 425-32, 455-9; 19: 2,
77-85, H 8 , 391-4.
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quickly since the three-year enlistments of 1777 would expire during the
coming winter.

He recommended total centralization of military affairs

under Congress' control and Institution of a three-year draft to offset
decreasing enlistments.

Washington argued that a strong Army cost less

than constant militia calls and reminded the delegates that
No Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist
a regular force. Even those nearest the seat of War are
only valuable as light Troops to be scattered in the woods
and plague rather than do serious Injury to the Enemy. The
firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is
only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and
service.
On 28 August Congress responded by appointing a committee to prepare
a reorganization plan.

In addition to Samuel Adams, who often disagreed

with Washington on policies, it contained Joseph Jones of Virginia, Thomas
McKean of Delaware, John M. Scott of New York, and Ezekiel Cornell of
Rhode Island.

Those four were close associated and predisposed to follow

the Commander-in-Chief's recommendations.

The committee consulted Steuben

and then recommended that Congress require each state to have a full com
plement of men in the field by 1 December each year.
posed insurmountable political problems.

They knew a draft

As an alternative to it they

convinced Congress to require each state to enlist its full quota for the
duration of the war.

Until it reached that goal a state had to provide

men for not less than one year's service.

The importance of this new ap

proach lay in the stipulation that the men remain until replacements came.^

5. Washington to Congress, 15 Sep 1780; Ibid., 20: 50. Also see 19:
402-13, 481-2.
6. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 5: 378-9, 389-90. Ford, Journals of
Congress. 17: 786; 18: 839, 844. In February the Board of War unsuccess
fully proposed a similar draft system; Ibid., 16: 248-51.
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Congress gave preliminary approval to a comprehensive reorganiza
tion plan on 3 October 1780 which attempted to balance financial limits
and Washington's military desires.

As James Duane told Washington, the

plan was "submitted, as it is, to your Opinion.

It is only to be con

sidered as an Essay open to such Alterations as you may suggest."^

On

21 October, true to its word, Congress adopted verbatim the changes
g
Washington requested.

The plan reduced "the regular army of the United

States" on 1 January 1781 to 49 infantry regiments, Moses Hazen's special
Canadian Infantry regiment, 4 artillery regiments, 4 legionary corps, 2
partisan corps, and a regiment of artificers.

Washington confirmed that

the engineers, Sappers and Miners, Marechaass£e, and Invalids remained
unchanged.

All other units had to disband and transfer their enlisted

men to the line regiments.

Every unit except Hazen's and the partisans

found Itself allotted to a single state to simplify subsistence and re
placement problems.^

At Washington's request Congress let the Army ra

ther than the state governments decide which officers to retain.
Infantry reorganization formed the heart of the change.
apportioned the forty-nine regiments on the basis of

a

Congress

realistic estimate

of the states' ability to raise men rather than on total population.
Hazen's unallotted regiment, now designated as the Canadian Regiment,
continued under its four-battalion configuration because of the unique

7. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 5s 414-5.
8. Ibid., 5: 404, 407, 417-8, 422-3, 428. Ford, Journals of Congress.
18: 893-7, 959-62.
Steuben to Washington, 23 Oct 1780; Steuben Papers,
New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 20:
157-67, 263-4, 277-81, 3 H - 2 , 400.
9. See Table 5.
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agreement Hazen had with Congress.

It absorbed the remaining Canadians

from Livingston's old 1st Canadian Regiment and other miscellaneous
men.10

Washington persuaded Congress to make some changes in the struc

ture of a regiment because he doubted that every regiment actually would
reach full strength.

The Commander-in-Chlef complained that if the three

regiments allotted to South Carolina and Georgia were excluded, a reason
able assumption since those states had been overrun by the British, the
plan provided only 18,000 Infantry.

Washington needed 22,000:

18,000

for mobile field forces, 2,500 to garrison the Hudson Highlands, and
1,500 on the frontiers.
The original Congressional plan continued the basic regimental
alignment of one light and eight line companies, all equal in size.
added three enlisted men to each and left the officers unchanged.

It
At

Washington's request Congress made major c h a n g e s . E a c h regiment's
three field officers, either a colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major,
or a lieutenant colonel commandant and two majors, no longer served as
company commanders.

This change enlarged the Army's pool of field offi

cers and increased the number of captains in each regiment, increasing
flexibility.
in combat.

Every company now expected to have three officers present
Two sergeants, one officially designated for the first time

as the first sergeant, and another corporal joined each company.
number of privates rose substantially from 53 to 64.

The

Four extra lieuten

ants joined the regimental staff as permanent paymaster, adjutant, quar
termaster, and regimental recruiter.

The latter remained in his home

10. Ford, Journals of Congress. 19: 427-8; 20: 711-2. Board of War re<
port, 28 Jun 1781; Record Group 360, National Archives.
11. See Figure 11.
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state with a drummer and a fifer and devoted full time to securing re
placements.

Surplus lieutenants created by the reduction in the number

of regiments filled these positions and vacant enslgncies.
Washington liked the new specifications for an infantry regiment.
Even without the recruiting party and the light company, which would be
detached under normal circumstances, it had considerably more power than
the 1778 regiment.

Each company's rank and file strength, the true mea

sure of force, increased by slightly more than 20 percent from 56 to 68.
More officers and sergeants promised better control.

A regiment engaging

in combat at full strength would deploy 544 rank and file under 40 ser
geants, 24 company officers, and 3 field officers.

The 1781 regiment

still remained weaker than the 1776 version, but it corrected most of the
deficiencies of the 1778 plan and employed better organization than a
British unit.
The new artillery regiment proposed by Congress added eleven matrosses to each company but reduced the number of companies in a regiment.
Staff and company officers and noncommissioned officers remained unchanged.
Congress initially planned on nine companies per regiment, but Washington
convinced the delegates to simplify administration by authorizing ten.
Otherwise he accepted Congress' plan.

12

Although the number of artillery

companies in the Army dropped to 40, the number of matrosses rose sharply
on paper from 1,344 to 1,560.

Allotment of the regiments to Virginia, New

York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania was based on their primary recruiting
areas.

The 1st and 3d regiments converted through attrition.

Lamb's 2d,

a very strong regiment, and Proctor's 4th, which had only eight companies,

12.

See Figure 12.
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presented more of a problem due to a long-standing argument between Lamb
and Pennsylvania.

Washington consolidated the two companies of the 2d

from Pennsylvania with Gibbs Jones' separate company and Isaac Coren's
company of laboratory technicians in the Artillery Artificer Regiment.
The resulting companies transferred to the 4th, bringing both regiments
to the ten-company limit.

13

Congress also Intended only minor changes in the four light dragoon
regiments, adding five privates to each troop.

Washington, conscious of

forage problems and the success of the 2d and 4th regiments' experiments,
countered with a very different proposal.1** Under his plan each regi
ment dismounted two troops, turning the unit into a European-style
legionary corps.

"1 prefer Legionary Corps," he told Congress, "because

the kind of Service _/ reconnaissance duties_/ we have for horse almost
15
constantly requires the aid of Infantry."

The Infantry contingent

gave each regiment the ability to defend its camp when on patrol.

Congress

liked the savings achieved by eliminating over one hundred horses per
regiment.

As in the case of the artillery, allocation reflected original

recruiting areas.
Similar considerations led Washington to make one further recommen
dation with respect to mounted units.

He stated, "Tho' in general I dis

like independent Corps, I think a Partisan Corps with an Army useful in

13. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 18: 277-9, 311; 20: 344-5; 21:
45-46, 411; 22: 45-48. Knox to Lamb, 8 Sep, 2 and 21 Nov 1780; Robert
Walker to Lamb, 31 Oct 1780; Ebenezer Stevens to Lamb, 3 Nov 1780; John
Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society.
14. See Figure 13.
15. Washington to Congress, 11 Oct 1780; Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washing
ton, 20: 163.
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many respects.

Its name and destination stimulate to enterprise."^

Congress approved retaining one for the Main Army and one for the sou
thern army, under Henry Lee and Colonel Armand respectively.

Although

similar in most respects to a legionary corps, the troop organization
had major differences.

Each had only fifty privates reflecting the fact

that the partisans did not disperse as much as the legions.

Three dis

mounted troops provided greater staying power because a partisan corps
operated at a greater distance from its army than a legionary corps.
Congress reduced the support units to a single regiment containing
eight sixty-man companies.

At the state's request and because Philadel

phia's urban status promised to be a more fertile recruiting area for
"mechanics," Congress allotted it to Pennsylvania.

The delegates did

not specify which of the two existing artificer regiments to retain until
29 March 1781.

Then Congress directed Baldwin's Quartermaster Artificer

Regiment to disband and regroup its men into single companies in the
Main Army and southern army.
Artillery Artificer Regiment.

The rest of the companies came from Flower's
Actually the artificers served in detach

ments for the remainder of the war and the planned eight companies never
materialized.

The southern army supplemented them in 1782 with a pro

visional pioneer com p a n y . ^
The plan for the Army in 1781 called for a total of sixty-one regi
mental equivalents.

States supporting the Southern Department furnished,

16. Washington to Congress, 11 Oct 1780; Ibid.» 20: 163. See Figure 14.
17. Ibid.. 20: 339-40; 21; 402; 23: 202-4; 24: 133. Ford. Journals of
Congress, 22: 148-9. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 5: 76-79, 462. Juli
an P. Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1950- ), 5: 574-8.
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on paper, a total of 1 artillery and 21 infantry regiments, 2 legionary
corps, and a partisan corps.

Washington expected to have the services

of 29 infantry regiments (including Hazen's large unit), 3 artillery
regiments, 2 legionary corps, and 1 partisan corps, plus the Sappers
and Miners, Marechauss£e, Invalids, and his guard.

This arrangement,

including the nominal services of the artificer regiment, reflected the
different types of operations faced in each theater.

Washington had

more artillery, Infantry, and specialist troops in anticipation of an
attack on the fortified base at New York City.

The Southern Department's

smaller infantry and artillery contingents but proportionately larger
cavalry force gave it more mobility.

Implementation of the reorganize-

tlon officially took place on 1 January 1781.

18

The Main Army reorganized in winter quarters.

The four New England

lines easily accomplished the transition by consolidating units where
practical or by disbanding higher numbered ones and transferring person
nel.

New Hampshire chose the latter route, Rhode Island the former,

ending its experiment in segregation in the process.

Massachusetts cut

from 16 to 10 regiments and Connecticut from 9 to 5 through consolidation.
Both renumbered their lines to reflect new seniority sequences.

Brigades

now required only three Infantry regiments to sustain the combat power of
four old ones.

These four lines organized six brigades:

setts, 2 from Connecticut, and 1 from New Hampshire.

3 from Massachu

Rhode Island's

regiment rounded out the 2d Connecticut Brigade, and the 10th Massachusetts
Regiment served as the third element of the New Hampshire Brigade.

18.

This

Fitzpatrick. Writings of Washington. 21: 12-13, 38-39, 82-83, 250-1.
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arrangement produced a regional force of three divisions with significant
homogeneity and strength.
New York's reduction from five to two regiments occurred in the
Northern Department where the state's brigade maintained garrisons.

Con-

solldation produced the required enlisted strength but left a surplus of
experienced officers.

The state used them to lead a new corps of state

troops which assumed responsibility for frontier defense with Congress'
financial support.

20

New Jersey simply disbanded its 3d regiment and

reorganized the remaining two at Pompton.

A full company of the 2d im

mediately marched to occupy the Wyoming Valley and mediate a ConnecticutPennsylvania territorial dispute.

21

Each state continued to field a

brigade, although both lacked one regiment.
The reorganization precipitated a major crisis in the Pennsylvania
line, camped for the winter at Morristown.

On the evening of 1 January,

before actual implementation, the enlisted men mutinied over chronic
shortages of food, clothing, and pay.

Most men believed that the reduc

tion released them from 1777 enlistments ambiguously recorded as "for
three years or the duration of the war."

Sergeants gained control, mar

ched the regiments to Princeton, and negotiated with representatives from
Pennsylvania's government and Congress.

The men proved that they only

wanted a redress of grievances by arresting several British agents.

The

19. Ibid.. 20: 410, 491; 21: 40-41, 45, 69-70, 405.
20. Ibid., 20: 295-7, 417-8; 21; 17. Ford, Journals of Congress. 19:
339; 23: 525. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 5: 148, 157-8, 177-8, 444-5;
6: 313-5, 322-3, 333-4, 337-8. Jacob Judd, ed., The Revolutionary War
Memoir and Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt (Tarrytown:
Sleepy Hollow Restorations, 1976), pp. 57-58.
21. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21: 29, 32-33, 37-38.
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settlement of the mutiny established an impartial review panel which
examined each man's enlistment and released 1,250 infantrymen and 67
artillerists by the end of January.

The remaining 1,150 men clearly

had enlisted for the duration and received furloughs until 15 March.
The soldiers received promises of back pay, clothing, and freedom from
reprisals.

The reorganization, with an effective date of 17 January,

consolidated paper cadres for six regiments and ordered them to reas
semble at specific t o w n s . ^
The mutiny not only deprived Washington of the two planned Pennsyl
vania brigades, it opened the door to future revolts.

On 20 January

the New Jersey regiments attempted to extract similar concessions.
Washington reacted swiftly this time and asked Congress not to interfere.
He sent General Robert Howe from the Highlands with a detachment of New
Englanders and orders to "compel the mutineers to unconditional submis
sion" and to execute "a few of the most active and Incendiary leaders."
On 27 January Howe suppressed the mutiny and shot two ringleaders,
checking the spread of unrest.

23

Active operations complicated the reorganization of the southern
units.

Washington realized that recruitment problems there dwarfed his

own and favored creating a mobile force to pin the British into coastal

22. Charles J. Stille, Major-General Anthony Wayne and the Pennsylvania
Line in the Continental Army (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1893),
pp. 248-63. William Henry Smith, ed., The St. Clair Papers ... (2 vols.,
Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co., 1882), 1; 532-3. Burnett, Letters of
Congress. 5: 516-33, 540-1. Pennsylvania Archives, 2d Ser., H : 631-74;
4th Ser., 3: 796-9.
23. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 21: 124-5, 128-30, 135-7, 146-9.
S. H. Shreve, ed., "Personal Narrative of the Services of Lieut. John
Shreve of the New Jersey Line of the Continental Army," Magazine of Ameri
can History. 3 (1879), p. 575.
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enclaves rather than attempt to reduce fortified cities.

On 14 October

1780 he selected Nathanael Greene to replace Gates as department comman
der.

To assist in rebuilding the department's forces he assigned

Steuben to Greene.

Greene left Steuben in Virginia to establish lines

of communications and oversee the rehabilitation of Virginia's forces
and arrived himself at Charlotte, North Carolina, on 2 December.
next day he formally relieved Gates.

The

24

The heart of the southern army remained the infantry regiments from
Maryland and Delaware.

After Camden the Delaware men served in Peter

Jacquette's line company with the Maryland troops and Robert Kirkwood's
light infantry company.

Surplus officers returned to Delaware to fill

the rest of the regiment but only organized two companies by mid-1781.

25

Maryland assembled recruits and men from disbanded units for Greene.
The veterans and first replacements reestablished the 1st and 2d Mary
land Regiments.

The 6th and 7th disbanded, and the 3d, 4th, and 5th

reorganized at cadre strength in Maryland.

The 5th refilled first and

reached Greene by mid-February; the 3d and 4th did not set out until 28
August and 4 September, respectively.

24. Ford, Journals of Congress, 18: 906, 994-6. Southern Department Gener
al Orders, 3 and 4 Dec 1780; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 20: 50, 181-2, 238-9, 321.
25. William Seymour, A Journal of the Southern Expedition, 1780-1783 (Wil
mington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1896), pp. 7-11. Joseph Brown
Turner, ed., The Journal and Order Book of Captain Robert Kirkwood ...
(Wilmington: Historical Society of Delaware, 1910), pp. 11-13. Charles W.
Dickens, ed., "Orderly Book of Caleb Prew Bennett at the Battle of Yorktown,
1781." Delaware History. 4 (1955), pp. 108-9, 113, 121, 139, 146.
26. Joslah Hall to Gates, 12 Oct 1780; Gist to Gates, 26 Oct 1780; Gates
Papers, New-York Historical Society. Greene to Gist (copy), 10 Nov 1780;
Gist to Steuben, 14 Feb 1781; to Governor Thomas Lee, 8 Feb 1781; Steuben
Papers, New-York Historical Society. Arthur J. Alexander, "How Maryland
Tried to Raise Her Continental Quota," Maryland Historical Magazine, 42
(1942), pp. 191-2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21: 82-83.

265
Greene knew he had no hope of organizing Continentals from Georgia
or the Carolines and told Steuben to concentrate on rebuilding Virginia's
regiments.

Civilian officials handled recruiting, freeing Continental

officers to organize the provisional units required to face a series of
crises.

The use of provisional formations undermined Washington's plan

to refill the regiments lost at Charleston.

The return of escaped prison

ers of war who claimed that their captivity had released them from their
enlistments, frequent reshuffling of the provisional units, and diversion
of officers to command militia detachments all complicated Steuben's task.
The Virginia line's reorganization amounted to a paper arrangement of of
ficers except in the case of the regiment at Fort Pitt, the only unit not
lost at Charleston.

It was reorganized with only two companies and re-

designated from the 9th to the 7th Virginia Regiment.

27

Without the Virginia infantry regiments Greene remained dangerously
weak.

Washington and Congress sent him Henry Lee's 2d Partisan Corps in

December and in February 1781 decided to shift the Pennsylvania line once
it recovered from the mutiny.

Majmr General Arthur St. Clair found reas

sembling his regiments in that state unexpectedly difficult.

To expedite

matters he formed three provisional regiments, each containing eight 40-man
companies.

A detachment of the 4th Continental Artillery Regiment with

four guns and one troop of the 4th Legionary Corps (containing all the men

27. Ibid., 19: 381-2; 20: 465; 21: 82. Boyd, Jefferson Papers, 4: 17-18,
349-50, 603-4; 5: 111-6, 162-3; 6: 30-32. William P. Palmer, ed.. Calen
dar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts (ll vols., Richmond:
Commonwealth of Virginia, 1875-93), 1: 594-6. Muhlenberg to Gates, 12 Oct
1780; Abraham Buford to Gates, 21 Oct and 1 Nov 1780; Return of the Sou
thern Army, 5 Nov 1780; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society. W. A.
Irvine, ed., "Affairs at Fort Pitt in 1782," Historical Magazine, 1st Ser.,
7 (1863), pp. 306-9.
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who had horses) complemented them.

After overcoming major financial

and logistical problems and crushing a minor mutiny, Anthony Wayne
finally departed from York in late May.
to continue recruiting.

St. Clair remained behind

28

The October 1780 plan for sixty-one regimental equivalents divided
into two major commands did not materialize.

Washington's Main Army

and subsidiary commands in the north lost the services of the 2d Parti
san Corps and Pennsylvania's legionary corps, its artillery regiment,
and the six Infantry regiments.

The Southern Department fared worse.

It completely lacked the 7 Infantry regiments projected for the Carolines
and Georgia and had only 3 of the 14 authorized Virginia, Maryland, and
Delaware infantry regiments.
during the first part of 1781.

None of the Pennsylvanians reached the area
Greene's single artillery regiment amoun

ted to the crews for a handful of fleldpieces, his two legionary corps
actually operated as a small cavalry regiment, and only one of the two
partisan corps remained fit for combat.

On the other hand the regiments

serving in the Continental Array in 1781 contained very experienced cadres.
The reorganization left only the most competent officers and placed them
in command of efficiently organized units.

During 1781 those troops

engaged in the war's decisive campaigns.

28. Ford, Journals of Congress. 19: 177-9, 275. Boyd, Jefferson Papers.
4: 322-4. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 21: 272-3, 294, 473-4;
22: 191-2. Smith, St. Clair Papers, 1; 544-5, 548-9. Stille, Wayne,
pp. 264-7. Historical Magazine. 1st Ser., 6 (1862), pp. 337-8. L/“ aw- _
rence_/ Keene to Board of War, 10 Apr 1781; St. Clair _/ to Board of War_/,
5 Apr 1781; Record Group 360, National Archives.
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Triumph at Yorktown.

The 1781 campaign conclusively demonstrated the maturity of the
Continental Army as a small but effective military force.

Washington

and Greene wrested the strategic initiative from the British, took ad
vantage of their troops' strengths, and adjusted plans to meet changing
circumstances.

Their joint actions combined with French military, naval,

and financial support to create and exploit a defect in British dispo
sitions.

In October they Inflicted a major defeat on Great Britain at

Yorktown, Virginia, an engagement which proved to be decisive.
The year's operations began in the Carolines.

General Charles

Cornwallis suffered a major setback at Cowpens on 17 January when Banastre Tarleton engaged the Southern Department's light troops under Briga
dier General Daniel Morgan.

Morgan had several contingents of southern

irregulars, special militia units which contained a large proportion of
Continental veterans, and Greene's best troops.

He developed tactics

which blended the talents of these diverse groups.

Morgan deployed the

irregulars in a double line of skirmishers, forcing Tarleton to commit
his reserve before the British reached the main American line.

A sharp

counterattack by the Continentals shattered the disorganized British and
destroyed Tarleton's force.

Losses in this battle and an earlier defeat

at King's Mountain eliminated most of Cornwallis' light troops.

29

29. Robert E. Lee, ed., Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of
the United States. By Henry Lee (New York: University Publishing Co.,
1869), pp. 230-1. / “Banastre_7 Tarleton, A History of the Campaigns of
1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North America (London: T.
Cadell, 1787), pp. 214-22. Morgan to Will/~iam Clajon_7, 26 Jan 1781;
Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
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Although Cornwallis chased Greene across the Dan River into Vir
ginia, the pursuit so debilitated his regiments that they had to with
draw to Wilmington, North Carolina, to refit.

That allowed Greene time

to regroup his troops, establish a supply system, and dispatch Henry
Lee's 2d Partisan Corps into South Carolina to assist Irregulars in
harassing British outposts and lines of communications.

By concentrating

on quality and mobility, Greene turned the small size of his regular
force into a logistical advantage.
contingents shortly before a battle.

He only called out large militia
The rest of the time he left these

part-time soldiers to restrict British reconnaissance and freedom of
movement with occasional assistance from Lee and William Washington's
composite detachment of Continental cavalry.

30

Greene reentered North Carolina and on 15 March fought Cornwallis
at Guilford Court House.

As at Cowpens, militia and Irregulars in skir

mish lines forced the British to deploy prematurely and Inflicted heavy
casualties.

The Continentals then punished Cornwallis with accurate

artillery and small arms fire.

The Marylanders even drove back the elite

Guards Brigade in a bayonet charge before Greene broke off the action.
Cornwallis' losses of nearly 50 percent crippled his regiments as fighting
units and ruined their m o r a l e . G r e e n e
Camden.

next moved against the depot at

He gambled that operations in South Carolina would restore

civilian morale and deprive the British of vital logistical support.

30. Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, eds., The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton (26 vols., New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-79), 2:
529-31. Boyd, Jefferson Papers. 4: 288-9; 5: 360-2. Fitzpatrick, Wri
tings of Washington. 20: 321.
31. Tarleton, Campaigns, pp. 271-9. George C. Rogers, Jr., ed., "Let
ters of Charles O'Hara to the Duke of Grafton," South Carolina Historical
Magazine. 65 (1964), pp. 159-66, 173-9.
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Cornwallis chose not to follow.

He hoped that he could disrupt Greene's

Virginia base before his own subordinates met defeat.
In a series of maneuvers and engagements Greene gradually drove
Francis Rawdon and Alexander Stewart back to the coast.
he attacked Stewart's camp at Eutaw Springs.
the attack, with the Continentals in reserve.

On 8 September

Militia and Irregulars led
The high number of recruits

in his regiments forced Greene to deploy into line sooner than planned,
robbing his attack of some of its momentum.

When his advance slowed,

Greene committed his reserve in "a brisk charge with trailed Arms, through
a heavy cannonade, and a shower of Musket Balls."
the main British body.

32

This maneuver routed

On the American side, broken terrain and casual

ties among key officers disrupted most units, allowing Stewart to rally
some of his men in dense thickets and a large brick house.
risk defeat, Greene withdrew.

Rather than

Eutaw Springs left the British incapable

of further offensive action in the south.

Cornwallis' gamble that his

subordinates could hold the Carolines and Georgia had failed.
As Greene planned his spring offensive Washington assembled the Main
Army's light infantry companies, each raised to a level of at least 5
sergeants and 50 rank and file.
them into three battalions.

On 19 February 1781 Washington formed

Lieutenant Colonel Elijah Vose's contained

the companies of the 1st through 8th Massachusetts Regiments.

Another,

under Jean-Joseph Glmat, included the remaining 2 Massachusetts companies,
the 5 from Connecticut, and Rhode Island's.

Francis Barber's battalion

began with the 2 New Hampshire light companies and the single light

32.

Greene to Congress, 11 Sep 1781; Record Group 360, National Archives.
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company of Hazen's Canadian Regiment; on 22 February it gained the 2
light plus 3 line companies from New Jersey.

Lafayette took command

of the light corps on 20 February.
Benedict Arnold in his new role as a British brigadier began opera
ting along Virginia's James River in January.

Washington sent Lafayette's

light infantrymen south to trap Arnold in conjunction with French war
ships from Newport.

Shallow waters frustrated the first naval expedition

while a superior British squadron drove off a second.

Lafayette's Con

tinentals remained in Virginia, however, as reinforcements from New York
City and Cornwallis' column from North Carolina joined Arnold.

Although

Lafayette could not defeat the British, Cornwallis lacked the mobility
to catch him or to prevent the arrival in Virginia of Wayne's Pennsyl
vanians.

Wayne reorganized his provisional units into two stronger regi

ments on 14 July, sending excess officers back to Pennsylvania to assist
in recruiting.^

Cornwallis ended the summer by selecting Yorktown as

the site for a permanent naval base.
While Greene and Lafayette gradually pressed the British troops in
the south into a few coastal enclaves, Washington planned a Franco-Ameri
can offensive to recapture New York City.

By June, when he called on

Rochambeau to march his expeditionary coTps from Rhode Island, the Main

33. John W. Wright, "The Corps of Light Infantry in the Continental
Army." American Historical Review, 31 (1926), pp. 459-61. Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington. 21: 169-<X), 232-5, 253, 274.
34. Ibid., 21: 254-6, 273-4, 421-4. Joseph A. Waddell, "Diary of Capt.
John Davis, of the Pennsylvania Line," Virginia Magazine of History and
Biography, 1 (1893), pp. 5-7. Joseph M. Beatty, ed., "Letters from Con
tinental Officers to Doctor Reading Beatty, 1781-1788," Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography, 54 (1930), pp. 159-61.
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Army and Its outposts contained 8 brigades, Hazen's regiment, 2 artil35
lery regiments, 1 legionary corps, and various special units.

Inclu

ding the light corps with Lafayette (about 1,300 men), the Infantry por
tion of Washington's force amounted to 61 field, 623 company, and 118
staff officers, 810 sergeants, 461 drummers and flfers, and 7,854 rank
and file.

The regiments remained 120 officers, 295 sergeants, 166 drum

mers and flfers, and 6,510 rank and file below authorized levels, a dis
couraging fact.

The artillery accounted for another 91 officers and 711

men, short 45 officers and 597 men; Sheldon's legion had 23 of 32 officers
and 303 of 423 men.

Rochambeau added over 5,000 experienced, professional

troops in 4 2-battalion Infantry regiments, a legion, 6 artillery compa
nies, 2 companies of miners, and a company of bombardiers.

They had re

cently participated in the French war games that tested the latest develop
ments in military theory.

Washington also expected Admiral the Comte de

Grasse to move up from the West Indies with additional troops and a large
naval squadron.^
Washington and Rochambeau joined forces at Dobbs Ferry, New York, on
6 July.

Morale climbed still more with the news that the frigate Resolue

had reached Philadelphia from France with arms, clothing, medicines, and
two million livres in cash.

When he learned that de Grasse Intended to

sail to the Chesapeake rather than come directly to New York, Washington
agreed with Rochambeau and decided to attack Cornwallis.

Washington took

35. General Return, Main Army, Jun 1781; Record Group 93, National Archives.
36. Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare; The Theory
of Military Tactics In Eighteenth Century France (New YoTk: Columbia Uni
versity Press, 1957), p. 233. Evelyn M. Acorob, ed., The Revolutionary
Journal of Baron Ludwig Von Closen 1780-1783 (Chapel Hill; University of
North Carolina Press, 1958), pp. 4-5, 92, 132. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 22: 86-87, 102-7, 109-U, 116-22, 156-8, 207-9.
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about half of the Main Army and all of the French troops south.

General

Heath, assisted by Generals McDougall, Stirling, and Stark, remained
behind to secure West Point and the northern frontier.

They relied on

militia and state troops plus the New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Con
necticut infantry regiments, the Invalids, the 3d Continental Artillery
Regiment, and the 2d Legionary Corps.

Extraordinary efforts by Superin

tendent of Finance Robert Morris and allied logistical staffs, drawing
heavily on French cash, handled the largest and most complex troop move
ment of the war with skill and dispatch.

Washington's shrewd use of de

ception obscured the change in plans from the British until they were
powerless to Intervene.

37

De Grasse's squadron defeated a British fleet off the mouth of the
Chesapeake Bay on 5 September, completing the isolation of Cornwallis.
Washington opened his headquarters at Williamsburg ten days later and
began organizing the allied troops for siege operations.

Major General

Benjamin Lincoln, the senior American commander, took charge of the al
lied Right Wing.

The six Continental brigades formed divisions under

Lincoln, Lafayette, and Steuben and acted as the first line of the Ameri
can wing.

Virginia militia formed the second line.

The Continental

force amounted to 41 field, 355 company, and 66 staff officers, 547 ser
geants, 272 drummers and fifers, and 6,412 rank and file.
tributed another 188 officers and 3,426 men.

Militia con

Rochambeau commanded the

37. Ibid.. 22: 236-7, 395-7, 401-2, 450-1, 501-2; 23: 11-12, 19-23, 25n,
33-34, 50-58, 68-72, 75-77, 104-7. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 6 : 20811. Heath to CongresB, 5 Sep 1781; Record Group 360, National Archives.
Victor L. Johnson, "Robert Morris and the Provisioning of the American
Army During the Campaign of 1781," Pennsylvania History, 5 (1938), pp.
7-20.
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Left Wing which consisted of his own corps and some 3,000 troops from
op
the West Indies under the Marquis de St. Simon.
Washington advanced on the evening of 28 September, urging the troops
to place their principle ]_ sic_/ relyance on the Bayonet,
that they may prove the Vanity of the Boast which the
British make of their particular prowess in deciding
Battles with that Weapon.3^
Surprisingly, Cornwallis abandoned an outer line of defenses and enabled
Washington to complete investment with only minor casualties.
itself followed formal European practices.

The siege

Engineers started trenches

during the night of 6-7 October at a range of 600 yards.

Batteries

opened fire on the ninth and quickly silenced defensive guns.

A Becond

or inner ring of trenches followed on the evening of 11-12 October.

Be

cause two detached redoubts threatened to outflank this new line Washing
ton stormed them on 14 October.

The French attacked one and Lafayette's

light infantry assaulted the other.

Preceded by a detachment of Sappers

and Miners to cut a patch through obstacles, one of Lafayette's columns
charged directly into the little fort while the other cut off retreat.
American pride soared when they secured their objective more quickly
than the elite French chasseurs and grenadiers.

New batteries opened

fire on the sixteenth, convincing Cornwallis that further resistance was
hopeless.

On 19 October his troops laid down their arras

38. Weekly Return, Main Army, 13 Oct 1781; Record Group 93, National
Archives. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 23: 134-5, 146-7.
39. General Orders, 27 Sep 1781; Ibid., 23: 147.
40. Ibid., 23: 178-85. Joseph Plumb Martin. Private Yankee Doodle ....
ed. by George F. Scheer (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1962), pp. 230-7.
John W. Wright, "Notes on the Siege of Yorktown in 1781 with Special Re
ference to the Conduct of a Siege in the Eighteenth Century," William and
Mary Quarterly. 2d Ser., 12 (1932), pp. 229-49.

Plans to continue the offensive against other British garrisons in
the south ended when de Grasse announced that his fleet had to return to
the West Indies.

Rochambeau decided to winter in Virginia, allowing the

Continentals to split up.

Major General St. Clair took some to rein

force Greene, arriving at Round 0, South Carolina, on 4 January 1782.
He had two Delaware companies, the 3d and 4th Maryland Regiments, a pro
visional Virginia regiment, Wayne's two Pennsylvania regiments and a
third which arrived at Yorktown after the siege, plus all available
mounted troopers from the 1st, 3d, and 4th Legionary Corps.

Greene

quickly regrouped the Pennsylvanians into two strong regiments, disbanded
his 5th Maryland Regiment to fill the other four from that state, and
transferred his Delaware men to the new companies.

Armand's 1st Partisan

Corps had to remain in Virginia because it required a more extensive re
organization, beginning with the transfer of fifty men from the light
Infantry corps.

41

Most of the rest of the Continentals marched from Yorktown under
Lincoln and joined Heath in the Highlands.

On arrival the light corps

broke up and the individual companies returned to their regiments for
the winter.

Hazen's regiment escorted prisoners to Lancaster, and then

41. Greene to Congress, 23 Jan 1782; Record Group 360, National Archives.
"Abstract of Musters for the Southern Army," 1 Apr-19 Sep 1782; Steuben
Papers, New-York Historical Society. W. A. Irvine, ed., "Extracts from
the Papers of General William Irvine," Pennsylvania Magazine of History
and Biography, 5 (1881), pp. 268, 274-5. Archives of Maryland, 18: 42975. Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers, 2: 127, 241, 582-5.
Kirkwood, Order Book, pp. 27-30. Tuffin Charles Armand, Marquis de la
Rouerie, "Letters of Col. Armand," New-York Historical Society Collections
for 1878, pp. 323-30. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 23: 193-5,
198, 200, 216-7, 248-50, 258, 266-7, 270, 292-9, 309-13, 317-8.
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assumed responsibility for guarding the depot there.

42

Lamb's regiment,

initially assisted by the Sappers and Miners, transported the siege train
and over 200 captured British pieces to Elkton, Maryland.

The captured

guns went on to Philadelphia to be overhauled by an artificer company;
the field pieces accompanied the brigades to West Point; and Lamb's
regiment camped for the winter at Burlington, New Jersey, with the siege
train.

It did not resume its march to West Point until August.

A3

Washington spent the winter at Philadelphia to discuss the future
with Congress.

The Continental Army had met the challenge during 1781.

Greene's army, Lafayette's contingent, and Washington's Franco-American
forces completely altered the course of the war.

Yorktown ended British

hopes of overrunning the south and reduced the enemy to a few footholds.
French financial, naval, and military aid played a major role in achiev
ing victory at Yorktown, but the Continentals' own battlefield prowess
and superior mobility set the stage for the denouement.

Washington had

every reason to be proud of the year's combat, but he still had to face
recurring economic problems and the failure of the states to furnish
their full quotas of men.

A2. Ibid.. 23: 290-1, 293-A, 323-A, 37A; 25: 110-1. James Thacher,
Military Journal of the American Revolution ... (Hartford: Hurlbut, Wil
liams & Co., 1862), pp. 302-3.
A3. Knox to Lamb, 2 Nov 1781 and 31 Jul 1782; Knox to Washington (copy),
30 Jul 1782; Lamb Papers, New York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick,
Writings of Washington. 25: 58-59. The convoy for the move in 1782 from
Burlington to West Point required H A horses and 200 oxen to move the
park's 39 wagons, A traveling forges, 18 assorted howitzers, 16 fieldpieces, and A 12-pounders. While at Burlington the regiment conducted
extensive scientific tests to evaluate different types of howitzers
for Knox.

276
The Road to Newburgh.

During the last two years of the Revolution the Continental Army
did not engage in any major battles.

Lack of French naval support pre

vented assaults on the remaining British strongholds, and changed politi
cal conditions in England made it clear that peace would be negotiated.
Congress and the American people, weary of a long war, Increased the
pressure on the military establishment to reduce costs.

Washington's

role In gradually dismantling the Army became one of his most important
contributions to the new nation because he guided it through a severe
political crisis.
Washington's winter conferences with Congress quickly established
that the delegates wanted to trim expenses.

They limited the number of

generals on active duty for the first time and reviewed staff organisa
tions for ways to reduce costs.

A committee recommended cutting the

number of infantry regiments and the proportion of officers since:
the Class of Men who are willing to become Soldiers is
much diminished by the War and therefore the Difficulties
of raising an Army equal to former Establishments have
increased and will continue to increase.
Washington countered with arguments that the Army had eliminated regi
ments faster since 1777 than the British, that captured documents indi
cated that the British had more Loyalists on their rolls than he had Con
tinentals, and that combat experience showed that the ratio of officers
to men was already too low.

He won his case for the time being, but on

23 April 1782 Congress overturned one of the Important features of the
1781 regiment in the interest of economy.

The delegates eliminated three

44. Morris and Peters to Washington, 13 Aug 1781; Burnett, Letters of
Congress. 6 : 177-9.
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lieutenants from each regiment and ordered that company officers perform the functions of adjutant, quartermaster, and recruiter.

45

Congress' 1782 economy drive concentrated on the Army's support
structure.

It used the new permanent executive "ministers" as the pri

mary vehicle for making changes.

Robert Morris, who became Superintendent

of Finance on 20 February 1781, played a major role.

Even more important

was the Secretary of War, the office filled on 30 October 1781 by Ben
jamin Lincoln.

Lincoln's official functions were quite similar to the

Board of War's and his English counterpart's.

In practice he acted as

Washington'8 liaison with Congress and Morris.

Under Lincoln the War

Office relied on an assistant, a secretary, and two clerks, and on the
part-time use of line officers to eliminate most staff officials.

Con

gress did insist on reducing many of the individuals concerned with the
direct support of the field armies, particularly those concerned with
transportation, although Washington protested that the change impaired
the Army's mobility.

46

Washington reached Newburgh on 31 March 1782 and formally resumed
command in the north four days later.

A private's letter written at

that time reflects the conditions he found:

"Times are very dubros ]_ sic

at present for there is no news of Peace as yeit.

But the armies are all

45. Ibid., 6 : 270-80. Ford, Journals of Congtess. 21: 791, 1127, 1163-5,
1179-83; 22: 211-2, 381-2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23: 29-32,
452-6, 498-9; 24: 391-2. The list of officers forced to retire by this
'reform', dated 27 Apr 1784, is in Record Group 360, National Archives.
46. Ford, Journals of Congress. 19: 126-8, 180; 20: 662-7; 21; 1030, 1087,
1173, H 8 6 - 7 ; 22 : 30-33, 36-37, 40-41, 129-31, 177-9, 216, 235, 244-5, 381,
408-15, 425-7; 23: 683-6. Burnett. Letters of Congress, 6 : 11-12, 190-1,
230-1. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 23: 410-2, 452-6; 24: 98-99;
25: 72-73; 26: 84.

well diciplined _/ sic_/ and in wonderful good spirits and draw very
47
good provisions."
were good.
housing.

By the Continental Army's standards conditions

The Highlands area contained long-established depots and
Training programs existed.

Yorktown had raised morale.

The

army also Included a high proportion of hardened veterans able to make
the most of their circumstances.
In June Washington and Steuben began monthly comprehensive brigade
inspections designed to evaluate appearance, unit paperwork, maneuvers,
and marksmanship.

Washington liked the overall performance and compe

titive spirit of the exercises, but warned the men to Temember that "It
is the effect of the shot not the report of the Gun that can discomfort
the Enemy and if a bad habit is acquired at exercise it will prevail in
real action."*8

This rigorous training program culminated on 3 I August.

Washington moved the Main Army's camp from Newburgh to Verplanck's Point
to simplify subsistence.

In the process he tested the feasibility of an

amphibious attack on New York.

Five brigades, including fieldpieces,

embarked in batteaux followed by other boats with baggage.

Boat assign

ments kept units intact and careful alignment Insured cohesion and rapid
deployment as the craft reached the landing zone.

This experiment was a

striking success and Indicated that if de Grasse's warships had been
available for a real assault, Washington's veterans probably would have
been able to capture Manhattan.

40

47. Sylvia J. Sherman, ad., Dubros Times: Selected Depositions of Maine
Revolutionary War Veterans (Augusta: Maine State Archives, 1975), p. 9.
Also see Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 24: loi.
48. Ibid., 24: 322.
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Washington also established a system of rewards in 1782 to enhance
morale.

He authorized an honorary badge, a chevron worn on the left

sleeve of the uniform coat, for all enlisted men who "served more than
three years with bravery, fidelity and good conduct."
represented six years of such service.

Two chevrons

The Badge of Military Merit, a

heart of purple silk edged with narrow lace and worn over the left lapel,
became a special decoration.

Washington proudly proclaimed that "The

road to glory in a patriot army and a free country is thus open to all."

50

He only granted three of these awards, all in 1783.***
In August 1782, when Washington practiced the Verplanck's Point
landing, his forces in the northern half of the nation Included eight
brigades, Hazen's regiment, two artillery regiments, a legionary corps,
and the smaller specialist units.

The Infantry contributed 67 field,

475 company, and 119 staff officers, 813 sergeants, 448 drummers and
flfers, and 9,210 rank and file.
of authorized strength.

That amounted to roughly two-thirds

The two artillery regiments contained 100 offi

cers and 907 men, the Invalids 27 officers and 337 men, and the Sappers
and Miners 5 officers and 77 men.

Sheldon's 2d Legionary Corps and the

Marechauss^e contributed 30 officers and 355 men, raising the basic
strength at Washington's disposal to about 800 officers and 12,000 men.
Because of the shortage of recruits, Washington bowed to Congress' de
sire to reduce the Army still further.

On 7 August Congress ordered

50. Ibid.. 24: 488.
51. Ibid., 24: 487-8; 25: 7, 142; 26: 363-4, 481. Recipients of the
Badge of Military Merit were Sergeants William Brown (formerly of the 5th
Connecticut Regiment) and Elijah Churchill of the 2d Legionary Corps, and
a Sergeant Blssel of the 2d Connecticut Regiment. Qualification for the
Badge was based on a combination of gallantry in action and overall
meritorious service.

280
all state lines to reform on the first of the year into complete regi
ments containing no fewer than 500 rank and file.

It did restore, on

19 November, the regimental adjutant and quartermaster positions to full
staff status.

At Washington's suggestion junior regiments disbanded to

provide the personnel to fill the remaining units.

52

On 1 January 1783 New York retained its two full regiments.

Con

necticut reduced its line to 3 regiments and Massachusetts to 8 , each
of which amounted to at least 500 rank and file.

Because New Hampshire,

Rhode Island, and New Jersey all came close to this minimum strength,
Washington obtained special permission from Congress to delay their re
organization until 1 March.

Those states complained that this policy

amounted to a disproportionate quota and failed to furnish the necessary
recruits.

On 1 March the 2d New Hampshire and 2d New Jersey Regiments

were reduced to battalion strength.

Each had 4 companies, 2 field

officers, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a paymaster, and either a sur
geon or a mate.

The Rhode Island Regiment formed a similar battalion

with six companies.

53

Greene faced greater problems during 1782 although the British
evacuated Savannah on 11 July and Charleston on 14 December.

The sou

thern army only engaged in skirmishing during this period, but its less
stable provisional regiments suffered greater neglect than Washington's

52. Monthly Return, Main Army, Aug 1782; Record Group 93, National Ar
chives. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 6 : 431-2, 537-8. Ford, Journals
of Congress. 22: 451-3; 23: 710-1, 736-9. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 24: 352-4.
53. Ibid.. 25: 286-7, 312-3, 376, 425-6, 439-40, 456, 460-1; 26: 3-4,
22, 140-2, 172. Ford, Journals of Congress, 23: 837. Burnett, Letters
of Congress. 7: 1-2, H - 1 3 .
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units.

Washington directed Greene to rebuild the lines from Georgia

and the Carolines so that the other regiments gradually could shift
back to the Main Army.

As a preliminary step he halted the movement

of recruits from Pennsylvania and Maryland to the south.
Greene's Pennsylvanians reorganized as a single provisional regi
ment under Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Harmar on 4 November 1782.

On 1

January Congress reduced the Pennsylvania line on paper from six to
three regiments which remained depot cadres in contrast to Harmar*8
crack combat unit.

Greene handled the permanent Maryland regiments

differently.

The 3d and 4th disbanded and transferred personnel to the

1st and 2d.

A detachment of new Maryland recruits served with the Main

Army in 1782 under Major Thomas Lansdale as a first step towards even
tual movement of the line back to the north.
the Delaware Regiment went home.

The last two companies of

The men received extended furloughs

when they reached Christiana Bridge on 17 January 1 7 8 3 . ^
Greene simply released the short-term Virginia troops as their en
listments expired.
January.

The state's permanent regiments reorganized on 1

All but two disbanded.

The arrangement retained officers in

proportion to the number of enlisted men remaining from the old regiments.
The 1st Virginia Regiment formed at the Winchester replacement depot.

54. Ibid., 6 : 446-7, 469-70, 480-1. Wayne to Greene, 12 Jul 1782;
Greene to Congress, 13 Aug 1782; Record Group 360, National Archives.
Ford, Journals of Congress. 23: 549, 560. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 24: 409-10; 25: 100, 162-3, 193-4.
55. Ibid., 25: 110-1, 283-4, 328; 26: 238. Archives of Maryland, 18:
476-82. Seymour, Journal, pp. 40-42. Returns, Southern Army, 9 Jan
and 2 Apr 1783; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society. Greene's
General Orders for 14 Sep and 2, 3, and 4 Nov 1782; Southern Department
Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society. Ford, Journals of Congress,
23: 560, 837.
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The 2d, only partially filled, contained the VlTginiana on duty at Fort
Pitt.

Virginia*8 portion of the 1st Continental Artillery Regiment

became a single overstrength company under Captain William Pierce; the
Maryland portion remained a single company with Greene.

The 1st and 3d

Legionary Corps formally consolidated as a five-troop unit.

56

Stabilized conditions in 1782 promised hope for reestablishing the
Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina lines.

Only North Carolina

had real success, following efforts to raise 1,500 men for a period of
eighteen months' service.

Greene temporarily formed them into two regi

ments and on 2 November permanently organized them as a regiment and a
battalion.

The South Carolina legislature decided to reorganize two

regiments, but even after the evacuation of Charleston made no progress.
Georgia planned to form its regiment and on 29 July 1782 even decided
to mount two companies.

Major John Habersham recruited some pardoned

Loyalists, but the unit never reached strength.

Congress did not ap

prove the projected variation in its composition.^
The winter menths of 1782-1783, when the Army adjusted to the new
quotas, became a critical period in national politics.

Various groups

56. Ibid., 24: 275-6. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington. 26: 98, 101,
206. J. D. Eggleston, "Officers of the Virginia Line at Winchester,
1783," William and Mary Quarterly. 2d Ser., 7 (1927), p. 61. Katherine
Glass Greene, Winchester. Virginia and Its Beginnings 1743-1814 (Strasburg: Shenandoah Publishing House, 1926), pp. 241-4. Archives of Mary
land, 18: 477, 580, 596-7. Palmer, Calendar of Virginia State Papers,
2: 335. Greene's General Orders for 2 and 3 Nov 1782; Southern Depart
ment Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society.
57. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 6 : 537-8. Allen D. Candler, ed.,
The Revolutionary Records of the State of Georgia (3 vols., Atlanta:
Franklin-Turner Co., 1908), 3: 57, 79-80, 157, 161-3. Wayne to Greene,
12 Jul 1782; Greene to Congress, 13 Aug 1782; Record Group 360, National
Archives. Mentges to Steuben, 9 Jan and 2 Apr 1783; Steuben Papers,
New-York Historical Society.
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realized that the war would end shortly and that they had to act quickly
to obtain special goals.

One group of politicians wanted to Increase

the powers of the central government and hoped to use the military to
pressure Congress into adopting a taxation program devised by Robert
Morris.

Officers and enlisted men sought to relieve their own finan

cial problems by collecting back pay and securing promised benefits be
fore the Army disbanded.

Discontent began to mount in the Main Army's

winter quarters at Newburgh.

Washington sympathized with both groups

but had real fears that the troops might get out of hand.

He warned

Congress that he would spend the winter in camp and "try like a careful
physician to prevent if possible the disorders getting to an incurable
height."58
Hints that Congress might renounce the promise of half pay made in
1778 precipitated action.

General McDougall, accompanied by Colonels

John Brooks and Matthias Ogden, carried a petition to Philadelphia in
January.

Unlike earlier protests, the officers this time spoke for the

entire Army.

Washington, who personally favored stronger central govern

ment, wrote private letters to several delegates from the nationalist
faction.

He reminded them that the petitioners deserved the first claim

on Congress' resources.

A committee reported favorably on the petition,

but Congress defeated a resolution offering to commute the pensions with

58. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25: 269-70. Basic to the fol
lowing discussion are: H. James Henderson, Party Politics in the Con
tinental Congress (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974), pp. 318, 3325; Richard H. Kohn, "The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d'Etat," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 27
(1970), pp. 187-220; and Max M. Mlntz, Gouveneur Morris and the American
Revolution (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), pp. 156-61.
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a sum equal to five years' pay.

Attention turned immediately to the

Main Army to see how the Continentals would react.

A generation that

matured listening to rhetoric about the dangers of a "standing army"
fully expected trouble.

59

Alexander Hamilton, now a delegate from New York, urged Washington,
with moderation, to use the Army's demands to push Congress towards
strengthening the national government.

Joseph Jones, a more cautious

nationalist delegate from Virginia, gave the Commander-in-Chief a clearer
picture of Congress' financial problems.

He also warned Washington that

The ambition of some, and the pressure of distress in others;
may produce dangerous combinations . . . .
If there are men in
the army who harbour wicked designs, and are determined to
blow the coals of discord, they will greatly endeavour to
hurt the reputation of those adverse to their projects.^
Washington's views came closer to Jones' than Hamilton's.

Although he

decided not to become openly involved in a political matter, he prepared
to neutralize a small group within the Army who might act.**1
Those malcontents centered around Horatio Gates, who had rejoined
the Main Army on 5 October 1782.

62

In March Major John Armstrong,

59. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 25: 430-1. Charles Thomson,
"The Papers of Charles Thomson, Secretary to the Continental Congress,"
New-York Historical Society Collections for 1878, pp. 70-80. Burnett,
Letters of Congress. 6 : 405-9, 514, 528, 553; 7: 13-15, 29-31, 72-74.
Ford, Journals of Congress. 22: 424-5; 24: 93-95, 145-51, 154-6, 178-9.
Syrett, Hamilton Papers. 3: 290-3.
60. Worthington C. Ford, ed., Letters of Joseph Jones of Virginia
(Washington: Department of State, 1889), pp. 97-103. Syrett, Hamilton
Papers, 3: 253-5.
61. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 7: 27-28. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 26: 185-8.
62. George Mesam to John Armstrong (copy), 14 Sep 1780; William Clajon,
another Gates protege, fed Gates poisonous comments on Washington ("George
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Gates' aide, prepared an anonymous address to the Army which Gates saw
and approved.

This document called upon the officers to plan a course

of action to pressure Congress.

Armstrong later explained that the pur

pose of the address was
to prepare their minds for some manly, vigorous Association
with the other public Creditors - but the timid wretch
_/ probably either John Brooks or_Walter Stewart_/ discovered
it to the only man ]_ Washington_/ from whom he had expressly
engaged to make it known - to be more explicit he betrayed
it to the Commander in Chief - who, agreeably the original
plan, was not to have been consulted till some later period.^3
The First Newburgh Address appeared publicly on 10 March, followed
two days later by a second.

Washington reacted swiftly by calling for

a general assembly of officers, warning Congress in the meantime that,
although the delay would allow time for hotheads to cool, Congress
would have to alleviate the underlying problems.

With fine dramatic

flair Washington dominated the officers' meeting on 15 March.

He fum

bled through the first paragraph of a prepared speech, then put on a
pair of glasses, murmuring that he had not only grown grey in the service
of his country, but he was also going blind.

The speech condemned the

addresses as a call to mutiny and suggested that the author was a
British agent.

The officers, some of whom broke down and cried, quietly

adopted a very moderate petition to Congress.

64

Delegates, regardless of their political views, overwhelmingly
approved of Washington's brilliant handling of the crisis.

On 22 March,

the same day that Washington's report arrived, the Connecticut delega
tion reversed itself and Congress approved commutation.

The officers

63. Armstrong to Gates, 22 and 29 Apr 1783; Gates Papers, New-York
Historical Society.
64. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26: 211-8, 222-7, 229-34, 323-5.
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accepted that offer, ending any threat of a coup as well as the ideologi
cal problem that the half-pay pensions had p o s e d . T h i s

settlement

and the news on 12 March of the preliminary peace treaty cleared the
way for Congress to dismantle the Army.

It ordered an end to hostili

ties on 11 April and gave approval to the text of the preliminary treaty
four days later.

Washington implemented the armistice at noon on 19

April -- eight years to the day after the first shots at Lexington.^
Washington and Lincoln promptly worked out the mechanics of dis
banding the Army, and Congress adopted a general resolution on the sub
ject on 23 April.

The policy represented a compromise between those

who hesitated to act until the British evacuated their last posts and
others who wished a swift disbandment to stop expenses.

Congress decided

that duration enlistments expired only with the ratification of a de
finitive treaty but allowed the Commander-in-Chief to furlough the troops
at his discretion.
tiations collapsed.

That device enabled the Army to reassemble if nego
Other instructions on 26 May specified that all

detachments march home under the control of officers and allowed the
men to keep their arms as a bonus . ^

65. Ibid.. 26: 221-2, 285-93. Ford, Journals of Congress, 24: 20710. Burnett, Letters of Congress. 7: 88-90, 93, 106-8, 110-1, 246-6,
378-88. Syrett, Hamilton Papers. 3: 317-21. Christopher Collier,
Connecticut in the Continental Congress (Chester, Conn.: Pequot
Press, 1973), pp. 63-67. The key vote in favor of commutation came
from Connecticut, and cost Eliphalet Dyer and Erastus Wolcott their
political careers.
66. Ford, Journals of Congress. 24: 238-52. Fitzpatrick, Writings
of Washington. 26: 263-4, 268-9, 334-6.
67. Ibid., 26: 330-3, 350-2, 442-3. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 7:
161-2. Ford, Journals of Congress. 24: 253-4, 269-71, 275-6, 358-61,
364-5, 390, 496; 25: 963, 966-7.

Washington announced the furlough policy on 2 June.

General Heath

supervised the arrangement of the remaining men into units.

Heath com

pleted his task on 15 June and six days later the Main Army moved into
garrison at West Point.

The force consisted of 4 infantry regiments

from Massachusetts, 1 from Connecticut, 5 companies from New Hampshire,
2 from Hazen's regiment, and 6 artillery companies:
tinental Artillery Regiment and 4 from the 3d.

2 from the 2d Con

A provisional light

corps under Lieutenant Colonel William Hull marched into Westchester
County to help restore civil government to that strife-torn region.
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The rest of the Army, including the troops from the Southern and Wes
tern Departments, went home on furlough.
On 17 August 1783 Washington turned command of
Knox and set out for C o n g r e ss.^

West Point over to

The previous year and a half had pre

sented difficult challenges which he had successfully met.

In

1782 he

sustained morale in the absence of action and honed the Main Army to
its peak of training and efficiency.

At Newburgh he crushed the first

hint of army action which went against the ideals of the Revolution.
During June he supervised the reduction of a wartime Continental Army
to a small force suited to peacetime missions.

Washington now turned

his attention to the composition of that "peace establishment."

6 8 . Ibid., 24: 403. Regimental Orders, 10 and H Jun 1783; 2d Contin
ental Artillery Orderly Books, New-York Historical Society. Regimental
Orders, 8 , 9, and 11 Jun 1783; 3d Continental Artillery Orderly Books,
New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26:
464-5, 471-5, 498; 27: 6-7, 10, 15, 19-20, 25-26, 34, 38-39.
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Peace*

The important transformation to a peacetime force still faced
Washington and Congress in the fall of 1783.

Objections to a Contin

ental Army enlisted for the duration of the war ended in late 1776 when
Congress realized that single-year regiments modeled on the Provincials
of the colonial period did not fit the realities of a long war.

Those

same ideological arguments resurfaced, however, during the debate over
the legality of any permanent army in peacetime.

The framework of dis

cussion established in 1783 and 1784 colored the development of the
United States Army for the remainder of the century.^
Planning actually began in April 1783 at the request of Alexander
Hamilton's Congressional committee appointed to investigate the subject.
The Commander-in-Chief discussed options with key officers before sub
mitting the Army's official views to Hamilton on 2 May.

Significantly,

the generals agreed on the basic needs of a peace establishment.
shington recommended four components;

Wa

a small regular army, a uniformly

trained and organized militia, a system of arsenals, and a military
academy.

He wanted four infantry regiments, each assigned to a specific

sector of the frontier, plus an artillery regiment.

The regimental

organizations he proposed followed Continental Army patterns in general
but provided for expanded strength in wartime.

Washington expected the

militia to serve as a reserve for the regulars and the military academy
to train artillery and engineering officers.

Steuben and Duportail

70. The best discussion of military policy from the establishment of the
peacetime force through the start of the Jefferson administration is
Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of
the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York; Free Press,
1975).
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submitted separate proposals which largely echoed Washington's for
Congress' consideration.

71

Congress tabled the report of Hamilton's committee on 12 May, but
realized that some troops had to remain on duty until the British evacu
ated New York City and several frontier posts.

The delegates told Wa

shington to release the men enlisted for the duration on furloughs and
retain those enlisted for fixed periods as temporary garrisons.

A de

tachment of the latter from West Point reoccupied New York City without
incident on 25 November.

Unfortunately, Steuben's July effort to ne

gotiate a transfer of the frontier forts with General Frederick Haldimand collapsed and the British retained control of them into the l790's.
The failure of that plan and the realization that most remaining enlist
ments expired before June 1784 led Washington to order Knox, his choice
as the commander of the peacetime army, to release all but 500 Infantry
and 100 artillerymen.

The former regrouped as Jackson's Continental

Regiment under Colonel Henry Jackson of Massachusetts.

The single

artillery company, John Doughty's New Yorkers, came from the remnants
of the 2d Continental Artillery Regiment.^

71. Syrett, Hamilton Papers, 3: 317-22. Burnett, Letters of Congress.
7: 150. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26; 315-6, 355, 374-98,
479, 483-96.
"Armand Papers," p. 359. Elizabeth S. Kite, BrigadierGeneral Louis Lebegue Duportail. Commondant of Engineers in the Contin
ental Army (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press for_the Institut Francais
de Washington, 1933), pp. 263-70. Memorandum /_dated 1783_/, Steuben
Papers, New-York Historical Society. Other officers submitting opinions
to Washington included Hand, Pickering, Knox, Gouvion, Rufus Putnam,
Heath, Ebenezer Huntington, Armand, and Governor George Clinton.
72. Ford, Journals of Congress, 24; 337. Magazine of American History,
9 (1883), pp. 254-5. Sebastian Bauman to George Clinton, 22 Aug 1783;
Bauman Papers, New-York Historical Society. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington. 26: 368-9, 399-400, 480; 27: 16-18, 61-63, 120-1, 221,
255-9, 278-9.
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Congress' proclamation on 18 October 1783 which thanked the troops
for faithful service also approved Washington's reductions.

The Com

mander- in- Chief released his own Farewell Order to the Philadelphia
newspapers for nationwide distribution to the furloughed men.

In the

message he expressed his gratitude to the officers and men for their
assistance and reminded them that
The singular interpositions of Providence in our feeble
condition were such, as could scarcely escape the atten
tion of the most unobserving; while ^he unparalleled
perseverence of the Armies of the U/ nited_/ States,
through almost every possible suffering and discourage
ment for the space of eight long years, was little
short of a standing m i r a c l e . ^3
Washington believed that blending persons from every colony into "one
patriotic band of Brothers" represented a major accomplishment, and he
called on the veterans to continue this devotion in civilian life.

74

Washington said a personal farewell to the Main Army's remaining
officers on 4 December at Fraunces' Tavern in New York City.

On 23

December he appeared in Congress, then sitting at Annapolis, and re
turned his commission as Commander-in-Chief
Having now finished the work assigned me, 1 retire from the
great theatre of Action; and bidding an Affectionate fare
well to this August body under whose orders 1 have so long
acted, I here offer my Commission, and take my leave of all
the employments of public l i f e . ^
Congress ended the War of American Independence on 14 January 1784 by

73. Ibid.. 27; 223.
74. Ibid.. 27: 167-9, 197-8, 205-8, 213, 222-30. Ford. Journals of
Congress, 25: 702-5.
75. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 27: 285.
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ratifying the definitive peace treaty that had been signed in Paris on
3 September 1783.

76

Congress rejected Washington's large peacetime force in June and
October 1783.
plan.

Nationalists could not secure enough support for that

Moderate delegates offered an alternative in April 1784 which

scaled the army down to 900 men in one artillery and three infantry
battalions.

Congress rejected the idea in part because New York ob

jected to retaining a predominantly Massachusetts force which might
side with its home state in a territorial dispute.

Another plan calling

for retaining 350 of the existing men and recruiting 700 new soldiers
also failed to win support.

On 2 June 1784 Congress ordered the dis

charge of all remaining men except for 25 caretakers at Fort Pitt and
55 at West Point.

The next day it created the peace establishment.^

The plan required four states to raise 700 men for a single year's
service.

Congress instructed the Secretary at War to form them into

eight infantry and two artillery companies.

Pennsylvania's quota of

260 men allowed it to nominate the lieutenant colonel, the senior of
ficer.

New York and Connecticut each had to raise 165 men and nominate

a major; the remaining 110 men came from New Jersey.

Economy dominated

this proposal for each major served as a company commander and line

76. Ibid.. 27: 16-18, 277-80, 284-5. Ford. Journals of Congress, 25:
836-9; 26: 23-31. Washington hoped that Rufus Putnam and other officers
would colonize the frontier with veterans. He expected them to act as a
buffer between the Indians and other frontiersmen.
77. Ibid., 24: 337, 492-4, 50ln; 25: 548-9, 722-45; 26: 54-55, 201-7;
27: 432-7, 486-8, 499-502, 512-24, 530-1. Burnett, Letters of Congress,
7: 166-9, 189-91, 540-3, 546-7, 550-3, 572-3, 587-8, 604-5.
Syrett,
Hamilton Papers. 3: 211, 378-97.
"Thomson papers," pp. 177-9. Fitz
patrick, Writings of Washington. 24: 140-4, 202-4.
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officers performed all staff duties except chaplain, surgeon, and sur
geon's mate.

Under Joslah Harmar the First American Regiment slowly

organized and achieved permanent status as an Infantry regiment of the
Regular Army.
This small peacetime Regular Army gradually expanded over the next
decade, led by Continental veterans.

It inherited the rules, regula

tions, and traditions of the Continental Army.

Steuben's Blue Book

remained the official manual for the regulars, as well as the militia
of most states, until Winfield Scott adapted the 1791 French Army Regu
lations for American use.

At Fallen Timbers in 1794 Anthony Wayne

applied the techniques of wilderness operations perfected by Sullivan's
1779 expedition against the Iroquois.

The integration of ex-Continen

tals into the militia, coupled with the passage of a national militia
bill in 1792, improved the military responsiveness of that institution
78
until the veterans began to age.
America's victory in the War of American Independence surprised
many European observers.
tier mystique:

Frenchmen tended to attribute it to a fron

"it may be asserted that North-America is entirely

military, and inured to war, and that new levies may continually be made

78. Lyle 0. Brundage, "The Organization, Administration, and Training
of the United States Ordinary and Volunteer Militia, 1792-1861" (Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1958), pp. 340-93. Jeffrey Kim
ball, "The Battle of Chippewa: Infantry Tactics in the War of 1812,"
Military Affairs. 31 (1967), pp. 169-86. Harrison M. Ethridge, "Gover
nor Patrick Henry and the Reorganization of the Virginia Militia, 17841786," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 85 (1977), pp. 42738.
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without making new soldiers."

79

Loyalists and some British observers

suggested instead that the British did more to lose the war than the
Americans did to win it.

80

Many modern historians feel that the British

faced insurmountable logistical obstacles and suffered from bad leader
ship, particularly on the political level.

Others see the militia,

either as guerrillas or as the enforcement arm of Revolutionary govern
ment, as the most important military institution.

It limited British

authority to those areas physically occupied by troops.

As the war

became a global struggle, Great Britain's manpower reserves could not
sustain the strain.

81

The militia did play a very important role in the War of American
Independence.

Particularly in the first several years of the war its

political functions probably were indispensable.

As a military insti

tution the militia, supported by state troops, continued the traditional
colonial responsibility for local defense and remained a general reserve
of men in arms.

It could not operate effectively as a main battle force

at any distance from home or for an extended period of time.

Congress

recognized that fact from the beginning of the war and turned to full-time

79. Marquis de Chastellux, Travels in North-America, in the years 1780,
1781, and 1782 ... (2 vols., London: G. G. J. Robinson, 1787), 1; 19.
Also see Orville Theodore Murphy, Jr., "French Contemporary Opinion of
the American Revolutionary Army" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Minnesota, 1957).
__
_
80. For example: C _/ harles_/ Stedman, The History of the Origin, Pro
gress and Termination of the American War (2 vols., Dublin: Privately
printed, 1794), 2: 499.
81. Summaries of recent scholarship are Stanley J. Underdahl, ed.c
Military History of the American Revolution: The Proceedings of the 6th
Military History Symposium United States Air Force Academy 10-11 October
1974 (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1976) and Don Higgin
botham, ed., Reconsiderations on the Revolutionary War: Selected Essays
(Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978).
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regular troops, the Continentals.

As long as a field array of Contin

entals remained in the vicinity, a British commander had to concentrate
on it, not on the militia.
Britain's defeat cannot be explained solely by the problems of a
3,000-mile line of communications.

The mother country sustained a war

effort for eight years, five of them after North America became a secon
dary theater in a global conflict.

Logistics and the Atlantic acted as

a handicap, particularly by increasing the interval between the time a
casualty occurred and the arrival of a replacement, yet the British
consistently placed more regulars and military supplies in their com
manders' hands than Congress did.

British seapower, unchallenged by

America, could have been extremely valuable along the coast.

Washington's

forces offset it in the field with better organization of land transport.
American commanders used their mobility to outmaneuver their opponents.
When forced to flee, as in the Tetreat through New Jersey or Greene's
race to the Dan, they could always escape to secure areas and reorganize.
That ability to outdistance pursuit also robbed British battlefield vic
tories of decisive impact.
Continental infantry regiments generally had superior organization
after 1775.

The official structure approved by Congress, usually re

flecting Washington's desires, made American units more efficient on
paper than British or German.

Greater line combat strength, higher

ratios of officers and noncommissioned officers, and a developed regi
mental staff produced a powerful and responsive regiment.
units of both combatants operated below ideal strength.

In practice
Continental

regiments, however, normally sustained company officer and noncommissioned
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officer levels better than their opponents', preserving the leadership
essential for a prompt response to changing tactical situations.

The

British never matched the permanent brigade instituted by the Continen
tals in 1777.

These factors allowed the Americans greater control

even in semi-dispersed formations and suited the Continental Army's
belief in infantry marksmanship.
this advantage.

The two-rank battle formation enhanced

Honed by a doctrine of aimed fire and the use of train

ing which included target practice, the Continentals often inflicted
heavier casualties on the British in a battle and dominated skirmishes.
Knox's artillerymen used better organization and doctrine.

82

They

employed the newer concept of concentrating fire on infantry targets;
the British used counterbattery fire.

Particularly at Monmouth tactical

use of regimental headquarters as an intervening echelon of command en
abled Knox to mass guns for a specific transitory mission.

More impor

tant, assigning a company of artillery to each permanent brigade devel
oped close teamwork between the arms.

Rotating companies between gar

rison, general support, and direct support assignments maintained train
ing and insured that every company could perform any mission in an emer
gency.

Once Americans overcame early procurement problems Knox could

tailor the armament of each company to its specific task.

82. Bernard A. Uhlendorf, ed., Revolution in America; Confidential
Letters 1776-1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian
Forces (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1957), pp. 348-56.
Charlotte S. J. Epplng, ed., Journal of Du Rol the Elder Lieutenant and
Adjutant in the Service of the Duke of Brunswick, 1776-1778 (New York:
D. Appleton and Co., 1911), pp. 107-8. John Graves Slmcoe, Simcoe's
Military Journal ... (New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1844), pp. 21-22,
98-99. William Moultrie, Memoirs of the American Revolution ... (2
vols., New York: David Longworth, 1802), 2: 270.
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The mounted arm of the Continental Army never had the opportunity
to develop into a battlefield force, although William Washington's
troopers gave a fine account of themselves in the later phases of sou
thern operations.

The dragoons did perform well in the original mis

sion of reconnaissance.

Theoretical development and practical necessity

combined to produce the 1781 legion, an excellent configuration for
r.arrying out this role in the prevailing conditions.

The partisan

corps, a European concept, developed into an excellent long-range inde
pendent force that could stiffen local irregulars.
A well-rounded group of support troops backed the combat units.
Unlike the British Army, Washington had specialized units to perform
ordnance, maintenance, quartermaster, and military police functions.
Highly trained engineers, both officers and units, functioned well in
offensive or defensive assignments after 1777.

All units, presided

over by a competent general staff, functioned by 1782 as a team equal
or superior in quality to any European army of the day.
The officers of the Continental Army in the beginning owed their
selection to political rather than military credentials.

Yet in crises

over the years, including the Newburgh incident, they justified their
reputation for reliability.

Experience nurtured latent talents and

produced an effective team of commanders, although few individual mem
bers could be called "great captains."

Once his trusted subordinates

(Greene, Heath, Sullivan, Stirling, Lincoln, and McDougall particularly)
became commanders of territorial departments, Washington assumed a more
active role in general policy.

His practice of consulting with his

subordinates, usually In a Council of War, has frequently been wrongly
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Interpreted to mean that a committee ruled the Army.

This conclusion

misjudges his desire to allow each officer to state his opinions and
feel that he was participating in the war effort.
was the Commander-in-Chief in every respect.
burden, and to him is due the credit.

Washington, however,

He alone carried the

Even his opponents understood

QO

that basic fact.
Although tradition in the United States depicts the Continental
Army as a hardy group of yeomen farmers and middle-class tradesmen under
amateur officers defeating one of the best European armies in the world,
an army of lower class troops commanded by aristocrats, after 1776 the
Continental Army did not fit that image.

The long-term Continentals

also tended to come from the poorer, rootless elements of American socie
ty to whom the Army, despite its problems, seemed to offer greater oppor
tunity than civilian life.

Enlisted men were young (over half were under

twenty-two when they enlisted), mostly common laborers, and so poor as
to be virtually tax-exempt.

A sizeable minority were either hired sub

stitutes or not native to the place where they enlisted.^

83. George Athan Billias, ed., George Washington's Generals (New York:
Morrow, 1964), p. xvi. George Washington, "Washington's Opinion of His
General Officers," Magazine of American History, 3 (1879), pp. 81-88.
Stedman, American W ar, 2: 448.
84. The best studies of the social composition of the Army are: Mark
Edward Lender, "The Enlisted Line: The Continental Soldiers of New Jer
sey" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University, 1975); Edward C. Papenfuse
and Gregory A. Stiverson, "General Smallwood's Recruits: The Peacetime
Career of the Revolutionary Private," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser.,
30 (1973), pp. 117-32; John Shy, A People Numerous and Armed: Reflections
on the Military Struggle for American Independence (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1976), pp. 171-3; John B. B. Trussell, Jr., The Penn
sylvania Line: Regimental Organization and Operations, 1775-1783 (Har
risburg: Pennsylvania Historical & Museum Commission, 1977), pp. 243-56;
and John P. Sellers, "The Common Soldier in the American Revolution,"
in Underdal, Military History of the American Revolution, pp. 152-8.

298
The officer corps, on the other hand, came from the upper social
strata.

In the deferential society of eighteenth-century America mem

bers of the leading families naturally assumed leadership in the regu
lar forces just as they did in the militia, politics, law, the church,
and business.

Although it was possible for an enlisted man to become

an officer, particularly during the reorganizations of 1776 and 1777,
Washington18 desire to maintain the distance between officers and men
as a disciplinary tool kept them from rising far.

In small colonies a

basic family unit, reinforced by cousins, in-laws, political allies,
and business associates dominated entire regiments.

85

In a force of this nature discipline posed a problem.

Desertion

rates ran high, although few men actively joined the British.
morale factors explained this phenomenon during the Revolution.

Basic
Washing

ton coped by developing, in conjunction with his Judge Advocates, a
system that adapted British military justice to the conditions of Ameri
can society in the l770's.

His approach was mild by contemporary Euro

pean standards, but extremely sophisticated.
duals for particularly serious crimes.

He executed a few indivi

The rest of the time Washington

preferred to issue last-second reprieves that extracted a maximum psy
chological advantage from a situation that resembled a morality play.
Washington led the Continental Army to victory in the longest war
in American history before Vietnam.

Together he and his men overcame

physical and spiritual obstacles which at times appeared insurmountable.

85. Lender, "Enlisted Line," pp. 127-33. Sidney Kaplan, "Rank and
Status Among Massachusetts Continental Officers," American Historical
Review, 56 (1951), pp. 318-26.

Washington's ability to hold the Army together stands as a tribute to
his Inspirational leadership and great judgement.

That he also moulded

it into a crack professional fighting force and then disbanded it with
out incident when economic considerations forced him to do so won him
great praise from his contemporaries, for it conformed to the highest
standards expected by men schooled in the Whlgglsh tradition.
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APPENDIX
PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY

Office

Name

Dates

Commander-in-Chief

George Washington

Duration of War

Commander, Eastern
Department

Artemas Ward
William Heath
Horatio Gates

4 Apr 1776-20 Mar 1777
20 Mar 1777-7 Nov 1778
7 Nov 17 78-Nov 1779

Commander, Northern
(New York) De
partment

Philip Schuyler
Horatio Gates
John Stark
Edward Hand
James Clinton
John Stark
William Alexander*
John Stark
William Alexander11

25
19
17
19
20
25
15
21
29

Commander, Highlands
Department

William Heath
Alexander McDougall
Israel Putnam
Alexander McDougall
Horatio Gates
Alexander McDougall
William Heath
Robert Howe**
Alexander McDougall
Benedict Arnold
George Washington
Alexander McDougall
Nathanael Greene
William Heath
John Paterson**
Alexander McDougall
William Heath
Henry Knox

12 Nov 1776-21 Dec 1776
21 Dec 1776-12 May 1777
12 May 1777-16 Mar 1778
16 Mar 1778-20 May 1778
20 May 1778-24 Nov 1778
24 Nov 1778-27 Nov 1779
27 Nov 1779-21 Feb 1780
21 Feb 1780-21 Jun 1780
21 Jun 1780-3 Aug 1780
3 Aug 1780-25 Sep 1780
25 - 28 Sep 1780
28 Sep 1780-5 Oct 1780
5 - 17 Oct 1780
17 Oct 1780-11 May 1781
11 May 1781-24 Jun 1781
24 Jun 1781- 18 Jan 1782
18 Jan 1782-24 Aug 1782
24 Aug 1782-end of war

Commander, Southern
Department

Charles Lee
Robert Howe
Benjamin Lincoln
Horatio Gates
Nathanael Greene

1 Mar 1776-9 Sep 1776
9 Sep 1776-25 Sep 1778
25 Sep 1778-13 Jun 1780
13 Jun 1780-31 Oct 1780
31 Oct 1780-end of war

a.
b.

Lord Stirling.
Acting.

Jun
Aug
Apr
Oct
Nov
Jun
Oct
Nov
Aug

1775-19
1777-17
1778-19
1778-20
1778-25
1781-15
1781-21
1781-29
1782-15

Aug
Apr
Oct
Nov
Jun
Oct
Nov
Aug
Jan

1777
1778
1778
1778
1781
1781
1781
1782
1783
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Office

Name

Dates

Commander, Western
Department

Edward Hand
Lachlan McIntosh
Daniel Brodhead
William Irvine

10 Apr
26 May
5 Mar 1
24 Sep

777-26 May 1778
778-20 Feb 1779
79-24 Sep 1781
781-end of war

Commander, Canadian
Department

Richard Montgomery*
David Wooster*
Charles Lee**
John Thomas
John Sullivan
Horatio Gate8°

9 Dec 1
31 Dec
17 Feb
6 Mar 1
1 Jun 1
17 Jun

75-31 Dec 1775
775-6 Mar 1776
776-1 Mar 1776
76-1 jun 1776
76-2 Jul 1776
776

Adjutant General

Horatio Gates
Joseph Reed
VACANT
Timothy Pickering
Alexander Scammell
Edward Hand

17 Jun
5 Jun 1
14 Jan
18 Jun
5 Jan 1
8 Jan 1

775-5 Jun 1776
76-13 Jan 1777
777-17 Jun 1777
777-5 Jan 1778
78-8 Jan 1781
81-end of war

Paymaster General

James Warren
William Palfrey
John Pierce

27 Jul
27 Apr
17 Jan

775-19 Apr 1776
776-14 Dec 1780
781-end of war

Mustermaster General

Stephen Moylan
Gunning Bedford
Joseph Ward

11 Aug
18 Jun
10 Apr

775-7 Jun 1776
776-10 Apr 1777
777-1 Mar 1780

Judge Advocate

William Tudor
John Laurance
VACANT
Thomas Edwards

30 Jul
10 Apr
4 Jun 1
2 Oct 1

775-10 Apr 1777
777-3 Jun 1782
82-1 Oct 1782
82-end of war

Inspector General

Thomas Conway*5
Frederick Steuben

13 Dec
28 Mar

777-28 Apr 1778
778-end of war

Quartermaster
General

Thomas Mifflin
Stephen Moylan
Thomas Mifflin
VACANT
Nathanael Greene
Timothy Pickering

14 Aug
7 Jun 1
28 Sep
8 Nov 1
2 Mar 1
5 Aug 1

775-7 Jun 1776
76-28 Sep 1776
776-7 Nov 1777
77-1 Mar 1778
78-5 Aug 1780
80-end of war

Commissary General
of Purchases

Joseph Trumbull
Joseph Trumbull
William Buchanan
Jeremiah Wadsworth
Ephraim Blaine
Charles Stewart

19 Jul
18 Jun
5 Aug 1
9 Apr 1
2 Dec 1
18 Jun

775-18 Jun 1777
777-5 Aug 1777
77-9 Apr 1778
78-2 Dec 1779
79-Nov 1781
777-Nov 1781

of Issues
a.
b.
c.

Acting.
Appointed but never served in that capacity.
Appointed but troops withdrawn from department before assumed command.
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GLOSSARY

AGENT. In the British Army a civilian appointed by the colonel of a
regiment to handle all the financial accounts of the unit.
ADJUTANT. The regimental staff officer responsible for the unit's ad
ministrative paperwork and for the supervision of daily details.
AIDE-MAJOR.

Archaic term for ADJUTANT.

BATMEN. Hired servants who cared for the baggage and personal effects
of an officer. Also used to describe privates detailed to perform
these functions.
BATTALION. The basic tactical unit of eighteenth century warfare composed
of a group of COMPANIES or PLATOONS and usually commanded in combat
by a LIEUTENANT COLONEL. In both the British and Continental Armies
most REGIMENTS had only a single battalion, and the terms were vir
tually synonymous.
BOMBARDIER. An artillery specialist. Rank given to privates who prepared
ammunition and fired mortars. The bombardier merited supplemental
pay for his more hazardous duty.
BRIGADIER. In the British Army a rank held only in wartime. Given to
the officer commanding a brigade, it fell between the ranks of
LIEUTENANT COLONEL and COLONEL and was not a general officer.
CAMP-COLOUR-MEN. A duty detail consisting of approximately one man per
company to assist the regimental QUARTERMASTER in preparing a new
camp site. The camp colors were small pennants used to mark the
outlines of the regimental area.
CAPTAIN.

The commanding officer of a company or troop.

CAPTAIN-LIEUTENANT. In infantry or cavalry units where field officers
also served as captains of specific companies, the lieutenant who
exercised actual command of the colonel's company. He ranked as
the senior LIEUTENANT in the regiment. In artillery companies the
second ranking officer.
COLONEL. The commanding officer of a regiment. In the British Army this
was a titular rank and the colonel was concerned only with financial
matters, in the Continental Army the colonel actually commanded and
had responsibility for tactical leadership as well as administration.
COMMISSARY.

A civil official performing various logistical duties.
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COMMISSIONED OFFICER. An officer who exercised authority by virtue of
a commission issued by the King or Continental Congress. Commis
sions ranged from ensign to general.
In the British Array they
were a form of property and could be bought or sold under govern
mental supervision.
COMPANY. The smallest administrative unit of infantry or artillery. In
both the British and Continental Armies companies could be either
separate entities or components of a REGIMENT.
In both armies it
was virtually synonymous with the tactical PLATOON.
COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER. The officers serving in company-sized units:
CAPTAIN, CAPTAIN-LIEUTENANT, LIEUTENANT, ENSIGN, and CORNET.
CONDUCTOR.
A member of the civil staff responsible for the supervision
of depots, magazines, or groups of wagons.
CONTINENTAL ARMY. Those units of regular soldiers enlisted for full-time
service, generally for extended periods of time, and for whom the
ultimate authority for their organization, maintenance, administra
tion, and discipline remained the Continental Congress.
CORNET. The most junior officer in a troop of cavalry.
an ENSIGN in an infantry company.

Equivalent to

CORPORAL. A noncommissioned officer who normally was responsible for
supervising a squad. In combat corporals served in the line of
battle with the privates.
ENSIGN. The lowest-ranking commissioned officer in an infantry company.
In the Continental Army a regiment's ensigns carried the regimental
colors on a rotating basis and were particularly responsible for
the dress and cleanliness of the company.
FIELD OFFICER. Officers concerned with the operations of a regiment as
a whole. COLONELS, LIEUTENANT COLONELS, and MAJORS were field
officers.
FIREWORKER. The rank of the youngest lieutenants in the artillery.
They were particularly responsible for preparing ammunition.
GENERAL. The category of officer responsible for the command of large
units. In the British Army there were three ranks of general of
ficer: major general, lieutenant general, and general (a still
higher rank, field marshal, was not employed in North America).
The Continental Army had two ranks: brigadier general (normally
commanding a brigade) and major general (division). Washington's
rank as "General and Commander-in-Chief" was unique.
GUNNER. An artillery private with special status derived from respon
sibility for aiming and loading an artillery piece. He received
higher pay than a MATROSS.
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LANCE CORPORAL. An acting CORPORAL. In eighteenth century European
armies the rank given to future officers receiving on the job
training. Both the British and Continental Armies preferred to
call such individuals "cadets" or "volunteers" and not give them
pay or official standing in the army until they were commissioned.
LIEUTENANT. The middle rank of COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER. When organiza
tions contained more than one lieutenant per company, the distinc
tion was drawn between first, second, and third lieutenants.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL. The second in command of a regiment. In the
British Army this individual actually commanded the regiment in
the field. In the Continental Army when a lieutenant colonel
was the senior officer of the regiment he was usually called a
lieutenant colonel commandant.
LINE.

The component of the Continental Army under the auspices of a
specific state. Also used to refer to the aggregate of the light
dragoon regiments or of the artillery regiments. The term applied
only to combat units, and was used for administrative purposes,
particularly to determine seniority for promotions. In battlefield
dispositions the segment of the army deployed in linear formation.

MAJOR. The lowest ranking FIELD OFFICER in a regiment, particularly
responsible for administration. Infantry majors were the only
regimental officers who went into battle mounted, and had the
responsibility to rally the regiment if its line became broken.
MATROSS. The term applied to artillery privates.
the semi-skilled tasks in firing a cannon.

Matrosses performed

MILITIA. The basic military force of each state or colony, nominally
composed of the total male population capable of bearing arms and
organized into geographical units. State governments always
exercised final authority over the militia even when it served
under operational control of the Continental Army. Because it was
essentially a local defense organization, provisional units performed
most of the extended service required of the militia.
MINER. A special engineer soldier who constructed tunnels during siege
operations.
M1NUTEMAN. A member of the MILITIA responsible for immediate response
to an emergency. Minutemen received extra training and partial
monetary compensation. This organization was used only in 1775-1776.
NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER.
SERGEANTS, CORPORALS, and drum and fife majors
appointed by the regimental commander to exercise immediate supervi
sion over privates, drummers, and fifers. Only the regimental com
mander or a court martial could remove them from their rank.
PAYMASTER. The officer formally charged with the care of a regiment's
funds and the payment of the troops.
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PIONEER. Troops responsible for the repair of roads, and occasionally
with the preparation of fortifications.
PLATOON. The tactical unit of the smallest size in the eighteenth cen
tury. Normally a BATTALION would deploy in eight platoons. In
European armies platoons were frequently temporary formations exis
ting only for a specific battle; in the British and Continental
Armies COMPANIES and platoons were virtually synonymous.
QUARTERMASTER. An officer responsible for logistical functions relating
to housing, feeding, equipping, and moving troops.
RANK AND FILE. The privates and corporals of a unit. A classification
used to reflect the actual combat strength of a unit deployed for
linear combat. Also referred to as the "bayonet strength" of the
unit.
REGIMENT. The basic administrative unit of eighteenth century armies.
In both the British and Continental Armies regiments normally had
only a single BATTALION, so the terms were used synonymously.
SAPPER.
Special engineering troops used to dig entrenchments ("saps")
during sieges.
SERGEANT. The noncommissioned officer aTmed with a halberd and used to
supervise discipline and act as a file closer in battle.
STATE TROOPS. Regular forces, frequently for full-time service, raised
on the authority of a state or colony government. Unlike Contin
entals, the state governments remained the ultimate authority for
state troops. They sometimes operated with the Continental Army
for extended periods.
SUBALTERN. Company-grade officer below the rank of captain:
ENSIGN, or CORNET.

LIEUTENANT,

WARRANT OFFICER. An officer exercising authority through a warrant
rather than a commission, and usually assigned to staff duty.
Warrants were issued by lesser authorities than a commission.
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I

found that certain materials were especially valuable in my approach to
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They also Include Important bodies of material on the Board
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30/55 in the Public Record Office.
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